

REPORT

TRAJECTORY AND TRANSIENCE

UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING
THE PRESSURES OF MIGRATION
ON COMMUNITIES

Phoebe Griffith
and Julia Halej

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Institute for Public Policy Research

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SUMMARY

Every region of the UK will become more ethnically diverse and see more migration in the coming decades. Record migration and higher birth rates among ethnic minority groups mean that this trend towards greater diversity will happen more rapidly than ever before.

History tells us that this transition can challenge the resilience of communities. It can test local institutions and services, and cause anxiety among settled residents. This is understandable. It takes time for migrants to find their feet, for settled residents to adapt to changes around them, and for services and institutions to become more inclusive and to adapt their practices.

This process of adaptation has happened successfully in many communities across the UK. The evidence that British attitudes towards diversity have become more positive and that indicators of social cohesion have remained stable overall are testament to this. The research conducted for this report in areas that have a higher rate of migration shows that diversity and migration are effectively 'normalised' in time. In more highly diverse areas, they are part of an everyday, accepted reality. In these areas most residents, migrant and settled, come to recognise diversity as a distinctive and valued asset in their communities.

However, migration and diversity by themselves do not represent the whole of the challenge. Recent trends driving greater transience in migration are placing new strains on communities. Transience is caused by a combination of factors: technology which makes it easier (and cheaper) for migrants to stay connected with 'home', trends in the labour market which make jobs less secure, and freedom of movement within the EU.

Policy decisions that explicitly set out to ensure that 'coming to the UK does not mean settling in the UK' are counterproductive and shortsighted because they inhibit integration. They prevent migrants from forming relationships, make it harder for migrants to thrive in our labour market and make an active contribution to our economy, and create a considerable cost for public services. Migrant children are particularly affected, as delaying their entrance to the UK education system stymies their chances of thriving academically.

We propose a series of measures aimed at central government, local authorities and other important non-state bodies (particularly universities) to alleviate local pressures caused by migration and ethnic diversity and to reduce transience, including a four-step action plan for local authorities to ensure that they reap the benefits of a more diverse future. We argue for greater focus on areas that have recently undergone rapid demographic change, particularly those that are characterised by a history of low-level migration and high levels of transience or 'churn'. Our findings, backed by electoral results, show that these areas are particularly vulnerable to heightened anti-immigration sentiments and social tensions, and low levels of integration.

Objective 1: ensure that immigration rules do not drive up transience and inhibit integration

The government should design its migration rules to encourage greater settlement and discourage transience, in order to promote the integration of migrants, alleviate the pressures on social cohesion that derive from population churn, and ease pressures on public services.

The government should review the current rules around post-study work and extend the routes available to graduates to make the transition into work after completing their education in the UK. Universities should also play an active role by helping to support international students with applications and processes related to post-study visas and by encouraging them to stay in the local area after completing their studies, for example, by setting up programmes that match international students with sectors of the local economy affected by skills shortages. At the same time, universities should ensure that investments to local campuses and facilities which are made chiefly to attract international students also benefit the wider community, by providing access to sports and cultural facilities, including local residents in cultural activities, and encouraging international students to engage with the local area.

The government should set out to gauge how current family migration policies and citizenship policies are affecting long-term integration outcomes. Recent falls in the number of migrants seeking naturalisation and being reunited with their families may be ‘good news’ in terms of helping to meet net migration targets, but they are likely to have a negative impact on long-term integration, particularly for children. In particular, the government should actively review income requirements for family reunion to ensure that they are proportionate.

The UK has one of the strictest citizenship regimes in the developed world. The tightening of the citizenship process has had a marked impact on naturalisation rates, which dropped by 40 per cent in 2014 from a year earlier. To promote naturalisation, EU and non-EU migrants should be auto-enrolled on a citizenship route (on an opt-out basis) after five years as a resident in the UK. Local authorities should support this locally by holding and widely advertising open, public citizenship ceremonies as community events.

Objective 2: create the conditions for better local policy

The government should prioritise areas that are making the transition towards greater ethnic diversity to foster greater community resilience. This includes a far more responsive system for managing data collection and funding mechanisms that allow areas to respond effectively to the pressures produced by demographic change.

A nationally coordinated, locally delivered registration scheme for all residents, along the lines of the German model, would be an invaluable resource for local authorities that would enable local areas to track trends and pre-empt challenges, as well as prepare local services to cater to migrants’ needs. Local authorities should also put in place systems to pool all registrations to public services, including the NHS, DWP and HMRC, national insurance, the national pupil database, the electoral register and DVLA, among others. Given that these systems are now electronic, this should be cost-effective and achievable.

The government’s Controlling Migration Fund – promised by the Conservative party in their manifesto as a way of addressing pressures on public services and paying for enforcement in local communities – should be launched and should be targeted in particular at ‘transition’ areas which have limited histories of migration but have seen high migration influxes in recent years. Local authorities should use the additional resources from the Controlling Migration Fund to address pressures on frontline public services (particularly in areas struggling to cope with rapid population transitions). If necessary, the funds should be used to enforce housing and labour market rules around identifying irregular migrants, in part in order to address problems of overcrowding and wage undercutting.

Local authorities should be given discretion over how to allocate any additional resources, including the immigration skills charge, which was introduced in the Immigration Bill 2015, and the Controlling Migration Fund. However, greater say

over the allocation of these resources should be conditional on the formulation of detailed action plans (as proposed below). More local authorities should make use of currently available EU funds, including from the European Social Fund and the European Integration Fund to fund these plans.

Objective 3: set up action plans for local authorities

Local authorities¹ should formulate strategies setting out how they will respond to demographic change, higher migration and greater diversity. These plans should form the basis for allocation of central government resources (including those set out above) and for public consultations with local residents. The plans should include:

1. Detailed forecasting of migration flows and populations trends (using census and pooled data from other services).
2. ‘Pressure pre-emption’ – scenarios for key impacts and pressures, particularly on public services and social cohesion.
3. Plans for local services, including detailed evaluation of the capacity of services to meet greater (and potentially more complex) demands and recommendations for how wider public service reform strategies will tackle the challenges generated by migration.
4. Measures to engage with the local population, for example, through initiatives such as citizens’ juries to involve local people and key actors, including community groups and faith groups, as well as the general public. These consultations should aim to reassure the public that there are local plans in place to meet pressures, and to involve the public in a wide-ranging dialogue about the implications for the local community and key services.

¹ We focus our recommendations on local authorities, rather than regional bodies or more local levels of government (such as parishes) because local authorities are largely responsible for delivering policies aimed at addressing the impacts of migration and are the bodies that will be charged with administering funds awarded via the Controlling Migration Fund.

1. INTRODUCTION

The UK's population is changing faster than ever before. By 2031, more than 45 local authorities across England and Wales will no longer be majority white British. While some areas have long histories of migration, others have begun this transition only very recently, and often very rapidly, as a consequence of recent migration from outside the UK.

Despite the growing interest in devolution among policymakers, this localised understanding of demographic change is currently overlooked in wider debates about identity, integration and migration. The focus of these debates remains largely on outcomes for different ethnic groups, not on the ways in which whole communities are evolving and reacting as they shift demographically.

