

Shared Responsibilities

A National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom

The Final Report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century



Summary and Recommendations

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This summary is divided into four parts:

- A set of observations on the current security context
- A statement of principles which, in the view of the Commission, should shape and underpin the UK's response to that context
- A summary of the conclusions reached in the report
- A list of all the Commission's recommendations, which turn these conclusions into calls for specific action in a wide range of areas.

Observations on the current security context

As part of the work for our Interim Report, published in November 2008, the Commission analysed the underlying drivers of the international security environment and made a series of basic observations on the nature of the challenges now faced. We stand by those observations¹ today. They are that:

- A process of globalisation and power diffusion is changing the nature of global order, diluting the control of national governments, deepening interdependence across borders and empowering a far wider range of actors than before. These actors include states that are emerging on to the world stage, but also private companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), terrorist organisations, criminal gangs and others. The overall result is increased freedom for some to disrupt or destroy, and reduced state dominance of the security environment, so that no state today can provide for its security needs by acting alone and state institutions in general are under pressure to adapt.
- Fragile and unstable states outnumber strong, accountable and stable ones in the international system today by more than two to one, and disorderly states are now a greater threat to international peace and security than is inter-state war.
- Climate change, global poverty and inequality are exacerbating this problem and the combination of these factors with resource scarcity is contributing to a global conflict environment that still takes too many lives, displaces too many people and violates too many human rights.
- Transnational criminal networks have expanded their trafficking operations in drugs, arms and people and in many countries are undermining and corrupting state governance arrangements from within, facilitating and profiting from violent conflict in the process.
- A globalised neo-jihadi ideology has emerged as a significant driver of the international security landscape.
- We have now entered a second and far more dangerous nuclear age in which proliferation not only to other states but also to non-state actors is a greater danger than inter-state nuclear conflict.
- Rapid advances in information- and bio-technologies are creating new vulnerabilities, making cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism and new forms of biological warfare all more likely in the future.
- The combination of globalisation, urbanisation and ever closer human cohabitation with a greater diversity of animal species is exposing humanity to greater risks from pandemic disease.
- Complexity has entered the physical infrastructure of modern life in the UK and our reliance on stretched and interconnected infrastructures has increased. More critical infrastructure is now in private sector hands than for many decades, and the priorities

1. The full analysis that underpins these observations is available in the Interim Report (ippr 2008).

of companies have, naturally, been profit, not resilience. The result is new internal points of societal vulnerability and less direct state control of the services essential for everyday life.

These observations describe a much changed and evolving world. But, just as importantly for UK national security strategy, the relative place of the UK and its major allies in the world order is changing too. In this report, we draw attention to the following important aspects of that context:

- The position of the United States in world affairs is changing.

It is our view that the United States will remain the world's most powerful nation for a decade or more, but it will hold that power in a different context, not as the single superpower, but as the power of greatest overall impact in a multipolar world in which new major players are emerging on the world stage.

The global financial crisis and the recession that has followed in its wake have accelerated the trend towards a relative decline in US political influence. The US faces severe economic strains at home and stronger challenges to its global leadership abroad. At the same time, it is becoming more focused on the genuinely global spread of its interests and alliances, and Europe is becoming less central to its overall world view.

The full effects of the long-term processes of change underway cannot be predicted, but it is possible that with these changes in the US position we may also be seeing the beginning of the end of five centuries of dominance of Western power, institutions and values over international affairs.

- Although still some of the richest countries on earth, the individual countries of Europe, including the United Kingdom, are likewise continuing a long and gradual process of decline relative to other powers emerging onto the global stage. Both demographic trends and future relative economic growth potential suggest a continuation of this trend, unless cooperation among the European powers leads to the European Union emerging as a more effective player on the world stage.
- There are harder constraints on the amount the UK, the US and the European NATO allies can afford to spend on security than there have been for many decades. These constraints are gripping us just as security risks are diversifying, the global recession is biting and long-term pressures towards competition, conflict and state failure are building up in the international system. Financial pressures within Europe may also cause additional strains in the transatlantic partnership.

Principles

Given this overall context, this report identifies and applies principles that we believe should underpin UK national security strategy in the circumstances described. These principles are set out below. While they furnish a view on the specific issues confronting us today, they also act as a guide to the longer-term security challenges facing the UK.

1. The objective of a national security strategy should be to protect the UK population from the full range of risks so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence under a government based on consent.
2. The risks to national security must be defined widely in current conditions, to cover major man-made threats and natural disasters.
3. In playing our role on the international stage, British sovereignty must be exercised responsibly. This means helping other countries and peoples to address their own problems, because in an interconnected world the needs and well-being of our own people are linked to the needs and interests of others.
4. A major increase in levels of multilateral cooperation is needed.
5. Extensive partnership working within the UK, with the private sector, with community groups and with local government and citizens as individuals, must likewise be a feature of security policy.

“In short, the Commission believes that government needs to think broadly, prepare thoroughly and act early”

6. Demonstrating and establishing legitimacy of state action is a strategic imperative.
7. We need to refine our conflict prevention policy. When well targeted and based on a good understanding of the dynamics of emerging problems, preventive action saves money, lives and political relationships.
8. A commitment to building national resilience, especially in our infrastructure, by measures including educating and increasing the self-reliance of our communities, is an integral part of security policy.
9. We need flexible and well coordinated national capabilities, forging a wide range of policy instruments, military and non-military, into a coherent whole.

In short, the Commission believes that government needs to think broadly, prepare thoroughly and act early. Because today’s challenges are more diverse and complex, and because relative state power is now more limited, governments have also to coordinate their internal effort more effectively and to cooperate externally with many other actors while at the same time being careful to demonstrate the legitimacy of the action they take.

This concept, of a distributed², coordinated and legitimate response has been used to shape much of the structure and content of this report.

