



Shared Responsibilities

A national security strategy for the UK

The final report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century

WWW.IPPR.ORG

INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY



About ippr

The Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr) is the UK's leading progressive think tank, producing cutting-edge research and innovative policy ideas for a just, democratic and sustainable world.

Since 1988, we have been at the forefront of progressive debate and policymaking in the UK. Through our independent research and analysis we define new agendas for change and provide practical solutions to challenges across the full range of public policy issues.

With offices in both London and Newcastle, we ensure our outlook is as broad-based as possible, while our international and migration teams and climate change programme extend our partnerships and influence beyond the UK, giving us a truly world-class reputation for high quality research.

ippr, 30-32 Southampton Street, London WC2E 7RA.

T: +44 (0)20 7470 6100 | E: info@ippr.org

www.ippr.org.

Registered Charity No. 800065

This report was first published in June 2009.

© ippr 2009

ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century

This is the final report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. This all-party Commission presents in this report its independent national security strategy for the UK. The Commission is co-chaired by Lord Robertson of Port Ellen and Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon. The full Commission membership includes:

- **Lord Paddy Ashdown**, Co-Chair, former leader of the Liberal Democrat Party and former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- **Lord George Robertson**, Co-Chair, former Secretary of State for Defence and former Secretary General of NATO.
- **Dr Ian Kearns**, Deputy Chair, ippr.
- **Sir Jeremy Greenstock**, Director of the Ditchley Foundation and former British Ambassador to the United Nations.
- **Sir David Omand**, former Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office and former Permanent Secretary in the Home Office.
- **General Lord Charles Guthrie**, former Chief of the Defence Staff.
- **Professor Lord Martin Rees**, President of the Royal Society and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge.
- **Sir Chris Fox**, former Chief Constable of Northamptonshire and former President of the Association of Chief Police Officers.
- **Professor Michael Clarke**, Director of the Royal United Services Institute and Professor of Defence Studies at King's College London.
- **Professor Tariq Modood**, Director of the University of Bristol Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship.
- **Constanze Stelzenmüller**, Director of the Berlin office of the German Marshall Fund.
- **Professor Jim Norton**, Senior Policy Adviser, Institute of Directors and former Chief Executive of the Radio Communications Agency.
- **Ian Taylor MP**, Chair of the Conservative Party Policy Task-force on Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics, Conservative MP for Esher and Walton and former minister for Science and Technology at the Department of Trade and Industry.

We publish this final report in the name of every Commission member.

For more information on the work of the Commission please go to www.ippr.org/security

Acknowledgements

As is the case with most projects of this nature, this report is the product of the labour of many, and without their assistance and support we would never have been able to publish. We wish to thank all those who have contributed to our deliberations over the past two years.

In particular, we wish to thank the incomparable staff at the Institute for Public Policy Research, led by the Commission's Deputy Chair, Ian Kearns. Andy Hull, Alex Glennie and Katie Paintin in the International and Security Programme have worked tirelessly on the Commission's demanding work programme and have contributed to the drafting of this final report. Many others in the Institute, including Matthew Lockwood and Georgina Kyriacou, also helped get us to the finish line.

We thank EDS and Raytheon, who are supporters of all the Commission's activities. We would also like to thank the following for their support of specific streams of work feeding into the Commission's deliberations: Booz & Co and E.ON (energy security and national infrastructure), De La Rue (border security and identity management), the Department for International Development and the Swedish Foreign Ministry (conflict prevention and peacebuilding), National Grid and Ofcom (resilience), the Economic and Social Research Council (policy briefs), Clifford Chance and Amnesty International UK (security lectures).

The views in this report are those of the Commissioners alone, not those of any sponsoring organisation, or of the Institute for Public Policy Research.

Foreword

We publish this report at a critical juncture. The long-term processes of global change described in our Interim Report have combined, in recent months, with the current recession and its fiscal consequences to re-shape the global order and the place of the United Kingdom and its major allies in it. New powers have begun to emerge on a world stage. The United States may well remain the world's most powerful nation for a decade or so to come. But the context in which the US holds that position will no longer be one in which it is the only superpower in a unipolar world. For the new world order we see emerging is going to be multipolar to a far higher degree than we have been used to in the last half century.

Meanwhile, Europe, faced with the need to do far more for its own security, is challenged by a lack of clear leadership and resource constraints more severe than for many decades. At the same time, new challenges ranging from the instability caused by failed and failing states, to the threats from transnational crime, pandemic diseases such as swine flu and international terrorism, provide a new dimension to national security, which is today about far more than old-style conventional national defence and the size and capabilities of our armed services.

We cannot, in these conditions, continue with business as usual. The pressure brought by financial crisis and global change presents us with an opportunity. In this, the final report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, we therefore offer not a counsel of despair, but a call to action.

First, we stress the need to work smarter: to think strategically, prepare for the worst, ruthlessly target resources at risks and work with our allies and partners to anticipate and prevent threats before they become real.

Second, we emphasise the need to coordinate a government effort that spans many departments and institutions, integrating a wide range of policy instruments. This means fundamental changes to government structures, the strengthening of strategic decision-making at the centre and the breaking down of departmental stovepipes. The administrative arrangements of the last century are no longer appropriate for the multi-layered and interlocking challenges we face. We must change not just what we do but how we organise ourselves to do it.

Third, and because in a globalised world we cannot provide for our security by acting alone, we argue that our policy must be to push power and responsibility up to multilateral institutions and to make our alliances more effective. We need new international partners to help build the rules-based international order that Britain, as a medium-sized nation, will need to provide the broader context for our security. Closer to home, we will also need a re-invigorated transatlantic alliance based on deeper and more effective European cooperation and a more equal relationship between Europe and the United States.

Fourth, to deal with security challenges at home like radicalisation, terrorism and the need for greater societal resilience, we argue that national government should look to devolve and delegate power and responsibility down and out to local government, private businesses, communities and individual citizens to build a shared response. Central government can lead and facilitate, but it needs to work in partnership with the rest of us if we are to achieve success together.

Fifth, we place a heavy emphasis on legitimacy in this report, suggesting security policy is most effective when it operates within the rule of law at home and consistently with human rights and international law abroad.

“the new world order we see emerging is going to be multipolar to a far higher degree than we have been used to in the last half century”

In sum, the Commission has concluded that if we remain trapped in the old ways of thinking and the old ways of doing things, the security of our country will suffer. But if we can find the new ways of thinking and acting along the lines suggested in this report, Britain can face the future with confidence.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Paddy Ashdown', with a horizontal line drawn underneath the signature.

Lord Paddy Ashdown

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'George Robertson', written in a cursive style.

Lord George Robertson

June 2009

Shared Responsibilities

A National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom

The Final Report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century



Summary and Recommendations

Summary and Recommendations

This summary is divided into four parts:

- A set of observations on the current security context
- A statement of principles which, in the view of the Commission, should shape and underpin the UK's response to that context
- A summary of the conclusions reached in the report
- A list of all the Commission's recommendations, which turn these conclusions into calls for specific action in a wide range of areas.

Observations on the current security context

As part of the work for our Interim Report, published in November 2008, the Commission analysed the underlying drivers of the international security environment and made a series of basic observations on the nature of the challenges now faced. We stand by those observations¹ today. They are that:

- A process of globalisation and power diffusion is changing the nature of global order, diluting the control of national governments, deepening interdependence across borders and empowering a far wider range of actors than before. These actors include states that are emerging on to the world stage, but also private companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), terrorist organisations, criminal gangs and others. The overall result is increased freedom for some to disrupt or destroy, and reduced state dominance of the security environment, so that no state today can provide for its security needs by acting alone and state institutions in general are under pressure to adapt.
- Fragile and unstable states outnumber strong, accountable and stable ones in the international system today by more than two to one, and disorderly states are now a greater threat to international peace and security than is inter-state war.
- Climate change, global poverty and inequality are exacerbating this problem and the combination of these factors with resource scarcity is contributing to a global conflict environment that still takes too many lives, displaces too many people and violates too many human rights.
- Transnational criminal networks have expanded their trafficking operations in drugs, arms and people and in many countries are undermining and corrupting state governance arrangements from within, facilitating and profiting from violent conflict in the process.
- A globalised neo-jihadi ideology has emerged as a significant driver of the international security landscape.
- We have now entered a second and far more dangerous nuclear age in which proliferation not only to other states but also to non-state actors is a greater danger than inter-state nuclear conflict.
- Rapid advances in information- and bio-technologies are creating new vulnerabilities, making cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism and new forms of biological warfare all more likely in the future.
- The combination of globalisation, urbanisation and ever closer human cohabitation with a greater diversity of animal species is exposing humanity to greater risks from pandemic disease.
- Complexity has entered the physical infrastructure of modern life in the UK and our reliance on stretched and interconnected infrastructures has increased. More critical infrastructure is now in private sector hands than for many decades, and the priorities

1. The full analysis that underpins these observations is available in the Interim Report (ippr 2008).

of companies have, naturally, been profit, not resilience. The result is new internal points of societal vulnerability and less direct state control of the services essential for everyday life.

These observations describe a much changed and evolving world. But, just as importantly for UK national security strategy, the relative place of the UK and its major allies in the world order is changing too. In this report, we draw attention to the following important aspects of that context:

- The position of the United States in world affairs is changing.

It is our view that the United States will remain the world's most powerful nation for a decade or more, but it will hold that power in a different context, not as the single superpower, but as the power of greatest overall impact in a multipolar world in which new major players are emerging on the world stage.

The global financial crisis and the recession that has followed in its wake have accelerated the trend towards a relative decline in US political influence. The US faces severe economic strains at home and stronger challenges to its global leadership abroad. At the same time, it is becoming more focused on the genuinely global spread of its interests and alliances, and Europe is becoming less central to its overall world view.

The full effects of the long-term processes of change underway cannot be predicted, but it is possible that with these changes in the US position we may also be seeing the beginning of the end of five centuries of dominance of Western power, institutions and values over international affairs.

- Although still some of the richest countries on earth, the individual countries of Europe, including the United Kingdom, are likewise continuing a long and gradual process of decline relative to other powers emerging onto the global stage. Both demographic trends and future relative economic growth potential suggest a continuation of this trend, unless cooperation among the European powers leads to the European Union emerging as a more effective player on the world stage.
- There are harder constraints on the amount the UK, the US and the European NATO allies can afford to spend on security than there have been for many decades. These constraints are gripping us just as security risks are diversifying, the global recession is biting and long-term pressures towards competition, conflict and state failure are building up in the international system. Financial pressures within Europe may also cause additional strains in the transatlantic partnership.

Principles

Given this overall context, this report identifies and applies principles that we believe should underpin UK national security strategy in the circumstances described. These principles are set out below. While they furnish a view on the specific issues confronting us today, they also act as a guide to the longer-term security challenges facing the UK.

1. The objective of a national security strategy should be to protect the UK population from the full range of risks so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence under a government based on consent.
2. The risks to national security must be defined widely in current conditions, to cover major man-made threats and natural disasters.
3. In playing our role on the international stage, British sovereignty must be exercised responsibly. This means helping other countries and peoples to address their own problems, because in an interconnected world the needs and well-being of our own people are linked to the needs and interests of others.
4. A major increase in levels of multilateral cooperation is needed.
5. Extensive partnership working within the UK, with the private sector, with community groups and with local government and citizens as individuals, must likewise be a feature of security policy.

“In short, the Commission believes that government needs to think broadly, prepare thoroughly and act early”

6. Demonstrating and establishing legitimacy of state action is a strategic imperative.
7. We need to refine our conflict prevention policy. When well targeted and based on a good understanding of the dynamics of emerging problems, preventive action saves money, lives and political relationships.
8. A commitment to building national resilience, especially in our infrastructure, by measures including educating and increasing the self-reliance of our communities, is an integral part of security policy.
9. We need flexible and well coordinated national capabilities, forging a wide range of policy instruments, military and non-military, into a coherent whole.

In short, the Commission believes that government needs to think broadly, prepare thoroughly and act early. Because today’s challenges are more diverse and complex, and because relative state power is now more limited, governments have also to coordinate their internal effort more effectively and to cooperate externally with many other actors while at the same time being careful to demonstrate the legitimacy of the action they take.

This concept, of a distributed², coordinated and legitimate response has been used to shape much of the structure and content of this report.

Policy conclusions

Given the context and principles outlined, we conclude that:

- To help build a distributed response externally, the UK must invest political capital and resources in efforts to build more effective international cooperation. If we can encourage others to do the same, we can push up power, responsibility and effective action to multilateral institutions and extend their authority into poorly regulated areas of the global space. We suggest it is important to do this across a wide range of issues, including energy competition, climate change, nuclear proliferation, the control of biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, transnational crime, cyber-security challenges and the increasingly important uses of outer space.
- To build a distributed response internally in the UK, and to deal with challenges related to resilience, counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism at home, central government needs to devolve and delegate power and responsibility down and out to local government, communities, NGOs, businesses and citizens and to enlist all of them as partners in the delivery of national security.
- To coordinate our own widely dispersed national effort and to better integrate our instruments at national level, the UK needs to strengthen the strategic centre of government and to break down the barriers between departmental stovepipes; to conduct not a Strategic Defence Review but a Strategic Review of Security in the widest sense, which incorporates but goes beyond armed defence; to establish a single cross-government security budget incorporating all areas of spending on national security, including defence; to review the role, relationships and remit of the Department for International Development (DfID) so that its activities can be more effectively integrated with the security effort; and to enhance the Diplomatic Service, so that it is capable of the more demanding tasks we now need it to perform.
- On legitimacy, we argue there is a need to think more creatively and be more demanding of ourselves when it comes to demonstrating it in practice. This is more than a question of values. It is part of the wider political strategy within which our security policies must sit. Our recommendations in Chapter 11 of this report, and summarised below, put flesh on these ideas.

In addition to these conclusions on overall strategy, the Commission has reached important conclusions on a range of more specific issues.

- On the immediate challenge of Afghanistan-Pakistan, we conclude that success there requires: more assistance for Pakistan; more effective integration of the international

2. A distributed response is one spread over a wide area and shared by a number of actors at a variety of levels.

effort; better coordinated regional diplomacy; and the use of military force only within a wider political strategy that protects civilians and builds legitimacy on the ground. Such an approach will be needed also in any future international interventions.

- We call for urgent investment in the UK's strategic gas storage capacity and for more cooperation on energy at the level of the European Union as part of a wider package of measures on energy security.
- On defence, we call for a transformation of the armed forces and, within the context of the alliances of which we are a part, for greater defence capability specialisation. We point to over £24 billion of future planned defence spending that needs to be re-thought as part of a full Strategic Review of Security.

Alliances

On alliance relationships, the Commission has examined the following five options for the UK.

1. The UK could try to perpetuate the status quo, in which the country depends on a version of the transatlantic alliance that is heavily reliant on American capabilities and resources and in which the UK tries to retain full-spectrum defence capabilities but on a much smaller scale than the US.
2. It could pursue a major strengthening of European defence and security cooperation, not as an alternative to NATO but as a route to reducing absolute dependence on the United States while continuing to build more effective multilateral institutions as a longer-term project.
3. It could look to some other intergovernmental grouping, such as the Commonwealth, to play a greater role or choose *ad hoc* arrangements for specific issues.
4. It could try to go it alone and only look for allies when absolutely necessary.
5. It could pursue a hedging strategy that assumes that no fundamental choices are necessary and leaves all four of the above options in play.

In this report, we make a deliberate choice. We argue that Option 2 above serves the national security interests of the UK more effectively than any other. We need to build better global institutions across a wide front, but for the foreseeable future UK security will be best served by our membership of the transatlantic alliance. The cosy status quo, however, in which the US takes much of the strain while Europe dissipates its limited defence and security resources on duplicated costs and Cold War museum armies, will not be available indefinitely. If we do not strengthen NATO by reinforcing its European pillar, not just on defence but on wider security issues too, the result will be neither the status quo nor some other fantasy of wider collective security cooperation. There will be a future crisis that leaves us vulnerable to shifting American interests and opinion, relative US decline and European disunity and weakness, when NATO's political glue fails to hold and Europe is left more exposed than at any time since the Second World War.

The British and European relationship with the United States should therefore remain the strongest pillar of our national security strategy, but it cannot be the only one. Strengthening our security base requires far more effective action at European level. We need to invest political capital, diplomatic effort and financial resources in the European Security and Defence Policy. We have to persuade our European partners to raise their minimum levels of security commitment and resources. And we need to modify the UK's defence posture to pursue greater capability specialisation within the overall alliance effort, a reduced scale of commitment to full-spectrum combat capabilities, and more targeted investment in the kinds of capabilities we are likely to need in the less conventional conflict environment of the future.

There are risks in relying more on others. In reality, however, both during the Cold War and since, we have been living with those risks for many years. There is a greater danger, in our view, in taking the United States for granted or in attempting to rely, inevitably inadequately given the resource constraints, on any effort we can mount

ourselves. No European country, including this one, has the resources to go it alone today and attempting to do so would be a misjudgement of historic proportions.

Resources

On the question of resource constraints and the public finances, we conclude that the debate is jumping too fast towards raising taxes or making cuts, skipping over the question of how we get more value out of what we already spend on security. Both cuts and tax increases may well be necessary, but before we get to that stage we should be fully exploring an approach that:

- Is based on a proper strategic assessment of threats across the whole security spectrum and that deploys our resources in a way that is ruthlessly targeted at those threats on a cross-departmental basis
- Faces up to difficult choices on defence policy and more effectively coordinates and exploits synergies across development and security spending
- Makes better, more targeted use of other resources. If, for example, we can save money by replacing the ID card scheme with more pervasive use of biometric passports, then that option should be explored. If we can save money by building more effective cooperation and collaboration between the MoD police, the British Transport Police and the Civil Nuclear Police, all of which play a role in protecting elements of the national infrastructure, we should look to do so.

We should also adopt an approach that:

- Makes more of our alliances so that the burden is more effectively shared between international partners
- Coordinates wider international action more effectively to ensure better outcomes for the money we invest
- Rationalises our procurement policy to target essential capabilities
- Makes a reality of well planned and relatively cheap efforts at conflict prevention instead of wasting money and lives when conflicts have broken out
- Looks to spread the costs and effort in areas like protection of the critical national infrastructure, energy security and maritime piracy fairly across the public sector, private businesses, consumers and citizens.

We do not pretend that these choices would miraculously remove the resource problem we face, but addressing that problem without a fundamental re-think will undermine public support for continued investment in national security and would be short-sighted. It would also be a missed opportunity because the scale of the fiscal pressure we currently face is an opportunity to get on and tackle the range of tasks we set out in this report and should be doing anyway.

Recommendations

The specific recommendations that flow from these overall conclusions are presented below, in the order in which they appear in the full report, where greater context and detail for each recommendation is provided.

Chapter 3: Dealing with the challenge of Afghanistan and Pakistan

Recommendation 1: The Government should direct more resources at the situation in Pakistan, both in terms of capacity building and operational support to help the Pakistani security forces deal directly with the threat from militants, and in terms of development assistance. The border areas of Pakistan are now the epicentre of the challenges we face in the region. It is from here that both Afghanistan and Pakistan are being destabilised and from this area that militant groups can plan their attacks, both in the region and in the West.

Recommendation 2: In relation to Afghanistan, while acknowledging the need for a long-term commitment on the UK's part, the Commission believes we need much more clarity and realism on the nature of the end state we are there to help deliver. The focus needs to be on

helping the writ of the democratically elected government in Kabul run throughout the country, and on preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base from which to attack us. It should not be on trying to implant our own cultural norms in a country that is not ours.

Recommendation 3: The international community needs a single plan for Afghanistan, developed in partnership with the Afghan authorities, with tightly defined priorities and a determination by all members of the international community to operate it with real unity of purpose and voice. There are over 50 countries engaged in bilateral activities in Afghanistan, and many multilateral organisations are active too. The power to do something about coordinating all this effort lies with the international community, not with our adversaries on the ground.

Recommendation 4: The use of military force, both in Afghanistan and in the border areas of Pakistan, must be locked more firmly within a coherent political plan that is designed to defeat the adversaries we face. That plan should prioritise the safety and protection of Afghan civilians and should be fully explained to the people of the country.

Recommendation 5: The UK government should, with international partners, further develop its efforts at narcotics eradication in Afghanistan by pursuing a multidimensional strategy focused on crop destruction, livelihood substitution, and dealer network disruption. This will help both to develop Afghanistan's legal economy and to undercut the Taliban, which profits from the narcotics trade.

Recommendation 6: The Government should support and encourage the US to pursue a wider regional approach to improving the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many neighbouring countries are affected by what is going on there at the moment and the region has several wider, interlocking security challenges that require regional solutions. India, China, Russia, Iran and the countries of Central Asia need to be brought into a coordinated process.

Recommendation 7: The UK's capacity for combined civilian-military stabilisation and reconstruction operations must quickly grow in-country and increasingly be Afghanised where possible. We have been good at winning military victories in Afghanistan, but less good at building a stable peace afterwards.

Chapter 4: Energy security

The UK has been used to plentiful supplies of energy, often available close to home and at low, stable prices. This era is now over. We are becoming an energy-importing country, more exposed to a range of risks that accompany increased reliance on others. Of particular concern is the supply of gas from mainland Europe, which will be a growing feature of the UK's energy mix in the years ahead. Consequently:

Recommendation 8: The UK should continue to press for an integrated and coordinated gas market across the whole of the EU. The integration of the European gas market is a foundation stone of EU unity over coming decades and it is in all member states' interests to ensure that Europe cannot be divided by suppliers seeking to exert political influence.

Recommendation 9: The UK should, as a matter of urgency, further develop its strategic gas storage capacity, and government should set a target date for achieving the required capacity. Private sector providers will not provide the strategic reserve we need. Strategic gas storage is vital to ensuring supply and the avoidance of possible energy blackmail.

Recommendation 10: The Government should further develop alternatives to gas in power generation. As pressure to cut carbon output increases, a switch from coal to gas is likely in power generation. To prevent this from further increasing our exposure to imported gas, the UK needs to explore renewables, further develop carbon capture and storage technology and, if it pursues more nuclear power, ensure this happens without creating additional security risks.

Recommendation 11: The UK should follow the example of California and establish a regulatory structure that genuinely incentivises both supply companies and consumers to save energy and increase efficiency levels in the use of gas. This again would contribute to reduced reliance on imported gas and therefore to improved national security.

Chapter 5: Defence policy

It is clear there is a black hole in the defence budget. There have also been strains on the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces due to the intensity of recent operations. The Commission believes this situation cannot continue as it is.

Recommendation 12: A full review of the UK's defence requirements is needed urgently, but this review should form an integral part of a wider Strategic Review of Security. It should not be a Strategic Defence Review conducted in isolation from the rest of government thinking on national security risks and responses. The defence component of this wider review should focus on: increased capability specialisation; capabilities required to handle risks that are specific to the UK; a reduced commitment to the full spectrum of conventional war fighting capability; an emphasis on post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction capabilities; and a new approach to the UK's nuclear deterrent, Trident. Each of these is addressed in further recommendations below.

Recommendation 13: The future defence investment programme should pursue greater UK defence capability specialisation within the context of a deepening of European defence integration and the wider NATO alliance of which we are a part. We need a focus on command and control assets, tactical ground-air support, heavy lift aircraft, cyber warfare capability, and Special Forces. We also need to emphasise high quality Service personnel training and an increase in overall Service numbers.

Recommendation 14: The Government should give high priority to the capabilities required to deal with a range of UK-specific security challenges. These might include major civil contingencies, major terrorist incidents on UK territory, small scale risks to UK communities living abroad, and some elements of maritime security.

Recommendation 15: The Government should thoroughly re-examine, as part of a Strategic Review of Security, its projected defence equipment requirements. This re-examination should explore all viable options for capability downgrading and quantity reductions, as well as for complete cancellation of some equipment programmes. For illustrative rather than comprehensive purposes, we suggest that programmes such as the Future Carrier, the Joint Strike Fighter, and purchases of Type 45 Destroyers and of Astute class submarines should be in the frame.

Recommendation 16: The UK should create a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force, only the headquarters of which should be a permanent standing element. This would be a joint civilian-military force, partly staffed from a trained civilian reserve, capable of being deployed into still dangerous post-conflict environments at short notice.

Trident

The Commission believes firmly in the need to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons and in the need for the UK to play an active role in bringing that about. In the meantime, and in relation to Trident, the Commission recommends:

Recommendation 17: The future of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent should be considered as an integral part of the recommended Strategic Review of Security. This should consider:

- Whether, as the Commission believes is the case, a minimum UK deterrent is still needed
- The best and most cost-effective way to provide it, including consideration of whether we should replace the Trident system, as is currently planned, seek to extend the life of the current system further or decide that some other system for providing Britain's deterrent in a nuclear armed world would be better suited to the strategic circumstances in which we then find ourselves
- The opportunity costs of maintaining our deterrent, in all its possible forms, for other sectors of the UK defence and security budget. This must take into account the costs that would be involved in decommissioning Trident and its facilities.

Recommendation 18: In order to maintain the option of refreshing the current system as

part of the Strategic Review of Security, the UK should continue with the crucial ongoing preparatory work on the concept, design and assessment phases of the Trident refresh.

Recommendation 19: To provide maximum additional flexibility in our position, the UK should also now recommence detailed exploratory work on the costs and viability of a further run-on, beyond 2024, of the existing Vanguard submarine hulls, so that the Strategic Review of Security, should it conclude that Trident is the appropriate way to go, can also consider this option if desired.

Recommendation 20: Finally, before any further decision of substance is taken on this matter, Parliament must have a further opportunity to vote.

Chapter 6: Deepening alliance cooperation: NATO, the EU and the transatlantic partnership

In line with the comments made earlier in this summary on the need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, the Commission makes the following recommendations.

Recommendation 21: Regardless of the outcome of future deliberations on the EU's Treaty of Lisbon, the UK government should support, fully engage in and if necessary lead moves to create permanent structured defence cooperation among a pioneer group of European Union countries.

Recommendation 22: Pioneer group defence ministers, backed where necessary by their national leaders, should also pursue increased levels of investment in priority areas such as on-the-ground force protection, improved transport to and within the field of operations, better communications and intelligence, improved logistics and more precision-guided weapons.

Recommendation 23: On the supply side, we need deeper collaboration in the European defence industry, particularly as this relates to land and sea systems. There is still wasted research and development investment in small-scale national defence industries in these areas, inflated prices to the European tax-payer, and consequently missed export opportunities for European defence manufacturers. This all needs to be stripped out, via European defence industry consolidation.

Recommendation 24: To help free up resources for much needed new investments, European countries should each pursue more pooling of resources and a higher degree of role specialisation. Clearly, total reliance on role specialisation would be dangerous in the absence of prior agreement on strategy and commitments to deploy forces, but provided it develops incrementally and takes place on a strictly voluntary basis, it should be encouraged and expanded wherever possible.

Recommendation 25: At the strategic level, there is an urgent need for an agreed EU external crisis management doctrine, which would cover the range of issues from preventive engagement and intervention in hostile environments to peacekeeping, conflict stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction.

Recommendation 26: To ensure that any doctrine is more than cosmetic, there is also a need to invest in the right kinds of European capabilities. EU countries should increase the number of Battlegroups³ on standby at any one time, while expanding the size of support units such as logisticians, engineers, helicopter squadrons, medics and intelligence teams that may be relevant not only to short-term Battlegroup interventions but also to longer-term stabilisation operations. Individual countries should also invest more in building deployable gendarmerie, policing and civilian capabilities needed for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction operations.

Recommendation 27: To strengthen European abilities to deal with less traditional security challenges like transnational crime, and to make more effective use of border crossing points as opportunities for interdictions of arms, drugs and people smuggling, the UK should both more fully engage and support the EU security body Frontex's activities at the borders of the European Union and pursue a much enhanced and more centralised role for the European Police Office, Europol.

3. An EU Battlegroup is a military force consisting of at least 1,500 combat soldiers drawn from EU member states.

NATO reform

Recommendation 28: The re-think of NATO's Strategic Concept, initiated at the 60th Anniversary Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, should be used as an opportunity to re-affirm the commitment to collective defence, as a vehicle to clarify and update the organisation's role and mission for today's changed circumstances, and to stimulate further debate on what NATO solidarity and the collective security guarantee mean in practice in current conditions. Since we live in a world where European and North American countries can be hit hard from a remote point and with long-term effects, solidarity requires NATO members both to commit to the defence of home territory and also to be collectively willing and capable of responding to non-conventional and 'out of area' challenges. This has to become a core feature of both deterrence and collective self-defence, not an optional extra.

Recommendation 29: In the context of the economic downturn, the reintegration of France into NATO military structures and the appointment of a four star French general to lead Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, efforts at the transformation of NATO capabilities must now be accelerated.

Recommendation 30: Far greater consideration should be given to how NATO's military capabilities can be used in coordinated fashion with policing, civilian and development instruments as part of more effective and integrated strategies in conflict, post-conflict and complex emergency situations.

Recommendation 31: NATO must continue attempts to reform its internal procedures and organisation. It cannot any longer be the same tightly organised, consensus-based organisation. It needs reform to its personnel structures, force planning and decision-making, as well as its financing. In particular, the 'costs-fall-where-they-lie' approach needs to be replaced by financial contributions that are based on size of member country GDP. Those countries, such as the UK and Germany, that insist on limiting the NATO budget to nought per cent growth in real terms, year on year, should also desist from doing so.

Recommendation 32: NATO must keep its door open to new members where this is consistent with its fundamental ideals and purpose. The criteria of membership, both civil and military, need to be made clearer and more demanding, but where they can be met, new members should be considered. No non-member state should have a veto over this process.

Chapter 7: Strengthening global cooperation

Action on fragile states

The consequences flowing from weak and fragile states are a potentially greater threat to security today than the actions of strong ones. To tackle this issue more effectively, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 33: The UK government should adopt a political rather than a technocratic stance when engaging in fragile states and it should encourage other states and international institutions to do the same. Providing assistance to incumbent governments in these environments can sometimes prop up flawed and illegitimate political regimes. We need to find ways of delivering financial aid that are conditional on improvements in governance, citizenship, peace and development.

Recommendation 34: The Government should increase its engagement with and support for regional organisations that promote good governance in their spheres of influence. Organisations such as the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), while still facing challenges, have had some success in fostering accountable political governance in their region and would benefit from increased international support.