The debate about the impact of ethnic diversity and migration on our social landscape is polarised and contested. Political discourse increasingly presents ethnic diversity as a source of social tensions and fragmentation, and argues for policies that seek to limit international migration and to enforce top-down approaches to integration.

This report aims to inject greater balance into this debate. We seek to do this by focussing on the lived experiences of ethnic diversity at the local community level, not on the cultural traits or outcomes of different ethnic groups. Rather than draw solely on aggregate data about people's perceptions, we have used a qualitative approach that we believe allows for a deeper analysis of how people 'make sense' of complex issues and provides insights into the nuances in experiences, perceptions and identifications of ethnic diversity – nuances which are inevitably flattened out in public perception data.²

Chapter 2 sets out how the UK is on course to become one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the developed world. It also evaluates existing evidence regarding the likely social impacts of this transition, and in particular claims that it is likely to make social cohesion unsustainable.

Chapter 3 sets out the challenges facing areas that have recently undergone dramatic demographic shifts and identifies new factors that are shaping this transition in different communities. It draws on qualitative interviews with residents and stakeholders in four contrasting locations in England³ – two areas with a more recent migration trajectory (Boston and York) and two with a more established trajectory (Slough and Sandwell).

2 We acknowledge the limitations to qualitative approaches. Critics have questioned the accuracy and truthfulness of what interviewees say, and thus the validity of this method (Roulston 2010: 2). They have also identified a complex interplay between narratives and their interpretation and presentation by the researcher and the audience. However, the aim of this research was not to provide 'neutral' or 'objective' representations of what our respondents think, but instead to analyse their narratives with an awareness that they were expressed in situational, flexible and often contradictory ways. Each subjective account is therefore considered to be 'meaningful', as it provides insights into the social reality of a respondent that he or she created on the basis of his or her experiences, interactions, interpretations, and knowledge (Mason 2002).

3 We conducted qualitative interviews with local stakeholders (including council staff, community organisations and local councillors) in Boston, Sandwell, Slough and York. We also conducted focus groups with local residents in these locations, except in Boston, where residents did not want to participate – our local contacts suggest this was due to a 'saturation' of research on ethnic diversity already conducted in the area.

Chapter 4 outlines a strategy for responding to these shifts more effectively, within the context of ongoing fiscal constraints and greater devolution of powers, responsibilities and resources. We call for a strategy that faces up to the reality of greater ethnic diversity and higher rates of migration, and propose a series of policies aimed at helping areas undergoing rapid demographic transition to respond to the pressures and new challenges generated by the greater transience that characterises migration.

Communities will of course vary widely across the UK. Their own history, geography and economy are among many factors which will have a considerable influence on how different areas respond to demographic change. Nevertheless, the framework set out in this report provides the scope required so that strategies reflect local conditions and also ensures that local areas take active steps to prepare.

2. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN THE UK: A LOCAL ANALYSIS

The UK is making a significant demographic transition. Every region will see more migration and become more ethnically diverse in the coming decades.

Revealing a more diverse UK

Most demographers agree that the UK is on course to become one of the most ethnically diverse nations in the developed world. Historically, projections of population change in the UK have in fact tended to underestimate both levels of migration and the growth of ethnic minority groups.⁴ The most recent projections, based on the 2011 census (Rees et al 2015), calculate that by 2061 the ethnic minority share of the population will be 30 per cent.⁵

Projections suggest that migration will also continue at a high level. For the past decade, the average net migration level into the UK was 245,000, with 2014 seeing record rates of 318,000 (Vargas-Silva and Markaki 2015). This can be attributed to both supply and demand factors.

Demand for migrants is likely to remain high in the UK. A considerable fall in net migration would be highly detrimental to the public finances: zero net migration would result in a 40 per cent increase to our debt-to-GDP ratio (OBR 2012). Given our ageing society, migration plays an important role in plugging skills gaps, particularly in healthcare (OECD 2009). Universities have a major, and growing, financial interest in attracting migrants: international student fees and spending on accommodation came to £4.4 billion in 2011/12 (UUK 2014a). To bring down net migration government policy would have to make a concerted effort to tackle shortages across many service and policy areas (OECD 2009). Other factors driving migration are the fact that the considerable foreign-born population in the UK will in turn encourage further immigration due to 'network effects' – that is, the UK will attract family members, friends and co-nationals of migrants through chain migration (ibid). English language is a big draw for migrants – English is the third most widely spoken language for native speakers (Lewis 2015) – as is the fact that the UK has one of the most flexible labour markets in the world (WEF 2014) and some of the strongest employment outcomes for migrants compared to migrants in other countries (Stirling 2015).

In terms of supply, while income differentials between developed and many developing countries are expected to narrow in the coming decades, they will persist in the Middle East, north Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and will thus lead to ongoing migratory pressures. Contrary to common assumptions, empirical studies suggest that social and economic development in poorer countries increase emigration, because they increase people's capabilities and aspirations. This means that, as poorer countries develop (particularly in south Asia and sub-Saharan Africa) we could see higher immigration from those

4 For example, after updating their previous projections to a 2011 census base, the most recent NewETHPOP study conducted at the University of Leeds (Rees et al 2015) shows that, while having projected largely accurately, the researchers had overprojected the white population on the basis of over-optimistic mortality assumptions, and underprojected the BME groups in their previous estimates.

5 These projections are provisional and subject to further research and verification.

regions (De Haas 2011). Conflict, political instability and environmental disasters (due to climate change) are also likely to see ongoing displacement. Historically, these events have driven higher levels of south-to-north migration and migration from rural to urban areas within developing countries (rather than south-to-north migration globally speaking). However, the recent experience of the refugee crisis in Europe indicates this may be changing.

Even if the UK was to leave the EU following an in/out referendum, a reduction in net migration in the short and medium term is unlikely. If the UK decided to stay a member of the European Economic Area (like Norway) or opt for a bilateral agreement to obtain – economically very desirable – access to the single market (like Switzerland), it would still need to sign up to the free movement of labour (Portes 2015). Indeed, it's even possible that the reverse could be true for certain migration flows. For example, 'Brexit' would mean less control over the flow of asylum-seekers, since the UK would no longer be covered by the Dublin regulation, which determines the EU member state responsible for a particular asylum claim, and which has resulted in Britain sending back 12,000 refugees since 2003 (Dixon 2015).

Moreover, Britain will become more diverse irrespective of future levels of migration. According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), over a quarter of UK births (26.5 per cent) in 2013 were to mothers who were born outside the UK, with Poland, Pakistan and India being the three most common countries of origin for non-UK mothers (ONS 2014).