Policy conclusions

Given the context and principles outlined, we conclude that:

- To help build a distributed response externally, the UK must invest political capital and resources in efforts to build more effective international cooperation. If we can encourage others to do the same, we can push up power, responsibility and effective action to multilateral institutions and extend their authority into poorly regulated areas of the global space. We suggest it is important to do this across a wide range of issues, including energy competition, climate change, nuclear proliferation, the control of biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, transnational crime, cyber-security challenges and the increasingly important uses of outer space.
- To build a distributed response internally in the UK, and to deal with challenges related to resilience, counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism at home, central government needs to devolve and delegate power and responsibility down and out to local government, communities, NGOs, businesses and citizens and to enlist all of them as partners in the delivery of national security.
- To coordinate our own widely dispersed national effort and to better integrate our instruments at national level, the UK needs to strengthen the strategic centre of government and to break down the barriers between departmental stovepipes; to conduct not a Strategic Defence Review but a Strategic Review of Security in the widest sense, which incorporates but goes beyond armed defence; to establish a single cross-government security budget incorporating all areas of spending on national security, including defence; to review the role, relationships and remit of the Department for International Development (DfID) so that its activities can be more effectively integrated with the security effort; and to enhance the Diplomatic Service, so that it is capable of the more demanding tasks we now need it to perform.
- On legitimacy, we argue there is a need to think more creatively and be more demanding of ourselves when it comes to demonstrating it in practice. This is more than a question of values. It is part of the wider political strategy within which our security policies must sit. Our recommendations in Chapter 11 of this report, and summarised below, put flesh on these ideas.

In addition to these conclusions on overall strategy, the Commission has reached important conclusions on a range of more specific issues.

- On the immediate challenge of Afghanistan-Pakistan, we conclude that success there requires: more assistance for Pakistan; more effective integration of the international

2. A distributed response is one spread over a wide area and shared by a number of actors at a variety of levels.

effort; better coordinated regional diplomacy; and the use of military force only within a wider political strategy that protects civilians and builds legitimacy on the ground. Such an approach will be needed also in any future international interventions.

- We call for urgent investment in the UK's strategic gas storage capacity and for more cooperation on energy at the level of the European Union as part of a wider package of measures on energy security.
- On defence, we call for a transformation of the armed forces and, within the context of the alliances of which we are a part, for greater defence capability specialisation. We point to over £24 billion of future planned defence spending that needs to be re-thought as part of a full Strategic Review of Security.

Alliances

On alliance relationships, the Commission has examined the following five options for the UK.

1. The UK could try to perpetuate the status quo, in which the country depends on a version of the transatlantic alliance that is heavily reliant on American capabilities and resources and in which the UK tries to retain full-spectrum defence capabilities but on a much smaller scale than the US.
2. It could pursue a major strengthening of European defence and security cooperation, not as an alternative to NATO but as a route to reducing absolute dependence on the United States while continuing to build more effective multilateral institutions as a longer-term project.
3. It could look to some other intergovernmental grouping, such as the Commonwealth, to play a greater role or choose *ad hoc* arrangements for specific issues.
4. It could try to go it alone and only look for allies when absolutely necessary.
5. It could pursue a hedging strategy that assumes that no fundamental choices are necessary and leaves all four of the above options in play.

In this report, we make a deliberate choice. We argue that Option 2 above serves the national security interests of the UK more effectively than any other. We need to build better global institutions across a wide front, but for the foreseeable future UK security will be best served by our membership of the transatlantic alliance. The cosy status quo, however, in which the US takes much of the strain while Europe dissipates its limited defence and security resources on duplicated costs and Cold War museum armies, will not be available indefinitely. If we do not strengthen NATO by reinforcing its European pillar, not just on defence but on wider security issues too, the result will be neither the status quo nor some other fantasy of wider collective security cooperation. There will be a future crisis that leaves us vulnerable to shifting American interests and opinion, relative US decline and European disunity and weakness, when NATO's political glue fails to hold and Europe is left more exposed than at any time since the Second World War.

The British and European relationship with the United States should therefore remain the strongest pillar of our national security strategy, but it cannot be the only one. Strengthening our security base requires far more effective action at European level. We need to invest political capital, diplomatic effort and financial resources in the European Security and Defence Policy. We have to persuade our European partners to raise their minimum levels of security commitment and resources. And we need to modify the UK's defence posture to pursue greater capability specialisation within the overall alliance effort, a reduced scale of commitment to full-spectrum combat capabilities, and more targeted investment in the kinds of capabilities we are likely to need in the less conventional conflict environment of the future.

There are risks in relying more on others. In reality, however, both during the Cold War and since, we have been living with those risks for many years. There is a greater danger, in our view, in taking the United States for granted or in attempting to rely, inevitably inadequately given the resource constraints, on any effort we can mount

ourselves. No European country, including this one, has the resources to go it alone today and attempting to do so would be a misjudgement of historic proportions.

Resources

On the question of resource constraints and the public finances, we conclude that the debate is jumping too fast towards raising taxes or making cuts, skipping over the question of how we get more value out of what we already spend on security. Both cuts and tax increases may well be necessary, but before we get to that stage we should be fully exploring an approach that:

- Is based on a proper strategic assessment of threats across the whole security spectrum and that deploys our resources in a way that is ruthlessly targeted at those threats on a cross-departmental basis
- Faces up to difficult choices on defence policy and more effectively coordinates and exploits synergies across development and security spending
- Makes better, more targeted use of other resources. If, for example, we can save money by replacing the ID card scheme with more pervasive use of biometric passports, then that option should be explored. If we can save money by building more effective cooperation and collaboration between the MoD police, the British Transport Police and the Civil Nuclear Police, all of which play a role in protecting elements of the national infrastructure, we should look to do so.

We should also adopt an approach that:

- Makes more of our alliances so that the burden is more effectively shared between international partners
- Coordinates wider international action more effectively to ensure better outcomes for the money we invest
- Rationalises our procurement policy to target essential capabilities
- Makes a reality of well planned and relatively cheap efforts at conflict prevention instead of wasting money and lives when conflicts have broken out
- Looks to spread the costs and effort in areas like protection of the critical national infrastructure, energy security and maritime piracy fairly across the public sector, private businesses, consumers and citizens.