Recommendation 35: The Government should give full support to a package of measures designed to reduce corruption and increase legitimacy in weak and fragile states. Corruption in these environments further undermines good governance, destroys lives and creates security risks.

Recommendation 36: The Government should commit to more predictable, effective and longer-term assistance to fragile and post-conflict states. Stable assistance packages are particularly important in post-conflict environments where too often international assistance begins to taper off just as the absorptive capacity of the state is increasing.

Recommendation 37: Where it is appropriate to do so, the Government should increase investment in pooled resources for fragile states. Donor coordination in these environments is often poor and common aims and objectives unclear.

Climate change and energy competition

Climate change is the most potent long-term threat facing humanity and the greatest challenge to our ingenuity and leadership. There are no scenarios in which unchecked climate change is good for either international or national security. The UK has limited influence on this issue and an enforceable international agreement on emissions targets is unlikely in the short term. However, we can still act and, in our view, the UK should focus on two issues without which any effective international action on climate change will be impossible: first, how mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries are to be financed; and second, how low-carbon technology development, transfer and deployment are to be organised. Consequently, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 38: The UK government should support the creation of a coordinating body for international climate finance flows aimed at supporting climate change adaptation and mitigation activities in developing countries.

Recommendation 39: The Government should prioritise support for technology transfer initiatives, especially in energy efficiency. While emissions reductions targets and carbon pricing issues frame international engagement on climate change in terms of burden-sharing, the development of low-carbon technology transforms that engagement into a discussion about sharing the industrial gains that will flow from action to meet the crisis. This is inherently more productive.

In addition, because there is a serious danger of competition and conflict over fossil fuel energy supplies in future, particularly once the global economy comes out of recession, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 40: The Government should plan for and advocate a truly global forum for energy cooperation (without precluding expansion of the International Energy Agency). This would help to limit competitive pressure by improving international cooperation and coordination on this issue.

Nuclear non-proliferation

The Commission believes the Government should vigorously pursue the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. This is a goal that may take generations to deliver but action in pursuit of it must begin immediately. In taking action to help bring this about:

Recommendation 41: The UK Government should vigorously pursue a strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions on monitoring and compliance, to provide greater assurances to all parties on the effectiveness of the Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, requiring a state to provide access to any location where nuclear material is present, should be accepted by all nations signed up to the Treaty and the policy goal should be to make such acceptance mandatory at the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

Recommendation 42: The Government should provide further practical help to those states that wish but are unable to fully implement Security Council Resolution 1540 on the safety and security of nuclear stockpiles.

Recommendation 43: The Government should continue to advance the case for the internationalisation of the nuclear fuel cycle and for the creation of nuclear fuel banks under IAEA control.

Recommendation 44: The Government should use all its influence inside NATO to ensure that the review of NATO's strategic concept produces a result sensitive to and supportive of the need for a successful strengthening of the NPT, both throughout the 2010 NPT Review Conference period and beyond.

“There are no scenarios in which unchecked climate change is good for either international or national security”

In addition to an effort to promote a strategic dialogue on non-proliferation among the P-5 (the US, UK, France, Russia and China), moreover:

Recommendation 45: The Government should also fund and contribute to a second, informal track of diplomatic activity involving former senior officials and policy experts from the P-5 plus India, Israel and Pakistan.

Biological and chemical weapons

Biological and chemical weapons are a growing concern. To address the challenges in this area:

Recommendation 46: The UK government should use the period leading up to the 2011 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) to push for the creation of an effective verification mechanism for this treaty and to improve the monitoring of state compliance with its terms.

Recommendation 47: The Government should take steps to restart stalled negotiations on the establishment of an Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, similar in structure to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that was set up in 1997 to ensure implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Recommendation 48: The Government should use its position as a Depository State for the BTWC to take a lead in developing programmes to educate individual scientists about the potential security implications of their work.

Recommendation 49: The Government should work with other major powers to eliminate the loopholes related to law enforcement in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which have encouraged some states to develop new and incapacitating chemical agents based on advances in neuroscience.

Cyber and space security

As we become more dependent on networked technologies and communications routed through satellites, two other areas are ripe for strengthened international cooperation. The first of these is cyber-security. On this, we believe:

Recommendation 50: The UK government should increase its political and financial support for global action to enhance 'cybersecurity', recognising the high priority also being placed on this by the Obama Administration in the US. As a first step, concerted action at a European level is required through supporting and building on the good work of European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA).

On space security, we also believe:

Recommendation 51: The Government should promote the idea of a follow-on treaty to the Outer Space Treaty, and pursue any and all other possible forms of cooperative dialogue to develop the international legal regime around the military uses of space.

Chapter 8: Resilience

As the recommendations above indicate, a theme running through the Commission's work has been that we live today in a complex, densely networked and heavily technology-reliant society. Extensive privatisation and the pursuit of competitive advantage in globalised markets have also led us to pare down the systems we rely upon until little or no margin for error remains. We have switched to lean production, stretched supply chains, decreased stock inventories and reduced redundancy in our systems. We have outsourced, offshored and embraced a just-in-time culture with little heed for just-in-case. This magnifies not only efficiency but also vulnerability. Everything depends on infrastructure functioning smoothly and the infrastructure of modern life can be brittle: interdependent systems can make for cascades of concatenated failure when one link in the chain is broken.

Critical infrastructure

The Commission believes the UK must do more to address the challenges that flow from the context described. In particular, we believe:

Recommendation 52: The UK government should review its powers to mandate realistic minimum levels of resilience in relation to all critical infrastructures and in relation to all

areas of interdependence between different infrastructure sectors. Where wider interpretation or amendment of existing legislation is not sufficient and new primary legislation is required, this should be included in the planned further Bill on Civil Contingencies.

Recommendation 53: The Government should bring together regulators of the different infrastructure industries and require them to enforce higher resilience standards in their own sectors, as well as to investigate and strengthen resilience in areas of interdependencies between sectors and in sector supply chains.

Recommendation 54: The Government should go further and signal to sector regulators that it would welcome investment by utility providers in relevant areas outside their own core business areas where such investment would reduce interdependence on other elements of the infrastructure. Investment by the power generators, national grid and energy distribution companies in mobile communications that are more resilient against power failure, for example, would be welcome.

Recommendation 55: The Government should instruct the Office of Communications (Ofcom) to make adequate spectrum available to ensure emergency service access to next generation mobile technology. This will be increasingly important to transmitting and receiving the data required for situational awareness and coordinated and timely emergency response in the future, and may be especially important for occasions when Airwave traffic is highest, such as during the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

Recommendation 56: The Government should work with the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) to ensure a supportive regulatory environment for rapid investment in Smart Grids. By diversifying and localising sources of energy supply, this technology could substantially increase the overall resilience of the UK's energy infrastructure.

Recommendation 57: The Government should task the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) with the development of security recommendations aimed at mitigating command and control risks associated with Smart Grids as there have been concerns raised in this area, if their use is significantly expanded.

Recommendation 58: Industry should develop marketing communications campaigns to promote the use of Smart Grid capabilities by domestic consumers, including the use of attractive off-peak tariffs that are associated with them.

Recommendation 59: The Government should task the CPNI to carry out a thorough analysis of the extent to which space-based technologies are embedded in our critical infrastructure and conduct a critical assessment of the quality of existing mitigation planning against their loss.

In order to ensure that weaknesses in the software code that increasingly runs critical parts of our infrastructure are minimised:

Recommendation 60: The Government should also approach the European Commission and the incoming Swedish Presidency to sponsor a programme for the creation of a range of secure and reliable standard software modules (such as simple operating systems, database management systems and graphical user interfaces). These modules should be developed using formal methods and be made available free of charge through an open source licence to encourage their widespread use.

Enterprise resilience

Not all of the action required to make the UK more resilient should come from government directly. The business community must make improvements too. To encourage this:

Recommendation 61: The Government and business organisations should work together on a communications campaign, specifically targeting small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), to overcome misconceptions about the resilience of existing infrastructure services. Some SMEs assume that basic services will be provided under almost all circumstances and that back-up plans are therefore not required.

Recommendation 62: The Government and business organisations should encourage major purchasers of infrastructure services (including, for example, logistics and power companies) to demand a range of options and service-level agreements for the availability of resilient infrastructure services against a range of price points. This would help to stimulate a private sector market for more resilient services.

Recommendation 63: The Government should encourage the provision of financial incentives, such as insurance premium reductions, for SMEs to undertake business continuity planning.

Recommendation 64: The Government should disseminate to SMEs real-life case studies of instances where companies have found they have benefited from having business continuity plans in place.

Recommendation 65: The Government should produce ‘boardroom briefs’ on resilience for companies to use in their corporate governance.

Recommendation 66: The Government should promote Business Continuity Planning as an element of Corporate Social Responsibility, establish a scheme of Champions of Resilience, and encourage big businesses to insist on satisfaction of the British Standard on Business Continuity, BS25999 among their suppliers so their purchasing power drives this standard more deeply into the supply chain.

Community resilience

Since central government cannot prevent all disasters or always be on site immediately to provide the necessary response, communities and citizens need to take more responsibility for resilience in their local area too. The Commission therefore believes:

Recommendation 67: The Government should assist communities to understand risk-oriented decision-making processes and outcomes and enable them to access funding to build community-level schemes, local networks and capacity to contribute to resilience on the ground.

Recommendation 68: Local and Regional Resilience Forums should review how they might benefit from further third sector involvement, what relevant training they could facilitate for interested individuals and voluntary and community sector organisations, and how they could more widely consult on and disseminate their emergency plans.

Recommendation 69: The Government should issue more advice to the public on basic preparatory actions that could be taken at a local level to bolster resilience. It is important, in this context, that when advice is issued to the whole population, it actually reaches them. Effective community resilience relies on effective information provision.

Recommendation 70: The Government should examine the extent to which existing good practice in the field of community emergency response and support networks, such as the Keswick Flood Action Group, WRVS (which gives support to the elderly) and the Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network (RAYNET), offer models for broader adoption.

Finally, on resilience, the Government should encourage a response not only from local communities but also from the UK’s information and communications technology community. In particular:

Recommendation 71: Government should facilitate the creation of the cyber equivalent of ‘Neighbourhood Watch’, by engaging positively with the law-abiding technical community (systems administrators, internet service providers, ‘white-hat’ or ‘ethical’ hackers and others) to enlist their help in securing important systems and networks.

Chapter 9: Countering radicalisation and terrorism inside the UK

The Commission remains concerned about the ‘homegrown’ terrorist threat, the quality of the Government’s understanding of the radicalisation of British citizens, and the strength of the ‘Prevent’ strand of its counter-terrorism strategy. We focus many of our recommendations in this area. In particular we believe:

Recommendation 72: The Government, Charity Commission and Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board should encourage and support mosque management committees to employ British imams who are proficient in the English language, have an understanding of modern UK youth culture and are trained to be able to discuss controversial topics such as jihad and human rights with their congregations. This would help to reconnect more established institutions with the young Muslim population.

Recommendation 73: The Government should train frontline youth workers dealing with young people who are vulnerable to radicalising messages in how to address the issues involved, building on work already underway with the Youth Justice Board.

Recommendation 74: The Government should develop further materials to assist local authorities and their partners to understand UK Islam in all its diversity, with its associated cultures and traditions, and to understand which denominations and systems are concentrated in which areas.

Recommendation 75: The Government should commission further research to underpin this effort. This should focus on:

- The radicalising effects of global events at UK street level
- The relationships between non-violent Islamist ideologies and terrorism in the UK
- The processes of disengagement from violence and deradicalisation
- The dynamics of extremism among more recently arrived British immigrant communities.

With regard to information sharing, we believe:

Recommendation 76: There should be further movement from a ‘need to know’ approach to a ‘responsibility to provide’ mentality. Government should share with Local Authority Chief Executives, Council Leaders and Police Borough Commanders more sanitised information and intelligence products regarding perceived vulnerabilities to radicalisation in their respective areas.

Recommendation 77: More good practice on ‘Prevent’ should be shared nationally: it is currently concentrated in only a small number of local authorities, usually those that have experienced terrorist and counter-terrorist activity directly, and the lessons learned need to be spread more widely.

Recommendation 78: The Government should expand the number of high-security police and prison cells. The custody suite of London’s Paddington Green Police Station is now no longer big enough and the lack of appropriate prison capacity elsewhere means that Britain’s convicted terrorists are excessively concentrated in Belmarsh Prison. This concentration does not support our wider attempts to deal with the problem, and it may in fact exacerbate it.

Recommendation 79: The Probation Service’s small, new, central counter-terrorism unit should be supported to develop the capability and capacity to understand and support growing numbers of individuals on probation who have been released from custody after having been convicted for terrorism-related offences. Some such individuals, such as Abu Izzadeen and Samina Malik, have already been released. Many more will be released in the years to come.

Recommendation 80: The Government should explain further how its stated willingness to address legitimate grievances, including with regard to UK foreign policy, will be carried forward in practice.

Recommendation 81: The Government should work with the police and Crown Prosecution Service following terrorist convictions to release more information to the public (from whom, of course, jurors are drawn) about the nature of disrupted terrorist plots. This would assist with public understanding of the nature, location and severity of the terrorist threat.

Recommendation 82: The Government should further review its use of language in this arena, building on the work of Research and Information Communications Unit (RICU) within the Home Office. We welcome the announcement that phrases such as ‘war on terror’ will no longer be used.

Recommendation 83: The Government should review, in consultation with the public, the unintended impacts at community level of existing counter-terrorism policy and practice.

Recommendation 84: The police and partner agencies must now recruit more Muslim staff. Whether in specialist departments, delivering training or performing community-facing roles, the language, life skills and cultural and religious understanding such staff bring to the counter-terrorism effort is invaluable.

Chapter 10: Making government more effective

The Commission believes improved coordination of the UK government effort is vital in current conditions. Not only are security threats and hazards more diverse but government itself needs to integrate a wide range of policy instruments to be effective in response. To strengthen strategic coordination of the national security effort and to break down departmental stovepipes in Whitehall, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 85: The Government should develop the existing Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) into a National Security Council (NSC) at government's heart. This should be chaired by the Prime Minister or, in his or her absence, by another very senior figure from the Cabinet. The central task of the NSC should be to develop a clear view on the national security challenges facing the country and a cross-departmental strategic response.

Recommendation 86: The Government should replace the practice of conducting periodic strategic defence reviews with a process of conducting a regular Strategic Review of Security (SRS). This should happen every five years and should include but go well beyond issues related to defence to consider the security context in its entirety.

Recommendation 87: The Government should create a single security budget, covering the entire national security terrain, as a tool to ensure that the National Security Council has full visibility of all current government spending of relevance, can make informed trade-offs between different security investment priorities, has a ready facility to transfer financial resources between departmental budgets if necessary and can do so in the most effective and openly accountable way possible.

In addition, we believe some changes to the work of the Department for International Development (DfID) are required. As we pointed out in our Interim Report, global poverty and inequality are major drivers of instability, and violent conflict is a major barrier to development. We support moves taken by DfID over the past five years to understand the causes of conflict, to make its development work more conflict-sensitive and to shift additional resources towards fragile and conflict-affected states. To ensure more effective integration of some elements of the work of DfID into the wider UK national security effort, however, the Commission believes further change is needed. As a result, we also recommend:

Recommendation 88: The International Development Act 2002 should be amended to say that the mission of the Department for International Development is to promote development through poverty reduction and the promotion of conditions of safety and security in the developing world. We believe this change is necessary to remove any ambiguity that may exist over a DfID role in development activities not directly related to poverty reduction.

Recommendation 89: The Department for International Development should publish explicit criteria for deciding where its resources are allocated and for what purpose. These are currently absent. As part of this change, we would like to see a portion of the DfID budget made available for activities that would not ordinarily be classified as aid, such as stabilisation and reconstruction activities in conflict-affected areas. In order to make sure that this does not undermine longer term efforts or diminish the assistance for fragile and failing states recommended in Chapter 7, this may need to be done through the creation of a Rapid Response Fund.

Recommendation 90: Government should conduct a review into how Department for International Development and Foreign and Commonwealth Office operations in overseas locations can be more effectively coordinated. We are not convinced that

running parallel operations, as is currently the case in many places, is a cost-effective way of operating or delivers the best results.

We believe that the recommended changes (along with the recommendation that the UK create a joint civilian-military Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force, put forward in Chapter 5), when coupled to DfID's ongoing efforts to improve its role and contribution on issues like justice and security sector reform in-country, would improve DfID's contribution to meeting both development challenges in dangerous places and national, regional or global security threats.

Beyond this, we believe other changes to the machinery of government are also necessary. We recommend:

Recommendation 91: The Cabinet Secretary should have a single senior Deputy for National Security at Permanent Secretary level; and the national security secretariat in the Cabinet Office should be expanded to provide proper servicing and coordination of business for the National Security Council and to ensure that decisions taken by it are followed up across Whitehall.

To promote more effective external challenge to the Government on national security, we believe:

Recommendation 92: The recently created National Security Forum, a panel of eminent individuals from outside government, should have an independent rather than a ministerial chair, a budget that would enable it to commission its own external research, and enough office support to allow publication of its own conclusions.

Recommendation 93: The Government should develop the idea of a single UK intelligence community (by which we do not mean a single intelligence agency, which we are not in favour of), with a clearly identified head at permanent secretary level (who could also be the chairperson of the Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC]).

Recommendation 94: The single head of the UK intelligence community should be given responsibility for coordinating all of the horizon-scanning activity going on across government, in order to ensure that it is properly coordinated and that, where appropriate, issues are brought to the attention of the National Security Council.

Recommendation 95: The Government should increase the capacity of the intelligence community to analyse and make use of the huge amounts of open source information now available.

Recommendation 96: The Strategic Review of Security should take into account the contribution to security made by the UK's diplomatic capabilities and ensure adequate levels of funding for this component.

Chapter 11: The role and requirements of legitimacy in national security strategy

In the view of the Commission, quite apart from being crucial to the operation of any democratic state, demonstrable legitimacy of action can be an influence multiplier when it comes to attempts to manage the international security environment. In a world where power is widely dispersed, it is an important part of the route to issue-specific alliances and partnerships and consequently to greater policy reach. We believe, therefore, that legitimacy is a strategic necessity, not a pleasant bonus, and that apparent tensions between legitimacy of action and seriousness of purpose are, for the most part, illusory.

In our view, legitimacy resides in a demonstrated commitment to a number of more specific ideas. These include:

- A commitment to the rule of law at home
- A commitment to a rules-based international system and to conformity with international law
- A willingness to uphold and protect fundamental human rights
- A commitment to more democratic and transparent policymaking, open to a wide array of inputs and subject to effective public scrutiny and accountability.

The UK has much in its history to be proud of in relation to many of these areas and in spite of our colonial history, we show a solid understanding of and respect for other cultures. Equally, however, we do not always live up to such ideals as well as we might in practice. The more widely a commitment to these ideas is shared and practised at home and around the world, the more likely we are to enjoy both national and international security now and in the long term. Consequently, the Commission makes recommendations in a number of related areas. These include:

The rule of law at home

The Commission believes:

Recommendation 97: Suspected terrorists should be treated as suspected criminals and should be dealt with using the standard Criminal Justice System.

Recommendation 98: The Government should continue to explore ways in which intercept evidence might be used in criminal proceedings without prejudicing national security.

Recommendation 99: The Government should put a draft Constitutional Bill of Rights and Responsibilities for the United Kingdom before Parliament, as a contribution to efforts to win hearts and minds and to help counter-radicalisation.

Public accountability and engagement in policymaking

In this area, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 100: The Government should strengthen the role of civic education in the National Curriculum taught in our schools, with the aim of instilling an awareness of the national and international need for intercultural understanding.

Recommendation 101: As has already been mooted by Government, a single National Security Select Committee should be set up in Parliament, made up of members of both Houses, with a membership also drawn from across other relevant Select Committees.

Recommendation 102: The level of resource and professional support to the Intelligence and Security Committee should also be increased, to allow it to better oversee the crucial but also highly sensitive work of the intelligence community.

Recommendation 103: The Government should dedicate additional resources to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office outreach programme and expand it into a broader ongoing programme which would systematically inform the British public about important foreign policy questions and issues and facilitate a more open dialogue and exchange between interested members of the public and FCO ministers and officials.

A rules-based international system

At international level, we may need to work with a wider range of partners to build the rules-based order that we seek, including through the G20, the United Nations and other groupings. But two issues remain fundamental to our attempts to pursue progress in this area. The first relates to the use of force and the second to human rights. On these, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 104: If the use of military force is deemed necessary, it should be based on the principles of the United Nations Charter or the specific approval of the Security Council. Where the latter is not possible because national interests paralyse the Security Council even in the face of serious human rights violations, a humanitarian crisis or a developing threat to international peace and security, then any action taken should have a strong claim to legitimacy in other elements of the UN Charter, be consistent with international law, be proportionate, have a reasonable prospect of success, and should only be taken as a last resort after all peaceful and diplomatic avenues to avert conflict have been exhausted.

On human rights and torture, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 105: The Government should ensure its own agents are properly trained as interrogators, employ only legal methods, and challenge robustly alleged or suspected torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of prisoners, wherever they encounter it.

Recommendation 106: The Government should sign and ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

Recommendation 107: The Government should use its close relationship with the United States to encourage the US to ratify international treaties, conventions and covenants on the Rights of the Child (ratified by all UN member states except the US and Somalia); the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Forced Disappearances; Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions; and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (increasingly important in a world in which the power of non-state actors is growing).

Recommendation 108: The Government should also put more effort into promoting and defending human rights around the world by applying whatever pressure it can bring to bear on regimes that violate those rights. There is a particular need to do this in countries in the Middle East and North Africa with which we have friendly relations but where too little is done to respect human rights. Although we may have limited capacity for influence bilaterally in many of these cases, we should seek to ensure that human rights issues are a key element shaping the European Neighbourhood Policy, a part of EU activity with a greater potential for regional influence.

Recommendation 109: The Government should avoid attempting to deport suspect foreign nationals on the basis of memoranda of understanding or diplomatic assurances to countries which practise torture, unless such arrangements can include robust independent additional monitoring to ensure the safety of the individuals involved.

Shared Responsibilities

A National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom

The Final Report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century



Full Report

Contents

FULL REPORT

Part 1: Introduction	
1. Introduction	30
2. Principles	34
Part 2: Immediate priorities	
3. Dealing with the challenge of Afghanistan and Pakistan	38
4. Energy security	42
5. Defence policy	46
Part 3: Building a distributed response: pushing power and responsibility up to alliances and international institutions	
6. Deepening alliance cooperation: NATO, the EU and the transatlantic partnership	56
7. Strengthening global cooperation	62
Part 4: Building a distributed response: pushing power and responsibility down and out to communities, citizens and businesses	
8. Resilience	72
9. Countering radicalisation and terrorism inside the UK	79
Part 5: Coordinating our effort	
10. Making government more effective	86
Part 6: Legitimacy	
11. The role and requirements of legitimacy in national security strategy	90
Part 7: Resources	
12. Resources	98
Appendices	
Appendix A: The terrain of national security policy today	104
Appendix B: Bibliography and list of contributors	108
Appendix C: Policy recommendations from the Commission's Interim Report, <i>Shared Destinies: Security in a Globalised World</i>	136
Glossary of abbreviations	140

PART 1

Introduction

1. Introduction

We publish this report – in June 2009 – in the context of a global recession that is aggravating an already challenging international security situation.

Several of the ‘swing states’ at acute risk of state failure or violent conflict identified in our Interim Report are seeing their economic conditions and stability deteriorate markedly. They include Nigeria and Côte D’Ivoire in West Africa and Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia.⁴ British troops are departing from Iraq, but that country is a long way from assured stability. A number of other states in Africa and elsewhere are struggling with poverty and internal tensions. This trend is already hurting areas where the United Kingdom and its allies are heavily involved in counter-insurgency and post-conflict stabilisation operations, but the problem is likely to grow in the months and years ahead.

As economic conditions drive some weak states and divided societies over the edge, we can expect the shock-waves to affect their sub-regions. Population displacement and further human suffering on a large scale is likely to follow. The problem of ungoverned spaces that can be exploited by terrorists is set to get worse; and the attractiveness of transnational crime as a form of economic survival, principally through trading in drugs and weapons, is likely to grow. Global poverty and inequality, already both present on a scale inconsistent with long-term peace and stability before the latest recession, are on the increase.⁵

The trends were already worrying enough. We still lack progress on world trade and protectionism remains a concern, despite positive talk on this issue at and after the G20 summit in April this year. The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains grave and more NATO troops are on the way to Afghanistan to try to stabilise the situation there. Despite the possibility of real and direct dialogue between the United States and Iran for the first time in three decades, tension on the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme remains high, while the behaviour and intentions of the North Korean regime remain volatile and uncertain. The prospects of a settled peace between Israel and Palestine remain remote.

Progress remains painfully slow on some of the big global challenges such as climate change, which we assess as both the most potent long-term threat facing humanity and the greatest challenge to our ingenuity and leadership. Advances in science and technology and their wider availability, while bringing enormous benefits to law-abiding activities, are creating the potential for lone individuals, as well as small groups, to engage in more devastating forms of crime and terrorism. New types of cyber-attack and biological warfare, and new vulnerabilities associated with each of them, are now either within or just over the horizon. Swine flu has reminded us of the alarm and danger that pandemics can cause and of the problems of managing global health security.

While many of these challenges require more effective and better planned forms of multilateral cooperation, power in the world is simultaneously diffusing into multiple centres, complicating the construction of effective multilateralism. Not only could we be seeing the end of the five centuries of dominance of Western power and European values in international affairs, but even the structures of the relatively stable last half-century may be breaking down. The world could be taking on the shape of Europe in the 19th century, with a many-sided balance of power. We cannot be sure, given these circumstances, that institutions such as NATO and the European Union will be adequate to meet the challenges that confront us. Each faces questions as to its effectiveness and unity.

The dangers that we analyse are therefore both immediate and potential. This final report, as with our Interim Report, should be read both as a warning and as a call to action. However, despite the scale and diversity of the challenges we describe, there is no need for pessimism. The world is largely at peace. Our multilateral experience so far

“The problem of ungoverned spaces that can be exploited by terrorists is set to get worse; and the attractiveness of transnational crime as a form of economic survival, principally through trading in drugs and weapons, is likely to grow”

4. For a map and list of the countries we placed in the ‘swing state’ category in our Interim Report, see ippr 2008a: 55–58.

5. For an account of many of the underlying issues raised in this paragraph, see ippr 2008a. Also see Blair 2009.

has taught us a great deal. The new US administration led by President Obama is addressing many of these problems with fresh energy and a constructive approach to international cooperation. It is also reminding us that periods of change and crisis are periods of opportunity. A huge amount can be done to address today's security challenges, provided we are willing to learn lessons, question old habits, update our world view and adapt our policy solutions and instruments to new circumstances.

Above all, we need to be realistic in analysing the implications of change for our own strategic position here in the UK. For that reason, in this final report, we emphasise four observations that form an important part of its context. These are that:

- First, a process of globalisation and power diffusion is drawing power away from states, enlarging unregulated territories, deepening interdependence across borders and empowering a far wider range of actors than before. The latter include newly emerging states on the world stage but also private companies and civil society organisations, terrorist cells, criminal gangs and others. In many countries, individuals themselves have much greater freedom. This is having profound consequences. State control over the security environment is diminishing, both because no state today can alone provide for all its security needs and because state institutions are themselves weaker. The factors that make up international influence are changing. With power dispersed and more actors involved, it requires persuasion and partnership with others, at home and abroad, to generate a catalytic effect.
- Second, the position of the United States in world affairs is gradually changing. Although the US will remain the world's most powerful nation for many years to come, it will increasingly hold that power not as the single superpower in a unipolar world but within a set of relationships where many other players have a voice.

The global financial crisis and the recession that has followed have accelerated the trend away from US dominance. At the same time, the US faces severe economic strains at home and stronger challenges to its global leadership abroad. As it shows a greater awareness of the global spread of its interests and relationships, Europe will become less central to its overall world view.

- Third, although still some of the richest countries on earth, the individual countries of Europe, including the UK, are also continuing a long and gradual process of decline relative to other regions and powers emerging onto the global stage. Both demographic trends and future relative economic growth potential suggest a continuation of this trend, unless the European powers can cooperate to turn the EU into an effective global actor in its own right.⁶
- Fourth, there are now more severe constraints on the amount the UK and its NATO allies can afford to spend on security at home and abroad than for many decades. These constraints are hitting us just as the security risk profile is diversifying, the global recession is biting, and long-term pressures towards conflict, competition and state failure are building up in the international system.

The upshot of all this is both an unfamiliar geopolitical environment and a changed place within it for the UK and its major allies. We have to learn to live in a more complex, less predictable environment, facing a broader spread of risks, with greater interdependence and reduced government power. New allies and partners may be needed, drawn from outside the conventional circle of Western powers, but from those who nonetheless share our interests. This report attempts to set out how the UK can chart a sensible course through the new terrain and define an effective security policy for itself at this challenging point in history.

In publishing our report, we seek to fulfil four specific objectives. These are:

- To affirm the principles that we believe should underpin UK national security strategy
- Within the terrain defined as relevant in our Interim Report (see Appendix A), to apply these principles to the challenges of our changed security circumstances and in doing so, to say something not only about how the UK should handle specific issues but also about how we should think about security as a whole

6. For data on the trends to support these assertions see ippr 2008a: 26-47.

- To offer a clear view on the big strategic choices that need to be made, both in relation to our overall international orientation as a country, relationships with key allies, and on the key issue of how best to use tight public resources
- To make specific recommendations to government and others across a wide range of specific security challenges and issues.

The structure of the report

In order to meet these objectives, the material in this report is organised into seven parts.