Ethnic diversity will affect all British cities, a process which is already underway. The number of majority non-white wards more than tripled from 2001 to 2011. Slough, Luton and Leicester are the first local authorities outside London that are no longer majority white British, but Birmingham, Blackburn, Bradford, Cambridge, Coventry, Crawley, Manchester, Milton Keynes, Nottingham, Reading, Oadby and Wigston, Oxford, Peterborough, Sandwell, Sutton and Wolverhampton are predicted to follow suit by 2031 (Jivray and Simpson 2015). Currently ethnically homogeneous areas such as Tyne and Wear, the East Midlands and South Yorkshire are already experiencing higher migration inflows (with numbers increasing by 210, 129 and 124 per cent respectively) than in London (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2014). Consequently, we can also expect currently ethnically homogeneous parts of the country to make the transition to greater diversity quite rapidly.

As illustrated in the maps below (see figure 2.1, over), showing projections for English local authority areas, a future characterised by greater ethnic diversity is inevitable, with only a handful of exceptions.⁶

The nature of diversity has also changed over the past two decades. Since the 1990s, new waves of immigration have resulted in the UK's demographic profile becoming more complex than ever. Britain is now home to people from practically every country in the world, and the number of people of 'Other ethnic' groups (ethnic groups not mentioned individually in the census) has grown in total by over 2 million in the past decade.⁷

In his groundbreaking study on diversity in the UK, sociologist Steve Vertovec shows how the nature of migration changed from a postwar pattern of replacement labour coming from a handful of sending countries with historical links to the UK, to

6 The cartogram basis for these maps was developed by Pia Wohland and Philip Rees, from cartograms used in *Identity in Britain: A Cradle-to-Grave Atlas* by Bethan Thomas and Danny Dorling, with permission of the authors. The cartograms represent local authorities in proportion to their 2001 census population. The maps were prepared by Stephen Clark using projected populations produced as part of an ESRC (ES/L013878/1) funded project 'NewETHPOP-Evaluation, Revision and Extension of Ethnic Population Projections'.


7 Authors' analysis from ONS census data, 2001 and 2011.

a new wave of migration originating from dozens of locations all over the world, with immigrants being subject to different immigration statuses and coming through a myriad of migration channels (Vertovec 2007).

Figure 2.1

Projections show that increasing ethnic diversity is inevitable in all but a few local authority areas

Share of white population in local authority populations in England, actual in 2011 (left) and projections for 2051 based on 2011 census (right)



Source: Rees et al 2015

Note: 'White' proportion includes White British, Irish, Gypsy/Traveller and 'White other'.

There are multiple drivers for this shift. Policy reforms which led to a significant increase in work permits in the 2000s, compared to family immigration in the 1990s, set in train processes that have led to greater diversification of migration (Kyambi 2005). Membership of the EU means that migrants come from a larger range of countries, and secondary migration also leads to greater diversification, as in the case of Latin Americans arriving via Spain and Portugal. International development has meant that more educated and aspirational people in middle-income countries are now able to take up the option of living or studying abroad. And conflict, escape and asylum focussed on areas such as the Middle East have also played a part.

How migration and greater diversity are impacting on British society

The debate about the impact of migration and diversity on Britain's social landscape is highly polarised and contested (Broeckerhoff et al 2015). On the one hand, some have expressed concerns that the UK's increased diversity and high migration are leading to fragmentation and social tensions, negatively affecting feelings of common experience and mutuality, and threatening social bonds and relationships (see for example Collier 2013, Goodhart 2013). It is these views which dominate the contemporary political debate about diversity in the UK.⁸ For the most part, they are

⁸ For example, the home secretary Theresa May, in her speech to the 2015 Conservative party conference, called for a reduction and control of immigration, stating that high immigration made it 'impossible to build a cohesive society' (EIN 2015).

grounded in research conducted in the US showing that interpersonal trust is lower in racially diverse communities, with members of more diverse communities being less politically engaged and participating less in community-led activities (see for example Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, Delhey and Newton 2005, Putnam 2007).

However, a growing body of literature from Europe and the UK paints a more nuanced picture. Multiple studies suggest that in many local contexts, people negotiate ethnic and religious diversity very successfully. Levels of trust are significantly more affected by deprivation rather than by diversity (see for example Becares et al 2011, Gesthuizen et al 2009, Laurence 2011, Letki 2008).⁹

Contrary to US-based analyses suggesting that migrants tend to stand apart from mainstream society – what sociologist Robert Putnam has labelled ‘hunkering down’ – a number of surveys have found that, for the most part, migrants and ethnic minorities in the UK do integrate socially and politically. For instance, they tend to trust political institutions and identify with the British nation more than white British groups (see for example Ford et al 2011, Nandi and Platt 2013). Some experts go as far as suggesting that encouraging diversity could help to cement the integration process of migrants and foster stronger identification with the UK in the second generation, because inter-ethnic contact significantly decreases the probability of strong co-ethnic identification (Demireva and Heath 2014).

Levels of residential segregation and ethnic clustering have also declined in the past decade, with ethnic minority groups becoming more evenly spread across England and Wales between 2001 and 2011 (Catney 2013). Research by the University of Manchester suggests that ‘plural’ local authorities – areas with no ethnic group making up the majority – are the fastest growing (Jivray and Simpson 2015). Their analysis of census data found that by 2011 all but one of the 407 local authorities in England, Scotland and Wales had become more ethnically diverse, and predicted that 48 local authorities would be ‘plural’ by 2031 (ibid). The causes for this trend lie in the movement of new immigrants out of central London due to house price increases, the dispersal of non-white ethnic minority groups into hitherto white suburbs, and the increase in ‘Other ethnic’ groups and the mixed-race population. Previous IPPR research showed that patterns of eastern European migration were more widely dispersed than previous waves of migration, which also contributes to this increasing diversity and plurality (Sriskandarajah et al 2008).

Our review of British attitudinal data concludes that, in aggregate, considerable demographic change has not had a significant impact on key indicators of social cohesion in the UK in the past decade. Levels of interpersonal trust and perceptions of cohesion have remained largely stable for the past three decades. For instance, in the Community Life survey of 2013/14, 85 per cent of respondents agreed that their local area was a place where people of different backgrounds got on well together, five percentage points up from a decade earlier (80 per cent in 2003). And data from Understanding Society suggests that, in 2012/13, 65 per cent of people thought that most people in their neighbourhood could be trusted (Siegler 2015).

Despite these aggregate trends, there are challenges. But these challenges are largely localised and often predictable, the consequence of a transition process to greater ethnic diversity. Contrasting patterns of support at the last general election for parties that have mobilised on issues of immigration suggest that there are considerable localised differences and that debates about migration and ethnicity play out very differently across the country (see figure 2.2). Our analysis shows


9 For example, in their study of London, Sturgis et al (2014) find that diversity is positively correlated to perceived social cohesion, including when social and economic deprivation is taken into account. In fact, the authors conclude that levels of cohesion actually rise as ethnic heterogeneity increases. Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010) focus on ‘co-ethnic density’, which occurs in areas with higher levels of ethnic diversity, and identify it as an asset in the building of more cohesive communities that balances out any negative effects of diversity on social norms and civic participation.

that parties such as Ukip made most progress in areas which have seen low but accelerating migration.¹⁰

Figure 2.2

White British residents are more likely to oppose immigration in areas with fewer immigrants

White British opposition to immigration by share of immigrants in ward, 2010/11



Source: DCLG and Ipsos MORI, Citizenship Survey, 2010/11, quoted in Kaufmann and Harris 2014


Understanding these localised variations is important for two reasons. The first is that it allows us to learn from areas that have already made the transition to greater diversity (and, hopefully, avoid the mistakes of the past). The second is that it helps us to ensure that increasingly constrained public resources are targetted most effectively.