We do not pretend that these choices would miraculously remove the resource problem we face, but addressing that problem without a fundamental re-think will undermine public support for continued investment in national security and would be short-sighted. It would also be a missed opportunity because the scale of the fiscal pressure we currently face is an opportunity to get on and tackle the range of tasks we set out in this report and should be doing anyway.

Recommendations

The specific recommendations that flow from these overall conclusions are presented below, in the order in which they appear in the full report, where greater context and detail for each recommendation is provided.

Chapter 3: Dealing with the challenge of Afghanistan and Pakistan

Recommendation 1: The Government should direct more resources at the situation in Pakistan, both in terms of capacity building and operational support to help the Pakistani security forces deal directly with the threat from militants, and in terms of development assistance. The border areas of Pakistan are now the epicentre of the challenges we face in the region. It is from here that both Afghanistan and Pakistan are being destabilised and from this area that militant groups can plan their attacks, both in the region and in the West.

Recommendation 2: In relation to Afghanistan, while acknowledging the need for a long-term commitment on the UK's part, the Commission believes we need much more clarity and realism on the nature of the end state we are there to help deliver. The focus needs to be on

helping the writ of the democratically elected government in Kabul run throughout the country, and on preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base from which to attack us. It should not be on trying to implant our own cultural norms in a country that is not ours.

Recommendation 3: The international community needs a single plan for Afghanistan, developed in partnership with the Afghan authorities, with tightly defined priorities and a determination by all members of the international community to operate it with real unity of purpose and voice. There are over 50 countries engaged in bilateral activities in Afghanistan, and many multilateral organisations are active too. The power to do something about coordinating all this effort lies with the international community, not with our adversaries on the ground.

Recommendation 4: The use of military force, both in Afghanistan and in the border areas of Pakistan, must be locked more firmly within a coherent political plan that is designed to defeat the adversaries we face. That plan should prioritise the safety and protection of Afghan civilians and should be fully explained to the people of the country.

Recommendation 5: The UK government should, with international partners, further develop its efforts at narcotics eradication in Afghanistan by pursuing a multidimensional strategy focused on crop destruction, livelihood substitution, and dealer network disruption. This will help both to develop Afghanistan's legal economy and to undercut the Taliban, which profits from the narcotics trade.

Recommendation 6: The Government should support and encourage the US to pursue a wider regional approach to improving the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many neighbouring countries are affected by what is going on there at the moment and the region has several wider, interlocking security challenges that require regional solutions. India, China, Russia, Iran and the countries of Central Asia need to be brought into a coordinated process.

Recommendation 7: The UK's capacity for combined civilian-military stabilisation and reconstruction operations must quickly grow in-country and increasingly be Afghanised where possible. We have been good at winning military victories in Afghanistan, but less good at building a stable peace afterwards.

Chapter 4: Energy security

The UK has been used to plentiful supplies of energy, often available close to home and at low, stable prices. This era is now over. We are becoming an energy-importing country, more exposed to a range of risks that accompany increased reliance on others. Of particular concern is the supply of gas from mainland Europe, which will be a growing feature of the UK's energy mix in the years ahead. Consequently:

Recommendation 8: The UK should continue to press for an integrated and coordinated gas market across the whole of the EU. The integration of the European gas market is a foundation stone of EU unity over coming decades and it is in all member states' interests to ensure that Europe cannot be divided by suppliers seeking to exert political influence.

Recommendation 9: The UK should, as a matter of urgency, further develop its strategic gas storage capacity, and government should set a target date for achieving the required capacity. Private sector providers will not provide the strategic reserve we need. Strategic gas storage is vital to ensuring supply and the avoidance of possible energy blackmail.

Recommendation 10: The Government should further develop alternatives to gas in power generation. As pressure to cut carbon output increases, a switch from coal to gas is likely in power generation. To prevent this from further increasing our exposure to imported gas, the UK needs to explore renewables, further develop carbon capture and storage technology and, if it pursues more nuclear power, ensure this happens without creating additional security risks.

Recommendation 11: The UK should follow the example of California and establish a regulatory structure that genuinely incentivises both supply companies and consumers to save energy and increase efficiency levels in the use of gas. This again would contribute to reduced reliance on imported gas and therefore to improved national security.

Chapter 5: Defence policy

It is clear there is a black hole in the defence budget. There have also been strains on the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces due to the intensity of recent operations. The Commission believes this situation cannot continue as it is.

Recommendation 12: A full review of the UK's defence requirements is needed urgently, but this review should form an integral part of a wider Strategic Review of Security. It should not be a Strategic Defence Review conducted in isolation from the rest of government thinking on national security risks and responses. The defence component of this wider review should focus on: increased capability specialisation; capabilities required to handle risks that are specific to the UK; a reduced commitment to the full spectrum of conventional war fighting capability; an emphasis on post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction capabilities; and a new approach to the UK's nuclear deterrent, Trident. Each of these is addressed in further recommendations below.

Recommendation 13: The future defence investment programme should pursue greater UK defence capability specialisation within the context of a deepening of European defence integration and the wider NATO alliance of which we are a part. We need a focus on command and control assets, tactical ground-air support, heavy lift aircraft, cyber warfare capability, and Special Forces. We also need to emphasise high quality Service personnel training and an increase in overall Service numbers.

Recommendation 14: The Government should give high priority to the capabilities required to deal with a range of UK-specific security challenges. These might include major civil contingencies, major terrorist incidents on UK territory, small scale risks to UK communities living abroad, and some elements of maritime security.