- In this first part, we introduce the report, the context within which it has been written and the principles that we believe should underpin and shape UK national security strategy.
- In Part 2, because any strategic framework must be able to handle the most immediate issues as well as the big picture and the long term, we present recommendations related to Afghanistan and Pakistan, energy security in the UK and changes urgently required to defence policy.
- Part 3 sets out our views on how the UK can best try to push up power and responsibility to regional and global institutions. It welcomes attempts to reform the United Nations and contains recommendations aimed at strengthening the EU, NATO and the transatlantic alliance. It suggests measures designed to extend and strengthen governance mechanisms into poorly regulated territories and across a range of specific issues. These include climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, the control of biological and chemical weapons, global health security, energy competition, terrorism, transnational crime, corruption, cyber-security and the increasingly important uses of outer space.
- Part 4 addresses the need to devolve and delegate power down and out to local government, citizens, community groups and private businesses, both to combat radicalisation in our local communities and to build national and local resilience to major disruptions and emergencies.
- Part 5 moves on to the theme of coordination and addresses how the machinery of government itself needs to change if it is to provide genuine strategic coordination of national security policy, both across its own activities and in its dealings with others. Chapter 10 contains recommendations in this area covering the organisation and role of central government in particular.
- In Part 6 we turn to a treatment of legitimacy in national security strategy and consider the requirements of demonstrating it openly and consistently. We agree with the overall tone and approach adopted by President Obama's Administration in the US and make recommendations for further changes that could assist UK national security in this crucial area.
- Finally, in Part 7, we comment on the implications of all of this for our use of limited national resources.

Our sources

Both this report and the Interim Report that preceded it have drawn on a number of sources, including:

- The published national security strategies of the UK and other countries
- The expert views of the Commission panel members themselves
- Interviews with Cabinet and other ministers and officials in government
- Dialogue with relevant practitioners and experts, not only from government and statutory bodies but also from the private sector, non-governmental organisations and community groups

- Independent research and synthesis of a wide range of secondary sources and literature by the Commission Secretariat within the Institute for Public Policy Research.

In addition, the report draws on submissions from a variety of groups and individuals, the contents of policy briefs on specific issues published alongside the Commission's work, and contributions to a variety of events and conferences hosted by the Secretariat while the Commission has been at work. A full list of sources consulted for this and for our Interim Report, plus a list of all those who have contributed views in written or oral form, is presented in Appendix B.

2. Principles

A key theme of today's security environment is that there is no single threat and no one front line. We have to think across a broad geographical and conceptual front: from the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the pig farms of Mexico and the streets of our own communities here in the UK; from the familiar images of conventional war to the hidden menaces of hatred and ideological extremism. It follows that there is no single actor, no single issue and no single level of action that should dominate the strategic response. Policymaking has to encompass global, regional, national and local domains and understand the roles of civil society, business, local communities, frontline professionals and citizens as well as governments.⁷ Our capacity to network UK government effort across these levels of action and with this wider range of actors will be crucial in meeting the complex challenges ahead.

This is not as unmanageable as it may sound, provided we keep some basic principles in mind.

Foundation stones

We believe the following ideas should be the foundation stones of the UK's strategic response to the world we have described:

1. The objective of a national security strategy should be to protect the UK population, and its government by consent, from the full range of risks so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence (Home Office 2009a, Bobbitt 2008).
2. The risks to national security must be defined widely in current conditions, including but going well beyond a concern for political violence to cover other major human-made threats or natural disasters.
3. In playing our role on the international stage, British sovereignty must be exercised responsibly. This means, when our input is welcome, helping other countries and peoples to address their own problems, because in an interconnected world the needs and well-being of our own people are linked to the needs and interests of others. In a world where problems and destinies are shared, measures to promote international peace and stability and address fragile political climates will often be the best course of action in our own defence.
4. A major increase in levels of multilateral cooperation is needed and must be prioritised by the UK and its allies, even when this sometimes means compromising on short-term national preferences.
5. Extensive partnership working at home, with the private sector, with community groups and with citizens as individuals, must likewise be a feature of security policy implementation.
6. Demonstrating and establishing legitimacy of state action is a strategic imperative in current conditions, since in a world where the partnership and cooperation of others will be required, legitimacy will be central to securing it.
7. We need to refine our conflict prevention policy. When we get it wrong, it can be ineffective and expensive. But well-targeted and intelligent preventive action saves money, lives and political relationships.
8. Not all disasters can be prevented. A commitment to building national resilience, including by educating and increasing the self-reliance of our communities, is an integral part of security policy. This preparation can in itself be a form of both deterrence and defence.
9. We need flexible and well coordinated national capabilities, forging a wide range of policy instruments, military and non-military, into a coherent whole and thinking not in terms of hard or soft power but of integrated power (CAP 2006).

7. See Kearns and Gude 2008 for a further articulation of the points made in this paragraph.

In short, the Commission believes that government needs to think broadly, prepare thoroughly and act early. However, precisely because the freedom and power to be both destructive and constructive is passing into more hands, because the challenges are more diverse and complex, and because state power is to some extent receding, the state now needs to join up its own internal effort more effectively and to work in common cause with many other actors if it is to succeed in building effective responses. State influence on the security environment, in our view, requires legitimate action from a widely distributed⁸ range of actors who are well coordinated, both internally and externally.

Distribution, coordination and legitimacy

We use these ideas of distribution, coordination and legitimacy to structure much of this report and so dwell briefly on each separately and on the relationships between them below.

A distributed response

A shared responsibility to act is required in a world in which power is more widely diffused and the freedom to act, sometimes destructively, is more widely available than at any time in the past. The concept is rooted in the idea that in today's world the state alone cannot deliver security. It no longer has the organisational reach or the necessary resources and does not have in-house all the skills that are required to get the job done. The state must play its part but must also now work with others and seek contributions to action from a number of different actors, including international organisations, allies, private sector organisations, community groups, NGOs and individual citizens. It must also seek to empower and resource its own frontline staff to take effective action where necessary.

A coordinated response

Such a widely distributed response can only be a strategic one if there is a clear overall strategic vision and if the separate efforts of different government actors are themselves more effectively coordinated. In the future, if we are to be successful in influencing the security environment, government itself must think holistically, join up its effort across departments and then bring in allies and partners. Stovepiped institutions must give way to networked ones and it is the docking points and mechanisms between institutions that matter most.

Legitimate action

Action that is widely understood to be legitimate is vital to achieving both international influence and a secure and ordered world. If the UK government wants to maximise its chances of facilitating, coordinating and shaping a response to today's security challenges, one that is distributed across many actors and levels of action, it must do so by persuading others that its overall vision is the right one, that opportunities to influence strategic direction have been made available, and that the action proposed acknowledges and incorporates the expertise and interests of others. We recognise that seeking legitimacy and, through that, shared action often involves compromising on both the range of action to be taken and on the ends to be achieved, but the extra effect conferred by legitimacy and shared action nearly always compensates for this.

Collectively, the principles and ideas outlined in this chapter have shaped and underpinned the development of both the content and structure of this report and they are reflected in our recommendations. We apply them first, in the next chapter, to the challenges of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“In the future, if we are to be successful in influencing the security environment, government itself must think holistically, join up its effort across departments and then bring in allies and partners”

8. A distributed response is one spread over a wide area and shared by a number of actors at a variety of levels.

PART 2

Immediate priorities

3. Dealing with the challenge of Afghanistan and Pakistan

What is at stake?

There is much at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. At a minimum, this can be said to include:

- The long-term interests of both countries and their peoples, as their future well-being is uncertain and terrorist and militant groups are a threat to the stability of both
- The stability of the entire region. As illustrated by the events in Mumbai in late November 2008 and their effects on the India-Pakistan relationship, terrorist acts in the area have the potential to escalate inter-state tensions, perhaps to the point of open conflict
- The danger that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and technology may fall into the hands of militant groups, both inside and outside the country
- The credibility of NATO, as the lead international actor engaged in attempts to provide security throughout Afghanistan
- The national security of the UK and its allies, since a large percentage of the most serious terrorist plots to attack the UK have links directly to Pakistan and the 9/11 attacks on the US were planned and orchestrated from Afghanistan
- Preventing the radicalisation of sections of our own population. We know that among the approximately 400,000 British residents of Pakistani heritage who make a trip to Pakistan each year, the vast majority go to visit family or friends or for other legitimate reasons, but a small minority go to train as terrorists (Bergen and Cruickshank 2006)
- The struggle to protect our communities from the socially damaging and economically costly consequences of the supply of heroin which reaches our streets from Afghanistan, in large measure via Pakistan. Indeed, Afghanistan is the source of 90 per cent of the heroin entering the UK with approximately half of this being smuggled through Pakistan (Cabinet Office 2009a).

We cannot relinquish our commitments in the region or accept failure as the outcome. The alternative would be a less stable region, a base both in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan from which militant and neo-jihadi groups including Al Qaeda can attack us, and a renewed and stronger threat to our own safety and well-being here at home.

Progress to date and current conditions

The UK is investing large sums of money⁹ and British military and civilian personnel are serving with great bravery and distinction in Afghanistan in particular. As a result, some overall progress has been made:

- In Afghanistan, GDP per head is up, at over 70 per cent since 2002. Around 4.7 million more children attended school in 2007 than in 2001, including two million girls who had been denied education under the Taliban regime. The percentage of the population with access to basic health services is also up, from 9 per cent in 2003 to 82 per cent in 2006 (Cabinet Office 2009a).
- The UK has made some recent progress in joining up its military and civilian effort in Afghanistan's Helmand Province and in increasing the number of UK civilians serving as members of joint civilian and military teams.¹⁰ In places like the village of Garmsir in Helmand, stabilisation and reconstruction lessons are being learned and applied on the ground. But there is still a long way to go to develop our overall approach and capability in this area, not least in improving DfID's ability to deliver immediate post-conflict reconstruction effect when the soldiers' job is finished.

9. 'The costs of UK military operations in Afghanistan increased from £750 million in 2006-07 to £1.5bn in 2007-08, and to 2.6bn in 2008-09. At the same time, development and stabilisation spending increased from £154m in 2006-07, to £168m in 2007-08, and to £207m in 2008-09' (Cabinet Office 2009a: 8). 'In 2006, the UK and Pakistani Prime Ministers signed a 10 year development partnership. The latest stage in delivering that partnership is a programme of £665m in development assistance to Pakistan in the four year period 2009-2013' (Cabinet Office 2009a : 25).

10. According to the UK government's recent strategy document on Afghanistan and Pakistan, the joint civilian and military team in Helmand now numbers 165, of whom 80 are civilians. The latter figure represents a two-fold increase over the last 12-14 months (Cabinet Office 2009a: 21).

- In Pakistan, despite political turmoil, the country has moved from military dictatorship to democracy in the recent past and its government has begun to address long-term problems with some structural economic reforms.

Nevertheless, conditions in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are extremely difficult and the progress made in both is less than satisfactory:

- In Afghanistan, the insurgency continues, making the overall security situation there difficult, with Taliban and other armed groups linked to drugs networks and criminal gangs operating on both sides of the Pakistani border, intimidating local populations, and conducting terrorist and guerrilla attacks on international and Afghan targets through the use of road-side bombs and suicide attacks. The drugs trade is well established in some areas, undermining and corrupting governance.
- In Pakistan, militant and terrorist groups active in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are becoming more confident, taking hold of more territory in recent months and moving out of the border areas and closer to Islamabad in the process. There is also a separatist insurgency in Baluchistan. This is a region that borders Helmand province in Afghanistan, is a vital supply route for international forces in the South of the country, a primary supply route for opiates smuggled to the UK and a base from which Afghan insurgents can train and prepare to conduct attacks on targets within Afghanistan.
- The Pakistani military has suffered substantial casualties in engaging militant groups. In the Swat Valley, combat between the Pakistani military and insurgents has led to a humanitarian crisis. The civilian population of Pakistan has also been subjected to a vicious campaign of suicide bombings in recent years. Over 5,000 Pakistani civilians have been killed by suicide bombers since 9/11, over half of these in the last 20 months (Cabinet Office 2009a).

Neither the Afghan nor the Pakistani security forces are well placed to deal with these challenges. In Afghanistan, both the military and police are relatively underdeveloped while Pakistan's well funded army is more suited to conventional warfare than to the demands of counter-insurgency in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

The severity of the region's economic problems makes winning popular support against the insurgents more difficult. In Afghanistan economic growth has slowed markedly over the last 18 months. Unemployment is at around 30 per cent, over half of the population lives in poverty and one in five children born in rural areas dies before reaching the age of five. Nearly 70 per cent of the population do not have access to clean drinking water and over 90 per cent are without access to reliable electricity. Life expectancy in Afghanistan stands at just 43 years (Cabinet Office 2009a).

Pakistan's economic conditions are also deteriorating. After facing rapidly shrinking foreign currency reserves and inflation of 25 per cent, the government was forced to negotiate a US\$7.6 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund in November 2008. The economy has experienced a steep downturn and this comes on top of already extremely difficult economic circumstances. Over 20 per cent of the population of 160 million lives in poverty and half of the population is illiterate, including two thirds of all women (Cabinet Office 2009a).

Recent policy context

Recent changes in approach in both the US and the UK are a positive sign. In particular, the Commission welcomes:

- The shift to addressing the linked but different problems facing Afghanistan and Pakistan within a single coordinated approach
- The commitments made by a number of NATO countries and others in recent months to increase troop numbers and resources going into Afghanistan
- The emphasis on getting the Afghan and Pakistani governments to work more closely together to address mutual problems in the border areas

- The continued emphasis on pursuing a comprehensive and integrated civilian-military approach to stabilisation and reconstruction in Afghanistan and to getting more development aid into the border areas of Pakistan, even in conditions that are not secure
- The stated desire, in the UK's most recent Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy (Cabinet Office 2009a), to pursue a more coordinated approach among international actors operating in Afghanistan in particular.

We believe all these measures are necessary to success. We do not, however, believe they are sufficient.

Policy recommendations

In addition to recent policy developments, the Commission believes other policy changes are required. In particular, we make the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: The UK government should direct more resources at the situation in Pakistan, both in terms of capacity building and operational support to help the Pakistani security forces deal directly with the threat from militants, and in terms of development assistance.

The border regions of Pakistan are now the epicentre of this problem. It is from this area that both Afghanistan and Pakistan are being destabilised and from this area that terrorist and militant groups can plan attacks against us, both in the region and in the West. We acknowledge that UK aid to Pakistan is the fifth largest of any contribution in the world, that there are problems with corruption and that getting development assistance to some parts of the country is difficult for security reasons. Even on current plans, however, we are spending only around 1.82 per cent of the DfID budget in Pakistan and only a fraction of what we currently spend on operations in Afghanistan (figures for 2007–08; see DfID 2008). Given the overwhelming importance of the issues at stake in Pakistan, the direct links to security threats being faced in the UK and the UK's historic, extensive population links to the country, this commitment needs to rise further still wherever this can be done effectively, and to be used both to help the country develop as a whole and to make progress in the FATA and other border areas.

Recommendation 2: In relation to Afghanistan, while acknowledging the need for a long-term commitment on our part, the Commission believes we need much more clarity and realism on the nature of the end state we are there to help deliver.

The goal should be to ensure that the writ of the democratically elected government in Kabul runs throughout the country, that Afghanistan cannot be used as a base from which to plan and carry out terrorist attacks against the UK and its allies and that the Afghan people have mechanisms to hold their own government to account and choose their own political future. Our goal should not be to implant our own cultural norms in a country that is not ours.

Even with this greater clarity on our goal, if we do not address the almost total lack of effective coordination of the international effort in Afghanistan, we will continue to make only slow progress and will pay the price in lives of soldiers and Afghan civilians. Consequently:

Recommendation 3: The international community needs a single plan for Afghanistan, developed in partnership with the Afghan authorities, with tightly defined priorities and a determination by all members of the international community to operate it with real unity of purpose and voice.

We acknowledge that there have been welcome developments, such as efforts to coordinate the international donor effort through a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, and through the NATO commander now also acting as the commander of US forces so that all international forces come under the same command. But there is still a problem. There are around 50 countries involved on a bilateral basis in Afghanistan and the UN, NATO, EU, World Bank and others are all active there. The power to improve coordination of this widely dispersed effort is in the hands of the international

community and the initiative must not be left with our adversaries on the ground. Given what is at stake, the UK needs to invest real political capital, with our allies, to do something about it. We are wasting money and risking lives by not doing so.

In addition:

Recommendation 4: The use of military force, both in Afghanistan and in the border areas of Pakistan, must be locked more firmly within a coherent political plan that is designed to defeat the adversaries we face. That plan should prioritise the safety and protection of Afghan civilians and should be fully explained to the people of the country.

We made a similar recommendation in general terms in our Interim Report (see this report, Appendix C). When Western forces frequently use air strikes that kill innocent civilians in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, we undermine our legitimacy in the eyes of the local population whom we need to win over. In the process, we make it harder to defeat the militant and neo-jihadi insurgency.

Since the illicit trade in narcotics inhibits the development of Afghanistan's legal economy, helps to fund the Taliban, and provides 90 per cent of the heroin reaching the streets of the UK, and since the UK has a specific responsibility to assist in drug eradication, there is also a need to do more to address the drugs problem. This is not easy, but we believe that:

Recommendation 5: The UK government should, with international partners, further develop its efforts at narcotics eradication in Afghanistan by pursuing a multidimensional strategy focused on crop destruction, livelihood substitution, and dealer network disruption.

This would help both to undercut the Taliban and to lay a stronger foundation for the long-term economic development of Afghanistan.

Because the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan involve or affect many neighbouring states, and because the region in which Afghanistan and Pakistan sit has a wider and interlocking range of security challenges, we also believe that:

Recommendation 6: The UK government should support and encourage the US to pursue a wider regional approach to improving the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

India, China, Russia, Iran and the countries of Central Asia need to be brought into a coordinated process aimed at addressing these multiple interlocking issues, thereby creating a context supportive of peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves. There may even be merit in exploring the extent to which we can draw in other Islamic nations, especially to help on the ground in Pakistan.

Notwithstanding the small-scale progress already made at operational level on combining civilian and military operations in conflict environments, much more needs to be done. While the UK is good at projecting force in the conventional sense, we are less good at recognising the limits to the utility of force and at projecting post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction capacity. We have suffered set-backs in the past in places like Musa Qala (in Helmand) by not being able to send in civilian specialists quickly enough behind the soldiers doing the fighting. This is often for reasons to do with the duty of care arrangements for civilian staff.

We return to this issue both in Chapter 5 on UK defence policy and in Chapter 6 on our approach to coordinating our defence and security efforts with the US, NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, in relation to Afghanistan, we remain convinced that:

Recommendation 7: Our capacity for combined civilian-military stabilisation and reconstruction operations must quickly grow in-country and increasingly be 'Afghanised' where possible.

The challenge being faced in Afghanistan and Pakistan is enormous. There are no easy options. The additional measures outlined above would move us in the right direction, however, and it is vital to follow through on them. If we persist with the current approach, the result will be failure in a high-profile and essential alliance undertaking.

“While the UK is good at projecting force in the conventional sense, we are less good at recognising the limits to the utility of force and at projecting post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction capacity”

4. Energy security

The UK has been used to plentiful supplies of energy, often available close to home and at low, stable prices. This era is now over and we are entering a new energy world with greater risks for the country. Energy security is a first order national security challenge for the United Kingdom and we need to take further action to ensure security of energy supplies as a matter of urgency (Taylor 2008 and Neville-Jones 2009a).

The UK and international context

The decline of oil and gas supplies from the North Sea, coupled with the fact that the UK is currently dependent on fossil fuels (coal, gas, and oil) for around 90 per cent of its energy needs, means that the UK will become increasingly dependent on imports for its energy and more open to threats of disruptions in supply in the years ahead (Bird 2007).

At the European level there are already concerns about Russia, an important regional supplier of gas which has increasingly sought to use energy supply for political ends, and about overall gas supply constraints in the medium term.

At the global level, though the global recession has seen a pause in the tightening of energy markets and lower prices than those experienced in 2008, we can expect to see a resumption of intense competition for oil, gas and to some extent coal in the years ahead, as the global economy recovers.¹¹ Unmitigated climate change could also seriously exacerbate economic disruption and security challenges worldwide. There is a need to think beyond the current period of hydrocarbon energy dependence by starting now (including as individuals) to focus more determinedly on renewable energy sources.¹²

Policy goals: energy and security

Given the situation outlined above, our goal for energy policy should not solely be security of supply, but rather energy alongside wider national and international security. This means a focus on physical security of energy supply but it also means developing ways of sourcing and using energy that:

- (i) mitigate climate change and the insecurity that it will generate
- (ii) limit and manage, as far as is possible, the UK and EU's exposure to international political risks such as energy blackmail or deliberate supply disruption
- (iii) avoid exacerbating instability and conflict in countries and regions involved in energy supply
- (iv) avoid producing additional and unmanaged nuclear safety or proliferation risks as a by-product of attempts to expand nuclear energy in response to climate change.

This is obviously a wider and more complex goal than traditional energy security. However, if we do not think about energy and security in this integrated way, the danger is that we will obtain short-term security of supply at the cost of hugely increased insecurity in other areas over the long term. This, sooner or later, would itself undermine security of energy supply.

We need new policy in a number of areas and we include policy recommendations in this report in relation to three of them. In Chapter 7 on international cooperation, we table specific proposals related to climate change and further cooperation on supply and demand in fossil fuel markets (principally oil). We see the need both to reduce competition for supplies and to help reduce the resource curse in oil and gas exporting countries, as well as to ensure that any resurgence in the global nuclear industry in response to climate change does not result in additional nuclear proliferation risks. In Chapter 8, and as part of a wider discussion on the requirements of resilience in the UK,

11. Although the recession has reduced demand, it has also reduced investment in energy projects and infrastructure which means that when the recovery does come, we may quickly move back into a situation where energy markets are very tight and competition for supplies is intense.

12. For our treatment of the likely security effects of climate change, see *ippr 2008a*: 40–43.

we discuss the issue of distributed energy generation at home and the role of ‘smart grids’. In this chapter, we limit ourselves to a discussion of market-based security of supply issues for the UK in the short to medium term.

Security of supply

Natural gas is key for the security of our energy supply for UK industry and electricity generation, and also for heating our homes. As noted in our Interim Report, UK Continental Shelf production is in decline and by 2020 we expect to be 80–90 per cent dependent on imports (ippr 2008a). Unlike oil, which is a globally traded commodity, the UK will be sourcing gas imports largely from a regional European market (with some Liquefied Natural Gas [LNG] from further afield).

The Government expects that, over the next decade or so, imports of gas to the UK will come primarily from Norway (rising from around 20 billion cubic metres [bcm] per year now to around 35 bcm per year by 2013), and secondarily from the Continent (rising to 12 bcm per year by around 2017) (DECC 2008). The latter figure means that the UK will have to get part of its gas from suppliers to Continental European markets via the interconnector with Belgium. Currently these imports are small relative to Norwegian sources, but they will grow; and they already play an important role in the period of peak winter demand. There is also likely to be a rising share of imports from LNG by tanker from a diverse range of producers in the Middle East, the Caribbean, North Africa and Asia, but this will make up a much smaller share of the UK total (DECC 2008, Noël 2008).

The main supply-security concerns are related to increasing UK dependence on imported gas through mainland Europe. These concerns are threefold.

First, there is the politicisation of gas supplies to Europe by Russia (Helm 2007). Russia supplies a little over a quarter of the gas used in the 27 EU member states and also plays a dominant role in the wider market, where it has floated the idea of a gas equivalent of OPEC and has sought strategic pricing agreements with other supplying countries, such as Algeria (Helm 2007). Supplies to the eastern and central parts of the EU have been interrupted quite seriously on two recent occasions, once in early 2006 and again in 2009, due to an apparent dispute between Russia and its neighbouring transit country, Ukraine.

While this situation is serious, the problem should not be overstated: it does not necessarily follow that Russia is interested in regularly interrupting gas supplies to Europe for any length of time (Noël 2008). Russia may have a higher pain threshold than many Western countries, but it is financially more dependent on gas exports to Europe and on European investment to help in its modernisation than Europe is dependent on gas imports from Russia. At the same time, companies in Germany, Italy and France – which between them account for over half of Russian imports into the EU – have close and stable bilateral arrangements with Russia’s Gazprom, with contracts for gas supply running into the 2030s, and Russia has not threatened these. That said, some EU states have been seriously affected by the Russia-Ukraine disputes, principally the small former Communist countries in the east. Six out of the ten new member states of the EU – those that have joined since 2004 – import more than 80 per cent of their gas from Russia (Noël 2008).

Second, a lack of liquidity and integration in European gas markets increases the level of risk. Under tight conditions and especially when there is a political crisis, European gas markets do not always function smoothly, meaning that even when prices are higher in the UK than in the rest of the EU, it is not always possible to obtain supplies. This is because energy companies in other countries (often with a history of national ownership) retain as much gas as they can for their own domestic markets. Pipeline links elsewhere in Europe are also underdeveloped, meaning that when some member states of the EU are suffering from politically motivated shortages of gas supply, there is insufficient option to sell and provide gas to these countries from elsewhere in the Union. This lack of integration raises both supply-security and solidarity issues.

“The integration of the European gas market is a foundation stone of EU unity over coming decades and it is in all member states’ interests to ensure that Europe cannot be divided by suppliers seeking to exert political influence”

Third, there is the possibility of overall limits to growth in gas supply to Europe over the next 10 years as global supply and infrastructure issues create a tighter supply and demand position. There has been a severe drying up of investment in new exploration and production during the recession and this will translate into significant pressure on supplies when the global economy picks up. Supplies in continental Europe may therefore come under greater long-term strain, with knock-on effects for price and availability in the UK.

Action must be taken urgently to address each aspect of this challenge.

Policy recommendations on security of supply

In the view of the Commission:

Recommendation 8: The UK should continue to press for an integrated and coordinated gas market across the whole of the EU.

The integration of the European gas market is a foundation stone of EU unity over coming decades and it is in all member states’ interests to ensure that Europe cannot be divided by suppliers seeking to exert political influence.

The main barriers to this are political, not legal or technical. France and Germany hold the key, as they perceive they have the most to lose. EU gas market integration will only be possible when other EU members find ways of meeting the concerns that these countries have, and ways of demonstrating the potential gain to them of a shift towards greater integration and liberalisation.

Recommendation 9: The UK should as a matter of urgency significantly expand its strategic gas storage capacity and the Government should set itself a challenging deadline to get this done.

We currently have gas storage capacity for the equivalent of around 15 days of supply. This represents considerable capacity to meet gaps that might arise at periods of winter peak demand and some additional capacity is under construction. National Grid expects a build-up of capacity to the equivalent of around 36 days by 2020 (DECC 2008).

However, there is both a short-term concern that the financial crisis and credit shortage will have a negative impact on current and proposed storage projects and a more fundamental and longer-term issue that must be addressed. The Government currently relies on commercial operators to build and operate storage facilities, mainly for managing seasonal price fluctuations. The private sector will not by itself, however, build *strategic* storage facilities that will, by their nature, rarely be used (Helm 2007). This is reflected in the fact that other EU countries with smaller gas markets but longer histories of import dependence have already built much larger storage capacities – the equivalent of 99 days in the case of Germany and 122 days in France.

In addition to encouraging the private sector to deliver commercial gas storage facilities, the Government should therefore develop a framework for the delivery of a *strategic* gas storage facility, based on scenarios of supply interruptions via pipelines and tanker. There will be a cost to constructing strategic storage, but, just as with stockpiling medicines in case of pandemics, there is a clear public-good argument that must be made for meeting that cost.

Recommendation 10: The Government should further develop alternatives to gas in power generation.

Electricity generation may need to increase if, as seems likely, there is major growth in the use of fully or hybrid electric vehicles. Gas use in power generation may also be expected to increase substantially across Europe as a result of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which will tend to drive fuel-switching to gas and away from carbon-intensive coal (Lewis and Curien 2008).

To avoid further reliance on gas to meet electricity needs in this context, other options must be explored. These include:

- **An expansion of renewable sources of electricity.** The Government anticipates that achieving the target for 20 per cent renewable energy by 2020 will reduce gas imports by 12–16 per cent against the business as usual scenario. However, major challenges remain in reaching that target, including grid extension for offshore wind, accelerating planning processes, getting the long-term funding mechanism right and overcoming the immediate effects of the credit crunch on financing for projects.
- **The further development of carbon capture and storage (CCS).** Coal is the major alternative to gas in power generation today. However, coal is also the most carbon-intensive of fuels, and it will only have a future role if emissions can be captured and stored safely. The UK has recently adopted an expanded CCS demonstration policy, with the aim of running up to four projects with a total capacity of around 2.5 GW. The main priority now is delivery of this programme as soon as possible, and continuing to work with other governments in the EU and around the world to demonstrate and develop the technology.
- **Measures to ensure that an expansion in the use of nuclear power does not lead to additional security risks.** Nuclear fission is a mature low-carbon technology, and so should be provided by the private sector if carbon prices are sufficiently high. However, unlike renewable sources of electricity, nuclear power can bring with it safety and security risks that must be addressed. This is partly about the security of our own facilities and partly about international action to ensure that nuclear materials and technologies are kept safe. Government must be vigilant on the former and play a major role internationally on the latter. We return to this issue in Chapter 7 in the context of wider proliferation risks.

Recommendation 11: The UK should follow the example of California and establish a regulatory structure that genuinely incentivises both supply companies and consumers to save energy and increase efficiency levels in the use of gas.

This should be backed up with robust implementation of European legislation on energy efficiency standards for products, and continuing the tightening of building regulations.

At the moment, the UK has various measures in place to increase the efficiency of gas use in residential heating (which along with power generation is the largest source of demand), but these have not yet had any significant effect on overall demand. A major problem is that the business model for the energy supply industry is to sell energy, rather than energy efficiency services. The measures recommended here should address this problem.

Our package of recommendations overall would bolster the UK's position in this crucial area, strengthen European unity and contribute to the British effort to mitigate climate change. The approach suggested also spreads the effort across public and private sectors and includes citizens and consumers in managing the problem. It is a distributed response, with government using not only its own resources but also regulatory instruments to achieve a measure of coordination. Provided the costs are distributed fairly, the approach should be seen as legitimate.

5. Defence policy

It is possible to trace a clear and consistent direction of travel on defence policy for at least the last 11 years, even if inherited programmes and legacy decisions have made it difficult to implement it in practice. This direction has been articulated in a series of policy documents, including the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the 2002 New Chapter to the SDR, the 2003 Defence White Paper, and the 2004 new chapter on Future Capabilities (See MoD 1998, 2002, 2003, 2004).