¹⁰ One important limitation of current attitudinal data in the UK is that it does not permit a localised analysis of social trends. Due to the termination of the Citizenship Survey in 2011 there are no sources of attitudinal data which allow for sound and up-to-date comparisons of how recent waves of migration have affected levels of tolerance, trust and social cohesion in different parts of the UK. Surveys such as Understanding Society are only available for regional rather than local comparisons. And household panel surveys conducted by individual local authorities cannot be used for comparative analysis due to differing methods of data collection and analysis.

3. THE EFFECTS OF TRAJECTORY AND TRANSIENCE

The case-study areas for this report were selected on the basis of analysis of existing largescale demographic data. We pooled four years of Citizenship Survey data (2007–2011) in order to categorise UK local authorities according to the relationship between levels of migration and existing ethnic minority population, as a reflection of historical migration levels and social change. We selected Slough and Sandwell as our ‘high migration and high ethnic minority share’ case studies, and Boston and York as our ‘high migration and low ethnic minority share’ case studies.

Figure 3.1
Comparing our case-study areas in terms of migration levels and existing ethnic minority population
International migration inflows versus ethnic minority share (% of population, 2014 estimate)



Our analysis shows that a history of migration plays a significant part in shaping local perceptions of migration and ethnic diversity, which in turn significantly influences acceptance of and adaptation to migrants and ethnic minorities in an area.

Trajectory: how migration history shapes cohesion

In Slough and Sandwell, two areas which have both experienced high levels of migration for several decades, diversity has in effect become 'normalised'. Here, most of our respondents were at ease with diversity and viewed migration as a fact of life.

'We have been living with this [diversity] for 60 years. It is how it is and I think people have got used to it.'

Resident, Sandwell

'Yes obviously it [diversity] adds vibrancy, it has increased the cultural awareness and it broadens the scope within areas and communities and interests, and things that grow from that.'

Resident, Sandwell

'I love diversity. I love working here and meeting people from diverse walks of life from different backgrounds. I thrive living in a place like that. Diversity contributes in terms of art, in terms of culture, music. I wish there was more of it coming out at grassroots level in Slough.'

Stakeholder, Slough

'We just see each other as humans. We don't see each other as "you are a Muslim" or "she's a Christian" – we just see each other as humanity.'

Resident, Slough

'Despite the fact that you get different groups here ... Slough is able to unite even with differences – I think that is a strength that Slough has. We incorporate any newness.'

Resident, Slough

'In other areas that I have gone into the kids will mix in the class because they have to and then you go in to the dinner hall or the playground and you don't see many mixed groups. But in Sandwell I do see mixed groups.'

Stakeholder, Sandwell

Migrants who we interviewed highlighted how it had been relatively easy to find their feet in these areas. The trajectory of migration in the area meant that these groups benefitted from networks of people from the same origin country (co-national groups), a richer community sector and services that were prepared to meet their needs.

'People are quite friendly in Sandwell. It's not an unwelcoming place at all and people quite enjoy the diversity on the whole. It's very interesting in that regard.'

Resident, Sandwell

'I like living here. All of the people help me improve my English and I didn't feel any different from my country – I feel like I am in my own home.'

Resident, Sandwell

'Our volunteers are very diverse – from white to Jamaican to Afro-Caribbean to African. They are very diverse and speak most languages.'

Stakeholder, Slough

In contrast, in areas where demographic shifts were more recent, we identified higher levels of concern. In Boston, a town in eastern England that has seen the number of immigrants rise almost fivefold (467 per cent) between 2001 and 2011

(Krausova and Vargas-Silva 2013), interviewees consistently highlighted the surge of migration from A10 countries¹¹ after 2004:

'People were mumbling and grumbling about the town changing. "These ethnic shops" were popping up and the town centre was changing in character, with people speaking foreign languages.'

Stakeholder, Boston

Through our interviews we found that practical concerns about the pressures being placed on infrastructure and services (particularly housing, GPs and schools) were very tangible:

'We will continue to have tensions here while there aren't enough resources. There have to be bigger classes in schools, and it takes forever to get doctor's appointment. As a white British person on the ground, you can't get a doctor's appointment because the surgery has a number of registered customers and there aren't enough doctors for the number of people registered with them. So the challenge then becomes very frustrating.'

Stakeholder, Boston

'There is a lot of moaning and some of it is probably fair about the pressure on public services, because our local council say the government haven't really recognised the amount of immigration, because it is difficult to measure, and the pressure on public services has been very difficult. There is a lot of resentment from local people about that.'

Stakeholder, Boston

Many studies find that public services in areas with high migration are generally well equipped to respond to the pressures placed on them by migration. In fact, recent evidence suggests that they may even benefit. For example, one study of NHS waiting times and immigration shows that an increase in the number of migrants living in a local authority equal to 10 per cent of the authority's existing population reduces outpatient waiting times by an average of three days (Giuntella et al 2015). Another study indicates that pupil attainment is better in more ethnically diverse local authorities (Burgess 2014). Indeed, for London, Burgess finds that better results in attainment are accounted for solely by ethnic diversity, concluding that the widely cited 'London effect' (whereby schools in the capital have outperformed schools in the rest of the country) can be attributed to the capital's attraction to migrants and benefits acquired through them (ibid).

The trend towards gradual 'normalisation' is echoed in other analyses. For example, studies of electoral trends reveal that anti-immigration sentiments and, consequently, support for parties that mobilise on public concerns about immigration (such as Ukip) were strongest in majority white British wards that have seen a steep rise in migration from a low base (Kaufmann and Harris 2014). Others have noted that, in the 2015 general election, support for Ukip was greatest in areas where there were in fact fewest migrants. However, while many of these areas do not have a history of migration, some have recently experienced higher levels of migration from an initial low base (ibid).

It is interesting to note how similar dynamics were highlighted by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion in 2007. In many of the areas that were highlighted as vulnerable in the commission's report (such as outer London boroughs and southern commuter-belt towns), diversity has become normalised in the years since (CIC 2007: 9). In Luton, for example – birthplace of the English Defence League and one of the towns profiled by the commission – migration was an issue that attracted

11 The A10 countries are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

serious local concern in the early 2000s. By 2015, however, levels of support for anti-immigration parties were comparable to the national average (Economist 2015). In most areas where migration had been a considerable concern, those concerns have been significantly reduced within a decade.

Indeed, during our research in Boston we found that gradual adaptation was starting to take place.

'I think there are still communities rather than one community, but because those communities get on more harmoniously there is a sense that we are more of a community now than we were three years ago.'