Recommendation 15: The Government should thoroughly re-examine, as part of a Strategic Review of Security, its projected defence equipment requirements. This re-examination should explore all viable options for capability downgrading and quantity reductions, as well as for complete cancellation of some equipment programmes. For illustrative rather than comprehensive purposes, we suggest that programmes such as the Future Carrier, the Joint Strike Fighter, and purchases of Type 45 Destroyers and of Astute class submarines should be in the frame.

Recommendation 16: The UK should create a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force, only the headquarters of which should be a permanent standing element. This would be a joint civilian-military force, partly staffed from a trained civilian reserve, capable of being deployed into still dangerous post-conflict environments at short notice.

Trident

The Commission believes firmly in the need to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons and in the need for the UK to play an active role in bringing that about. In the meantime, and in relation to Trident, the Commission recommends:

Recommendation 17: The future of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent should be considered as an integral part of the recommended Strategic Review of Security. This should consider:

- Whether, as the Commission believes is the case, a minimum UK deterrent is still needed
- The best and most cost-effective way to provide it, including consideration of whether we should replace the Trident system, as is currently planned, seek to extend the life of the current system further or decide that some other system for providing Britain's deterrent in a nuclear armed world would be better suited to the strategic circumstances in which we then find ourselves
- The opportunity costs of maintaining our deterrent, in all its possible forms, for other sectors of the UK defence and security budget. This must take into account the costs that would be involved in decommissioning Trident and its facilities.

Recommendation 18: In order to maintain the option of refreshing the current system as

part of the Strategic Review of Security, the UK should continue with the crucial ongoing preparatory work on the concept, design and assessment phases of the Trident refresh.

Recommendation 19: To provide maximum additional flexibility in our position, the UK should also now recommence detailed exploratory work on the costs and viability of a further run-on, beyond 2024, of the existing Vanguard submarine hulls, so that the Strategic Review of Security, should it conclude that Trident is the appropriate way to go, can also consider this option if desired.

Recommendation 20: Finally, before any further decision of substance is taken on this matter, Parliament must have a further opportunity to vote.

Chapter 6: Deepening alliance cooperation: NATO, the EU and the transatlantic partnership

In line with the comments made earlier in this summary on the need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, the Commission makes the following recommendations.

Recommendation 21: Regardless of the outcome of future deliberations on the EU's Treaty of Lisbon, the UK government should support, fully engage in and if necessary lead moves to create permanent structured defence cooperation among a pioneer group of European Union countries.

Recommendation 22: Pioneer group defence ministers, backed where necessary by their national leaders, should also pursue increased levels of investment in priority areas such as on-the-ground force protection, improved transport to and within the field of operations, better communications and intelligence, improved logistics and more precision-guided weapons.

Recommendation 23: On the supply side, we need deeper collaboration in the European defence industry, particularly as this relates to land and sea systems. There is still wasted research and development investment in small-scale national defence industries in these areas, inflated prices to the European tax-payer, and consequently missed export opportunities for European defence manufacturers. This all needs to be stripped out, via European defence industry consolidation.

Recommendation 24: To help free up resources for much needed new investments, European countries should each pursue more pooling of resources and a higher degree of role specialisation. Clearly, total reliance on role specialisation would be dangerous in the absence of prior agreement on strategy and commitments to deploy forces, but provided it develops incrementally and takes place on a strictly voluntary basis, it should be encouraged and expanded wherever possible.

Recommendation 25: At the strategic level, there is an urgent need for an agreed EU external crisis management doctrine, which would cover the range of issues from preventive engagement and intervention in hostile environments to peacekeeping, conflict stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction.

Recommendation 26: To ensure that any doctrine is more than cosmetic, there is also a need to invest in the right kinds of European capabilities. EU countries should increase the number of Battlegroups³ on standby at any one time, while expanding the size of support units such as logisticians, engineers, helicopter squadrons, medics and intelligence teams that may be relevant not only to short-term Battlegroup interventions but also to longer-term stabilisation operations. Individual countries should also invest more in building deployable gendarmerie, policing and civilian capabilities needed for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction operations.

Recommendation 27: To strengthen European abilities to deal with less traditional security challenges like transnational crime, and to make more effective use of border crossing points as opportunities for interdictions of arms, drugs and people smuggling, the UK should both more fully engage and support the EU security body Frontex's activities at the borders of the European Union and pursue a much enhanced and more centralised role for the European Police Office, Europol.

3. An EU Battlegroup is a military force consisting of at least 1,500 combat soldiers drawn from EU member states.

NATO reform

Recommendation 28: The re-think of NATO's Strategic Concept, initiated at the 60th Anniversary Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, should be used as an opportunity to re-affirm the commitment to collective defence, as a vehicle to clarify and update the organisation's role and mission for today's changed circumstances, and to stimulate further debate on what NATO solidarity and the collective security guarantee mean in practice in current conditions. Since we live in a world where European and North American countries can be hit hard from a remote point and with long-term effects, solidarity requires NATO members both to commit to the defence of home territory and also to be collectively willing and capable of responding to non-conventional and 'out of area' challenges. This has to become a core feature of both deterrence and collective self-defence, not an optional extra.

Recommendation 29: In the context of the economic downturn, the reintegration of France into NATO military structures and the appointment of a four star French general to lead Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, efforts at the transformation of NATO capabilities must now be accelerated.

Recommendation 30: Far greater consideration should be given to how NATO's military capabilities can be used in coordinated fashion with policing, civilian and development instruments as part of more effective and integrated strategies in conflict, post-conflict and complex emergency situations.

Recommendation 31: NATO must continue attempts to reform its internal procedures and organisation. It cannot any longer be the same tightly organised, consensus-based organisation. It needs reform to its personnel structures, force planning and decision-making, as well as its financing. In particular, the 'costs-fall-where-they-lie' approach needs to be replaced by financial contributions that are based on size of member country GDP. Those countries, such as the UK and Germany, that insist on limiting the NATO budget to nought per cent growth in real terms, year on year, should also desist from doing so.