The emphasis in these documents has been on:

- A shift from the requirements of Cold War planning to a focus on rapidly deployable expeditionary forces capable of operating far from home (MoD 1998)
- A shift to Effects Based Operations (EBO), which largely means the increased use of technology to gain military effect and the use of networked information systems to generate information superiority and therefore combat advantage over potential adversaries (MoD 2002)
- An emphasis on fewer but more capable platforms at the expense of quantity, both of equipment and of personnel (Taylor *et al* 2008, MoD 2003).

The July 2004 additional chapter (MoD 2004) to the 2003 White Paper set out some detail on what this would mean for each of the Armed Services.¹³ The manpower requirement of the Army was reduced, the number of Regular battalions declined from 40 to 36 and, to help make this more workable, the Infantry Arms Plot was phased out.¹⁴

In pursuit of a more flexible maritime capability, the Royal Navy lost 12 ships from its surface fleet and three nuclear powered attack submarines; and the requirement for the Type 45 air defence destroyer was reduced from 12 to eight vessels. The manpower requirement for the Navy overall was reduced by 1,500 to 36,000. Some RAF squadrons were given up and manpower also reduced (Taylor *et al* 2008).

Meanwhile, the defence budget saw real-terms increases in most of the years covered. In the period 1997–2006/07 those increases averaged 2.1 per cent a year. In the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), the Government also announced that the defence budget would rise to £36.7 billion in 2010–11 from a baseline of £32.6 billion in 2007–08 (excluding the cost of operations, which are met from the Treasury Reserve). This was a 1.5 per cent average annual real-terms growth over the three years of the CSR period (Taylor *et al* 2008).

Nonetheless, the UK's defence forces are now under considerable stress. Defence policy today is undoubtedly more hotly debated and more controversial than at any time for decades.

There are several challenges:

- The level of operational commitment of the Armed Forces in recent years, principally in Iraq and Afghanistan, has been intense. The MoD itself acknowledged in its 2008 Spring performance report that: 'Delivery has only been possible through continuing to operate above the level of concurrent operations set out in the December 2003 White Paper, which our force structures assume' (MoD 2008a: 3).¹⁵ It also went on to spell out that the Armed Forces 'have been operating at or above the level of concurrent operations they are resourced and structured to deliver for seven of the last eight years and for every year since 2002....' (MoD 2008a: 11).
- This level of operations has increased the degree of personal risk experienced by individual service personnel and has placed strain on the Services' ability to meet harmony guidelines.¹⁶
- In 2008, the MoD further confirmed that, since 2005, on average 10 per cent of training exercises have had to be cut as a result of either operational pressures or

13. The 2003 White Paper had already made some clarifications in this area. For example, it asked the Royal Navy to prioritise land attack capability, amphibious assault capability and the projection of force. Land forces were set on a track to become more balanced across a graduated range of light, medium and heavy capability, with the requirement for heavy armoured fighting vehicles and artillery reduced and the formation of a new light brigade proposed. Air assets were to be focused on the projection of air power from land and sea and on the strategic lift capability to support expeditionary operations. Given the requirement to be ready for multiple concurrent expeditionary operations of one kind or another, a joint, integrated and interoperable logistics capacity was again recognised as central in the 2003 White Paper.

14. The Infantry Arms Plot system involved moving battalions between locations and roles every few years. Battalions being moved or re-trained were not available for deployment and were taken out of the Order of Battle. The decision to remove the IAP was therefore aimed at freeing up a higher percentage of the total force for deployment.

15. The Defence Planning Assumptions currently envisage the Armed Forces being able to undertake, without creating overstretch, three small to medium scale operations concurrently, two of which would be enduring peace support operations and one a small-scale intervention operation.

16. The harmony guidelines for each Service set out expected and recommended minimum interval periods between unit deployments on operations. These are designed to help manage the stress level and family separation aspects of regular operational deployment.

cost-saving measures (Taylor *et al* 2008). These factors, along with raging debates on the quality of housing, welfare, medical and other support services for both serving personnel and veterans, and on the level of recognition afforded to the Armed Forces by wider UK society, have all placed strain on the MoD's ability to recruit, train, motivate and retain military personnel. Pressure on the manning balance for each of the Services has also been evident.¹⁷

In addition:

- Some have argued that the real-terms increases in the defence budget give only a partial and misleading account of the resources being made available. One side of this relates to the claim that the expenditure increases are inadequate to finance the level of the Government's foreign policy and defence capability ambitions. This goes beyond the strains caused by current operations. Despite its stated defence reform goals, the Government has continued to maintain and purchase conventional war fighting capability on a large scale in a number of areas and the future equipment programme envisages not only more aircraft carriers and fast jets but also large quantities of important and expensive technology.
- Another claim is that defence inflation is higher than general inflation, meaning that defence budgets have actually gone down over the last decade in terms of purchasing power, despite real-terms increases in the budget when measured against more generic assessments of inflation.
- Others point out that expenditure on current operations, as a percentage of annual defence expenditure outturn, has grown at a faster rate than the overall defence budget. This means that, even with contributions from the Treasury Reserve, less of the defence budget is now actually available for expenditure on non-operational items than was previously the case.

Most serious commentators now believe the situation cannot continue as it is. It is clear there is a 'black hole' in the defence budget if the UK persists with all current plans and commitments. The Commission shares the view that we cannot carry on as we are. We believe the UK needs radical thinking to address the challenges being faced. In some areas, we need only to implement the earlier reassessment in a more determined way. In others, we need to reconstruct our approach.

The Commission's view on defence policy

The Commission believes fundamental choices are necessary. The attempt to maintain the full spectrum of conventional combat capabilities at current scale has produced acute strains on resources and, increasingly, on operational effectiveness. It cannot be sustained. The UK's Armed Forces are certainly capable of being genuinely effective in any one, or perhaps two, foreign operations. But the opportunity costs of that success are now so severe on the rest of the force structure and on its necessary recovery time following combat operations that the viability and sustainability of the force structure as a whole has come into question. Operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan have indicated the limits both on what force alone can achieve in isolation from other policy instruments and on what a force structure based on ever smaller numbers of platforms and personnel can deliver.

In addition, we believe that too little attention is being focused on the long-term implications of the changing conflict environment. On the one hand, while it is extremely difficult to predict future conflicts with accuracy, a trend to conflict within states as opposed to more traditional forms of inter-state warfare is evident (ippr 2008a). The consequences flowing from weak and failing states are a bigger potential security threat than the actions of strong ones in the period ahead; and there is an evident growth in the destructive potential of non-state actors engaging in asymmetric warfare.¹⁸ The global trend to urbanisation of the human population further means that operational environments like some of those being experienced in Iraq, where wars are fought 'among the people', are unlikely to be aberrations (Smith 2005).

While inter-state warfare on a major scale should not be ruled out, we do not believe it safe to assume that any such wars in future will be a replay of the kinds of conventional

17. The manning balance relates to whether the Services have the human resources they need. The appropriate balance is said to reside between -2 per cent and +1 per cent of the specified required trained strength for each Service. The Royal Navy failed to reach this balance in every year between 1998 and 2008; the Army achieved it in only two years over the same decade; the RAF fared better but still failed to hit the required manning balance in two of the 10 years between 1998 and 2008 (Taylor *et al* 2008; see also House of Commons 2008: 47).

18. As a term, 'asymmetric warfare' originally referred to war between two or more belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly. Contemporary military thinkers tend to broaden this to include asymmetry of strategy or tactics; today 'asymmetric warfare' can describe a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and, in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the 'weaker' combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality.

engagements anticipated during the Cold War. Given the current superiority of NATO's conventional military capability over that of any potential adversary, and assuming the continuation of NATO's deterrence posture, it is probable that even major inter-state conflict would be played out by adversaries using unconventional and asymmetric tactics such as cyber attacks and terrorism through proxy actors, rather than through conventional warfare conceived in the traditional way. It is crucial to remember, as has been indicated in most recent defence White Papers, that the UK does not need to be prepared to handle such conflicts alone. Our alliance attachments exist to help share that burden.

It is also plain from the recent experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq that the most difficult aspect of military intervention is seldom fighting the war but building the peace that follows. The UK and its allies have proved highly adept at fighting short, sharp 'digital wars' in swift order. But we have shown ourselves much less able to deliver a stable peace. In this context, it seems to us illogical to have spent so much time, energy and money developing the ability to project force to win wars, but so little to project the ability to reconstruct and build peace after the war is over.

The Commission believes the UK now urgently needs a new review of its defence capabilities, set within the wider context of a broad security strategy for the UK, so that future requirements can be planned strategically and focused on the main risks evident in today's changed circumstances. We also believe there is a need for a new structural approach to the conduct of that review and for some important changes to the conceptual approach underpinning defence policy.

A new structural and conceptual approach

First, it is important that decisions on UK defence capability are not taken in isolation from analysis of the wider security threats and hazards facing the country. We are not only underlining the limits to what force alone can achieve, with the military needing to be seen as one instrument among several to be deployed in a networked and interlocked fashion to pursue our strategic objectives, but the UK's defence requirements now also need to be reviewed as part and parcel of a much wider Strategic Review of Security. We say more about the need for this wider review in Chapter 10. We therefore believe:

Recommendation 12: A full review of the UK's defence requirements is needed urgently, but this review should form an integral part of a wider Strategic Review of Security. It should not be a Strategic Defence Review conducted in isolation from the rest of government thinking on national security risks and responses.

As far as the defence component of such a wider review is concerned, given the resource constraints and changed circumstances outlined, this should in our view be shaped by a focus on the following:

- A commitment to increased capability specialisation. We need to identify genuinely core capabilities, those things that we cannot do without and ought to be investing in
- Prioritisation of the capabilities required to handle UK-specific risks
- A reduced commitment to maintaining the full spectrum of conventional war fighting capabilities at currently planned scales
- An emphasis on stabilisation and reconstruction capabilities
- A new approach to Trident

We deal with each of these in turn below.

Capability specialisation: where we need to invest

The issue of which defence capabilities we should choose to invest in is a challenging one. This will of course depend on how defence is seen to fit within the wider framework of national security. But on the basis of the present analysis, we believe key investment choices ought to be influenced by current and future operational requirements on the one hand and, on the other, by the distinction between capabilities that could be quickly acquired, augmented and expanded in changing circumstances and those that are essentially never available at short notice.

The Commission believes medium-weight forces, such as armoured land vehicles, are normally available and capable of integration into overall force structures, at a price, to a country like the UK. This is true in all three environments – maritime, land and air. Those assets that are never easily available at short notice, at any price, are the key command and control enablers and dedicated, professional and committed Armed Forces personnel across all the Services. This leads the Commission to conclude that:

Recommendation 13: The future defence investment programme should pursue greater UK defence capability specialisation within the context of a deepening of European defence integration and the wider NATO alliance of which we are a part. It should prioritise command and control facilities, high quality personnel training, an increase in overall Service personnel numbers, and investments in the types of capability most likely to be relevant to future combat environments.

In particular, we believe investments in the following areas need to be ramped up:

- Tactical ground-air support, especially helicopters, which UK forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have lacked and which are likely to be highly relevant and valuable in the kinds of conflict environments we have to face in the future
- Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, which along with more tactical ground-air support would make the UK ground force more effective
- Heavy lift aircraft
- Offensive and defensive cyber warfare capabilities¹⁹
- The quality of our Special Forces, an area in which we must continue to remain a genuine world leader. Some increase in the size of these forces would be a positive development, but only if achieved without reducing their quality
- The professional quality of our Armed Forces overall, in all the Services, interpreted here as increased investment in their ability to train, exercise, develop technically and operate flexibly.

We also believe there is a need to consider increasing once again the size of the Armed Forces. This would need to be considered in a Strategic Review of Security. But if defence planning assumptions are to remain unchanged, there is a case for increasing the Army's size back to the level of 115,000–120,000 personnel, from the current 98,000.²⁰ While the withdrawal from Iraq is easing some of the current operational pressure, we cannot assume a benign future conflict environment. There may be instances where simultaneous future deployments in more than one theatre are unavoidable in the national interest. In such circumstances, and given the nature of the conflict and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction environments we are likely to encounter, numbers matter. An increase in the size of the Army as suggested here would strengthen our capability to handle the potential future demand of operations without undermining our capacity to train forces not on operations to a world-class standard.

UK-specific risks

Prioritising primarily national risks also has concrete implications. There are some risks that we clearly face with our allies. Examples might include:

- Risks of major structural instability in and around Europe
- Global terrorist activity, perhaps involving CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) weaponry
- Involvement in regional wars involving significant foreign powers.

In these cases, the UK Armed Forces should be judged by the effectiveness of a particular set of contributions they would make to a coalition operation. We return to the whole issue of our relationships with our main allies in NATO and the EU in the next chapter.

19. It is necessary, in a world in which cyber-warfare will be more common, for the UK to develop offensive cyber attack capabilities as well as defensive ones. The ability to access and potentially manipulate an adversary's networks, data, and voice communications, as well as to conduct denial of service attacks, could help to deter possible attacks and to deliver victory quickly when conflict does occur.

20. Current Defence Planning Assumptions envisage the Armed Forces being able to undertake, without creating overstretch, three small to medium scale operations concurrently, two of which would be enduring peace support operations and one a small-scale intervention operation.

Other risks, however, we may need to face primarily alone. It is at these that our overall security policy should be ruthlessly targeted. Consequently, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 14: Government should prioritise investment in the capabilities required to deal with a range of UK-specific security challenges.

In practice, this means a focus on:

- Major civil contingencies where a significant military contribution may be needed as part of the response. The Foot and Mouth disease outbreak in 2001 and the floods in summer 2007 were both examples of events where this was the case
- Terrorist attacks inside the UK around both our population centres and infrastructure. A Mumbai-style attack in the UK, especially outside London, that were prolonged, mobile and multi-site would require a military, not a policing, response. With significant elements of our Special Forces on overseas operations, there are questions as to how well prepared we are to deal with such an incident quickly (Neville-Jones 2009b)
- Small-scale risks to particular UK communities abroad
- Maritime law and order. We are more dependent on this relative to some allies, as both an island nation and one heavily reliant on trade through open and secure shipping lanes. This implies a strong case for investing in certain kinds of naval forces, such as frigates, capable of playing a role in both interdiction at sea and maintenance of maritime law and order.

It is in relation to this spectrum of challenges that the UK has to target its resources in order to manage the risks.

It is important to note that 'UK-specific' risks in this context are not necessarily about small risks or the defence of UK home space. Given our reliance on maritime trade and the extent to which sea routes are used for organised crime that impacts heavily on the UK, prioritisation of naval resources to help maintain maritime law and order could mean operations in some important but far-off places.

Capability specialisation: where to cut

Given current and future likely resource constraints, forces that cover the full spectrum of conventional combat capabilities cannot be maintained at currently planned scales. Major choices are necessary. This is even truer if we want to prioritise investments in the areas listed above. Our forces must remain balanced, but the balancing needs to be against a realistic and cold assessment of risks. Provided we continue to invest in the core priority areas we have set out, we may be able to consider reducing our capabilities in other areas without taking unnecessary risks with national security or undermining our value to others as an important ally.

Consequently, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 15: The Government should thoroughly re-examine, as part of a Strategic Review of Security, its defence equipment requirements. This re-examination should explore all viable options for capability downgrading and quantity reductions, as well as for complete cancellation of some equipment programmes.

The UK government has been clear in recent defence documents that it would only envisage engaging in major combat operations as part of a coalition operation most likely led by the United States. If savings are needed, and they are, we should therefore look to make them in areas where we are members of an alliance that already possesses the relevant capabilities in abundance, relative to any potential adversary, and where additional UK capability would therefore be adding little of extra value to the overall alliance effort.

This analysis and approach puts certain capabilities in the frame for reconsideration. For illustrative rather than comprehensive purposes, these might be said to include:

- The Future Carrier Programme: This involves the decision to purchase two new aircraft carriers at a procurement cost of around £3.9 billion (see Blitz 2009)

- The F35 Joint Strike Fighter,²¹ which is designed to fly off the carriers and, depending on numbers, could cost up to £10 billion, with more costs to follow over the years on maintenance and upgrades (see Blitz 2009)
- The Type 45 Destroyer: six are currently planned at a procurement cost of £6.5 billion (see Blitz 2009)
- The delayed Astute class hunter-killer submarines, the full fleet of four of which is estimated, after delays and cost overruns, to be costing over £3.7 billion (see IISS 2009, Pfeifer 2008).

We return to the issue of Britain's Trident nuclear deterrent in a separate section below.

In addition, the Government should look to explore the options for retiring some other already existing capabilities early. In this category, there is a case for focusing on:

- Reductions in the number of our Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks. At over 350, we arguably have far more than we need
- Quicker reductions in the number of Tornado fighter and ground attack aircraft, especially given the recent decision to buy Tranche 3 of the Typhoon (Eurofighter)
- Reductions in anti-submarine warfare capability
- Reductions in the scale of our air defences
- Possible streamlining of infrastructure, such as the number of naval bases we maintain

It is not at all clear that maintenance of our own UK capability in each of these areas at planned scale is either the best use of our own limited resources or the best way for the UK to be an effective partner to others. Indeed, we may well be of far greater use as an ally to the United States if we provide world-class capability in some areas, such as in Special Forces and some areas of maritime capability, than if we attempt to duplicate the full spectrum of US capability at a smaller scale. A debate is now beginning even in the United States on the need for the US to begin to prioritise its resources more effectively to meet the challenges of the 21st century – despite the fact that in 2007/08, the US spent 440 billion Euros on defence, ten times more than the UK spent.²²

To be clear, the changed overall balance of priorities suggested above is not a recommendation to cut UK air power and armour to the point that traditional mass armoured operations, for example, become an attractive asymmetric option to a potential enemy. The UK will need to retain sufficient conventional air and armoured forces to ensure tactical level dominance in stabilisation operations as well as success in the event of small-scale national operations like Operation Palliser, the British Armed Forces operation that took place in Sierra Leone in 2000. But this scale of capability, with its effect multiplied by technology, should also equal that required for an effective UK contribution to multinational deterrence of any larger potential aggressor. What we are suggesting is a significant rebalancing of UK capabilities against the profile of risks now being faced and much sharper capability specialisation for the UK in the light of both the risks and of the resource constraints that are now evident. We are also suggesting that while some capabilities ought to have their place in the list of national priorities re-examined, we may still actually need to be expanding the Services in some other areas, both in terms of absolute numbers and in terms of specific capabilities.

Making the comprehensive approach to conflict stabilisation a reality

In addition, we believe that it is now time to make the UK's approach to the stabilisation of conflict environments a more integrated and comprehensive one. When force is used, it must be as part of an approach designed not only to win wars but also to build peace. While the Government acknowledged this at conceptual level in the first presentation of its National Security Strategy in March 2008, and while to some extent the UK has been learning to deliver on this approach in Afghanistan and Iraq, we are still not seeing this being driven into the core of either Armed Forces doctrine, structure and training or civilian conflict planning. This needs to change.²³ The so-called 'comprehensive approach' remains

21. We would have included in this category Tranche 3 of the Eurofighter programme, which we do not believe we need, but Government has already made the decision to buy it.

22. For comparative data on defence expenditure, see Chalmers 2008b: 20–27. On the debate in the US, see Rothkopf 2009.

23. The UK's recent experience has been one of winning quick victories in the combat phase of conflicts while not doing anywhere near well enough in the post-conflict phase. This creates opportunities for enemies to regroup, is costly in both money and lives lost, and can undermine public support for future missions that may become necessary.

more a convenient phrase to describe what should be happening, rather than a description of what is happening, especially on the ground, where it matters most.

Recommendation 16: The United Kingdom should now create a stabilisation and reconstruction force, only the headquarters of which should be a permanent, standing element.²⁴

The Commission recommends the creation of a fully integrated military-civilian Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force (SRF). With the exception of the headquarters, this would not be a standing force. The Force would be able to address post-conflict stabilisation challenges in hostile environments. Such challenges might require continued security operations, the ability to provide emergency housing and shelter, the delivery of emergency humanitarian relief, water and electricity supplies, the repair of other basic infrastructure (such as roads and schools) and the provision of grassroots local governance.

The Force would contain both military and civilian staff, operating under a single chain of command, with military components able both to engage in combat operations and to contribute to stabilisation goals and tasks. Civilian components would be drawn from across Whitehall, local government, ex-Service personnel and individuals from other sectors and walks of life. Most of these individuals would be doing other jobs, but would make up a civilian reserve capable of deployment at short notice on terms similar to those of the military Reserves. They would go through a reservist training course and would receive training on the strategic and operational background challenges of stabilisation environments at the Defence Academy.

Force staff's roles would be defined within a single Force doctrine. This doctrine would be developed within the SRF headquarters which would itself be staffed not only by military personnel but also by civilian staff from all relevant Whitehall departments and would include representatives of relevant NGOs. The doctrine would spell out details on chains of command, ways of working and arrangements for docking with NGOs and international partners as well as with other elements of the military. The Force headquarters would organise exercises to test the doctrine in practice, and Force doctrine would shape the content of relevant training programmes.

To allow the Force to work, periods performing civilian roles within it would need to be recognised as career enhancing within the wider public sector. Different terms and conditions from those in other parts of the civil service would need to apply. The fixed periods of service envisaged for civilians would also come with different risk and duty of care regimes to those applied to other civil employees, and tour lengths would need to be harmonised with those of the military.

We would envisage that the Force would fall under the overall remit of the MoD, which, while serving as the body with overall responsibility for the SRF, should nevertheless be fulfilling this task in close coordination with other engaged Whitehall departments (especially the FCO and DfID) and with relevant NGOs. All of these should be seen as stakeholders in the management of any operations in which the SRF is involved. The Cabinet Office should play a key role in coordinating the terms, conditions and provision of the civilian component.

Trident: A new approach

It is our view that, in current circumstances, the UK should maintain a minimum credible independent nuclear deterrent.²⁵

However, we also recognise that the greatest threat today comes not from an attack by a nuclear armed state, but from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including to non-state actors.

We set out our proposals for the UK's policy to deal with this threat in our Interim Report, both in terms of measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and, more specifically, measures to promote multilateral nuclear disarmament in pursuit of

24. An outline of a similar proposal has been developed by a sitting Member of Parliament (see Tobias Ellwood MP, *The Creation of a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force*, December 2008). In developing this proposal for a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force, we are also grateful to several serving and retired senior officials for their private views and input on the workability of this proposal.

25. Some members of the Commission hold this position based on the security arguments and a belief in the concept of deterrence, others, less convinced by deterrence, out of recognition that it reflects the majority UK opinion after several decades of public debate on the issue.

a world free of nuclear weapons.²⁶ We reiterate our commitment to those proposals here, and later in this report. The dangers of proliferation are real and, notwithstanding the recommendations outlined below, we are clear that it is in the UK's interest to play a full part in global attempts to get as close as possible to a world without nuclear weapons, including by being prepared, if necessary, to place all or part of our nuclear weapon assets at the disposal of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.

President Obama's leadership in this area has moved the debate on in recent months and we welcome Prime Minister Brown's recent statement that 'as soon as it becomes useful for our arsenal to be included in a broader negotiation, Britain stands ready to participate and to act' (Brown 2009). Any future UK Government should be active and bold in ensuring that the UK is at the forefront of this debate.

It is in this context that we approach the question of Trident and its potential renewal or replacement.

The Trident system consists of three components: the Trident missile itself, the warhead and the Vanguard class submarines from which it is launched. Although the Trident missile will not reach the end of its operational life until around 2042, the hulls of the Vanguard class submarines on which it is mounted are seen as reaching the end of their operational lives by 2024. To allow for the option of keeping the current system operational beyond 2024, if we should wish to take it, and because it takes around 17 years to design and build a new nuclear submarine and bring it into service, the decision was taken in May 2007 to approve design and concept work for a new fleet of replacement submarines. Decisions to place contracts worth £11–£14 billion for the build of such submarines, however, do not need to be and should not be taken until around 2014.

In light of these facts, the Commission believes the UK should now pursue a new approach in relation to Trident in which the necessary steps are taken to keep the possibility of refreshing the system open, while a fundamental review of all options related to the deterrent are considered as part of a Strategic Review of Security. As a result, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 17: The future of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent should be considered as an integral part of the recommended Strategic Review of Security. This review should consider:

- Whether, as the Commission believes is the case, a minimum UK deterrent is still needed
- The best and most cost-effective way to provide it, including consideration of whether we should replace the Trident system as currently planned, seek to extend the life of the current system further or decide that some other system for providing Britain's deterrent in a nuclear armed world would be better suited to the strategic circumstances in which we then find ourselves
- The opportunity costs of maintaining our deterrent, in all its possible forms, for other sectors of the UK defence and security budget. This must take into account the costs that would be involved in decommissioning Trident and its facilities.

Recommendation 18: In order to maintain the option of refreshing the current system as part of the Strategic Review of Security, the UK should continue with the crucial ongoing preparatory work on the concept, design and assessment phases of the Trident refresh.

Recommendation 19: To provide maximum additional flexibility in our position, the UK should also now recommence detailed exploratory work on the costs and viability of a further run-on, beyond 2024, of the existing Vanguard submarine hulls, so that the Strategic Review of Security, should it conclude that Trident is the appropriate way to go, can also consider this option if desired.

While recognising this option would not be straightforward or without risk, we note that the Permanent-Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Defence confirmed in

“we are clear that it is in the UK's interest to play a full part in global attempts to get as close as possible to a world without nuclear weapons”

26. In our Interim Report we called for the determined diplomatic pursuit of a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the pursuit by Britain of Track II diplomatic initiatives to bring together not only representatives of the P-5 but of India, Israel and Pakistan too, with a view to discussing a route map to zero nuclear weapons, and further international action to internationalise control of the nuclear fuel cycle. For our full recommendations on this see ippr 2008a: 112–115.

27. During Prime Minister's Questions on 14 March 2007, the day of the Trident vote, and in response to a specific question on Trident, Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that: 'It is absolutely right that this Parliament cannot bind the decisions of a future Parliament and it is always open to us to come back and look at these issues. He is right to suggest that when we get to the gateway stage, between 2012–2014 – when we let the main contracts for design and construction [of the submarines] it will always be open to Parliament to take a decision' (See Hansard 2007: column 397). John Hutton, the Secretary of State for Defence also confirmed in the House of Commons on 30 March 2009, that the House of Commons would have a vote on any future related decision by the UK to build its own new nuclear warhead. See Hansard House of Commons 2009.

comments to the Public Accounts Committee in November 2008 that a further extension to the life of the Vanguard fleet (above the five year extension already planned) was possible.

We believe that this new overall approach would send a positive message to the international community and in particular to the Non-Nuclear Weapon State signatories of the NPT, as well as to the other assumed nuclear weapon states who have to be part of any multilateral disarmament decision, that Britain was not pre-judging attempts at nuclear disarmament by locking itself into a Trident extension programme any earlier than was absolutely necessary. It could also push some of the heavier spending years of the Trident programme further into the future, take some shorter-term pressure off budgets and give the UK extra decision-making flexibility should we find ourselves, a few years down the line, in a context in which major US and Russian cuts in strategic arsenals might begin to impact on the US programmes on which the UK's Trident deterrent depends.

Recommendation 20: Finally, before any further decision of substance is taken on this matter, Parliament must have a further opportunity to vote.²⁷

PART 3

**Building a
distributed response:
pushing power and
responsibility up to
alliances and
international
institutions**

6. Deepening alliance cooperation: NATO, the EU and the transatlantic partnership

In the developing new world order, we need to be alert to the possibility of finding shared interests with new allies beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. At the same time, however, the Commission believes a close relationship with the United States and other NATO allies remains fundamental to the United Kingdom's national security. The relationship with the US in particular is rooted in history and in deep cultural and economic ties, bringing enormous benefits through military cooperation and intelligence sharing. The two countries may not agree on everything, but that is not necessary for the centrality and importance of the relationship to the UK to be acknowledged.

Membership of NATO, for its part, brings the enormously valuable commitment to collective self-defence, which was an outstanding feature of the West's success in the Cold War.

All that said, it is also true that too many on this side of the Atlantic, both inside the UK and across Europe, take the transatlantic relationship for granted, believing that minor, politically painless, change will be sufficient to see it survive. This is a fundamental mistake. Our comments here are part warning and part charter for a renewed and strengthened transatlantic partnership between Europe and North America for the 21st century.

A warning on transatlantic unity

Processes of power diffusion and globalisation, as outlined in our Interim Report, are combining with the effects of the global financial crisis and demographic change to have a profound effect on American interests, power and domestic politics. The United States today is suffering economically at home and facing larger-scale challenges to its leadership abroad. At the same time its economic and political interests in a more multipolar world are diversifying and intensifying beyond Europe. In these circumstances, there is a risk that the US will become less willing or perhaps even less able to take as much responsibility for the well-being of Europe as it has done over the last six decades.

As this process of change has been unfolding, there has been a collective failure by most European leaders to respond to the demands of the post-Cold War world. This is particularly acute in relation to defence policy. As the former Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency recently noted in relation to European defence capabilities:

‘European defence resources still pay for a total of 10,000 tanks, 2,500 combat aircraft, and nearly two million men and women in uniform – more than half a million more than the US hyper-power. Yet 70 per cent of Europe's land forces are simply unable to operate outside national territory – and transport aircraft, communications, surveillance drones and helicopters (not to mention policemen and experts in civil administration) remain in chronically short supply. This failure to modernise means that much of the 200 billion Euros that Europe spends on defence is simply wasted.’ (Witney 2008: 1)

In our view, this combination of factors related to the US and Europe is a dangerous one. It constitutes a long-term threat to transatlantic unity, and action to avert the danger must become central to UK defence and diplomatic strategy. It is necessary to invest more time, political capital, money and energy to make the relationships relevant and valued on both sides of the Atlantic. This means continuing to reform NATO, but it also means much deeper, more cost-effective and more strategically coordinated and

targeted collaboration within Europe. With our primary partner, the US, finding new interests in the world, with an increasingly assertive Russia to our east, and with new economic powers developing on the Pacific Rim and in Asia, Europe must realise that, in this new world, the right reaction is for us to deepen our defence and foreign affairs cooperation.