Stakeholder, Boston

'People have become more accepting of each other. I don't use the word tolerance, because that is an engineering term and it means how much pressure you put on something before it snaps. The word acceptance is more appropriate. They are more accepting now and therefore things are much calmer.'

Stakeholder, Boston

'We got over the initial shock as a community. I put myself in that: it was a shock, thousands of new and different people coming, not speaking our language, some liking to party, some having different cultural backgrounds – you know, crossing the road in front of your car and not putting their hand up and saying thank you, you don't [do that] in Poland ... Some from the eastern European community have a very unrealistic expectation, but so do some people I went to school with who were born and bred down the road from me.'

Stakeholder, Boston

'The one thing we do find very hard to do is to engage with those Europeans ... So our usual ways of working with our customers from those communities has had to change in order for us to be able to engage and find out what their issues are, because they don't go out to public meetings like we do. They are not used to feeling sufficiently confident to be able to have their say. It takes time for confidence and trust to grow.'

Stakeholder, Boston

It is understandable that rapid demographic transformation will be felt most intensely in places that lack the social and policy infrastructure that enables them to cater for the needs of a more diverse population. This is partly because migrants are likely to find the settlement process more problematic, as they benefit from fewer social networks and services designed to meet their particular needs.

For local residents, change will also be more unsettling, given that they may have had less previous contact with people from different backgrounds than in other parts of the country. However, as residents benefit from greater levels of contact, many of these concerns subside. As described by one respondent in Slough, these experiences can have a deep impact on attitudes and wider perceptions:

'Certainly when I made the odd train trip to London in the morning, even then the train was packed solid, young Asian business men always offer me a seat, or twice young black women have offered me a seat. It makes me feel a bit old but it is very nice – so we do make an effort to get on. I would say that relations are good and we have got to keep it that way, it is very important.'

Resident, Slough

Everyday contact plays a crucial role in moderating attitudes and perceptions (Laurence 2014). As argued by the social psychologist Miles Hewstone (2009),

when people interact with diversity routinely, they develop a capacity for ‘passive tolerance’ which enables them to function effectively in very diverse contexts. Sociologists have labelled the generalised adaptability that characterises plural areas, such as Hackney in east London, ‘common place diversity’ (Wessendorf 2010) or ‘everyday multiculturalism’ (Wise 2009).

The trend towards greater plurality is also likely to help this process. One study found that plurality increases the tolerance for (existing and future) minority groups (Hewstone et al 2006). This is partly because it reduces the potential for social tensions based on the scapegoating of any single group.

As described by our respondents in Slough and Sandwell, people living in areas of high diversity are generally able to adapt without a great need for interventions specifically designed to foster greater interaction.

‘I think that’s the key to it. I think the best policymakers can do is really give groups and communities the tools to be able to interact with each other, rather than make policy or force policy.’

Stakeholder, Slough

‘I think it is up to people. I think policymakers sometimes get it badly wrong ... I think that natural integration is far better than forced integration, so I think communities naturally integrate when each community within that environment is proactive.’

Stakeholder, Slough

‘You need to stop having one centre or another – it needs to be for everyone. It shouldn’t be about religion, age, sex or whatever.’

Resident, Sandwell

‘One example would be the Smethwick Bangladeshi Youth Forum, which was established about 10 or 12 years ago – it is now so integrated that it has changed its name to Community Connect Foundation because it is no longer in Smethwick, it is no longer Bangladeshi, and it is no longer “youth”. Basically, although it still talks to those communities, it now reaches all communities. That has been a trend.’

Stakeholder, Sandwell

Transience: people on the move

One emerging and little-understood challenge facing UK towns and cities (both those that are already diverse and those making the transition to greater diversity) is that many migrant populations are becoming more transient. Research suggests that migrants spend shorter periods in the UK. The average length of visa applications has declined, as have extensions to stay – now 35 per cent less than in 2008 (Home Office 2015). Surveys of migrants show that they have a greater intention to return to their origin countries (Finch et al 2009), and rates of naturalisation have also started to fall (Morris 2015). Research has also shown that particular migrant-dependent job sectors, such as the hospitality sector, experience very high labour turnover rates (see for example Alberti 2013). The growing propensity for migrants to maintain links across borders has been observed by academics for more than three decades (see for example Glick Schiller et al 1994).

Transience is driven by a range of factors:

- labour market trends, such as a growth in seasonal working patterns in towns near agricultural centres, or in areas of extensive development¹²
- pressures on housing, particularly in larger cities

12 An example of this is the London 2012 Olympics and the population churn encountered in five host boroughs: Newham, Hackney, Waltham Forest, Tower Hamlets and Greenwich (see Scanlon et al 2010).

- social mobility creating movement from deprived to more affluent areas
- trends in higher education, as universities attract record numbers of international students as a means of generating resources.

Freedom of movement within the EU also contributes to greater transience: EU migrants can make (often quite short-term) decisions to move in response to changes in personal circumstances. Changes to exchange rates which have an impact on the amount they are able to remit home or hikes in rental prices which may make their stay in the UK economically unviable are often enough to make an EU migrant decide to return home – quite unlike the approach of a migrant who does not enjoy the right to free movement.

This transience is problematic for a number of reasons. First, transience places considerable strain on local services and infrastructure. One study by Travers et al (2007) outlines a series of costs that arise from population churn: translation costs, housing administration and maintenance costs, electoral registration turnover costs, council tax registration costs, costs of planning law contraventions, public assistance costs for migrants with no other means of support, homelessness provision and administration, and social services. These effects are likely to be particularly challenging in areas with a low-migration trajectory, historically speaking. However, our fieldwork in Slough reveals that it is transience, rather than migration and ethnic diversity, which also causes greatest unease in the local population in areas of longer trajectory.

Transience inevitably has an impact on people's attachment to a local area and a community's capacity to build links between residents. Higher rates of population turnover mean that there are fewer long-term residents in an area. Turnover can also undermine social networks, erode trust and increase levels of insecurity (Bailey et al 2008). This was a notable concern in Slough:

'Slough is a very diverse town, as it is five miles or less from Heathrow airport. So for many people who just get off a plane it's the nearest town ... So it's a transitory town.'

Stakeholder, Slough

'The local authority doesn't know exactly how many people live in Slough, does it? That sounds stupid, but we are consistently underfunded as a result: less people trying to provide more for more people with less.'

Resident, Slough

'It would be good to find our own identity, and I don't think we have an identity at the moment. I don't feel we have.'

Stakeholder, Slough

Similar concerns were echoed during our fieldwork in York. The city has always attracted a vibrant student population but in recent years it experienced more rapid change as a consequence of increasing numbers of international students (who make up 15.6 per cent of the student body at the University of York).¹³ Respondents spoke about the impact that this highly mobile population has had on social relations, local infrastructure and public space.

'Wherever I see housing in York it's all connected with the university, and I am told it is largely for overseas students.'

Resident, York

13 Based on HESA data for 2013 – see: <http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/international/international-students-the-facts/by-university/>

'That side of town, the majority is all private let for students. There are a lot of houses over that side. The university seems to get money from I-don't-know-where for new complexes. Just up the road where the dairy used to be they have a big student complex there.'