Recommendation 32: NATO must keep its door open to new members where this is consistent with its fundamental ideals and purpose. The criteria of membership, both civil and military, need to be made clearer and more demanding, but where they can be met, new members should be considered. No non-member state should have a veto over this process.

Chapter 7: Strengthening global cooperation

Action on fragile states

The consequences flowing from weak and fragile states are a potentially greater threat to security today than the actions of strong ones. To tackle this issue more effectively, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 33: The UK government should adopt a political rather than a technocratic stance when engaging in fragile states and it should encourage other states and international institutions to do the same. Providing assistance to incumbent governments in these environments can sometimes prop up flawed and illegitimate political regimes. We need to find ways of delivering financial aid that are conditional on improvements in governance, citizenship, peace and development.

Recommendation 34: The Government should increase its engagement with and support for regional organisations that promote good governance in their spheres of influence. Organisations such as the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), while still facing challenges, have had some success in fostering accountable political governance in their region and would benefit from increased international support.

Recommendation 35: The Government should give full support to a package of measures designed to reduce corruption and increase legitimacy in weak and fragile states. Corruption in these environments further undermines good governance, destroys lives and creates security risks.

Recommendation 36: The Government should commit to more predictable, effective and longer-term assistance to fragile and post-conflict states. Stable assistance packages are particularly important in post-conflict environments where too often international assistance begins to taper off just as the absorptive capacity of the state is increasing.

Recommendation 37: Where it is appropriate to do so, the Government should increase investment in pooled resources for fragile states. Donor coordination in these environments is often poor and common aims and objectives unclear.

Climate change and energy competition

Climate change is the most potent long-term threat facing humanity and the greatest challenge to our ingenuity and leadership. There are no scenarios in which unchecked climate change is good for either international or national security. The UK has limited influence on this issue and an enforceable international agreement on emissions targets is unlikely in the short term. However, we can still act and, in our view, the UK should focus on two issues without which any effective international action on climate change will be impossible: first, how mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries are to be financed; and second, how low-carbon technology development, transfer and deployment are to be organised. Consequently, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 38: The UK government should support the creation of a coordinating body for international climate finance flows aimed at supporting climate change adaptation and mitigation activities in developing countries.

Recommendation 39: The Government should prioritise support for technology transfer initiatives, especially in energy efficiency. While emissions reductions targets and carbon pricing issues frame international engagement on climate change in terms of burden-sharing, the development of low-carbon technology transforms that engagement into a discussion about sharing the industrial gains that will flow from action to meet the crisis. This is inherently more productive.

In addition, because there is a serious danger of competition and conflict over fossil fuel energy supplies in future, particularly once the global economy comes out of recession, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 40: The Government should plan for and advocate a truly global forum for energy cooperation (without precluding expansion of the International Energy Agency). This would help to limit competitive pressure by improving international cooperation and coordination on this issue.

Nuclear non-proliferation

The Commission believes the Government should vigorously pursue the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. This is a goal that may take generations to deliver but action in pursuit of it must begin immediately. In taking action to help bring this about:

Recommendation 41: The UK Government should vigorously pursue a strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions on monitoring and compliance, to provide greater assurances to all parties on the effectiveness of the Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, requiring a state to provide access to any location where nuclear material is present, should be accepted by all nations signed up to the Treaty and the policy goal should be to make such acceptance mandatory at the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

Recommendation 42: The Government should provide further practical help to those states that wish but are unable to fully implement Security Council Resolution 1540 on the safety and security of nuclear stockpiles.

Recommendation 43: The Government should continue to advance the case for the internationalisation of the nuclear fuel cycle and for the creation of nuclear fuel banks under IAEA control.

Recommendation 44: The Government should use all its influence inside NATO to ensure that the review of NATO's strategic concept produces a result sensitive to and supportive of the need for a successful strengthening of the NPT, both throughout the 2010 NPT Review Conference period and beyond.

“There are no scenarios in which unchecked climate change is good for either international or national security”

In addition to an effort to promote a strategic dialogue on non-proliferation among the P-5 (the US, UK, France, Russia and China), moreover:

Recommendation 45: The Government should also fund and contribute to a second, informal track of diplomatic activity involving former senior officials and policy experts from the P-5 plus India, Israel and Pakistan.

Biological and chemical weapons

Biological and chemical weapons are a growing concern. To address the challenges in this area:

Recommendation 46: The UK government should use the period leading up to the 2011 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) to push for the creation of an effective verification mechanism for this treaty and to improve the monitoring of state compliance with its terms.

Recommendation 47: The Government should take steps to restart stalled negotiations on the establishment of an Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, similar in structure to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that was set up in 1997 to ensure implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Recommendation 48: The Government should use its position as a Depository State for the BTWC to take a lead in developing programmes to educate individual scientists about the potential security implications of their work.

Recommendation 49: The Government should work with other major powers to eliminate the loopholes related to law enforcement in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which have encouraged some states to develop new and incapacitating chemical agents based on advances in neuroscience.

Cyber and space security

As we become more dependent on networked technologies and communications routed through satellites, two other areas are ripe for strengthened international cooperation. The first of these is cyber-security. On this, we believe:

Recommendation 50: The UK government should increase its political and financial support for global action to enhance 'cybersecurity', recognising the high priority also being placed on this by the Obama Administration in the US. As a first step, concerted action at a European level is required through supporting and building on the good work of European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA).

On space security, we also believe:

Recommendation 51: The Government should promote the idea of a follow-on treaty to the Outer Space Treaty, and pursue any and all other possible forms of cooperative dialogue to develop the international legal regime around the military uses of space.

Chapter 8: Resilience

As the recommendations above indicate, a theme running through the Commission's work has been that we live today in a complex, densely networked and heavily technology-reliant society. Extensive privatisation and the pursuit of competitive advantage in globalised markets have also led us to pare down the systems we rely upon until little or no margin for error remains. We have switched to lean production, stretched supply chains, decreased stock inventories and reduced redundancy in our systems. We have outsourced, offshored and embraced a just-in-time culture with little heed for just-in-case. This magnifies not only efficiency but also vulnerability. Everything depends on infrastructure functioning smoothly and the infrastructure of modern life can be brittle: interdependent systems can make for cascades of concatenated failure when one link in the chain is broken.