Some will argue that this is wishful thinking, that European defence and security cooperation is going nowhere fast, and that the reform of NATO will be too difficult politically. But those who make these arguments need to address a central question themselves: what is the alternative? Should we, in Europe, simply assume that the Americans will always be there, no matter what commitments and engagements they have elsewhere and no matter how unequal a share of the security burden they carry? If European defence cooperation has proved too difficult in the past, should the UK try to invest instead – inevitably, given the state of our public finances, inadequately – in a purely national insurance policy for the unforeseen? Or should we, as some have suggested, even look beyond Europe and the transatlantic relationship to the Commonwealth or other groupings to somehow ensure the UK's future?

Our view is clear. The transatlantic partnership remains at present and for the foreseeable future the most important axis for the preservation of our security. However, the cosy status quo in which the US takes much of the strain while Europe dissipates its limited defence resources on duplicated costs and Cold War museum armies will not be available indefinitely. European, not just US, leaders have some fundamental choices to make. Just as the leadership of a former generation took difficult and unpopular decisions in desperate post-war conditions to build the institutional foundations of the post-1945 peace, so today, in the UK and across Europe, politicians have to find the strategic vision and courage to face down national defence establishments, confront electoral pressures and lead their publics to a more secure future.

We believe that the creation of the 'twin pillar' NATO, first proposed by Kennedy and Kissinger, would provide a more appropriate, effective and enduring structure to cope with the new circumstances than continuing on the present basis of a NATO heavily dominated by the US. If we do not strengthen NATO by reinforcing its European pillar, not just on defence but on wider security issues too, the result will be neither the status quo nor some other fantasy of wider collective security cooperation. There will be a future crisis that leaves us vulnerable to shifting American interests and opinion, relative US decline and European disunity and weakness, when NATO's political glue fails to hold and Europe is left more exposed than at any time since the Second World War.

It is delusional for governments and publics to believe some other solution is viable.

The European pillar

Old arguments that a strengthening of European security and defence cooperation would somehow undermine or threaten NATO are no longer valid. The United States itself is making its support for stronger European defence clear.²⁸

We now need more cooperation and coordination in European defence and this must be grounded in two essential realities. First, that no Member State of the European Union (short of a need to fulfil its NATO Article 5 collective defence obligations) will allow itself to be forced into a conflict or told how it can spend its defence budget. Second, that some Member States, by their reluctance to spend money on defence or to contribute forces when the call for them goes out, have made it quite plain that they do not wish to be involved in certain categories, in our view essential ones, of military action. Many European Union states, for example, already spend under 2 per cent of GDP on defence, the level that might be described as the minimum required to demonstrate seriousness of purpose on this issue. Indeed, only four states (Bulgaria, France, Greece and the UK) spent at that level or above in 2007 (the most recent year for which full comparative data is available).²⁹

28. Despite being hostile to the idea of a stronger European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) for many years, US messaging on this changed even before the arrival of the Obama Administration. US Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, told the Paris Press Club in February 2008 that: 'Europe needs, the United States Needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs, more capable European defence capacity. An ESDP with only soft power is not enough' (Nuland 2008). For the first time, after the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the summit communiqué also included an explicit welcome of 'European defence' (NATO 2009).

29. Bulgaria spent 3 per cent of GDP, France 2.4 per cent, Greece 2.6 per cent and the UK 2.5 per cent. (See NATO 2009.)

These realities mean that more cooperation and coordination should be voluntary and take place between those European states most able and willing to be involved. Those wishing to deepen cooperation should not be hampered by those who are not. Cooperation and coordination should, we underline, not be about the creation of a European Army. Consequently and against this backdrop, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 21: Regardless of the outcome of future deliberations on the EU Lisbon Treaty, the UK government should support, fully engage in and if necessary lead moves to create permanent structured defence cooperation among a pioneer group of EU countries. This could work along the lines of the St Malo UK/French agreement and would essentially allow creation of a coalition of willing states from within the EU.

Multiple pioneer groups, with different and overlapping memberships on different issues, such as research and technology cooperation, armaments cooperation or the development of improved military and civilian capabilities, are likely. But at the core of the activity should be an open and self-selecting group of states demonstrating seriousness of purpose against a number of criteria, including: reasonable level of investment in defence (as a measure of GDP); record on cooperation; percentage of forces able to be deployed overseas; and track record on actually deploying forces overseas.

Recommendation 22: Pioneer group defence ministers, backed where necessary by their national leaders, should also pursue increased levels of investment in priority areas like on-the-ground force protection, improved transport to and within the field of operations, better communications and intelligence, improved logistics and more precision-guided weapons.

Recommendation 23: On the supply side, we need deeper collaboration in the European defence industry, particularly as this relates to land and sea systems.

There is still wasted research and development investment in small-scale national defence industries in these areas, inflated prices to the European tax-payer, and consequently missed export opportunities for European defence manufacturers. This all needs to be stripped out, via European defence industry consolidation.

There has been some success with this in the aerospace and electronics sectors, but more is needed. European countries willing to be pioneers in coordinated defence equipment purchase should agree a single line with the defence industry and let it be known that, if European defence companies do not engage in merger and consolidation activities of their own, then governments will perform this task for them by placing coordinated bids with single preferred suppliers.³⁰ This step would require a genuine act of political leadership and a willingness on the part of national leaders to go beyond the rhetoric of European coordination while in practice attempting to ensure that national defence industry champions are protected. National security ‘exemptions’ are often used to justify this behaviour, but we have reached the point where such exemptions are reducing innovation, wasting scarce tax revenues and generating less overall security for the European Union and for its individual member states.

Recommendation 24: To help free up the resources for much needed new investments, European countries should each pursue more pooling of resources and a higher degree of role specialisation.

No European state today can afford a full range of military capabilities at sufficient scale to guarantee its own security, which is precisely why most choose to enjoy the collective security guarantee in NATO. Pooling of effort is already commonplace and we now need more of it at European level, not least to strengthen NATO itself. Some good work has already been done on this, as with the EU Battlegroups³¹, the Dutch/Belgian joint naval command, and attempts to mutualise support functions both regionally (as with Nordic efforts to share maintenance and logistics arrangements) and functionally (as with joint Belgian/French pilot training) (Witney 2008: 29–35). But more is needed.

Role specialisation is politically more sensitive, but here too EU member states need to develop it. As an extreme example, the Baltic States have chosen to forgo new combat

30. A similar approach was adopted in the United States in the early 1990s. Then US Secretary of Defense Aspin and US defence industry chief executives met to discuss the state of the US defence industry. Aspin reportedly told industry leaders that the Pentagon was no longer willing, in the post-Cold War climate of cuts in defence spending, to continue to pay the overheads of so many companies. They were told to work out their own path to industry consolidation or failing that, the Pentagon would use its monopoly position to effectively decide for them by putting some suppliers out of business (see Witney 2008: 36–38).

31. An EU Battlegroup is a military force consisting of at least 1,500 combat soldiers drawn from EU member states.

aircraft and to accept air-policing by allies. At another level some states have niche capability advantages that should be exploited for wider benefit (the Czech Republic in nuclear and chemical defence, for example). Clearly, total reliance on role specialisation would be dangerous in the absence of prior agreement on strategy and commitments to deploy forces, but provided it develops incrementally and takes place on a strictly voluntary basis, it should be encouraged and expanded wherever possible and the savings recycled into the priority investment areas noted above.

Recommendation 25: At the strategic level, there is an urgent need for an agreed European Union external crisis management doctrine and structures, which would cover the range of issues from preventive engagement and intervention in hostile environments to peacekeeping, conflict stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction.

Recommendation 26: To ensure that any doctrine is more than cosmetic, there is also a need to invest in the right kinds of European capabilities. EU countries should increase the number of Battlegroups on standby at any one time, while expanding the size of support units such as logisticians, engineers, helicopter squadrons, medics and intelligence teams that may be relevant not only to short-term Battlegroup interventions but also to longer-term stabilisation operations. Individual countries should also invest more in building deployable gendarmerie, policing and civilian capabilities needed for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction operations.

Increased capability in all these areas will be important not only to our own security in future but also to our ability, as European countries working together, to support important humanitarian intervention and support activities elsewhere in the world, if and when these become necessary.

Recommendation 27: To strengthen European abilities to deal with less traditional security challenges like transnational crime, and to make more effective use of border crossing points as opportunities for interdictions of arms, drugs and people smuggling, the UK should both more fully engage and support Frontex³² activities at the borders of the European Union and pursue a much enhanced and more centralised role for Europol.³³

The latter move in particular could greatly strengthen a coordinated EU response to challenges in this area. At the moment, and partly as a consequence of not being a member of the Schengen Area, the UK supports and engages in Frontex activities less fully than it could and should. Europol, for its part, is just one of many bodies at EU level with responsibility for handling the criminal challenge. Other bodies and activities involved include the Police Chiefs Task Force³⁴, Eurojust³⁵, SitCen³⁶, OLAF³⁷ and Prüm³⁸, and the EU is reportedly considering setting up a new agency to tackle illegal immigration from North Africa. We believe Europol should be made the central information hub with which all other bodies share information, allowing it to provide the much needed strategic coordination.

If those European countries willing and able to move in the overall direction we have outlined, on a voluntary basis, get serious about the enterprise of European security and defence, this will strengthen NATO for the long term, enhance the capacities of Europeans to act autonomously in defence of our own interests when needed, and provide a platform from which Europe can pursue its security interests in the modern context.

At the same time, we need to continue with attempts to reform NATO itself, so that it is well positioned to perform the roles we need it to assume in the decades to come.

Reforming NATO

NATO is already the most powerful and successful collective self-defence organisation in history. It is a permanent coalition of 26 willing nations, pledged to defend each other through Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that 'an attack on one is an attack on all'. The organisation promotes wide-ranging security cooperation among its members and reaches out to Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, North Africa and to the Gulf States and beyond through a range of friendship and partnership

32. Frontex is the EU body that looks after security at the external borders of the Union.

33. Europol – the European Police Office – is the European Law Enforcement Organisation which aims to improve the effectiveness and cooperation of the competent authorities in the member states in preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international organised crime.

34. The Police Chiefs Task Force develops personal and informal links between the heads of the various law-enforcement agencies across the EU, to exchange information and assist with the development of more spontaneous interaction and closer cooperation between the various national and local police forces and other EU law-enforcement agencies.

35. Eurojust is an EU body established in 2002 to enhance the effectiveness of the competent authorities within member states when they are dealing with the investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border and organised crime.

36. SitCen is the EU's Situation Centre, set up to monitor common foreign and security policy issues such as Weapons of Mass Destruction and proliferation.

37. OLAF is the European Anti-Fraud Office. Its mission is to protect the financial interests of the EU, to fight fraud, corruption and any other irregular activity, including misconduct within the European Institutions.

38. The Prüm Treaty is a crime-fighting initiative of seven EU member states, mainly concerned with the exchange of data.

agreements. It has helped to provide law and order to the citizens of Bosnia and Kosovo, patrols the sea-lanes in the Mediterranean and provides assistance to victims of hurricanes and earthquakes, as in the case of the Pakistani earthquake in 2005. It provides security in Afghanistan, educates officers in post-Communist states to the virtues of democracy, provides logistic support for the African Union and fights terrorism.

Yet it still has a long way to go to respond to changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, to the demands of a growing membership and expanding geographic scope, to a rapidly changing international landscape and to new and more diverse security threats. It is engaged and under pressure in Afghanistan as a direct result of the attack on the United States 11 September 2001, must manage the relationship with Russia sensitively and, in the context of the economic downturn and European weaknesses outlined earlier in this chapter, contend with a new and heated debate on burden-sharing between the US and European members of the alliance.

Notwithstanding current attempts at NATO transformation, to navigate this shifting international security environment and the developing debate on burden-sharing among alliance members, political leaderships on both sides of the Atlantic should now take a number of further steps:

Recommendation 28: The re-think of NATO's Strategic Concept, initiated at the 60th Anniversary Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, should be used as an opportunity to reaffirm the commitment to collective defence, as a vehicle to clarify and update the organisation's role and mission for today's changed circumstances, and to stimulate further debate on what NATO solidarity and the collective security guarantee mean in practice in current conditions.

Since we live in a world where European and North American countries can be hit hard from a remote point and with long-term effects, solidarity requires NATO members both to commit to the defence of home territory and also to be collectively willing and capable of responding to non-conventional and 'out of area' challenges. This has to become a core feature of both deterrence and collective self-defence, not an optional extra. In addition, NATO members need to commit to assisting one another in building resilience to the kinds of challenges that might be faced in future, such as the effects of cyber-attacks or acts of CBRN terrorism that could create complex and large-scale domestic emergencies.

Equally, since even NATO cannot provide all the answers without working with others, it should now be clear that, when asked by other governments and international bodies, a key part of NATO's international role should be the willing provision of support to others, under certain conditions. The nature of such support will need discussion inside the Alliance but it could cover the organisation, management and running of headquarters in the field, a weak area in many UN-led peacekeeping operations. It could cover strategic lift capacity and logistics support, alongside wider EU and US economic assistance to organisations such as the African Union, training and other assistance in the important field of security sector reform, and the rapid provision of force protection to UN and other forces when an international mandate is being challenged on the ground (Berdal and Ucko 2009).³⁹ We have seen some activities in each of these areas, but they need to be defined as a core part of the NATO mission and to be significantly scaled up.

While we have commented earlier on the need to reinvigorate Europe's security capabilities and effort, it will be essential for the interaction between NATO's and the EU's security theatres to address the provision of this kind of external support. The EU could be particularly well placed to contribute strongly to the arrangements for policing and other civilian services in a conflict area, where at present the military-civilian interface, as in Afghanistan, leaves some important gaps. More widely still, there is an important need to join up the strategic dialogue between NATO and the EU across all areas of defence, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security Strategy (ESS) to make sure the external efforts of each are complementary.

“solidarity requires NATO members both to commit to the defence of home territory and also to be collectively willing and capable of responding to non-conventional and ‘out of area’ challenges”

39. An example of the latter would be Operation Palliser, carried out by the UK's Armed Forces in Sierra Leone in 2000, to support a fledgling UN mission there.

Recommendation 29: In the context of the economic downturn, the reintegration of France into NATO military structures and the appointment of a four star French general to lead Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, efforts at the transformation of NATO capabilities must now be accelerated.

This transformation work should continue developments in network-centric warfare and effects-based operations,⁴⁰ but also re-focus on overall numbers to ensure that transformation does not become a euphemism for cuts in both personnel and platforms.⁴¹ NATO capabilities related to asymmetric warfare, the requirements of stabilisation operations drawing on lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq, and both cyber-threats and emerging security challenges emanating from increased reliance on assets in outer space, should all be given higher priority. And the NATO transformation debate needs to focus more deliberately on the capabilities the Alliance should seek to apply to the management of complex emergencies on home territory.

Focusing transformation on this range of issues should not only get more value for money for NATO member countries' tax-payers, but also help us to save soldiers' and citizens' lives in future, building added insurance against newer vulnerabilities in the process.

Given the nature of today's complex conflict environments and the limitations on the utility of force when it is used in isolation from other non-military instruments, NATO also needs to adapt in other areas. Consequently:

Recommendation 30: Far greater consideration should be given to how NATO's military capabilities can be used in coordinated fashion with policing, civilian and development instruments as part of more effective and integrated strategies in conflict, post-conflict and complex emergency situations.

In this context, there is much to be learnt from new thinking and strategies related to the concept of 'human security'. We say more about the specifics of this in relation to the crucial issue of Afghanistan in Chapter 3 above. However, this is a long-term challenge and the future conflict environment is going to demand that NATO capabilities be both flexible and well integrated with non-military instruments. This in turn means investing in the institutional capabilities, procedures and doctrines required to ensure effective cooperation across military, civilian and development institutions. The capacity to dock NATO activities with a wide range of other organisations, whether national, local, international or non-governmental, is a skill the organisation needs to develop.

Clearly, progress on all of this will not happen unless issues related to NATO's internal organisation are also addressed. The Commission therefore believes:

Recommendation 31: NATO must continue attempts to reform its internal procedures and organisation. It cannot any longer be the same tightly organised, consensus-based organisation. It needs reform to its personnel structures, force planning and decision-making, as well as its financing.

In particular, the 'costs-fall-where-they-lie' approach needs to be replaced by financial contributions that are based on size of member country GDP.

Those countries, such as the UK and Germany, that insist on limiting the NATO budget to nought per cent growth in real terms, year on year, should desist from doing so.⁴²

Recommendation 32: NATO must keep its door open to new members where this is consistent with its fundamental ideals and purpose. The criteria of membership, both civil and military, need to be made clearer and more demanding, but where they can be met, new members should be considered. No non-member state should have a veto over this process.

40. The terms 'network-centric warfare' and 'effects-based operations' refer to the increased use of technology to gain military effect and the use of networked information systems to generate information superiority and therefore combat advantage over potential adversaries (see MoD 2002).

41. Some have seen military modernisation and transformation measures as Trojan horses for an agenda to cut troop numbers.

42. The costs-fall-where-they-lie approach means that when NATO forces are deployed on operations, the costs are picked up by the countries volunteering the forces. This in turn, of course, means there is a financial incentive not to participate in operations, so both the military risks and the financial costs fall on the same players, and some can vote for military action knowing they will end up neither committing forces nor paying the bill.

7. Strengthening global cooperation

Beyond strengthening core alliance institutions, it is in our interests to make wider international cooperation more effective. As noted in the Introduction to this report, a process of globalisation and power diffusion is under way and having profound effects. It is creating ungoverned spaces beyond the control of any individual state and is deepening interdependence across borders. It is also empowering a far wider range of actors than before. Some of these are states emerging on to the world stage but others include private companies, NGOs, terrorist organisations, criminal gangs and others.

The result is reduced state control over the security environment, both in the sense that no state can now provide for its security needs by acting alone and in the sense that state institutions in general are less in control of events than they used to be. States themselves can respond to this situation at international level, but to do so they need to put political will and resources into building more effective institutions for global cooperation. If this can be achieved, and if compromises on short-term national interests can be made in order to build a better world in the medium and long term, then more power and responsibility could effectively be pushed up to global institutions and treaty-based organisations, facilitating a reassertion of collective state control over many areas where it has been lost in the recent past.

This is a goal worth pursuing and UK policy should be to contribute to its achievement. Action to strengthen and reform the UN is important in this context. This should include the expansion of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, to make it more reflective of the changing distribution of world population and the shifting balances of world power; changes to the inter-governmental direction of the IMF and the World Bank; and further strengthening of certain other UN agencies, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO). Priority action is also needed in a number of other specific areas, however, and it is on these that we focus our comments here.

In this chapter, we make recommendations on:

- Fragile states
- Climate change
- Energy competition
- Nuclear non-proliferation
- Biological and chemical weapons
- Cyber-security
- Outer space

Though this range of issues seems disparate, each of them is capable of provoking a 21st century security crisis if we do not act. They all also have the potential to affect UK national security directly, not just the wider international landscape.

In some of what follows we suggest that the answers lie in strengthening existing systems, mechanisms and regimes; in other parts that the challenge is to create new institutions, treaties and forums. On nuclear non-proliferation and global bio-security, we reiterate recommendations made in our Interim Report.

A five-point plan for engaging with fragile states

State fragility and failure is now, arguably, a greater threat to our peace than inter-state conflict, and action to address the problem is needed urgently. When states fail or are failing, they tend to be led in a way that is unresponsive to citizens' needs and to cease providing basic services or protection to their people. They can also become possible jumping-off points for criminal gangs, terrorists and others. However, if they could be

lifted out of fragility and failure and be assisted in becoming capable, accountable and responsive states, this would be a significant contribution to international peace and security in general and would limit the pool of ungoverned spaces from which direct threats to the UK and its allies might emerge.

The scale of the challenge is significant, with weak states outnumbering strong ones in the international system by more than two to one and a large swathe of states in West Africa, East Africa, the Persian Gulf and Central Asia all being at acute risk of state failure or violent conflict in the period ahead.

In our Interim Report we put forward recommendations on short-term conflict prevention and crisis management that are relevant to the challenge of fragile states. These focused on preventive diplomacy and the approach required for intervention in these environments when that becomes necessary. They are reproduced in Appendix C.

Here we address the longer-term structural challenges associated with building legitimate and resilient states. While we recognise that the most successful state-building is almost always the result of domestic action driven from within, we also believe that international assistance can act as a significant enabler in the state-building process, if delivered in the right way. Indeed, in a closely interconnected community of states with vastly differing capacities and resources, where problems in one part of the world can quickly spread to many others, and where a neighbourhood is often affected by problems inside one state, it is a moral requirement as well as a collective interest for the strong to do more to help the weak.

State-building is an intrinsically political process. The recommendations below are therefore grounded in the belief that the relationship between state and society – or what the OECD-DAC⁴³ terms the ‘state-society contract’ – must be placed at the centre of state-building processes in fragile environments. Stable states are able to manage and reconcile states’ and citizens’ expectations through political processes, but fragility arises when these political processes are weak or absent (OECD 2008a). Building inclusive and accountable political institutions should therefore be a guiding principle for all state-building endeavours. Indeed, all assistance provided in fragile state contexts, whether or not it is specifically labelled as ‘state-building’, should be reviewed and checked to ensure that it will contribute to, rather than undermine, this process. This necessarily requires that all external assistance is grounded in a thorough understanding of the state in question, and that strategies are developed as a result of context-specific analysis.

Furthermore, we believe that only action by many different players working together will produce the results that are needed to address the challenges posed by fragile states. Consequently, the Commission believes the UK contribution to this effort should focus on the following areas:

Recommendation 33: The Government should adopt a political rather than a technocratic stance when engaging in fragile states and it should encourage other states and international institutions to do the same.

State-building work, to be effective, must address the fundamental relationship between state and society. While donor governments, including that of the UK, may find it preferable to provide assistance to the incumbent government of another state, budgetary support to fragile state governments can itself carry significant risks. Not only does this mode of assistance automatically assume the existence of a certain level of trust between citizens and government that may in reality be lacking, but such support can too often prop up flawed and illegitimate political regimes, when the core problem is to address fundamental imbalances in governance structures.

The approach required is one that engages directly with political institutions to support and promote effective, accountable and inclusive states. This means finding ways to deliver financial aid that are conditional on improvements in governance, citizenship, peace and development. The approach must also be bottom-up as well as top-down, so government should further increase its support for locally developed initiatives that are working towards building inclusive and accountable institutions.

43. The OECD Development Assistance Committee is the principal body through which the OECD deals with issues related to cooperation with developing countries.

Recommendation 34: The Government should increase its engagement with and support for regional organisations that promote good governance in their spheres of influence.

Regional organisations can play an important role in articulating and promoting norms around good internal government and are often better placed, and have more legitimacy, than bilateral donors to do so. The EU accession process and the European Neighbourhood Policy demonstrate that such organisations can use sticks and carrots to incentivise reform in fragile state environments. While the capacity and willingness of regional organisations to encourage good governance in their spheres of influence will differ (ASEAN – the Association of South East Asian Nations – for example, is explicitly non-interventionist when it comes to security policy), more support should be offered to those institutions that have the potential to influence change. By way of example, organisations such as the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), while still facing some challenges, have had some success in fostering accountable political governance in the region and would benefit from increased international support.

Recommendation 35: The Government should give full support to a package of measures designed to reduce corruption and increase legitimacy in weak and fragile states.

Corruption in these environments further undermines good governance, destroys lives and creates security risks. This is a problem that primarily requires domestic action. The UK, with its international partners, should nevertheless explore creative approaches like cultural exchanges, or the creation of an international charity to provide auditing skills and support – an *Auditors Sans Frontières* perhaps – that might be able to support it. In weak states, where criminal elements and corrupt officials can latch onto and take advantage of state utilities for personal gain, auditors can play an important role in exposing and combating corruption.

There is much that can be done, too, to diminish the enablers of corruption. A package of measures to tackle it should include increased transparency in the flows and use of private sector revenues. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has been a very useful development in this direction, and steps to strengthen it should be supported. Ultimately, international businesses have to be held accountable for their willingness to corrupt or be corrupted in fragile states.

The OECD Guidelines on Overseas Corruption should be made more credible: measures on banking transparency, for instance, which will have to cover tax havens, are needed. The existing standards for records and disclosures established by the Financial Action Task Force, which include due diligence on people who hold public office, should be enforced more effectively and sanctions applied to banks that do not fully and actively comply. Smart sanctions on elites, targeted at travel by named individuals, should be pursued and be backed up by an international aid regime that supports the long-term process of strengthening genuine public accountability in developing countries.

Recommendation 36: The Government should commit to more predictable, effective and longer-term assistance to fragile and post-conflict states.

In practice, this should mean three-year (minimum) funding commitments in all fragile states to which UK aid is granted, as well as efforts to encourage longer-term funding from other donors, particularly the EU. DfID has led the way in terms of providing more predictable, stable and longer-term funding for fragile states. Three-year agreements have been signed with some states, as well as a small number of 10-year partnership agreements (such as those with Yemen, Afghanistan, Rwanda and Sierra Leone). However, such longer-term commitments need to become the norm in order to provide fragile states with more predictable aid flows, avoiding the problems associated with aid volatility. Stable and through-life assistance packages are particularly important in post-conflict environments where too often international assistance begins to taper off just as the absorptive capacity of the state is increasing.

Recommendation 37: Where it is appropriate to do so, the Government should increase investment in pooled resources for fragile states.

The problems associated with effective aid delivery in fragile and conflict-affected states are well recognised within the UK government and the wider international community. In volatile and unpredictable environments, traditional aid modalities are often ill-suited to the context on the ground. Moreover, donor coordination in fragile states is often poor and common aims and objectives unclear. Yet in fragile environments, even more so than in more stable ones, harmonisation of development assistance is crucial. The pooling of donor resources offers more opportunity for alignment between international donors as well as between international donors and national governments. This needs to extend beyond multi-donor trust funds, which can be overly bureaucratic and lack a focus on building accountable and responsive institutions in recipient countries. Political coalitions of international actors with a commitment to governance and accountability improvements are also required.

“in fragile environments, even more so than in more stable ones, harmonisation of development assistance is crucial”

UK efforts to address climate change

Climate change is the most potent long-term threat facing humanity and the greatest challenge to our ingenuity and leadership. There are no scenarios in which unchecked climate change is good for either international or national security and almost all other measures outlined in this report are likely to amount to fire-fighting at best unless the challenge of climate change is met. The UK itself will face impacts on infrastructure and property and will almost certainly be impacted by the wider effects of increased state failure, violent conflict and forced movement of people that are likely to accompany climate change elsewhere (see *ippr 2008c*: 40–43 and 85–87).

We have limited influence on this issue globally but we can still act. In line with our recommendations in Chapter 4 on energy security, the UK should take a range of measures to reduce its own emissions to meet the requirements of the Climate Change Act. Internationally, in the wake of the 2008 US Presidential election and change in the US position, there are high hopes for what the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations for a post-Kyoto agreement might yield. However, domestic political pressures among the main players, including the US, China and the EU, mean it is unlikely that an enforceable agreement will be reached on an environmentally effective set of emissions targets, or on a major step towards global carbon markets, in the short term.

Consequently, in our view, the UK should focus on two issues without which any effective international action on climate change will be impossible: first, how mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries are to be financed; and second, how low-carbon technology development, transfer and deployment are to be organised.

Recommendation 38: The Government should support the creation of a coordinating body for international finance flows to tackle climate change.

To avert dangerous climate change, between US\$100 and \$200 billion a year will have to be spent in developing countries on mitigation measures by 2020–30. Perhaps double that amount will be needed for adapting successfully to existing climate change (Pendleton 2009). Most or all of this will have to come from OECD countries. It is likely that finance on this scale can only come from a variety of mechanisms and sources, including offsetting, auction revenues from emission trading schemes, borrowing or possibly even a financial transactions tax (a Tobin tax⁴⁴). It is unlikely that all parties will agree to a single disbursement mechanism, such as a global fund. In practice, resources will need to be routed through a variety of institutions. In these circumstances the UK should support the establishment of a body that oversees the finance landscape, sets standards for and verifies mitigation actions and plans, keeps an inventory of financial flows from developed to developing countries, informs good practice and reports back to the UNFCCC.

Recommendation 39: The Government should prioritise support for technology transfer initiatives, especially in energy efficiency.

44. A Tobin tax is a suggested tax on all trade of currency across borders.

While emissions reductions targets and carbon pricing issues frame international engagement on climate change in terms of burden-sharing, the development of low-carbon technology transforms that engagement into a discussion about sharing the industrial gains that will flow from action to meet the crisis. This is inherently more productive. The UK itself may do well out of certain emerging low-carbon technologies, such as carbon capture and storage and wave and tidal power. But it should also prioritise support for initiatives (including sectoral agreements), whether inside or outside of the formal UNFCCC process, that produce rapid shifts to lower-carbon technologies in major economies in both the developing and developed world.

An example might be joint agreement between G20 governments and a small number of large firms to fast-track the phase-out of older, inefficient and high-carbon technologies in areas like lighting, electric drives and air-conditioning, all of which have short payback periods. A balanced package, where firms from all of the major economies could compete to benefit from such market transformation programmes, is more likely to be adopted and lead to real emissions reductions than another unenforceable Kyoto-style agreement.

These measures may seem remote from the traditional concept of national security but they are emblematic of the new environment in which we live. Acting early to prepare for and prevent the worst on climate change is directly in the national security interests of the UK.

Action to manage energy competition

After a long period of relative stability, the fundamentals of the oil market seem to be shifting for a number of reasons, including there being less response to higher prices in importing countries than in the past; stagnant supply from and less investment in production by OPEC producers; the rise of new non-OPEC producers; and rapid growth in China and India. These shifts, collectively, appear to have created uncertainty in expectations of what the long-run price of oil should be, which in turn has opened up the oil markets to irrational speculation and bubbles, the most recent of which was in 2008, when prices peaked at around US\$150 a barrel (bbl) in the late summer, before collapsing as the financial crisis unfolded (Allsop and Fattouh 2008, Smith 2008a).

Market dysfunctionality and instability and concerns over the capacity of supply to meet demand are beginning to drive some large importers, like China, to seek bilateral barter arrangements, swapping oil for aid. It is also highly likely that when the global economy comes out of recession there will be a sharp increase in the price of oil. Over the long term, this whole process has the potential to turn into serious competition for oil, particularly in areas like the Arctic (see ippr 2008a: 41), potentially putting great strain on key relationships between major economies and powers within the international system.

Consequently:

Recommendation 40: The UK Government should plan for and advocate a truly global forum for energy cooperation (without precluding expansion of the International Energy Agency).