Resident, York

'I think there are tensions. In this area there is a high proportion of tenants who are students, and there are tensions between students who come and go. I don't want to say all students, because I am on the residents' association and occasionally we have a student who has a commitment to get involved locally and to look after their properties and gardens. But I'm not sure that always happens because it does come up as an issue. I think maybe they [students] are out of proportion to the local residents.'

Resident, York



Trajectory and transience affect how local communities respond to demographic change. A longer history of migration and diversity and a more ethnically plural population help areas to manage this transition successfully. Transience, on the other hand, is generating a set of new pressures. The policy requirement is therefore twofold:

- to help areas in transition manage change, address pressures on public services, and defuse potential tensions
- to enable areas either to face up to the challenges posed by transience, or to put in place strategies to promote and support settlement and hence integration.

4.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS

The demographic projections are clear: regardless of future immigration policies, every region of the UK will see more migration and become more ethnically diverse in the coming decades. This process is likely to bring both challenges and opportunities. Ensuring that this process is successful requires both central and local government to put in place strategies to bolster preparedness and community resilience.

In this section we set out a series of strategies aimed at ensuring that local areas, particularly those that are making the transition recently and rapidly, are able to respond to and benefit from inevitable demographic change.

While we argue for a more devolved approach to responding to the impacts of migration, we believe local authorities need to be far better prepared than they are at present. Central government can play a central role in aiding this preparation by addressing the funding and data deficits that undermine the ability of local authorities to respond strategically to demographic change. And it needs to take account of how national immigration policies impact on levels of transience and integration. Nevertheless, ultimately the responsibility will fall on local areas to be prepared.

Objective 1: ensure that immigration rules do not drive up transience and inhibit integration

The government's net migration target has been widely criticised for numerous reasons: its failure has undermined public confidence; it has led to policies with considerable economic downsides (such as restrictions on the number of international students); and it has delayed and deterred decisive government action during the recent refugee crisis.

While it appears that the reforms pursued as a consequence of the net migration target have had little impact in terms of reducing migration (including from outside the EU), we believe that they have contributed to higher levels of transience and thus have acted to undermine integration.

The government should design its migration rules to encourage greater settlement and discourage transience, in order to promote the integration of migrants, alleviate the pressures on social cohesion that derive from population churn, and ease pressures on public services.

We recommend that the government should review recent decisions in three areas in particular: post-study work, family migration and citizenship. Pursuing policies that explicitly set out to break the link between coming to the UK and settling here is counterproductive.

Post-study work for international students

The benefits of international student migration to the UK economy, the higher education sector and the UK's international image are largely uncontested (see Sachrajda and Pennington 2013). However, policies which seek to ensure that

students leave the UK once they complete their degrees¹⁴ are counterproductive. They limit the ability of local areas to reap the benefits and drive up the level of churn in local populations.

Universities have argued for extending the time that students spend in the UK because this allows the UK higher education sector to remain competitive in the international market. However, allowing students to stay for a period following graduation brings many additional benefits. Whereas the gains from temporary student migration are largely concentrated in universities themselves (and can have a negative impact on local residents, in the form of greater congestion and inflated rents), the gains from students staying after study are far more widespread. International graduates who choose to put down roots are more likely to contribute both to the local economy (as investors, entrepreneurs or by filling skills gaps in the local labour market) and to the local community (see box 1).

Box 1: Sachsen giving students a hearty welcome

The German region of Sachsen runs a programme called *Herzlich Willkommen in Sachsen* ('Welcome to Sachsen') aimed at both attracting qualified migrants to the region and encouraging international students to settle in the local area. The initiative includes programmes aimed at helping students to access the local labour market, supporting migrant entrepreneurs to navigate bureaucracy. The region also ensures that individual migrants wait no longer than four weeks to have their visa confirmed, through an administrative process called 'AKZESS', which stands for the objective to 'direct the immigration of foreign-skilled workers efficiently and sensibly'. This process introduced standardised procedures and coordinates applicants, businesses, local authorities and foreign offices to ensure a speedy and efficient review of visa applications.

Current rules on post-study work need to be reformed to ensure that when international graduates remain they make a tangible local contribution. The government could build in incentives to ensure that students remain in the towns where they have completed their study, for example, by lowering visa fees or streamlining the application process. Students could also be required to reapply for a work visa should they decide to work in a different location.

UK universities, working alongside local authorities, should also play an active role in encouraging international students to become involved in the wider community and the local labour market. This could include carrying out skills assessments to match international students to sectors of the local economy affected by skills shortages, or incentivising international students to play an active role in the local community and economy (for example, by offering additional credits for volunteering). At the same time, universities should ensure that investments to local campuses and facilities which are made chiefly to attract international students also benefit the wider community, for example by providing access to sports or cultural facilities or including local residents in cultural activities.

Family reunion

The UK has the least family-friendly immigration system in the developed world. Migrants seeking to be reunited with their families face the highest income requirement (which, at £18,600, is now higher than the earnings of almost half the UK population) and the highest fees. The UK is also one of the few countries that implements a language test abroad (MIPEX 2015).

¹⁴ Students from outside the EU are no longer allowed to apply for extensions to their visas or switch to work visas while in the UK. From November 2015, they will also be banned from extending their studies in the UK unless they are registered with a recognised higher education institution. Those at publicly funded *further* education colleges will be banned from working part-time, and study visas at this level will be cut from three years to two.

Since 2012, numbers entering the UK through the family reunion route have dropped markedly.¹⁵ Given that net migration has increased overall (including from outside the EU) it is possible to conclude that a growing number of migrant families now live apart as a consequence of these reforms (Somerville and Sumption 2009).

In addition to putting considerable pressure on families (see JCWI 2015), being unable to reunite with their families makes it far less likely that migrants will choose to settle and lay down roots. Delayed arrival also acts as a significant barrier to integration. For example, delaying the arrival of migrant children hampers their progress in the educational system considerably: studies by the OECD and others have shown that young children who arrive late to the educational system take much longer to catch up with their peers (Strand et al 2015, OECD 2010a). Other studies have shown that delays to reunion harm the ability of newly arrived spouses to access the labour market (MPG 2013).

The government should actively review income requirements for family reunion, in light of how current, more stringent rules are impacting on levels of transience and integration. In most other European countries these requirements are actively reviewed (Sweden and Portugal have both decreased requirements on the basis that they delay integration). Benchmarking income requirements against the living wage, for example, would help to ensure that they are proportionate.

Citizenship

Naturalisation is a critical milestone in the integration process. Naturalised migrants are more likely to lay down roots and become actively involved in the community (Liebig 2011). Naturalised citizens face less discrimination than non-naturalised migrants, and studies show that citizenship has a tangible impact on labour market integration and educational outcomes (see OECD 2010).