Critical infrastructure

The Commission believes the UK must do more to address the challenges that flow from the context described. In particular, we believe:

Recommendation 52: The UK government should review its powers to mandate realistic minimum levels of resilience in relation to all critical infrastructures and in relation to all

areas of interdependence between different infrastructure sectors. Where wider interpretation or amendment of existing legislation is not sufficient and new primary legislation is required, this should be included in the planned further Bill on Civil Contingencies.

Recommendation 53: The Government should bring together regulators of the different infrastructure industries and require them to enforce higher resilience standards in their own sectors, as well as to investigate and strengthen resilience in areas of interdependencies between sectors and in sector supply chains.

Recommendation 54: The Government should go further and signal to sector regulators that it would welcome investment by utility providers in relevant areas outside their own core business areas where such investment would reduce interdependence on other elements of the infrastructure. Investment by the power generators, national grid and energy distribution companies in mobile communications that are more resilient against power failure, for example, would be welcome.

Recommendation 55: The Government should instruct the Office of Communications (Ofcom) to make adequate spectrum available to ensure emergency service access to next generation mobile technology. This will be increasingly important to transmitting and receiving the data required for situational awareness and coordinated and timely emergency response in the future, and may be especially important for occasions when Airwave traffic is highest, such as during the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

Recommendation 56: The Government should work with the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) to ensure a supportive regulatory environment for rapid investment in Smart Grids. By diversifying and localising sources of energy supply, this technology could substantially increase the overall resilience of the UK's energy infrastructure.

Recommendation 57: The Government should task the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) with the development of security recommendations aimed at mitigating command and control risks associated with Smart Grids as there have been concerns raised in this area, if their use is significantly expanded.

Recommendation 58: Industry should develop marketing communications campaigns to promote the use of Smart Grid capabilities by domestic consumers, including the use of attractive off-peak tariffs that are associated with them.

Recommendation 59: The Government should task the CPNI to carry out a thorough analysis of the extent to which space-based technologies are embedded in our critical infrastructure and conduct a critical assessment of the quality of existing mitigation planning against their loss.

In order to ensure that weaknesses in the software code that increasingly runs critical parts of our infrastructure are minimised:

Recommendation 60: The Government should also approach the European Commission and the incoming Swedish Presidency to sponsor a programme for the creation of a range of secure and reliable standard software modules (such as simple operating systems, database management systems and graphical user interfaces). These modules should be developed using formal methods and be made available free of charge through an open source licence to encourage their widespread use.

Enterprise resilience

Not all of the action required to make the UK more resilient should come from government directly. The business community must make improvements too. To encourage this:

Recommendation 61: The Government and business organisations should work together on a communications campaign, specifically targeting small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), to overcome misconceptions about the resilience of existing infrastructure services. Some SMEs assume that basic services will be provided under almost all circumstances and that back-up plans are therefore not required.

Recommendation 62: The Government and business organisations should encourage major purchasers of infrastructure services (including, for example, logistics and power companies) to demand a range of options and service-level agreements for the availability of resilient infrastructure services against a range of price points. This would help to stimulate a private sector market for more resilient services.

Recommendation 63: The Government should encourage the provision of financial incentives, such as insurance premium reductions, for SMEs to undertake business continuity planning.

Recommendation 64: The Government should disseminate to SMEs real-life case studies of instances where companies have found they have benefited from having business continuity plans in place.

Recommendation 65: The Government should produce ‘boardroom briefs’ on resilience for companies to use in their corporate governance.

Recommendation 66: The Government should promote Business Continuity Planning as an element of Corporate Social Responsibility, establish a scheme of Champions of Resilience, and encourage big businesses to insist on satisfaction of the British Standard on Business Continuity, BS25999 among their suppliers so their purchasing power drives this standard more deeply into the supply chain.

Community resilience

Since central government cannot prevent all disasters or always be on site immediately to provide the necessary response, communities and citizens need to take more responsibility for resilience in their local area too. The Commission therefore believes:

Recommendation 67: The Government should assist communities to understand risk-oriented decision-making processes and outcomes and enable them to access funding to build community-level schemes, local networks and capacity to contribute to resilience on the ground.

Recommendation 68: Local and Regional Resilience Forums should review how they might benefit from further third sector involvement, what relevant training they could facilitate for interested individuals and voluntary and community sector organisations, and how they could more widely consult on and disseminate their emergency plans.

Recommendation 69: The Government should issue more advice to the public on basic preparatory actions that could be taken at a local level to bolster resilience. It is important, in this context, that when advice is issued to the whole population, it actually reaches them. Effective community resilience relies on effective information provision.

Recommendation 70: The Government should examine the extent to which existing good practice in the field of community emergency response and support networks, such as the Keswick Flood Action Group, WRVS (which gives support to the elderly) and the Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network (RAYNET), offer models for broader adoption.

Finally, on resilience, the Government should encourage a response not only from local communities but also from the UK’s information and communications technology community. In particular:

Recommendation 71: Government should facilitate the creation of the cyber equivalent of ‘Neighbourhood Watch’, by engaging positively with the law-abiding technical community (systems administrators, internet service providers, ‘white-hat’ or ‘ethical’ hackers and others) to enlist their help in securing important systems and networks.

Chapter 9: Countering radicalisation and terrorism inside the UK

The Commission remains concerned about the ‘homegrown’ terrorist threat, the quality of the Government’s understanding of the radicalisation of British citizens, and the strength of the ‘Prevent’ strand of its counter-terrorism strategy. We focus many of our recommendations in this area. In particular we believe:

Recommendation 72: The Government, Charity Commission and Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board should encourage and support mosque management committees to employ British imams who are proficient in the English language, have an understanding of modern UK youth culture and are trained to be able to discuss controversial topics such as jihad and human rights with their congregations. This would help to reconnect more established institutions with the young Muslim population.