This will not be easy, but bringing the large importing countries together to attempt to minimise inter-state competition over energy, to increase cooperation and to engage collectively with OPEC and other producers would be a useful first step. Such an institution might be able to organise clearer information on reserves and depletion strategies and so reduce the likelihood of price bubbles. The IEA, which was initially established in response to the first oil shock in the 1970s, would be a useful body to build on, but it currently does not include large emerging net importers like China and India, who would need to be involved. The UK should promote the development of such a forum and seek, through the EU, to engage the US and China on the idea.

Managing the second nuclear age

On nuclear non-proliferation, the UK's active diplomacy in relation to the Iranian and North Korean cases, its support for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, its pursuit of implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the earliest date possible and its

support for the resumption of serious strategic arms reduction talks between the US and Russia are all to be welcomed. The Prime Minister's recent statement, quoted in Chapter 5 on defence policy, that the UK stands ready to put its own nuclear arsenal on the table as part of multilateral nuclear disarmament talks, is also a positive development.

Nevertheless, more needs to be done if we are to ensure that a resurgence in the global nuclear industry does not produce additional proliferation risks, that dangerous nuclear weapons and materials do not fall into the hands of terrorists, and that serious progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons begins to be made. This goal may require an effort spanning several generations, but this reality should only reinforce our determination to make a start now.

We therefore reiterate the following recommendations from our Interim Report (a full list of which is available in Appendix C).

Recommendation 41: The UK should vigorously pursue a strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions on monitoring and compliance, to provide greater assurances to all parties on the effectiveness of the Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, requiring a state to provide access to any location where nuclear material is present, should be accepted by all nations signed up to the Treaty and the policy goal should be to make such acceptance mandatory at the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

Recommendation 42: The UK should provide further practical help to those states that wish but are unable to fully implement Security Council Resolution 1540 on the safety and security of nuclear stockpiles.

The resolution requires nations to improve the security of stockpiles and allows for the formation of teams of specialists to be deployed in those countries that do not possess the infrastructure or skills to do so. In a world where terrorist organisations are known to be seeking the nuclear option, this regime is pivotal to the counter-terrorism effort and must be given priority support.

Neither of these measures should in any way hinder the legal right of all states parties to the NPT to engage in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In order to ensure that those states wishing to use nuclear power for the first time, or those wishing to expand their use of civil nuclear power, can do so without this resulting in a proliferation of enrichment facilities around the world, we believe:

Recommendation 43: The UK should continue to advance the case for the internationalisation of the nuclear fuel cycle and for the creation of nuclear fuel banks under IAEA control.

In addition, and because a review of NATO's strategic concept is now underway:

Recommendation 44: The UK government should use all its influence inside NATO to ensure that the review of the strategic concept produces a result sensitive to and supportive of the need for a successful strengthening of the NPT, both throughout the 2010 NPT Review Conference period and beyond.

Finally, and in addition to its efforts to promote a strategic dialogue on non-proliferation among the P-5 (the US, UK, France, Russia and China):

Recommendation 45: The Government should also fund and contribute to a second, informal track of diplomatic activity involving former senior officials and policy experts from the P-5 plus India, Israel and Pakistan.

This would be aimed at thinking through, at a credible level of senior expertise, the political and strategic issues required for a phased progression to zero nuclear weapons among this group, but at arms length from the governments of these states themselves.

Strengthening regimes on biological and chemical weapons

The international legal regimes in place to deal with biological and chemical weapons are also in need of further development. We therefore recommend that:

“Many of the scientists involved in the biological revolution are largely unaware of the possible exploitation of their work by others and are therefore unable to contribute their expertise to dealing with the problem”

Recommendation 46: The Government should use the period leading up to the 2011 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) to push for the creation of an effective verification mechanism for this treaty and to improve the monitoring of state compliance with its terms. The BTWC was brought into force during a period when biological weapons were not perceived to be a significant military threat, which led to the omission of provisions for verification and compliance monitoring. However, the rapid pace of development in the field of biotechnology, as outlined in our Interim Report, has meant that these arrangements are now inadequate and in urgent need of revision.

Related to this:

Recommendation 47: The Government is urged to take steps to restart stalled negotiations on the establishment of an Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, similar in structure to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that was set up in 1997 to ensure implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Despite frequent review conferences calling for the creation of such a body, the objections of a number of major powers, including the US, have prevented its emergence thus far. The changed leadership in the US might now represent an opportunity to push for an institutionalisation of an inspection and verification regime.

In the interim, and in light of the relatively widespread availability of information about dangerous biological materials and the potential for this knowledge to fall into the hands of those who might put them to offensive use, we recommend that:

Recommendation 48: The Government should use its position as a Depository State for the BTWC to take a lead in developing programmes to educate individual scientists about the potential security implications of their work.

Many of the scientists involved in the biological revolution are largely unaware of the possible exploitation of their work by others and are therefore unable to contribute their expertise to dealing with the problem. NGOs and states parties to the BTWC have long advocated the need for educational programmes that would describe the risks associated with the misuse of biotechnology, explain the ethical obligations incumbent on those working in the field of the biological sciences and provide guidance on the types of activities that could be contrary to the aims of the Convention, to relevant national laws and regulations and to international law. However, it will take a strong push by national governments before these kinds of programmes are established.

Although the international legal regime for monitoring and regulating the use of chemical weapons is much better developed than its biological counterpart, there is still more that could be done to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. On this front, we recommend:

Recommendation 49: The Government should work with other major powers to eliminate the loopholes related to law enforcement in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which have encouraged some states to develop new and incapacitating chemical agents based on advances in neuroscience. For example, Russian use of the chemical fentanyl to end the siege in a Moscow theatre in 2002 resulted in the death of more than 100 hostages, along with many of the militants that the authorities were seeking to subdue. Much tighter international regulations are required to limit the indiscriminate use of such weapons, which could easily be exploited by would-be terrorists should they fall into the wrong hands.

These recommendations on biological and chemical weapons complement earlier proposals on global bio-security put forward in our Interim Report. These are attached in Appendix C, and chief among them were the following:

- A call on the Government to work with international partners to create a panel of scientific experts, equivalent to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for purposes of reviewing and bringing to policymakers' attention developments in the biological sciences that may have implications for security and public safety.

- A call for the Government to commit to the promotion of a Global Compact for Infectious Diseases. This would be a new treaty designed to deliver a number of internationally coordinated bio-security advances, including:
 - The creation of a network of research centres aimed at carrying out fundamental research on infectious diseases
 - Improved data and knowledge sharing from research and bio-surveillance activities around the world
 - The harmonisation of national standards, regulatory practices, and best laboratory practices
 - A major expansion in the production of, and arrangements for sharing, important drugs and vaccines.

Swine flu has demonstrated that this proposal is as relevant now as it has ever been.

Dealing with the 21st century challenges of cyber and space security

Lastly, we turn to two further important areas of the 21st century security landscape, cyber-security and space security. These are both of growing significance and there is a need for more international cooperation on each if we are to diminish our societal vulnerabilities and head off new possible sources of international tension and conflict.

As we noted in our Interim Report, societies around the world have become more complex and more technology-reliant. We now depend heavily on information and communications technologies and, to a very significant degree, on communications routed through satellites in outer space. The former are subject to unintended failure, deliberate state- or terrorist-backed attacks upon critical Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems and lower-level hacking. The latter are vulnerable to increasing problems from space debris and the possible militarisation of space, as more powers acquire the capacity for space launches and weapons capable of disrupting space communications.

Cyber security

We table cyber-security proposals in Chapter 8 on resilience. At the global level however, there is already a Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) housed within the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which aims to promote cooperation between governments, international law enforcement authorities, the private sector, international organisations and civil society to make cyberspace more secure. With 191 member states and more than 700 sector members, the ITU is in principle well placed to serve as a framework for international cooperation in cyber-security. However, the GCA was only established in 2007 in response to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) Action on 'Building Confidence and Security in the use of ICTs'. It may not be able on its own to respond on the timescale required.

We believe, therefore, that:

Recommendation 50: The Government should increase its political and financial support for global action to enhance cybersecurity, recognising the high priority also being placed on this by the Obama Administration and in particular Recommendation Seven of the US Cyberspace Policy Review.⁴⁵

As a first step, concerted action at the European level is required, supporting and building on the good work of European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). The timescales for the GCA should be critically examined and if necessary accelerated through the establishment, under the World Summit on the Information Society, of a body equivalent to the successful Internet Governance Forum, but targeted specifically on global cybersecurity.

Space security

Recommendation 51: The Government should promote the idea of a follow-on treaty to the Outer Space Treaty, and pursue any and all other possible forms of cooperative dialogue, to develop the international legal regime around the military uses of space.

45. US Cyberspace Policy Review Recommendation 7: 'Develop U.S. Government positions for an international cybersecurity policy framework and strengthen our international partnerships to create initiatives that address the full range of activities, policies, and opportunities associated with cybersecurity.' See: www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf

The use of space is currently governed by the 1967 'Outer Space Treaty': a universally accepted and binding UN convention which bans the deployment of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction in outer space, but otherwise places few restrictions on the military use of space for defence or intelligence-gathering purposes. Nor does it cover the use or threat of force against a country's assets in outer space. These arrangements may have been sufficient during a period where the US and Russia were the only two major powers engaged in space exploration and development, but they are clearly inadequate in the new conditions where more states are active in this area.

President Obama has recently called for a ban on the use of space weapons. This provides the international community with an opportunity to develop clearer rules and regulations governing both the offensive and defensive military uses of space.

In this chapter, we have set out a wide range of proposals aimed at strengthening multilateral institutions, treaties and less formal cooperative arrangements for the challenges ahead. The goal is practical, internationally coordinated action in issue-specific areas across a wide front. The success of our effort here is as vital to our national security today as an effective defence policy. We urge government and all political parties to pursue this agenda vigorously.

PART 4

Building a
distributed
response:
pushing power
and responsibility
down and out
to communities,
citizens and
businesses

8. Resilience

As the recommendations at the end of the last chapter indicate, a theme running through the Commission's work has been that we live today in a complex, densely networked and heavily technology-reliant society. New technologies have enabled an explosion in the diversity of sources of information that people can use to design their own lifestyles. Extensive privatisation combined with globalised market forces, driving us towards ever greater efficiency in pursuit of competitive advantage, have led us to pare down the systems we rely upon until little or no margin for error remains. We have switched to lean production, stretched supply chains, decreased stock inventories and reduced redundancy in our systems. We have outsourced, offshored and embraced a just-in-time culture with little heed for just-in-case.

Automation and integration on this scale magnify not only efficiency but also vulnerability, because complexity invites disruption. Paradoxically, although new technologies empower people and drive efficiency, the control of the systems that enable this has also become increasingly centralised, and communities have become less self-reliant, again increasing vulnerability. As a result, the sometimes inflexible infrastructure of modern life can be brittle: interdependent systems can make for cascades of concatenated failure when one link in the chain is broken.

In addition, our complex society faces likely future risks in the form of:

- Unconventional state-backed attacks on our infrastructure, perhaps through cyber-attack, including both industrial espionage and hostile acts
- Terrorist attacks, both conventional and unconventional, and including attacks such as the London bombings in 2005 and attacks aimed directly at our infrastructure
- Disruptive industrial action, such as the UK's fuel protests in 2000
- Disease (human or animal), such as a pandemic influenza, which could lead to major service shut-downs as a result of both illness and government instructions to people to stay at home
- Industrial accidents, such as the Buncefield Oil Storage Depot explosion in Hertfordshire in 2005
- Extreme weather, such as the floods in Yorkshire and Gloucestershire in summer 2007.

Our infrastructure and social systems therefore need to be made more resilient to such events. However, this cannot be delivered by government alone. Resilience requires more self-reliance on the part of businesses, communities and citizens, and this is an area where government, businesses and communities need to work alongside each other in partnership to achieve the desired overall effect.

It is important to recognise that much has been done and is being done by the Government in this area, notably under the leadership of the Cabinet Office's Civil Contingencies Secretariat. A National Risk Register has been published for the first time detailing the risks the UK faces. Lessons have been learnt from previous disasters, such as those captured in the inquiry into the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001 (Anderson 2002), in the Greater London Authority's review of the emergency response following the bomb attacks on 7 July 2005 (GLA 2002) and in Sir Michael Pitt's review of the summer 2007 floods (Pitt 2008). Local and Regional Resilience Forums, involving public, private and voluntary sector partners, have been established. A Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme is underway, drawing in new responders such as the Met Office, improving collaboration with some emergency responders and considering the need for amendments to the Civil Contingencies Act brought into effect in 2005.⁴⁶

46. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 places responsibilities on two categories of organisations that respond to emergencies. Category 1 responders include local authorities, government agencies, emergency services and various health bodies. Category 2 responders include utilities, transport providers and the Health and Safety Executive.

A major exercise in terms of a ‘black’ restart⁴⁷ of the national grid has been undertaken. A similar exercise, ‘White Noise’, simulating a major communications failure, is planned for later this year. The Prime Minister has tasked his Council on Science and Technology to make urgent recommendations for a major renewal programme of the UK national infrastructure, enhancing resilience and reducing interdependence.

Nevertheless, despite this positive trajectory, much remains to be done.

In this chapter, we are sensitive to a three-fold distinction in relation to the concept of resilience. First Generation resilience work might be said to be concerned with the ability of our systems to absorb shocks and to bounce back quickly into operation. This idea includes work to strengthen and protect the critical infrastructure on which we rely. Second Generation resilience, based on the recognition that there is a strong social and psychological dimension to this issue, relates primarily to work on the community resilience agenda.⁴⁸ Third Generation resilience, based on a biological analogy, involves anticipating trouble and adapting to circumstances, but recognising that the system is often better off not bouncing back into exactly the same shape it was in before it was disrupted. This translates into ideas such as adapting planning arrangements so that we do not, for example, rebuild flooded power stations on flood plains.

We do not make explicit recommendations on Third Generation resilience in this report, but we would urge government to ensure that this idea is a key part of ongoing attempts to improve national and local planning criteria. Being smart about where we put our infrastructure could save not only lives in the future but also billions of pounds.

The recommendations below do, however, explicitly address both First and Second Generation resilience. We cover critical infrastructure; enterprise resilience; and community resilience. The theme binding all these areas together is that of the state using legal and other powers to devolve and delegate power, responsibility and resources down and out to regulators, businesses, communities and citizens.

Critical infrastructure

The critical infrastructure encompasses those sectors that supply essential services to the citizen and on which normal daily life depends, such as communications, emergency services, government and public services, finance, energy, food, health, transport and water. Many of these sectors, such as the utility and telecommunications sectors, are dominated by private and often foreign-owned companies. Though subject to regulation, the regulators are economic rather than security-focused and they rarely act in concert to tackle cross-cutting issues of concern. The result is that minimum standards of resilience are set too low by the regulators themselves (where they are set at all), interdependencies across sectors are poorly understood and weaknesses in one area can therefore lead to vulnerabilities in others.

In this context, we believe:

Recommendation 52: The Government should review its powers to mandate realistic minimum levels of resilience in relation to all critical infrastructures and in relation to all areas of interdependence between different infrastructure sectors. Where wider interpretation or amendment of existing legislation is not sufficient and new primary legislation is required, this should be included in the planned further Bill on Civil Contingencies.

Recommendation 53: The Government should bring together regulators of the different infrastructure industries and require them to enforce higher resilience standards in their own sectors, as well as to investigate and strengthen resilience in areas of interdependencies between sectors and in sector supply chains. An example of recent progress on this front is the introduction by the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) of a new resilience criterion – requiring water companies to review their vulnerabilities to surface water flooding and other potential hazards – in its latest five-year Price Review (Ofwat 2009).

“Being smart about where we put our infrastructure could save not only lives in the future but also billions of pounds”

47. A black restart of the national grid is the process of restoring power stations to operation following a total shutdown without relying on external energy sources. It entails isolated power stations being started individually and gradually being reconnected to each other in order to form an interconnected system again.

48. We pick up this idea of social resilience again in Chapter 11 on Legitimacy, since divided societies that have governing institutions seen as lacking in legitimacy and that also have low levels of trust, both in government and between citizens, are less likely to be resilient when subject to severe stress.

Recommendation 54: The Government should go further and signal to sector regulators that it would welcome investment by utility providers in relevant areas outside their own core business areas where such investment would reduce interdependence on other elements of the infrastructure. For example, investment by the power generators, national grid and energy distribution companies in mobile communications that are more resilient against power failure would be welcome.

In the area of emergency communications in particular:

Recommendation 55: The Government should instruct the Office of Communications (Ofcom) to make adequate spectrum available to ensure emergency service access to next generation mobile technology. This will be increasingly important to transmitting and receiving the data required for situational awareness and coordinated and timely emergency response. At this stage, Ofcom need only reserve suitable spectrum (as the US Administration has done); it can be auctioned at a later date. But the change being suggested may be especially important for occasions when airwave traffic is highest, such as during the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, when Ofcom currently proposes temporarily to borrow spectrum from the MoD to meet short-term demand.

On energy infrastructure:

Recommendation 56: The Government should work with the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) to ensure a supportive regulatory environment for rapid investment in Smart Grids.

We have fallen behind the US and major Continental European countries in the application of this technology. Smart Grids (a generic term used to refer to power distribution systems that support both extensive small-scale local power generation and enhanced command and control facilities for load management) allow better handling and prioritisation of supply at points of peak demand. They also allow selective load shedding when the system is under stress and, by diversifying and localising sources of energy supply, could substantially increase the overall resilience of the energy infrastructure.

Some argue that the command and control facilities used in Smart Grids themselves could become new points of vulnerability and targets for attack. To guard against this:

Recommendation 57: Government should task the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) with the development of security recommendations aimed at mitigating command and control risks associated with Smart Grids.

Recommendation 58: Industry should develop marketing communications campaigns to promote the use of Smart Grid capabilities by domestic consumers, including attractive off-peak tariffs.⁴⁹ In our view, by using such services, consumers could contribute to a more resilient UK energy infrastructure and see financial savings in the process.

We must also enhance the resilience of elements of our electronic information infrastructure that are less visible and less well understood by the public at large, but the utility and ubiquity of which are beyond doubt.

We rely heavily, if unwittingly, for our everyday activities upon satellites in space and their terrestrial receiving stations. Space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, for instance, enables the synchronisation of both power grids and mobile telephone networks. The military and emergency services use it to navigate and control their vehicular fleets. Space-based technology is used by the MoD for surveillance and the targeting of weapons systems. It is the primary means by which the Royal Navy communicates. In civilian life, space-based technologies facilitate, among many other applications, banking transactions, breakdown service vehicle recovery in remote areas, the coastguard at sea, air traffic control, weather forecasting, environmental monitoring, oil and gas exploration, the functioning of lighthouses and prisoner tagging. Many important pieces of equipment would no longer work or move without the technology in space.

Yet much space infrastructure is controlled by foreign countries and multinational companies over which we in the UK have limited control. This technology is vulnerable to

49. A further feature of Smart Grids is their ability to differentiate between certain types of use. This allows, for example, domestic washers and dryers to be used at lower tariffs at off-peak times, evening out load on the system in the process.

accidental disruption by collisions with space debris or charged particle damage from solar disturbances.

Space assets, with limited exceptions such as the British-owned Skynet 5 platform, are also vulnerable to deliberate technical attack, ranging from a small jammer manufactured and deployed on Earth to take out GPS across the South of England, which would be a simple task for an engineering undergraduate, to an Electro-Magnetic Pulse device detonated at high altitude by another state.

Consequently:

Recommendation 59: The Government should task the CPNI to carry out a thorough analysis of the extent to which space-based technologies are embedded in our critical infrastructure and conduct a critical assessment of the quality of existing mitigation planning against their loss.

Other parts of the electronic information infrastructure include the fibre-optic cables on the ocean floor that sustain global communications and that bunch vulnerably at, for instance, the Suez Canal and the Pacific island of Guam. Webservers and databases, too, present vulnerabilities: last year in San Francisco a computer network controlling data for the Californian city's police, courts, jails, payroll and health services was rendered inaccessible for days by its disgruntled administrator, Terry Childs (Sundin 2008). President Obama's White House is taking cyber-security very seriously, whereas the recently revised UK counter-terrorism strategy states that the threat from cyber-terrorism 'is not currently assessed as great'. This should be critically reassessed.

We need to harden key elements of our infrastructure against cyber threats. Much of the embedded process control across all of our utilities is based on software that has not been developed with reliability (or resilience to hacking threats) in mind. Researchers have reported fault densities of one to 30 defects per KLoC (thousand lines of source program) in commercial software in service. The UK Ministry of Defence found over 20 defects per KLoC in the software in the C130J ('Hercules') military transport aircraft, including many safety critical faults, *after it had passed certification* (Pfleeger and Hatton 1997, Fenton and Ohlsson 2000, German and Mooney 2001). We need a different approach, drawing on our heritage of experience in science-based methods and mature engineering processes. The US National Security Agency has shown that it is practical to develop software with almost zero defects quickly and cheaply by using formal methods (AdaCore 2009).

Therefore:

Recommendation 60: The Government should approach the European Commission and the incoming Swedish Presidency to sponsor a programme for the creation of a range of reliable standard software modules (such as simple operating systems, database management systems and graphical user interfaces). These modules should be developed using formal methods and made available free of charge through an open source licence.

A range of modules is required to avoid the risks associated with a monoculture. They could then form the secure core for a wide range of commercially developed embedded systems within the Critical National Infrastructure and associated services.

Action through the European Commission would accord with the concern expressed by Information Society and Media Commissioner Viviane Reding at the EU Ministerial Conference on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection held in Tallinn, Estonia, in April 2009 that: 'Cyber attacks have not only become a tool in the hands of organised crime, a means of blackmailing companies and organisations, of exploiting the weakness of people, but also an instrument of foreign and military policy, and globally a challenge to democracy and economies. A one month-long internet interruption in Europe or the US would mean economic losses of at least €150 billion' (Mellor 2009).

Enterprise resilience

Beyond regulation, we believe business itself needs to invest in the resilience of both its assets and its people to optimise its own self-sufficiency and continuity in emergency

“Given the critical importance of communications and the proliferation of mobile phones, a more resilient mobile communications service would seem to be a ‘no brainer’”

situations. This means enhancing markets in resilience-related services, an impossible task without first addressing current information failures that prevent companies from appreciating the competitive advantage additional resilience could offer (Norton 2009).

There is a poor level of understanding, particularly among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), of the extent to which existing infrastructure has limited resilience and extensive interdependence. Research shows, for example, that 84 per cent of SMEs wrongly believe that their mobile voice and data services would be unaffected by a 12-hour region-wide power failure. This contrasts starkly with only 47 per cent believing that their fixed voice and data services would be unaffected (IoD 2008).

Business customers need to understand how to ask the right questions about the resilience of the essential services on which their businesses depend. Infrastructure providers need to offer a range of different levels of resilience alongside a range of different service costs. For many this might open up whole new areas of profitable premium service, yet still save money overall for their customers. Given the critical importance of communications and the proliferation of mobile phones, a more resilient mobile communications service would seem to be a ‘no brainer’. Such a service might offer resilience against defined durations of power loss (say 24 hours) and overload (as happened on 7 July 2005 in London) to a subset of customers prepared to pay a premium rental.

Where there is business justification, organisations should demand the option of buying services at a range of trade-off points between resilience and cost. This will break the vicious circle of market failure that characterises many of the areas of resilient service provision at present, where suppliers say that there is no customer demand and so no need to offer enhanced service.

Recommendation 61: The Government and business organisations should work together on a communications campaign, specifically targeting SMEs, to overcome misconceptions about the resilience of existing infrastructure services.

Recommendation 62: The Government and business organisations should encourage major purchasers of infrastructure services (including, for example, logistics and power companies) to demand a range of options and service-level agreements for the availability of resilient infrastructure services against a range of price points.

Simple contingency planning can also bring business real benefits if trouble does strike. But business continuity planning is thought by many SMEs in particular to be too complicated and to demand excessive costs and management time. Less than half of all UK companies and only a third of SMEs have a business continuity plan (BCP) in place and less than half of those that have a plan regularly test or rehearse it (Woodman 2008).

It is strongly recommended that organisations carry out realistic risk assessments of the likelihood and impact on their operations of various levels and durations of infrastructure or other failures, and plan for their mitigation. Indeed, this is a mandatory requirement for compliance with the British Standard on Business Continuity, BS25999 (BSI 2009). There is plenty of good advice on this, freely available (DirectGov 2009). One element of compliance with BS25999 is to ensure that businesses’ key partners up and down the supply chain also have effective business continuity plans. Increasingly, larger businesses should demand evidence of compliance from their SME trading partners.

Of those organisations that invoked their business continuity plans during the floods of summer 2007, 94 per cent agree that they reduced the resulting disruption. Similarly, 78 per cent of those who had carried out exercises indicate that these helped by revealing shortcomings in their existing plans (Woodman 2008). The alternative is stark: 80 per cent of businesses caught without a workable business continuity plan are forced to close within a year of a major flood or fire (LCCI 2006). The reality is that, for many SMEs, a good BCP can make the difference between successfully overcoming a few days’ disruption and shutting forever. To tackle this situation:

Recommendation 63: The Government should encourage the provision of financial incentives, such as insurance premium reductions, for SMEs to undertake business continuity planning.

Recommendation 64: The Government should disseminate to SMEs real-life case studies of instances where companies have found that they have benefited from having business continuity plans in place.

Recommendation 65: The Government should produce ‘boardroom briefs’ on resilience for companies to use in their corporate governance.

Recommendation 66: The Government should promote business continuity planning as an element of Corporate Social Responsibility, establish a scheme of Champions of Resilience, and encourage big businesses to insist on satisfaction of BS25999 among their suppliers so their purchasing power drives this standard more deeply into the supply chain.

Community resilience

As noted earlier, resilience is a field in which power and responsibility must be pushed not only out to businesses but also down to citizens and voluntary and community groups. At times of emergency, volunteers in local communities can provide emotional support, culturally sensitive advice, language services, first aid, food and water, childcare, clothing and blankets, use of telephones, pastoral care, places of safety, transport, reassurance and basic equipment. When tsunamis or earthquakes have struck in far-off places, British citizens have done what they can to help those affected to recover. Closer to home, on 7 July 2005 London medical students at the British Medical Association (BMA) rushed to assist those injured in the bomb blast on the bus outside in Tavistock Square. Technology cannot always be relied upon, but human compassion can.

It is reasonable for the public to expect government (local, regional and national) to have well-rehearsed plans for emergencies, but government cannot do it all. Individuals, families and communities in their village, ward or estate need to part-own risks and their mitigation in order to achieve some level of local responsibility and self-sufficiency.

However, this will not happen unless the public feel they have access to information and relevant processes that make their meaningful participation viable. This is evident, for example, with regard to counter-terrorism, where sometimes necessary official secrecy generates public complacency regarding the nature, severity or location of the threat.

We therefore need greater transparency and a more informed public debate on the nature of risk in our society and what to do about it. The public must understand that 100 per cent security is a false prospectus. A decision has to be made about how much insecurity is to be tolerated and therefore about the trade-offs between security, convenience, freedom, privacy and cost. For example, should the public be involved in deciding what value we put on an individual human life in public policymaking, as we already do without them when it comes to road traffic accidents? If we want a distributed model of resilience, which we do, then we will need to make good on a ‘responsibility to provide’ information rather than a ‘need to know’.

Consequently, the Commission believes:

Recommendation 67: The Government should assist communities to understand risk-oriented decision-making processes and outcomes and enable them to access funding to build community-level schemes, local networks and capacity to contribute to resilience on the ground.

Recommendation 68: Local and Regional Resilience Forums should review how they might benefit from further third sector involvement, what relevant training they could facilitate for interested individuals and voluntary and community sector organisations, and how they could more widely consult on and disseminate their emergency plans.

Recommendation 69: The Government should issue more advice to the public on basic preparatory actions that could be taken at a local level to bolster resilience and that when advice is issued to the whole population, it actually reaches everyone.

At present this does not always happen. For example, the recent swine flu leaflet was meant to reach every household in the UK but by the time the deadline for delivery had

expired, a quarter of ippr staff and several members of this Commission had not received it. Effective community resilience relies upon effective information provision.

With a significant opening up of information-sharing and decision-making around emergency preparedness, citizens should be expected to do more to enhance the resilience of their own communities. Under these circumstances:

Recommendation 70: Government should examine the extent to which existing good practice in the field of community emergency response and support networks, such as Keswick Flood Action Group⁵⁰, WRVS⁵¹ and the Radio Amateurs' Emergency Network (RAYNET)⁵², offer models for broader adoption.

Recommendation 71: The Government should facilitate the creation of the cyber equivalent of 'Neighbourhood Watch', by engaging positively with the law-abiding technical community (systems administrators, internet service providers, 'white-hat' hackers⁵³ and others) to enlist their help in securing important systems and networks. This would mean reaching a clear understanding of what is legitimate practice. At present, much of the technical community is engaged in finding ways to protect the internet from what is seen as unwarranted interference by the state. How much better if the state were to earn their trust and recruit their help towards achieving shared goals.

Finally, security is in part a psychological construct. It can be enhanced by feelings of unity and solidarity, which can in turn be fostered by effective civic leadership, such as that shown in the Mayor of London's 'One London' campaign in the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 bombings. Elected politicians, at all levels, with their knowledge of and standing among their communities, have a vital role to play after a disaster in helping avoid public panic and disorder, and in reducing the danger of fallout, division or fragmentation in society as a result.

This is not unconnected to the recommendations we have set out above. A resilient society is one that cannot only keep infrastructure and services running in emergency situations, but one in which core social values define the nature of the emergency response. Citizens' trust in the legitimacy and effectiveness of government, and citizens' trust in each other, are important to achieving the right outcome. We believe the recommendations set out above would contribute to public confidence in government's understanding of, and effectiveness in, dealing with possible emergencies. We believe the recommendations made in relation to community involvement could help facilitate a growth in social capital and trust in our communities. Both are needed in dealing with the challenges we face.

50. Formed following the serious flooding which occurred in Keswick, Cumbria, on 7 January 2005.

51. Provides volunteers to support elderly people in their homes, communities and in hospital.

52. A national voluntary communications service provided for the community by licensed radio amateurs.

53. White-hat hackers are computer security experts who specialise in penetration testing and other testing methodologies to ensure that a company's information systems are secure.