The UK has one of the strictest citizenship regimes in the developed world. It charges the highest naturalisation fees, at almost £1,000 (compared to £189 in Germany and £313 in Canada), and in addition to written language and country knowledge tests and 'good character' references, since October 2014 migrants have had to prove that they possess an appropriate level of conversational English (to B1 intermediate level). The tightening of the citizenship process has had a marked impact on naturalisation rates. In 2014, 125,800 foreign citizens adopted British citizenship. This was a 40 per cent fall from 2013, when citizenship grants reached almost 208,000 (the largest annual number recorded since 1962); from 2009 to 2013, citizenship grants averaged 195,800 per year (Blinder 2015).

Moreover, as the process becomes more stringent, it has also become increasingly bureaucratic, punitive and distant from local communities. In most areas of the UK, citizenship ceremonies are increasingly impersonal affairs, with limited input from the local population – uninvited UK citizens are barred from attending. The tests that prospective citizens must pass lack any local component, and the process offers no opportunities for migrants to develop links locally.

Citizenship is a privilege. But, as IPPR has argued previously, citizenship should become the default rather than the exception for migrants (IPPR 2014). To promote naturalisation, EU and non-EU migrants should be auto-enrolled on a citizenship route after five years as a resident in the UK. This should be done on an opt-out basis, whereby migrants can choose not to participate if their current citizenship does not allow for dual citizenship, or if they don't want to take up British citizenship for personal reasons.

¹⁵ Migrants entering to the UK via the family migration route have historically been the most likely to stay. Thus, although the number of family reunion entries is relatively small, they contribute significantly to net migration figures.

At the same time, the integration opportunities offered by the naturalisation process should be capitalised upon.

The newly elected Liberal government in Canada, for example, has proposed to reintroduce a 'residency time credit' for international students and other temporary residents. Migrants will receive credits for the time they have already spent in Canada, which will give them priority in the naturalisation process. And in addition, all new citizens will be given free admission to all Canadian national parks.

Local authorities should actively take control of the design and content of the knowledge test (although central government should take steps to ensure that tests meet a minimum standard of difficulty across all local authorities), and should include practical information about community life and how to get involved in local activities as part of the citizenship process. Citizenship ceremonies should be widely advertised as community events and take place in public places, such as parks, public libraries and schools. They should be open to all local residents and form part of wider efforts to promote local identity. Local authorities should also consider awarding subsidised membership to local historical attractions and cultural institutions to the new citizens.

Objective 2: create the conditions for better local policy

The government increasingly recognises the need to do more to help local areas to respond to the impacts of increased migration. This is welcome.

The government should prioritise areas that are making the transition towards greater ethnic diversity to foster greater community resilience. This includes a far more responsive system for managing data collection and funding mechanisms that allow areas to respond effectively to the pressures produced by demographic change.

Improving data collection and use

Having access to up-to-date demographic data would enable local areas to be better prepared to meet the challenges associated with rapid demographic change. Being able to anticipate the projected scale of future migration and where future migrants are likely to come from would help preparedness. Going deeper, more detailed information about migrants' skills, status and plans would help local services to adapt (and to tap into those skills).

However, current UK demographic data is not fit for this globalised age. Immigration statistics are limited by gaps and inconsistencies;¹⁶ existing population data does not fully explain *local* migration trends and its impacts; and most local areas base population projections on census data, which is collected only every 10 years. Analysis of census data analysis is very time-consuming and thus, in a context of rapid change, cannot reflect the latest conditions.

Proposals to create an online census for 2021 may address some of these problems¹⁷ – it will enable greater quality of data, increase efficiency and reduce costs.¹⁸ However,

16 Estimates of net migration are derived from the International Passenger Survey (IPS) and the Annual Population Survey (APS), which includes data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). However, these surveys were designed for different purposes and use different definitions: for example, IPS estimates define migrants as individuals coming to or leaving the UK for over one year, while the APS defines migrants by citizenship or place of birth and excludes international students living in communal establishments. IPS data is based on a small sample size, relies on inherently unreliable self-reporting about the intended length of stay in the UK, and does not record migration status.

17 See: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/census/2021-census/about-the-census-transformation-programme/index.html>

18 Some census returns are already completed online. In 2011, 60 per cent of household returns came via the ONS Census website, and were on average of much better quality than paper forms. The online form also halved the time required to fill out the census form, due to its in-built flow control mechanism.

these changes in how census data is collected do not guarantee that the data will remain relevant beyond the point of its collection. Government should therefore put in place other mechanisms to allow for a more continuous and up-to-date collection of data on population changes. These processes should be coordinated by local authorities (see box 2 below).

One of the central challenges is that the UK is one of the only countries in the developed world to have no centralised ID system. A decade ago, an ID cards system was ruled out in the UK due to (justifiable) concerns about cost, pervasive bureaucracy and likely infringements on privacy and civil liberties. The alternative would be to introduce a nationally coordinated yet locally delivered registration scheme, as exists in Germany. Such a registration scheme would require newcomers to an area (whether from outside the UK or from other parts of the country) to register with their local authority on arrival. In order to reduce costs, registration could consist of a few additional but compulsory questions on council tax return forms (Sachrajda and Griffith 2014).

Box 2: Resident registration in Germany

In Germany, resident registration is compulsory. Within a week of moving, an individual's change of address must be reported to the local resident registration office (*Meldeamt*), of which there are more than 5,000. These local offices report the registration of non-nationals to the Central Register of Foreign Nationals (*Ausländerzentralregister*). A number of federal states are now aggregating all the data from local offices in a single federal register. This information is available online and is accessible to public bodies and planners.

Local authorities should also put in place systems to pool all registrations to public services, including the NHS, DWP and HMRC, national insurance, the national pupil database, the electoral register and DVLA, among others. Given that these systems are now electronic, this should be cost-effective and achievable.

Funding targetted at transition areas

The current government is committed to launching a Controlling Migration Fund. According to the 2015 Conservative party manifesto, the fund's aim will be to both ease pressure on services and pay for additional immigration enforcement in local areas (Conservative Party 2015).

The government should give local authorities discretion over how they allocate additional resources. Depending on local circumstances, local authorities may opt to use additional funding to regulate private landlords and employers; prioritising the enforcement of housing and labour market rules is likely to be fairer, carries less risk of ethnic profiling and will have additional dividends. As well as helping to identify irregular migrants, it will also help to ensure that people legally in the UK are protected, and that problems of overcrowding and wage undercutting are addressed.

Funds should also be used to address pressures on frontline public services, which often struggle to catch up in areas experiencing rapid transition – something which can become a significant source of anxiety for existing residents.

There are a number of ways to raise capital for this fund. One would be to access funds via the European Social Fund (as proposed by former home secretary David Blunkett) or the European Integration Fund (Glennie and Pennington 2014). However, this strategy has a number of risks: funding would be susceptible to changes to the EU budget and to changes in the relationship between the UK and the EU. An alternative option would be to use the revenues from citizenship fees – as a similar case, the revenue for the Migration Impacts Fund was previously raised from a £50 levy on non-EU migrants. IPPR has estimated that this would amount to approximately £390 million (Sachrajda and Griffith 2014).