Recommendation 73: The Government should train frontline youth workers dealing with young people who are vulnerable to radicalising messages in how to address the issues involved, building on work already underway with the Youth Justice Board.

Recommendation 74: The Government should develop further materials to assist local authorities and their partners to understand UK Islam in all its diversity, with its associated cultures and traditions, and to understand which denominations and systems are concentrated in which areas.

Recommendation 75: The Government should commission further research to underpin this effort. This should focus on:

- The radicalising effects of global events at UK street level
- The relationships between non-violent Islamist ideologies and terrorism in the UK
- The processes of disengagement from violence and deradicalisation
- The dynamics of extremism among more recently arrived British immigrant communities.

With regard to information sharing, we believe:

Recommendation 76: There should be further movement from a ‘need to know’ approach to a ‘responsibility to provide’ mentality. Government should share with Local Authority Chief Executives, Council Leaders and Police Borough Commanders more sanitised information and intelligence products regarding perceived vulnerabilities to radicalisation in their respective areas.

Recommendation 77: More good practice on ‘Prevent’ should be shared nationally: it is currently concentrated in only a small number of local authorities, usually those that have experienced terrorist and counter-terrorist activity directly, and the lessons learned need to be spread more widely.

Recommendation 78: The Government should expand the number of high-security police and prison cells. The custody suite of London’s Paddington Green Police Station is now no longer big enough and the lack of appropriate prison capacity elsewhere means that Britain’s convicted terrorists are excessively concentrated in Belmarsh Prison. This concentration does not support our wider attempts to deal with the problem, and it may in fact exacerbate it.

Recommendation 79: The Probation Service’s small, new, central counter-terrorism unit should be supported to develop the capability and capacity to understand and support growing numbers of individuals on probation who have been released from custody after having been convicted for terrorism-related offences. Some such individuals, such as Abu Izzadeen and Samina Malik, have already been released. Many more will be released in the years to come.

Recommendation 80: The Government should explain further how its stated willingness to address legitimate grievances, including with regard to UK foreign policy, will be carried forward in practice.

Recommendation 81: The Government should work with the police and Crown Prosecution Service following terrorist convictions to release more information to the public (from whom, of course, jurors are drawn) about the nature of disrupted terrorist plots. This would assist with public understanding of the nature, location and severity of the terrorist threat.

Recommendation 82: The Government should further review its use of language in this arena, building on the work of Research and Information Communications Unit (RICU) within the Home Office. We welcome the announcement that phrases such as ‘war on terror’ will no longer be used.

Recommendation 83: The Government should review, in consultation with the public, the unintended impacts at community level of existing counter-terrorism policy and practice.

Recommendation 84: The police and partner agencies must now recruit more Muslim staff. Whether in specialist departments, delivering training or performing community-facing roles, the language, life skills and cultural and religious understanding such staff bring to the counter-terrorism effort is invaluable.

Chapter 10: Making government more effective

The Commission believes improved coordination of the UK government effort is vital in current conditions. Not only are security threats and hazards more diverse but government itself needs to integrate a wide range of policy instruments to be effective in response. To strengthen strategic coordination of the national security effort and to break down departmental stovepipes in Whitehall, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 85: The Government should develop the existing Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) into a National Security Council (NSC) at government's heart. This should be chaired by the Prime Minister or, in his or her absence, by another very senior figure from the Cabinet. The central task of the NSC should be to develop a clear view on the national security challenges facing the country and a cross-departmental strategic response.

Recommendation 86: The Government should replace the practice of conducting periodic strategic defence reviews with a process of conducting a regular Strategic Review of Security (SRS). This should happen every five years and should include but go well beyond issues related to defence to consider the security context in its entirety.

Recommendation 87: The Government should create a single security budget, covering the entire national security terrain, as a tool to ensure that the National Security Council has full visibility of all current government spending of relevance, can make informed trade-offs between different security investment priorities, has a ready facility to transfer financial resources between departmental budgets if necessary and can do so in the most effective and openly accountable way possible.

In addition, we believe some changes to the work of the Department for International Development (DfID) are required. As we pointed out in our Interim Report, global poverty and inequality are major drivers of instability, and violent conflict is a major barrier to development. We support moves taken by DfID over the past five years to understand the causes of conflict, to make its development work more conflict-sensitive and to shift additional resources towards fragile and conflict-affected states. To ensure more effective integration of some elements of the work of DfID into the wider UK national security effort, however, the Commission believes further change is needed. As a result, we also recommend:

Recommendation 88: The International Development Act 2002 should be amended to say that the mission of the Department for International Development is to promote development through poverty reduction and the promotion of conditions of safety and security in the developing world. We believe this change is necessary to remove any ambiguity that may exist over a DfID role in development activities not directly related to poverty reduction.

Recommendation 89: The Department for International Development should publish explicit criteria for deciding where its resources are allocated and for what purpose. These are currently absent. As part of this change, we would like to see a portion of the DfID budget made available for activities that would not ordinarily be classified as aid, such as stabilisation and reconstruction activities in conflict-affected areas. In order to make sure that this does not undermine longer term efforts or diminish the assistance for fragile and failing states recommended in Chapter 7, this may need to be done through the creation of a Rapid Response Fund.

Recommendation 90: Government should conduct a review into how Department for International Development and Foreign and Commonwealth Office operations in overseas locations can be more effectively coordinated. We are not convinced that

running parallel operations, as is currently the case in many places, is a cost-effective way of operating or delivers the best results.

We believe that the recommended changes (along with the recommendation that the UK create a joint civilian-military Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force, put forward in Chapter 5), when coupled to DfID's ongoing efforts to improve its role and contribution on issues like justice and security sector reform in-country, would improve DfID's contribution to meeting both development challenges in dangerous places and national, regional or global security threats.