9. Countering radicalisation and terrorism inside the UK

The Commission has previously made clear its view that the main global terrorist threat today comes from neo-jihadi groups, principally Al Qaeda and those it inspires (ippr 2008a: 62–69, 77–81). These groups are operating both inside and outside the UK.

Al Qaeda has suffered definite setbacks in recent years:

- Osama bin Laden no longer has free access to his acolytes and members of the movement he nominally leads
- Its operatives, including several key figures, have been imprisoned or killed in significant numbers in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Indonesia
- It has failed to involve itself in the Israel-Palestine conflict
- Its unconstrained *takfiri* attacks on fellow Muslims (exemplified by its failed plot to attack the Hajj in Mecca in 2007) have meant it has claimed more Muslim than non-Muslim lives since 9/11, alienating some it might previously have been able to count as supporters
- Some of its locally expedient tactical successes, such as the bombing campaign in Iraq led by the late Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, have had counter-productive ramifications for it in strategic terms, such as the decrease in public support recognised by Ayman al-Zawahiri (Global Security 2005), its failure to elicit the desired response from the US in Iraq and the emergence there of the Sunni Awakening Councils
- It has failed to mobilise the Muslim masses and is seeing a growing backlash against it in many Muslim majority countries, confirmed by worldwide polling (Terror Free Tomorrow 2008, Wike and Holzwart 2009), albeit starting from a troublingly high base: it was reported in March 2008 that 7 per cent of Muslims globally – equivalent to 91million people – thought then that the 9/11 attacks were 'completely justified' (Esposito and Mogahed 2008).

But Al Qaeda has also enjoyed some success:

- Its core has been able to regroup and regenerate in the tribal areas of Pakistan, hijacking the Pashtun cause, and, with the support of the Pakistani Taliban, has established a presence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas such as Waziristan and in the North-West Frontier Province, including in the Swat Valley
- Its activities continue to grow in Somalia, Algeria and Yemen
- It has succeeded in inspiring atypical recruits, such as Nicky Reilly, aka Mohammed Rashid Saeed Alim, 22, from Plymouth, who had learning difficulties and a mental age of 10, and who tried to blow himself and others up in a restaurant in Exeter on 22 May 2008
- In developing a unifying ideology and identity that transcends the specifics of localised conflicts, it has globalised highly effectively.

Although the election of President Obama in the US is a negative development for Al Qaeda (BBC 2009a), the wider global socio-political context in which it operates remains largely favourable in a number of respects. Some of the features of this include:

- Numerous conflict zones and insurgencies worldwide which provide conditions conducive to terrorist recruitment and training and a theatre for the rapid development of operational expertise
- A growth in fragile and failing states and ungoverned spaces – exacerbated by the current recession – providing more locations ripe for terrorist exploitation (there is reason to believe, for instance, that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is looking with

this in mind at Mauritania, and at Mali, where it recently beheaded kidnapped British citizen, Edwin Dyer)

- Signs that pan-Islamism is taking hold in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where pan-Arabism has failed
- Growing youth disenchantment with quasi-secular authoritarian regimes across the MENA region
- A media environment that continues to reward ‘propaganda by deed’ by covering terrorist incidents at length on all major outlets, that facilitates global-local communication, and that allows 4,000-plus terrorism-related websites and interactive internet forums to function and provide indoctrination and online training
- Ongoing scientific and technological advance and knowledge dispersion enabling terrorists to acquire more lethal weaponry (ippr 2008a).

The terrorist threat in the UK and the recent policy response

The above summary describes the context within which the neo-jihadi terrorist threat to the UK remains severe, not least on account of the nexus between militant British Muslims, Pakistan and Al Qaeda. Two thirds of terrorist networks in the UK have links to South Asia (HMIC 2006). The national threat level is currently set at SEVERE, suggesting another attack is highly likely: it has been raised above this level on occasion (after the arrests of suspects thought to be plotting to detonate liquid bombs onboard transatlantic aircraft and after the attempted bombings in London’s Haymarket and in Glasgow in June 2007) but never lowered beneath it, since it was first published on 1 August 2006 (MI5 2009). The Security Service has indicated that the number of suspected terrorists requiring further investigation is five times greater than it was in 2001 (HMIC 2006).

Public perception of the threat, however, is often at odds with that of those charged with countering it in the Agencies and police. The public remembers the 52 innocent people killed in London on 7 July 2005, but, since that day, to the lay person the threat has at times seemed remote. Forgotten too readily are the 196 terrorism-related convictions in the UK between 11 September 2001 and 31 March 2008 (Home Office 2009b) and the 15 or more plots that have failed or been foiled on UK soil since 9/11, including plans to use dirty bombs (Operation Rhyme), fertiliser bombs (Operation Crevice), backpack bombs (Operation Vivace), car bombs (Operation Seagram), shoe bombs (Operation Snagged), mortars (Operation Tonic) and sub-machine guns (Operation Kyoto) (MPS 2007, Leppard *et al* 2007, Lloyd 2006: 81).

The Government has devoted significant energy to tackling the terrorist threat. Recently it published its revised UK counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST. Its publication in detail is a welcome step towards the transparency and openness that is necessary if our counter-terrorist effort is to command widespread confidence, trust and legitimacy. As the former Home Secretary Jacqui Smith said, ‘counter-terrorism is no longer something you can do behind closed doors and in secret’ (BBC 2009b). In addition, the Security Service (MI5) now employs at least 50 per cent more people than it did in 2001. Between the end of 2008 and 2011 the Home Office will have spent an additional £240 million on counter-terrorist policing (Brown 2007). The number of police working on counter-terrorism has already risen from 1,700 in 2003 to over 3,000 now. This investment has enabled a significant increase in our capacity to tackle the terrorist threat and has enhanced our coverage of it.

The convictions mentioned above constitute evidence of significant success in the pursuit of terrorists.

In terms of preventing terrorism, the Government’s initial attempts at community engagement in the aftermath of 7/7, through the vehicle of the Preventing Extremism Together (PET) taskforce, were seen by many in Britain’s Muslim communities as a highly centralised cosmetic exercise, delivering little of substance. More recently, the Government’s Preventing Violent Extremism programme, a vehicle for community-led

“Forgotten too readily are the 196 terrorism-related convictions in the UK between 11 September 2001 and 31 March 2008 and the 15 or more plots that have failed or been foiled on UK soil since 9/11”

preventive work delivered locally across the UK and enhanced in the updated CONTEST strategy, has been a positive development.

The Protect strand of CONTEST has also been strengthened. The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) now issues authoritative advice to industry on, for instance, the protection of hazardous sites and materials, and Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers advise those responsible for crowded places and iconic sites, helping them ‘design out’ terrorism. Under Project Griffin⁵⁴, police officers have delivered counter-terrorism presentations to thousands of security professionals and members of the extended police family.

In relation to the Prepare strand of the Government’s strategy, advanced CBRN contingency planning is taking place and new equipment (such as the Fire Brigade’s New Dimension kit)⁵⁵ is being rolled out. A counter-terrorism exercise programme, including at least two national live-play exercises each year, is up and running. Joint exercises between police and military occur regularly under Operation Wooden Pride.⁵⁶ Project Argus presentations have been made to businesses nationwide to help them identify measures they can take to prevent, handle and recover from a terrorist attack.⁵⁷

The Commission’s view on the ‘homegrown’ challenge

Despite all this positive activity, the Commission remains concerned about a number of issues. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament wrote in its *Report into the London terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005*:

‘we remain concerned that across the whole of the counter-terrorism community the development of the homegrown threat and the radicalisation of British citizens are not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking. A common level and better level of understanding of these things among all those closely involved in identifying and countering the threat against the UK ... is critical in order to counter the threat effectively and prevent attacks.’ (ISC 2006)

The update to this report published this year by the ISC adds that, despite progress driven by the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism in the Home Office and implemented by the police, the Prevent strand of the CONTEST strategy remains ‘the weakest element’ (ISC 2009). We agree with this judgement and focus many of the recommendations below in this area.

Muslims in the UK

Of the 1.3 billion Muslims in the world, around 2 million live in the UK, over a third of them in London. Half of all British Muslims have origins or heritage in South Asia, predominantly in poor rural areas such as Azad Kashmir in Pakistan, Sylhet in Bangladesh and Gujarat in India. Others have come from recent warzones, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo and Somalia. Nearly half of all British Muslims were born in Britain and most Muslim children in the UK speak English as their first language. The Muslim communities of Britain are highly heterogeneous and ethnically diverse, they are young (with 34 per cent under the age of 16), and they suffer widespread deprivation: British Muslim adults are the least qualified of all faith groups, and, compared with the population as a whole, they are three times more likely to be unemployed and are disproportionately represented in the prison population (Masood 2006, Naqshbandi 2006, Fitzgerald 2006). To the extent that the terrorist threat we face is ‘homegrown’, it is primarily drawn from among this British Muslim population, the vast majority of whom abhor violence and respect the law.

Single explanations of radicalisation among this group are unsatisfactory. However, we can observe that the process does require three conditions simultaneously to be met: personal disaffection; an enabling group; and a legitimising ideology (Richardson 2006).

Many young Muslims of South Asian descent in Britain today are undergoing a psychological and emotional crisis of identity, struggling to develop a sense of themselves as a group. They are caught ‘between two cultures’ (Anwar 1998): on the

54. Project Griffin is a police initiative to raise awareness among security professionals and extended police family members about counter-terrorism measures so that they are better equipped to deal with their organisations’ security challenges on a day-to-day basis and in the event of a major incident.

55. The New Dimension project was established after 9/11 to supply equipment, procedures and training to enhance the capability of the fire and rescue service to respond to a range of incidents including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks.

56. Operation Wooden Pride is the collective name given to regular joint exercises between the police and the military.

57. Project Argus is a National Counter-Terrorism Security Office initiative delivered by Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers. It involves presentations to businesses and simulation exercises to help identify measures business can take to prevent, handle and recover from a terrorist attack, particularly in a crowded place.

one hand, experiencing profound intergenerational conflict with their parents and grandparents over their elders' perceived factionalism and outdated and dislocated customs, language and traditions; and, on the other, rejecting a British society that is unwilling to accept them on their own terms. They are culturally uprooted, isolated and alienated, and therefore insecure (Shaikh 2007, Fitzgerald 2006).

Accordingly, some young people are turning their backs on the 1,600 increasingly remote and irrelevant traditional *masjids* (mosques), many of whose management committees are riven by tribal power struggles, 97 per cent of whose imams come from overseas, 44 per cent of which do not provide the Friday *khutbah* (sermon) in English and almost 50 per cent of which have no facilities for women (Hart Dyke 2009). Instead, younger members of the community are finding religious instruction and moral guidance from increasingly influential *salafi* and *wahhabi* reformist and revivalist groups (Mukerjee 2008). These groups subscribe to a neo-fundamentalist theology that appears to provide definite answers to complex questions but that also, in its role as guide to social action, underpins practical efforts to 'revert' young Muslims through provision of services such as after-care to ex-prisoners, and engagement of gang members on their own turf and in English.

As the social control exerted by families and traditional structures fades, there can be a cognitive opening during which such young people may also become susceptible to Al Qaeda's charismatic, even inspirational, recruiters with their persuasive allegories, utopian visions and selective quotations from the Qu'ran and Hadith (Wiktorowitz 2005, Githens-Mazer 2009, Innes *et al* 2007).

The political component of this is important and, however difficult, we ignore it at our peril. Unlike first generation Muslim immigrants to the UK, with their traditions of civility and deference and their discomfort with dissent, many younger Muslims are increasingly politicised (Bunglawala 2009). Some of this activism expresses itself in mainstream engagement in the political process, but some also comes in the form of anger at collective (if not necessarily individual) deprivation and socioeconomic exclusion, at hostility and Islamophobia in the media and society (Runnymede Trust 1997, European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia 2002, Uniting Britain Trust 2004 and Moore *et al* 2008), or at US and UK foreign policies perceived as colonial, warmongering neo-imperialism.

For many young Muslims, this anger may be informed by conspiracy theories prompting them, for instance, simultaneously and paradoxically to believe both that Mossad carried out the 9/11 attacks and that Osama bin Laden is great for taking the battle to the Great Satan by attacking the Twin Towers. It is with such anger that the seductive ideology of Al Qaeda's single narrative is infused, claiming to explain the collective condition of Muslims across both time and space as one of persecution by the West, and citing emotive examples such as the suggestion that Muslim women are being violated by infidel invaders in Afghanistan and Iraq (just as Nick Griffin MEP, Leader of the British National Party, has claimed gangs of Asian men have drugged and raped white girls in the UK as part of an Islamic plot to take over Britain [*The Independent* 2009]).

Recommendations

To help disengage people from violence, counter the radicalisation processes we have outlined and enhance the preventive counter-terrorism activity already happening in the UK, the Commission believes the package of additional measures identified below, which builds on existing plans laid out in the most recent revision of the Government's strategy, is now required:

Recommendation 72: The Government, Charity Commission and Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board should encourage and support mosque management committees to employ British imams who are proficient in the English language, have an understanding of modern UK youth culture and are trained to be able to discuss controversial topics such as jihad and human rights with their congregations. This would help to reconnect more established institutions with the young Muslim population.

Recommendation 73: The Government should train frontline youth workers dealing with young people vulnerable to radicalising messages in how to address the issues involved, building on work already underway with the Youth Justice Board.

Recommendation 74: The Government should develop further materials to assist local authorities and their partners to understand UK Islam in all its diversity, with its associated cultures and traditions, and to understand which denominations and systems are concentrated in which areas. Additional materials should be developed to assist the same local authorities and their partners to understand the impact of global events on communities in their areas, enabling a globally aware model for delivery of the local Prevent agenda.

Recommendation 75: The Government should commission further research to underpin this effort. This should focus on:

- The radicalising effects of global events at UK street level. For example, what the actual interplay is between the Israeli military campaign in Gaza in 2008/9 and neo-jihadi recruitment in British communities
- The relationships between non-violent Islamist ideologies and terrorism in the UK
- The processes of disengagement from violence and deradicalisation
- The dynamics of extremism among more recently arrived British immigrant communities.

Recommendation 76: With regard to information sharing, there should be further movement from a 'need to know' approach to a 'responsibility to provide' mentality. The Government should share with local authority Chief Executives, Council Leaders and Police Borough Commanders more sanitised information and intelligence products regarding perceived vulnerabilities to radicalisation in their respective areas (building on the Prevent Central Analysis disseminated in August 2008 and counter-terrorism local profiles drawn up since).⁵⁸ This would enable local officials and representatives to make more informed decisions regarding the delivery of Prevent locally.

This will require the completion of clear information-sharing protocols. Where unhelpfully inhibitive, classification levels and vetting restrictions should be reviewed to facilitate this shift.

Recommendation 77: More Prevent good practice should be shared nationally: it is currently concentrated in only a small number of local authorities, usually those that have experienced terrorist and counter-terrorist activity directly, and the lessons learned need to be spread more widely (The Audit Commission and HMIC 2008).

Recommendation 78: The Government should expand the number of high-security police and prison cells. London's Paddington Green Police Station's custody suite is now no longer big enough and the lack of appropriate prison capacity elsewhere means that Britain's convicted terrorists are excessively concentrated in Belmarsh Prison. This concentration does not support the UK's wider attempts to deal with the problem.

Recommendation 79: The Probation Service's small, new, central counter-terrorism unit should be supported to develop the capability and capacity to understand and support growing numbers of individuals on probation who have been released from custody after having been convicted for terrorism-related offences. Some such individuals, such as Abu Izzadeen and Samina Malik, have already been released. Many more will be released in the years to come.

To enable the Prevent strand of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy to address the claims, grievances and conspiracy theories of extremist groups directly, to develop public understanding and support for the strategy, and to build confidence in its overall effectiveness:

Recommendation 80: The Government should now explain further how its stated willingness to address legitimate grievances, including with regard to UK foreign policy, will be carried forward in practice (see Obama 2009 and Miliband 2009).

58. The Prevent Central Analysis is a collection of papers produced by the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism on themes related to the prevention of terrorism and provided to local government and local partners as background information. Counter-terrorism local profiles are assessments of local areas, identifying potential threats and vulnerabilities in terms of violent extremism, and suggesting possible preventive responses.

Recommendation 81: The Government should work with the police and Crown Prosecution Service following terrorist convictions to release more information to the public (from whom, of course, jurors are drawn) about the nature of disrupted terrorist plots to assist with public understanding of the nature, location and severity of the terrorist threat.

Recommendation 82: The Government should further review its use of language in this arena, building on the work of Research and Information Communications Unit (RICU) within the Home Office. We welcome the announcement that phrases such as ‘war on terror’ will no longer be used. The UK should take care to stress that, in acting against Al Qaeda and other neo-jihadi groups, we are not ‘defending our western values’ but rather defending universal values which are at the heart of all great religions and civilisations.

While prevention work is critical, work to pursue terrorists is obviously vital too. It is, however, important not to confuse the two: intelligence gathering is not the primary purpose of community engagement and, when enforcement activity is performed, we must be very careful that in resolving symptoms we do not needlessly aggravate causes: Pursue must not become Provoke. Some of the pursuit and disruption tactics employed have had just such unintended consequences. This damages a counter-terrorism strategy that must be enacted ‘amongst the people’ (Smith 2008b) and that is largely predicated on community trust and confidence in the state and its agents.

Similarly, the police are a service, not a force, and in order to function effectively they rely on community consent (Farr 2009). This is more difficult to secure when police tactics and operations are perceived as unfair or disproportionate. Trust and confidence can break down when a community feels singled out and over-policed (MacPherson 1999, Spalek *et al* 2009).

These are important issues, still inadequately addressed. The Commission therefore believes a number of further measures are necessary. In particular:

Recommendation 83: The Government should review, in consultation with the public, the unintended impacts at community level of existing counter-terrorism policy and practice.

Finally, in terms of the counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation recommendations we are putting forward, we also believe that:

Recommendation 84: The police and partner agencies must now recruit more Muslim staff. Whether in specialist departments, delivering training or performing community-facing roles, the language, life skills and cultural and religious understanding they bring to the counter-terrorism effort are invaluable.

The National Association of Muslim Police and the think tank Demos found in a survey of police forces across the UK in 2008 that, despite efforts made by the police nationally to recruit more black and minority ethnic staff, only 27 Muslims across 22 forces worked in counter-terrorism departments at that time, out of a total of 2,374 officers (NAMP and Demos 2008). There have been some local improvements: for instance, the number of Muslim officers in the Metropolitan Police’s Counter-Terrorism Command increased from eight to 30 during 12 months of a proactive recruitment campaign.⁵⁹ But this effort must be scaled up considerably.

We believe the overall package of measures outlined in this chapter would enhance current efforts at counter-radicalisation, improve the public understanding and overall effectiveness of the Government’s strategy, and strengthen relationships between those tasked with enforcing counter-terrorism measures and the communities they serve. The measures suggested would also distribute the effort involved across national and local levels of government and across both the public and voluntary sectors.

This chapter has focused on the dangers inherent in the radicalisation of relatively small numbers of members of the UK’s Muslim communities. The Commission is aware that the vast majority of members of those communities are law-abiding UK citizens. We also recognise that the terrorist methods developed by, in particular, Al Qaeda can be imitated by non-Muslim individuals and criminal groups in other contexts. The measures advocated above for the UK are intended as a contribution to countering terrorism in any form, from whatever backgrounds its perpetrators come.

59. Information based on private conversation with senior member of MPS staff.

PART 6

Legitimacy

10. Making government more effective

If pushing up power and responsibility to multilateral institutions and down and out to citizens, businesses and frontline public service workers creates the distributed response we need, it also increases the need for effective coordination. This is true at two levels.

First, the UK government must pursue a strategy, endorsed by Cabinet, within which the full range of our domestic and international activities makes sense and within which each relevant actor can see where their own contribution fits. The Government has made some progress on this by publishing a National Security Strategy for the first time and by committing to updating it annually, but there is still more work to be done.

Second, the Government must develop greater coordination of its own activities by integrating all of the policy instruments at its disposal and by joining up the activities of the various government departments and agencies that have a role to play in national security policy.

To achieve this second task, we need a much stronger set of arrangements at the centre of government. Despite some improvements in departmental coordination on particular issues in recent years (such as on conflict and counter-terrorism), and despite the use of some cross-departmental Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets on issues related to national security policy, for the most part individual departments are still operating in their own stovepipes. There is insufficient coordination at the point at which departmental strategies are being developed and the publication of a National Security Strategy has not yet helped to shape strategy and the allocation of resources at departmental level.

This situation has to change. In order to meet the diverse challenges we face in a coherent and coordinated way, the Commission believes stronger strategic leadership from the centre of government and much better networking between departments are required. In our view, delivering this means:

Recommendation 85: The Government should develop the existing Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) into a National Security Council at the heart of government.

The National Security Council, which would remain a ministerial committee, should meet regularly and be formally chaired by the Prime Minister. In his or her absence, it should be chaired by a very senior political figure from Cabinet able to speak with the full authority of the Prime Minister. This person should be either a Deputy Prime Minister or a senior Member of the Cabinet.

The central task of the National Security Council is to be clear about the national security challenges facing the country and to develop a cross-departmental strategic response. In performing this role, it should ensure that all available instruments of UK security policy, whether related to defence, diplomacy, aid, policing or to private sector or local community engagement, are integrated into a single strategic response to the challenges being faced. Decentralised responsibility for implementation of policy should remain under each relevant Secretary of State, within the single overall strategy.

To develop a comprehensive strategy:

Recommendation 86: The Government should replace the practice of conducting periodic strategic defence reviews with a process of conducting a regular Strategic Review of Security (SRS). In the US the Quadrennial Defense Review happens every four years. We believe a UK Strategic Review of Security should take place every five years.

The SRS should consider all security challenges facing the country and the full balance of capabilities the UK needs in order to offer an effective response. Any such review should incorporate a review of the UK's defence requirements, but should also examine

what other non-defence capabilities are required and what the appropriate balance between defence and other capabilities is likely to be.

The need for an SRS is urgent. We recognise it is highly unlikely to occur before the next general election, but the first SRS should be conducted as soon as possible thereafter and preparatory work to underpin it should commence in government immediately. Any major capability decisions taken in its absence will almost certainly be tactical and cost-driven, rather than the product of a major and holistic re-think of our security circumstances.

In addition, and in order to ensure that overall national security strategy is directly linked in future to the allocation of resources to departments:

Recommendation 87: The Government should create a *single security budget*, covering the entire national security terrain, as a tool to ensure that the National Security Council has full visibility of all current government spending of relevance, can make informed trade-offs between different security investment priorities, has a ready facility to transfer financial resources between departmental budgets if necessary and can do so in the most effective and openly accountable way possible.

We believe this will force much-needed changes to departmental structures and, in particular, to the way departments interact with each other. We need a realisation that one of the most important elements of the modern structure of government lies not with internal departmental organisation but with each department's ability to work with others. Today, it is the docking points and interconnections that matter most.

Nowhere are these more relevant or more needed than in the relationship between DfID, the FCO and the MoD.

As we pointed out in our Interim Report, global poverty and inequality are major drivers of instability and violent conflict is a major barrier to development. We support moves taken by DfID over the past five years to understand the causes of conflict, to make its development work more conflict-sensitive and to shift additional resources towards fragile and conflict-affected states. In particular we welcome recent moves by the current Secretary of State for International Development to add to DfID's core mission of supporting economic growth and providing basic services a 'commitment to build peace and to build functioning states' in countries affected by conflict (Alexander 2009). This underlines the central importance to development of tackling armed conflict and state fragility.

In spite of these positive steps, we believe conflict work is still not fully mainstreamed into DfID activities. We are aware that some, both inside and outside the department, believe DfID's role in conflict prevention and response is constrained by the focus on poverty reduction written into the International Development Act. We also believe there is a need to address the major issue of how to improve DfID's contribution to coordinated efforts to use development, defence and diplomatic measures together in areas where UK national security interests are at stake.

To address these issues, we propose that:

Recommendation 88: The International Development Act 2002 should be amended to say that DfID's mission is to promote development through poverty reduction and the promotion of conditions of safety and security in the developing world.

We believe this change is necessary to remove any ambiguity that may exist over a DfID role in development activities not directly related to poverty reduction.

In addition, we think:

Recommendation 89: The Department for International Development should publish explicit criteria for deciding where its resources are allocated and for what purpose.

These are currently absent. As part of this change, we would like to see a portion of the DfID budget made available for activities that would not ordinarily be classified as aid, such as stabilisation and reconstruction activities in conflict-affected areas. In order to

“We need a realisation that one of the most important elements of the modern structure of government lies not with internal departmental organisation but with each department's ability to work with others”

make sure that this does not undermine longer term efforts or diminish the assistance for fragile and failing states recommended in Chapter 7, this may need to be done through creation of a Rapid Response Fund.

In relation to DfID and its integration with other parts of the UK government, especially the FCO, we believe:

Recommendation 90: Government should conduct a review into how DfID and FCO operations in overseas locations can be more effectively coordinated. We are not convinced that running parallel operations, as is currently the case in many places, is a cost-effective way of operating or delivers the best results.

It may be that merging in-country operations under a single leader might be the best approach in some instances.

The package of changes we propose would, in practice, be likely to impact on the spread of activities and locations where DfID is making investments. They would also allow, where necessary, stronger targeting of DfID resources at locations that met both poverty and national, global or regional security risk criteria. Our proposals would make it easier to justify, for example, greater support to Pakistan at the present time.

We believe that the recommended changes (along with the recommendation that the UK create a joint civilian-military Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force, put forward in Chapter 5), when coupled to DfID's ongoing efforts to improve its role and contribution on issues like justice and security sector reform in-country, would improve DfID's contribution to meeting both development challenges in dangerous places and national, global or regional security threats.

Three further changes to the wider machinery of government would also help to ensure that the overall package of measures outlined in this chapter succeeded in improving UK national security.

First, to perform its tasks, the National Security Council will need stronger official support than NSID has enjoyed up to now. Consequently:

Recommendation 91: The Cabinet Secretary should have a single senior Deputy for National Security at Permanent Secretary level; and the national security secretariat in the Cabinet Office should be expanded to provide proper servicing and coordination of business for the NSC and to ensure that decisions taken by it are followed up across Whitehall.

We also believe the UK's national security strategy is likely to be strengthened by a process of external challenge. So, second:

Recommendation 92: The recently created National Security Forum, a panel of eminent individuals from outside government, should have an independent rather than a ministerial chair, a budget that would enable it to commission its own external research, and enough office support to allow publication of its own conclusions. This would position it not only to perform an advisory function to the rest of government but also to challenge it on the basis of independent, transparent and expert opinion.

Third, with regard to intelligence and the UK's ability to anticipate, prepare for and sometimes prevent significant national security threats from materialising, we believe:

Recommendation 93: The Government should develop the idea of a single UK intelligence community (by which we do not mean a single intelligence agency, which we are not in favour of), with a clearly identified head at permanent secretary level (who could also be the chairperson of the Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC]). This lead figure should take responsibility for the professional health of the intelligence community as a whole and for coordinating the further development of cooperation between agencies.

Recommendation 94: The single head of the UK intelligence community should be given responsibility for coordinating all of the horizon-scanning activity going on across government, in order to ensure that it is properly coordinated and that, where appropriate, issues are brought to the attention of the National Security Council.

As part of this:

Recommendation 95: The Government should increase the capacity of the intelligence community to analyse and make use of the huge amounts of open source information now available. This could provide a useful point of comparison and challenge to secretly acquired intelligence information and could assist with ongoing efforts to anticipate relevant developments and improve long-term horizon-scanning.

Diplomacy

Finally, the approach we have advocated throughout this report, of international cooperation and of detailed understanding of the overseas factors which feed into risks to the UK, requires concentrated action by those parts of the Government that operate abroad. The UK's Diplomatic Service (DS) has, under a long period of financial constraint, been reducing its capacity to conduct overseas political analysis and to construct relationships with new players and new generations. Our diplomats and other international professionals form a vital part of the UK's warning and prevention capability across a wide range of activities and disinvestment in this area would amount to a false economy. Proper staffing and support of the DS should be regarded as an essential part of the broad review of security we are recommending.

Recommendation 96: The Strategic Review of Security should take into account the contribution to security made by the UK's diplomatic capabilities and ensure adequate levels of funding for this component.

Overall, we believe the full package of recommendations in this chapter would strengthen the strategic centre of government, improve the UK's capacity for strategic thinking, break down barriers between different departments and locate individual departmental activities and resource allocations within a coherent strategic framework. This package of measures is necessary if we are to deliver the coordinated and integrated response across a wide range of instruments and actors that is required to generate effect. It is also required if future updates of the National Security Strategy are to be properly connected to and shape what actually goes on in the name of that strategy in departments across government.

11. The role and requirements of legitimacy in national security strategy

The debate in the UK on the role and requirements of legitimacy in national security strategy has focused on two issues in particular in recent years: the legality of the invasion of Iraq and the maximum period of pre-charge detention for suspected terrorists. Both are important. But in our view the issue is both broader and more fundamental.

As we stressed in our Introduction, quite apart from being crucial to the operation of any democratic state, demonstrable legitimacy of action can be an influence multiplier. In a world where power is widely dispersed, it is an important part of the route to issue-specific alliances and partnerships and consequently to greater policy reach. We believe, therefore, that legitimacy is a strategic necessity, not a pleasant bonus, and that apparent tensions between legitimacy of action and seriousness of purpose are, for the most part, illusory.

Given that, the question becomes how to demonstrate legitimacy in action and against what criteria.

In our view, legitimacy resides in a demonstrated commitment to a number of more specific ideas. These include:

- A commitment to the rule of law at home
- A commitment to a rules-based international system and to conformity with international law
- A willingness to uphold and protect fundamental human rights
- A commitment to more democratic and transparent policymaking, open to a wide array of inputs and subject to effective public scrutiny and accountability.

The UK has much in its history to be proud of in relation to many of these areas; and, in spite of our colonial history, we show a solid understanding of and respect for other cultures. Equally, however, we do not always live up to such ideals as well as we might in practice. The more widely a commitment to these ideas is shared and practised at home and around the world, the more likely we are to enjoy both national and international security now and in the long term.