We propose that funding is targetted at areas ‘in transition’. It is important to note that these areas will not necessarily be those with the highest net migration rate. Instead, they are the areas that are likely to experience the greatest pressures. This selection could be based on Home Office research that has identified 26 local authorities (7 per cent of all local authorities in the UK) as areas that have high migration and limited histories of migration (Poppleton et al 2013). The list of targetted areas should be reviewed regularly to ensure that areas which are starting to experience rapid demographic change receive adequate support. The review process should be carried out on the basis of advice from an independent body, such as the Migration Advisory Committee.

While local authorities should be given room to establish their own priorities, the government should make the allocation of these funds conditional on their being able to provide a strategic account of their priorities, and a clear plan for how they will be achieved, as set out in section 3 below.

The immigration skills charge

In the Immigration Bill 2015, the government proposed the introduction of a visa charge on migrant-dependent employers: the immigration skills charge. The purpose of the charge would be to incentivise employers who hire a proportionally high number of overseas migrants to think more strategically about why they rely on overseas labour. In addition to this charge, the government has also proposed to introduce an apprenticeship levy to address local skills shortages, by directing funds at ensuring training and apprenticeships.

We propose that central government should retain overall oversight of the proposed immigration skills charge, setting its parameters (such as the point at which an employer is considered to be ‘migrant-dependent’) and rate (potentially using similar rules to those applied for setting council tax rates).

However, local authorities will be far better placed to disburse the funds in ways which suit their particular local conditions (Morris 2015). Authorities should therefore have responsibilities for both collecting the levy and deciding how funds should be allocated – although tight criteria should be in place to ensure that money is used on interventions that are likely to address the needs of local employers. They should be responsible for liaising closely with local employers and for helping them to meet their recruitment needs by matching firms with local workers.

Objective 3: set up action plans for local authorities

Local authorities should formulate strategies setting out how they will respond to demographic change, higher migration and greater diversity. These plans should form the basis for allocation of central government resources (including those set out above) and for public consultations with local residents. Each plan should cover the following four steps.

Step 1: forecast flows and population

Local authorities need to be proactive about gaining a greater understanding of the trends affecting their local populations. As noted in section 2 above, this could be aided by introducing a local registration system and by pooling public service registration data.

Step 2: pre-empt pressures (and potential opportunities)

Once they have information about likely trends, local authorities need to engage in scenario planning to help pre-empt the pressures that are likely to fall on their community, especially related to services and social cohesion.

- **Impact on public services:** Local authorities need to think systemically about the ways in which new populations are likely to need and use public services. At the very least, this assessment should aim to establish whether existing local

services have the capacity to meet future demand. A more comprehensive assessment would focus on pre-empting the likely needs of the most vulnerable groups, such as resettled refugees, and identifying potential opportunities, perhaps created by the arrival of international students or highly qualified migrants.

- **Impact on communities and cohesion:** Local authorities should also analyse the ways in which demographic change is likely to affect the local community. For example, if there is evidence that new groups with only limited links to the area are likely to arrive in increasing numbers, the authority will need to ensure that it is able to build relevant cultural awareness of these new groups into local services (Ramalingam and Morris 2015 forthcoming). A sound understanding of likely settlement patterns will also help to pre-empt any risks of segregation, and being aware of trends in the labour market may help authorities to address transience among new groups.

When developing this analysis, local authorities should be proactive about drawing lessons from areas with similar experiences. They should develop mechanisms which allow them to tap into the expertise which exists in other local authorities that have already seen a significant demographic transition (for example, by setting up placements for key frontline staff). Authorities should also make active use of the range of informational resources available, such as the European Web Site on Integration¹⁹ and the Global Diversity Exchange.²⁰

Step 3: prepare local services

Having bespoke 'one-stop-shop' services aimed at migrants can help to streamline the integration process for new groups (see box 3) – but it is not enough. Local authorities need to evaluate the preparedness of mainstream public services across the piece. Critically, as well as addressing future demand, it also means that services should have a level of cultural competence – that is, an understanding of the cultural traits and practices of different migrant and ethnic groups – that will enable them to respond to migrants' needs effectively (Ramalingam and Morris 2015 forthcoming).

Box 3: New Bostonians

In Boston, the Mayor's Office of New Bostonians, a municipal agency, helps migrants to settle and establish themselves by improving access to ESOL courses, providing immigration advice, and running the successful New Bostonians Summit Initiative. This initiative mobilises a collaboration of key stakeholders from seven sectors – the immigrant community, mainstream advocates, businesses, philanthropies, labour, higher education and government – to develop an ongoing 'New Bostonians Agenda' to address the top priorities as identified by Boston's immigrant communities.

This kind of one-stop-shop can provide invaluable bespoke support and advice for migrants, removing a lot of pressure from the initial settlement process. They can provide advice on visas, employment and local mainstream services, and could play a part in efforts aimed at tackling labour market exploitation and landlord abuse.

As part of this process, local authorities need to ask themselves a series of questions, including:

- Do local schools have the capacity and expertise to respond to a larger number of pupils learning English as an Additional Language (EAL)? Are there resources within the community which could support schools to provide for a more diverse pupil body (for example, by working more closely with established

19 See: <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/home>

20 See: <http://www.globaldiversityexchange.ca/>

supplementary schools – see Ramalingam and Griffith 2015)? Do schools have access to resources on best practice in EAL provision?

- What are the likely health needs of newcomers? How is their age profile likely to impact on key services, including GPs, maternity wards and health visitor services? Are local hospitals and other services equipped with the right expertise to respond?
- Are social services well prepared to meet the likely needs of vulnerable groups, such as resettled refugees?

Step 4: engage with the local population

There are many methods for engaging with local people. This could include local hearings or citizens' juries. However, in the context of a public confidence crisis on migration (MORI 2015), local authorities should embark on a programme of engagement only once they are armed with a clear sense of likely future trends and a plan for how the local area will respond – in other words, once they have completed steps 1–3 of the action plan. Launching an engagement drive with only limited data or without a strategic plan is likely to backfire.

These exercises should be as inclusive as possible, involving those who benefit directly from higher rates of migration (such as local universities and employers) alongside key community groups, faith groups and the general public.

'Welcoming Cities'

A number of US cities vie against each other for the title of the 'city most welcoming to migrants'. Dayton, which now calls itself the 'Ellis Island of Ohio', has led the way in establishing grant and microfinance programmes to encourage migrants to settle locally; it also provides tutoring for international students and support for migrant entrepreneurs. Within 12 months of launching the campaign the city saw its immigration rate rise by 40 per cent (six times the Ohio average), including economic migrants from India, central Africa and Latin America, and refugees from Turkey. Other cities in the UK have started to follow suit.

Some UK cities are taking a similar approach. In 2014, Birmingham launched an initiative called 'Places of Welcome', aimed at making Birmingham a more welcoming city. This initiative created a network of community groups and organisations that offer conversation, local information and refreshment to anyone in their neighbourhood at least once a week, in order to foster a sense of inclusion and belonging.

Many US cities have launched local naturalisation drives, as have cities in Germany. These drives are often fronted by high-profile local individuals, such as the local mayor. Information and advice is made readily available in libraries and other public buildings.

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