Beyond this, we believe other changes to the machinery of government are also necessary. We recommend:

Recommendation 91: The Cabinet Secretary should have a single senior Deputy for National Security at Permanent Secretary level; and the national security secretariat in the Cabinet Office should be expanded to provide proper servicing and coordination of business for the National Security Council and to ensure that decisions taken by it are followed up across Whitehall.

To promote more effective external challenge to the Government on national security, we believe:

Recommendation 92: The recently created National Security Forum, a panel of eminent individuals from outside government, should have an independent rather than a ministerial chair, a budget that would enable it to commission its own external research, and enough office support to allow publication of its own conclusions.

Recommendation 93: The Government should develop the idea of a single UK intelligence community (by which we do not mean a single intelligence agency, which we are not in favour of), with a clearly identified head at permanent secretary level (who could also be the chairperson of the Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC]).

Recommendation 94: The single head of the UK intelligence community should be given responsibility for coordinating all of the horizon-scanning activity going on across government, in order to ensure that it is properly coordinated and that, where appropriate, issues are brought to the attention of the National Security Council.

Recommendation 95: The Government should increase the capacity of the intelligence community to analyse and make use of the huge amounts of open source information now available.

Recommendation 96: The Strategic Review of Security should take into account the contribution to security made by the UK's diplomatic capabilities and ensure adequate levels of funding for this component.

Chapter 11: The role and requirements of legitimacy in national security strategy

In the view of the Commission, quite apart from being crucial to the operation of any democratic state, demonstrable legitimacy of action can be an influence multiplier when it comes to attempts to manage the international security environment. In a world where power is widely dispersed, it is an important part of the route to issue-specific alliances and partnerships and consequently to greater policy reach. We believe, therefore, that legitimacy is a strategic necessity, not a pleasant bonus, and that apparent tensions between legitimacy of action and seriousness of purpose are, for the most part, illusory.

In our view, legitimacy resides in a demonstrated commitment to a number of more specific ideas. These include:

- A commitment to the rule of law at home
- A commitment to a rules-based international system and to conformity with international law
- A willingness to uphold and protect fundamental human rights
- A commitment to more democratic and transparent policymaking, open to a wide array of inputs and subject to effective public scrutiny and accountability.

The UK has much in its history to be proud of in relation to many of these areas and in spite of our colonial history, we show a solid understanding of and respect for other cultures. Equally, however, we do not always live up to such ideals as well as we might in practice. The more widely a commitment to these ideas is shared and practised at home and around the world, the more likely we are to enjoy both national and international security now and in the long term. Consequently, the Commission makes recommendations in a number of related areas. These include:

The rule of law at home

The Commission believes:

Recommendation 97: Suspected terrorists should be treated as suspected criminals and should be dealt with using the standard Criminal Justice System.

Recommendation 98: The Government should continue to explore ways in which intercept evidence might be used in criminal proceedings without prejudicing national security.

Recommendation 99: The Government should put a draft Constitutional Bill of Rights and Responsibilities for the United Kingdom before Parliament, as a contribution to efforts to win hearts and minds and to help counter-radicalisation.

Public accountability and engagement in policymaking

In this area, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 100: The Government should strengthen the role of civic education in the National Curriculum taught in our schools, with the aim of instilling an awareness of the national and international need for intercultural understanding.

Recommendation 101: As has already been mooted by Government, a single National Security Select Committee should be set up in Parliament, made up of members of both Houses, with a membership also drawn from across other relevant Select Committees.

Recommendation 102: The level of resource and professional support to the Intelligence and Security Committee should also be increased, to allow it to better oversee the crucial but also highly sensitive work of the intelligence community.

Recommendation 103: The Government should dedicate additional resources to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office outreach programme and expand it into a broader ongoing programme which would systematically inform the British public about important foreign policy questions and issues and facilitate a more open dialogue and exchange between interested members of the public and FCO ministers and officials.

A rules-based international system

At international level, we may need to work with a wider range of partners to build the rules-based order that we seek, including through the G20, the United Nations and other groupings. But two issues remain fundamental to our attempts to pursue progress in this area. The first relates to the use of force and the second to human rights. On these, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 104: If the use of military force is deemed necessary, it should be based on the principles of the United Nations Charter or the specific approval of the Security Council. Where the latter is not possible because national interests paralyse the Security Council even in the face of serious human rights violations, a humanitarian crisis or a developing threat to international peace and security, then any action taken should have a strong claim to legitimacy in other elements of the UN Charter, be consistent with international law, be proportionate, have a reasonable prospect of success, and should only be taken as a last resort after all peaceful and diplomatic avenues to avert conflict have been exhausted.

On human rights and torture, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 105: The Government should ensure its own agents are properly trained as interrogators, employ only legal methods, and challenge robustly alleged or suspected torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of prisoners, wherever they encounter it.

Recommendation 106: The Government should sign and ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

Recommendation 107: The Government should use its close relationship with the United States to encourage the US to ratify international treaties, conventions and covenants on the Rights of the Child (ratified by all UN member states except the US and Somalia); the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Forced Disappearances; Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions; and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (increasingly important in a world in which the power of non-state actors is growing).

Recommendation 108: The Government should also put more effort into promoting and defending human rights around the world by applying whatever pressure it can bring to bear on regimes that violate those rights. There is a particular need to do this in countries in the Middle East and North Africa with which we have friendly relations but where too little is done to respect human rights. Although we may have limited capacity for influence bilaterally in many of these cases, we should seek to ensure that human rights issues are a key element shaping the European Neighbourhood Policy, a part of EU activity with a greater potential for regional influence.

Recommendation 109: The Government should avoid attempting to deport suspect foreign nationals on the basis of memoranda of understanding or diplomatic assurances to countries which practise torture, unless such arrangements can include robust independent additional monitoring to ensure the safety of the individuals involved.