The rule of law at home

The rule of law is a fundamental principle of liberal democracy, but it comes under strain when intelligence gathered by the Agencies or the police leads to restrictions on liberty for some individuals on the basis of information that cannot currently be used in ordinary court, either because it is based on hearsay or because its publication might compromise undercover sources or covert methods. Intelligence work is vital. But the legal right, associated with *habeas corpus*, of the accused to hear the evidence against him or her has been enshrined in English law since 1215 and the Magna Carta. On occasions, such as in cases of lengthy pre-charge detention or in relation to those held under Control Orders, this right is now suspended.

We recognise the difficulties in this area but we must also recognise that developments that subvert the rule of normal law, however well intentioned, can be a propaganda coup for the radical and neo-jihadi groups we are trying to combat.

As stated in our Interim Report, we believe that:

Recommendation 97: Suspected terrorists should be treated as suspected criminals and should be dealt with using the standard Criminal Justice System.

Moreover, and on the issue of Control Orders and *habeas corpus* in particular, the Commission remains concerned.

The Chilcot Review, which looked into the related issue of the use of intercept evidence in court, concluded that such evidence should be used, but only if a series of nine conditions related to national security could be satisfied (Chilcot 2008). The Government accepted this, and commissioned ongoing work on how and whether these conditions could be met.

The Commission supports this work and believes:

Recommendation 98: The Government should continue to explore ways in which intercept evidence might be used in criminal proceedings without prejudicing national security.

This happens in many other jurisdictions and its introduction here will be a powerful statement that our values shape our security strategy and are not shaped by it.

Demonstrable legitimacy of action in security policy also requires other measures.

We need honest recognition that levels of trust in government and the political process have reached a low point in recent months. Controversy over MPs' expenses and over the loss of large amounts of sensitive personal data has added to earlier concerns over the Iraq dossier, with damaging effect. A weakened political society is not in a position to ask citizens simply to take the word of governing institutions at face value. More must be done to address this issue and to rebuild trust.

In the security domain, as elsewhere, this is partly about practising what we preach and partly about strengthening the mechanisms of public accountability and transparency in policymaking.

We must now see principled action as one of our most potent instruments in the attempt to build security. In doing so we should not be complacent about how well our society currently reflects the most widely accepted principles of civilised human interaction. We have a proud tradition of democratic development, of tolerance and support for liberty, but any society that is happy to rest on its laurels is one likely to have seen better days.

Our society is less equal than it should be, more divided than it should be, more diverse than ever before, and leaves some groups isolated and excluded from the many benefits the rest of us enjoy. Overall, this situation is not good for democracy and not good for security. There are legitimate grievances that need to be addressed and a divided and grievance-ridden society is unlikely to prove a resilient one when subjected to the extreme disruptions that future security scenarios might bring.

Our task must therefore be to build on common ground and to ensure that our values themselves are so widely shared and so potent a weapon in addressing grievance, that terrorism and the rejection of societal values seem blunt instruments by comparison.

Too many voices in the security debate talk of the need to win hearts and minds while in practice calling only for extremist views to be subjected to challenge. Such challenge is necessary in our circumstances but it is insufficient. We need to do more. To win hearts and minds we need to demonstrate, even more effectively than we have to date, that our society can truly deliver for all its citizens and that all are equal stakeholders in it.

Consequently, and to make this outcome more likely, the Commission recommends that:

Recommendation 99: The Government should put a draft Constitutional Bill of Rights and Responsibilities for the United Kingdom before Parliament.

Such a Bill, if passed into legislation, would put the law more firmly at the disposal of those with a grievance, would be good for strengthening trust in our system of government and valuable in the attempt to win hearts and minds among those tempted to support or sympathise with terrorism. It should, in other words, be seen as a major element in a political strategy designed to make us more secure, more socially resilient and more united.

In addition, and in this context:

Recommendation 100: The Government should strengthen the role of civic education in the national curriculum taught in our schools, with the aim of instilling an awareness of the national and international need for intercultural understanding.

Public accountability and engagement in policymaking

On public accountability in relation to security, a number of bodies are currently responsible for holding government and its agents to account. These bodies include:

- The Intelligence and Security Committee, which examines the policy, administration and expenditure of the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
- Relevant parliamentary select committees, such as the Home Affairs Select Committee, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Committee on Arms Export Controls and the Joint Committee on Human Rights
- Independent Commissioners, such as the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, the Interception of Communications Commissioner and the Intelligence Services Commissioner
- Police Authorities, which scrutinise and oversee the work of local police services.

As parliamentary authority recovers from the immense damage done to it in recent months, it is our view that it should remain central to the task of holding the Government to account on national security issues. We therefore call for a strengthening of the mechanisms of parliamentary and therefore public accountability in this field. In particular, we recommend that:

Recommendation 101: As has already been mooted by the Government, a single National Security Select Committee should be set up in Parliament, made up of members of both Houses, with a membership also drawn from across other relevant Select Committees.

This would scrutinise activity incorporated within and related to the Strategic Review of Security and single security budget recommended in Chapter 10 and would, of course, publish reports for wider public consumption in the usual way.

In addition, and notwithstanding the recommendation above:

Recommendation 102: Levels of resource and professional support to the Intelligence and Security Committee should be increased, to allow it better to oversee the crucial but highly sensitive work of the intelligence community.

Beyond this, we need to find ways of engaging the public directly. At present, the public are informed of issues surrounding national security on a ‘need to know’ basis, which, while necessary in some sensitive areas, can further feed the sense of public mistrust that is already present. We believe that a normative shift is needed within government away from closed-door policymaking and that the Government should adopt a ‘responsibility to provide’ mentality, so that information is given to the public on a range of security issues as a matter of course, whenever it is safe to do so.

In other areas, we need to build on and expand some good practice that has begun to emerge by way of engagement with the public.

The FCO runs an outreach programme, for example, which engages with communities throughout the UK on important foreign policy issues such as the Middle East Peace Process, Iraq and Afghanistan. It has a specific programme for communication with British Muslims. As part of the outreach programme, ministers and senior officials take part in meetings and events with Muslim organisations and communities throughout the UK. For example, in 2008 the Foreign Secretary addressed members of Bradford’s Muslim community at the Madni Jamia Mosque. Such outreach events are designed not only to counter potentially negative perceptions of British foreign policy, but also to provide an opportunity for direct public engagement in its formation.

“We believe that a normative shift is needed within government away from closed-door policymaking and that the Government should adopt a ‘responsibility to provide’ mentality”

The FCO's outreach programme for British Muslims (and other communities) has been successful in encouraging open and honest dialogue about foreign policy questions within particular communities. We therefore recommend that:

Recommendation 103: The Government should dedicate additional resources to the FCO outreach programme and expand it into a broader ongoing programme which would systematically inform the British public about important foreign policy questions and issues and facilitate a more open dialogue and exchange between interested members of the public and FCO ministers and officials.

Some other departments, like the Home Office, are also active in this area but other relevant departments should now also consider ways in which they can make themselves and their ministers more directly available to the public to discuss security issues up and down the country.

A rules-based international system

Turning to the international scene, cooperation across the range of specific issues dealt with in Chapter 7 is directly relevant to calls for a rules-based international system. Such cooperation should both help to extend governance to the ungoverned spaces beyond individual state control and help to contribute to the creation and strengthening of a wider rules-based approach. That approach is needed for the management of international relations as a whole and must be underpinned by the UN, but its long-term development will require partnerships that extend well beyond our traditional alliances in the West. The G20 is highly relevant here and we may need to look for partners even beyond that.

Two other areas must also be seen as central to this wider ambition. The first relates to the UK's attitude to the use of force and the second to the consistency of our commitment to protecting and defending human rights elsewhere in the world. We need to be clear and consistent on both if our claims to believe in the principle of a rules-based order are not to ring hollow.

The use of force

There are, as stated earlier, limits to the utility of force in the modern world. Equally, there are limits to the circumstances in which the use of force is legitimate.

No government can or should be denied the right to take unilateral action to protect its citizens from a clear and imminent danger, but the lesson to draw from the context we have described in earlier chapters of this and our Interim Report is clear: establishing the widely perceived legitimacy of any action will be necessary to carry public support at home (necessary for any operation to be successful), will mobilise more partners with more resources abroad, and will more often be a route to security policy effectiveness than a barrier to it.

In practice, in our view, this means that:

Recommendation 104: If the use of military force is deemed necessary, it should be based on the principles of the United Nations Charter or the specific approval of the Security Council. Where this is not possible because national interests paralyse the Security Council, even in the face of serious human rights violations, a humanitarian crisis or a developing threat to international peace and security, then any action taken should have a strong claim to legitimacy in other elements of the UN Charter, be consistent with international law, be proportionate, have a reasonable prospect of success, and should only be taken as a last resort after all peaceful and diplomatic avenues to avert conflict have been exhausted.

It is our view that military interventions in the 1990s in both Kosovo and Bosnia satisfied these criteria and led to many lives being saved, including the lives of many Muslims.

Human rights

A rules-based order must not only protect the rights of individuals but also lay responsibility at their door. For this reason, the Commission supports the application of international law to individuals, and believes developments such as the creation of an International Criminal Court should be welcomed and strengthened.

The Commission also supports calls for the principles of the Responsibility to Protect to be embodied more widely in international affairs and, through its proposals on conflict prevention (see Appendix C), supports early action to prevent the violent conflicts that so often lead to human rights violations on a large scale.

Beyond this we are concerned with a number of other issues related to human rights.

Torture is not only illegal but unethical, cruel and counter-productive (Guthrie 2009, Hull 2009). It is illegal to deport someone to a state 'where there are substantial grounds for believing that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture' (UN 1984 [Article 3]).

The Attorney General has asked police to investigate whether MI5 was involved in the alleged torture of Binyam Mohamed, recently returned to the UK after seven years in extrajudicial custody, including four years in Guantánamo Bay. At the same time, UN Special Rapporteur Martin Scheinin has named the UK as one of a number of countries that aided and abetted the US extraordinary rendition regime, and expressed concern that it was using state secrecy provisions to hide 'illegal acts from oversight bodies or judicial authorities, or to protect itself from criticism, embarrassment, and, most importantly, liability' (Scheinin 2009).

We pass no judgement on these allegations. However, in our view, in ordering the closure of Guantánamo Bay, ending the CIA practices of enforced disappearances and secret detentions and forbidding torture, President Obama is re-establishing American legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of the world. In the UK, we too must consider what more we can do to be unambiguously on the right side of these issues.

There is a dilemma, which we must confront, and to which there is no easy answer. UK intelligence liaison with some overseas governments suspected of torturing detainees has and does save British lives. At the same time, such an intelligence relationship inherently runs the risk of being perceived as – or actually being – collusive in torture. The only way to avoid that risk altogether would be to terminate the relationship, but that may threaten British lives.

We nonetheless agree with the Government that 'violations of human rights feed extremism and when linked to Western governments ... give extremists an opportunity to argue that our ideals of democracy, justice, equality and tolerance are insincere' (FCO 2009). We therefore recommend that:

Recommendation 105: The Government should ensure its own agents are properly trained as interrogators, employ only legal methods, and challenge robustly alleged or suspected torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of prisoners, wherever they encounter it.

Recommendation 106: The Government should sign and ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

Recommendation 107: The Government should use its close relationship with the United States to encourage the US to ratify international treaties, conventions and covenants on the Rights of the Child (ratified by all UN member states except the US and Somalia); the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Forced Disappearances; Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions; and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (increasingly important in a world in which the power of non-state actors is growing) (Roth 2008).

Recommendation 108: The Government should also put more effort into promoting and defending human rights around the world by applying whatever pressure it can bring to bear on regimes that violate those rights.

There is a particular need to do this in countries in the Middle East and North Africa with which we have friendly relations but where too little is done to respect human rights. Although we may have limited capacity for influence bilaterally in many of these cases, we should seek to ensure that human rights issues are a key element shaping the European Neighbourhood Policy, a part of EU activity with a greater potential for regional influence.

Finally, in terms of our recommendations:

Recommendation 109: The Government should avoid attempting to deport suspect foreign nationals on the basis of memoranda of understanding or diplomatic assurances to countries that practice torture, unless such arrangements can include robust independent additional monitoring to ensure the safety of the individuals involved.

The Government has on occasion sought to deport foreign terrorist suspects to countries such as Jordan which routinely breach international obligations on torture (Amnesty International 2009, Amici Curiae 2008). It has done so on the basis of memoranda of understanding containing diplomatic assurances that these individuals will not be tortured upon their return. Yet we are powerless to secure compliance once the person is returned; there is often no provision in that country's law that gives effect to the memorandum; there is inadequate post-return monitoring; none of these countries has any incentive to investigate alleged breaches; there is no sanction for non-compliance and there is no means of enforcement in international law (Hull 2009). While the deportation of such suspects to the countries concerned can put the spotlight on them and their practices in relation to the treatment of prisoners, such deportations, without the additional safeguards we are calling for, are unworthy of our professed commitments to reject torture and to promote and defend human rights. Again, they offer propaganda material to those who thrive by accusing the UK of hypocrisy.

PART 7

Resources

12. Resources

Clearly, many of the proposals set out in both this and our Interim Report have cost implications. We have called for increased financial investment in several areas. These include:

- Conflict prevention activity
- The UK's overseas in-country and wider diplomatic expertise
- Targeted investments in areas of defence capability like command and control, tactical air support and the creation of a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force
- Britain's strategic gas storage capacity
- The UK contribution to a range of multilateral efforts to address issues like nuclear non-proliferation, global bio-security, state failure, cyber security, energy competition and the uses of outer space.

We have called for a strengthening of the UK's national infrastructure, and for more to be done on counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation at home.

This report has argued that a world in which both climate change and global poverty and inequality are present on current or projected scales is a world not well placed for long-term stability and security. Since neither of these major challenges can be addressed without incurring further costs beyond the realm of national security strategy, this position, too, has its budgetary implications.

At the same time, it is clear to all of us that the public finances are already in a poor state of health.

Given this context, we acknowledge that any security strategy that incorporates even some of the changes we have advocated is going to be difficult to finance. Nonetheless, we have to act to confront the risks. Calls to cut back on security spending to save money in the short term are as short-sighted as resorting to protectionism in the face of the global recession. The security situation is worsening as a result of difficult world economic conditions, not improving. While some might wish to ignore the new security environment, the security environment will not ignore us. The Commission therefore does not attempt to argue that its recommendations can be delivered in a cost neutral way. More positively, the pressures attending the global financial crisis and tight budgetary conditions at home represent an opportunity to get on and take the new approach to national security set out in this report and which we believe we should be pursuing anyway.

The debate on national security resources

The debate on how best to pay for national security has some familiar features.

One common way to approach the problem is to say that security is the first responsibility of any government and that the money must be found.

For those determined to take this position, this rapidly becomes a choice between cutting other government programmes to pay for defence and security or explaining the security challenges more persuasively to the country and raising taxes.

A second approach is to set a bench-mark level, a minimum target, for spending as a percentage of GDP. Some argue 3 per cent is the absolute minimum, others that over 3 per cent is more appropriate, especially for an important medium-sized power like the UK.

Both of these approaches have their merits. The first in particular may be unavoidable given the serious nature of the security challenges being faced today and the condition of the public finances.

However, the Commission believes neither approach offers the best starting point. Picking a percentage of GDP as the correct percentage of national wealth to spend on security in all circumstances is arbitrary; while jumping straight to a debate about expenditure cuts or tax increases in the middle of a recession is to miss a vital third option. Before we do anything else, we should be asking whether we are extracting the maximum value from the substantial sums that are already being spent on defence and security. To do that effectively, we believe we need a new approach to the problem, one based on the principles set out at the beginning of our report and applied throughout.

The Commission's approach to paying for security

We propose a five-stage approach:

1. Understand the status quo

The UK needs to develop a much clearer understanding of how much it is currently spending across the entire terrain of national security policy. This is why we have recommended the creation of a single, cross-government security budget. At the moment, we do not believe the Government, Parliament or the public has clarity on this.

On the other hand, it is possible to estimate in general terms the range within which this expenditure might currently fall.

In 2007 the UK spent £34.4 billion on defence, which equates to 2.5 per cent of GDP (NATO 2009). As we have stressed throughout our report, however, national security includes but extends beyond defence. Taking the total annual budgets for 2007/08 of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, relevant streams of the Home Office budget and 10 per cent of the budget of the Department for International Development, the figure for 2007/08 comes to approximately £43 billion, or 3 per cent of GDP.⁶⁰

Going wider still, as we believe we should, to include relevant elements of the spend of the Cabinet Office, Communities and Local Government, Transport, Health, both the departments that, until recently, were dealing with aspects of education – Department for Children, Schools and Families and Innovation, Universities and Skills, plus the relevant expenditure of local authorities, then it is probable that in 2007/08 we were spending somewhere in the region of £61 billion, or 4.2 per cent of GDP, on national security as defined in this report.⁶¹

Table 1 shows how both the higher and lower estimates compare with other key public spending priorities as a percentage of GDP, using 2007/08 figures.

Table 1. Expenditure by area as percentage of GDP, 2007/08

Expenditure by area	% of GDP 2007/08
Social protection	13.3
Health	7.3
Education	5.6
Transport	1.5
Other services	6.1
National security (lower estimate)	3.0
National security (upper estimate)	4.2

Note: Annual GDP figures apply to the 2007–2008 financial year, and were taken from the Office for National Statistics' website (ONS 2009)

60. The choice of 10 per cent of the DfID budget is arbitrary. A case could be made for including more, or indeed all of its budget, which is in fact what we do in the upper estimate.

61. The higher figure is based on a more expansive definition of security spending and includes the entire DfID budget, relevant elements of the Communities and Local Government budget, the Cabinet Office intelligence budget, government spending on the Health Protection Agency (HPA) and Department for Transport spending on strengthening the safety and security of transport, plus an arbitrary 5 per cent of DCSF, DIUS and local authority budgets (see MoD 2008b, Home Office 2008a, FCO 2008, DFID 2008, DCSF 2008, DIUS 2008, DCLG 2008, HPA 2008 and Department for Transport 2008).

These illustrative estimates urgently need to be replaced by more robust government figures to put before Parliament and the public.

Given the Prime Minister's decision to begin publishing a national security strategy with annual updates, clarity on the figures is an essential prerequisite both of a genuinely strategic conversation within government about how to fund the strategy and of an informed public conversation about where national security does, and should, sit within the list of national priorities.

2. Map current resources more effectively to the real priorities

Once we have firm spending figures, we need to develop a thorough understanding of how well our existing spend is being targeted at the real priorities and how we can make sure our current budgets stretch as far as possible. This will facilitate informed debate about where we might need to reduce or increase expenditure within the existing spending envelope.

The Commission has itself made two main sets of recommendations related to the need for some refocusing of existing resources.

As noted above, we have recommended:

- Greater capability specialisation in Defence. This means greater investment in some areas, such as command and control and development of a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force, and re-examination of the scale of the UK's commitment to the full spectrum of conventional war-fighting capabilities. We proposed that all the viable options for capability downgrading, quantity reductions and complete cancellation of some equipment programmes should be included in a re-examination of the UK's defence needs. For illustrative rather than comprehensive purposes, we pointed to areas of planned spending totalling some £24 billion that ought to be looked at again as part of a Strategic Review of Security covering a full review of defence expenditure.

We have also recommended:

- Continued moves within DfID to incorporate conflict concerns into the core of the UK's development work. This will entail wider changes to the remit of DfID to allow both greater coordination and integration of UK policy instruments and the channelling of more of DfID's resources into tackling national security risks that emanate from developing countries. Were 25 per cent of DfID's budget to be used for this latter, non-aid, purpose, this would mean around £1.5 billion being directed at issues at the heart of the security/development nexus affecting the UK.

In addition, we have called for:

- A full review of Britain's nuclear deterrent and, even if the decision to proceed with the renewal of Trident goes ahead, for further extensions to the life of the existing Vanguard submarine fleet to be explored. Such a review has the potential either to find ways of delivering a UK deterrent at lower cost than Trident, or to push the £11–14 billion of possible expenditure on new Trident submarines further out into the future. It would result in substantial budget savings over the 2014–2024 period, which will be an extremely tight one in public spending terms.

We would also add here that government should now be looking to cut out any possible duplication of effort across its activities and to maximise the benefits of further collaborative activity across its operations where possible. The option, for example, of scrapping the planned ID card scheme in favour of more pervasive use of biometric passports should be thoroughly explored. According to the National Identity Service Cost Report (May 2009), the estimated total resource cost for providing passports and identity cards to British and Irish citizens resident in the UK, and for providing identity cards to foreign nationals applying to extend their leave in the UK, will be £4.9 billion between April 2009 and April 2019. Of this, the minimum projected spend for the ID card scheme specifically for UK citizens is £1.3 billion (Home Office 2009c). This figure excludes the costs to other government departments and agencies of scanners and other equipment for verifying the identity of those trying to access public services.

In addition, there is a case for exploring increased collaboration to strip out waste and duplication while improving performance across the British Transport Police, the MoD Police, various ports police and the Civil Nuclear Police Authority, which each have different but related and overlapping responsibilities for protecting parts of our critical infrastructure.

3. Build prevention and anticipation into a long-term approach

One estimate of the military costs to the UK of the conflict in the Balkans from 1992 to 2003 puts the total figure at £1.3 billion. This breaks down as £429.5 million in the case of Bosnia and £866 million for Kosovo (Hartley 2002). By contrast, the cost of involvement in successful UN, NATO and EU-led efforts to avoid conflict in Macedonia, via the UNPREDEP mission and other later measures, was negligible.

We also know that if the international community took more effective action on conflict prevention activity, there would be major savings not only of lives but also of money for the international community as a whole. In relation to Rwanda it is estimated that if a package of conflict prevention measures costing US\$1.4 billion had been undertaken in 1994, preventing the spread of the genocide outside Kigali, the subsequent refugee crisis and the widespread damage to infrastructure, the international community could have made a net saving of \$5.6 billion (Chalmers 2007). In relation to the entire Western Balkans region, it is estimated that a net saving to the international community of more than \$70 billion could have been achieved had effective preventive and stabilisation measures been taken in advance of the region's several wars in the 1990s (Chalmers 2007). We need to stop seeing investments in conflict prevention as costs and start seeing them as life- and money-saving investments. In future, the UK national security budget should reflect this shift to a greater emphasis on effective prevention measures.

Preventive action is not only needed in specific locations but also on cross-cutting systemic issues. If we invest now in climate change mitigation and adaptation, in cooperative regime-building, in reducing proliferation and energy competition and in more effective action on fragile states and the uses of outer space, we will be more likely to avoid expensive future crises.

Beyond this, the UK needs to become much smarter at anticipating and avoiding problems before they happen. In Chapter 8 of our report, we noted the importance of Third Generation resilience, or the adaptation of systems to disruptive circumstances so that they are actually less likely to suffer such disruptions in future. We repeat the point here. If, for example, we can avoid significant future costs by building power stations and other infrastructure away from flood plains, we should build such considerations into the planning system. If we can reduce the requirement for extra gas storage capacity by engaging the whole country in an energy efficiency drive that would be good for the environment, good for business and household budgets, good for national security and good for the public purse, it is clear that at least part of the solution to the resource challenge rests with 'smart' changes of habit.

4. Apply a burden-sharing filter to expenditure decisions

The notion of burden-sharing, both at home and with our international partners, is another route to making national security funds go further.

Enhancing European defence and security cooperation, both to strengthen transatlantic alliance for the long term and to strip out waste and duplication in the European effort, is one element of this. It is a viable route to addressing many of our security problems effectively while sharing and limiting the cost.

At home, another aspect of this is the need to stimulate a more effective contribution from the private sector. Some of this relates to use of the state's legal and regulatory instruments to increase the security obligations on private sector organisations. We have suggested this in relation to higher resilience obligations being placed on providers of critical national infrastructure operating inside the UK. More widely, however, there is room for a further conversation between public and private sector organisations on security. For example, nuclear power providers currently have a responsibility to provide on-site security at their facilities, gas providers do not. This should be examined.

“We need to stop seeing investments in conflict prevention as costs and start seeing them as life- and money-saving investments”

On maritime piracy, it is unclear that deploying the military is the most cost-effective way of addressing the problem. Relatively simple security measures by shipping companies, such as removal of external boarding ladders from the exterior of container ships and use of powerful water cannons, could make it much harder for pirates to board ships, reduce the need for expensive military intervention and reduce insurance premiums for the shipping companies.

These are just a few examples of areas where more innovative approaches to some of the challenges we face could be found.

5. Develop different strategic options for different levels of funding

Finally, we believe the UK should in future develop, as part of the publication of five-yearly Strategic Security Reviews, a different range of strategic policy options for different levels of national investment. We need to be realistic about what we can achieve as a country for any given level of investment. At the moment, politicians of all persuasions tend to behave as though all commitments can be met, almost regardless of the budget being made available. Avoiding difficult choices between funding and security instruments reduces security capacity for the future.

We are not claiming that these measures and approaches will miraculously square the circle on resources. We do believe, however, that collectively they will make a serious contribution over the medium term and that they indicate the structure of the approach we need to take. In summary, this is:

- Better and more targeted use of our resources
- Raising the value of our alliances so that the burden is more effectively shared with international partners
- Making a reality of conflict prevention instead of expending money and lives when conflicts have broken out
- Looking to spread the costs and necessary action fairly among the public sector, private businesses, consumers and citizens.

Even with all this, it is likely that government may well need to ask the taxpayer to pay more, which will be difficult in a period of extreme financial constraint. If that proves necessary, then the electorate need to understand that they are buying a more secure environment. This should not be pursued as an option, however, unless government has demonstrated seriousness of purpose on all the areas set out above.

Appendices

Appendix A: The terrain of national security policy today

The traditional view of security policy focuses primarily on the role of states, on the tendency towards competition and conflict between them, and on the central importance of the balance of power. It does so in response to a history of major and frequent inter-state wars, and many of the issues with which it is concerned remain pivotal to contemporary security policy debates.

An awareness and understanding of the concerns to which the traditional view gives rise is, however, no longer enough. Assuring security may once have been a matter for a nation's Ministry of Defence but it now involves every Department of State, not just in one's own country but in those of one's allies and partners, too. The traditional view of security policy, in short, now leaves too much out. The privileging of states and of the inter-state level of analysis means the importance of many non-state actors, be they terrorist groups, private sector bodies, international governmental organisations like the United Nations, or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is largely ignored. The emphasis on military issues, while obviously still vital, comes at the price of a serious exclusion of wider social and economic issues of relevance to the security agenda. And the over-emphasis on some strategic drivers, such as the balance of power between states, leads to an under-emphasis on others that are now critical, such as globalisation and climate change.

Consequently, whatever the merits of the traditional view, there is now a strong case for moving beyond it.

The Government significantly widened its own interpretation of the relevant terrain when it published the United Kingdom's first national security strategy in 2008 (Cabinet Office 2008a). In our Interim Report, the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century did the same.

In the material in this and our Interim Report we have adopted an issue-led rather than an actor-led approach. We focus on those risks, be they human-made threats or natural hazards, that have the ability to threaten the security and safety of the UK state, its communities, and the families and individual citizens living here. The traditional concern with defence, with the threat of external military attack on the UK from another state, and with the need for strong and appropriately configured conventional forces remains crucial but is nested within a frame of reference that stretches far beyond to issues such as energy security, global poverty, the stability of the international economy, terrorism, transnational organised crime and the security effects of climate change.

The adoption of this wider issue-based approach shifts the emphasis of the analysis in this report. It opens up the relevant terrain to more actors and to several other levels of analysis, some above and some below the level of the national state. Again, depending on the issue, actors from lone individuals and local community groups at one extreme, all the way up to global bodies like the United Nations, are defined as in-scope.

We believe this widening of the terrain brings analytical advantages over the traditional view. In doing so, however, it also raises an important question. If the terrain of national security policy today is much wider than traditional notions would allow, where do we now draw the line between national security policy and other policy areas? Some attempts to re-think security policy have gone wider than others, arguably to the point where almost all areas of policy become defined as security policy (see Commission on Human Security 2003). This can be valuable in pointing out risks to human life and safety that go well beyond the threat of political violence, but in our view it can also result in a loss of policy focus.

“The emphasis on military issues, while obviously still vital, comes at the price of a serious exclusion of wider social and economic issues of relevance to the security agenda”

Applying a ‘threat test’

In delimiting the terrain of UK national security policy and the terrain with which the Commission has been concerned we have therefore applied a UK threat test. The threat test asks whether an issue has the potential to be a direct threat to British life and interests in the short to medium term. If it has, then it is defined as relevant to UK national security policy and to our deliberations here. If not, it is excluded from our enquiry, though without prejudice as to whether it ought still to be a focus of other areas of UK government policy.

We would stress at the outset that the use of a threat test to delimit the terrain does not in any way imply acceptance of an overly narrow approach to the definition of UK interests. On the contrary, and as is clear throughout this report, in a globalised world in which no state can isolate itself or fully provide for the security of its people without the help of others, the best way to protect ourselves and to look after our own interests will often be to have regard for the interests and concerns of others and to help others to protect themselves.

Seen through the lens of a threat test, national security policy still also legitimately encompasses a wide area. Some elements of development policy and some elements of global health policy are included within our remit, for example, as the former are directly relevant not only to poverty reduction and conflict management but also to failed states that may become the source of threats, and the latter is directly linked to infectious disease that may come from overseas but still have devastating impacts here at home. Even under the threat test, we are concerned with issues of climate change and with the potential for international poverty to contribute to emerging threats to British life and interests. What the threat test does exclude, however, is a concern with *all* global health policy, or a concern with *all* development policy, despite the fact that health and development challenges represent massive threats to human life all over the planet.

Subsidiarity

In this report we have also adopted the principle of subsidiarity. This principle suggests that responsibility, as well as power and resources, should rest at the level best placed to handle the issue being faced. On some issues this might be at the global level, on some it might be at the level of the UK or other national state, and on others still it might be at the local level.

With all these ideas in mind, the range of issues, actors, and the various levels of analysis that we have defined as in-bounds for national security policy, and therefore for the work of the Commission, is captured in the table overleaf. (Some use the notion of ‘human security’ to describe the approach we have adopted. See Human Security Report Project 2005, Commission on Human Security 2003.).

The terrain of national security policy

Level of policy action and actors involved

Issue	Policy challenge	Sub-national	UK National	UK bilateral relationships	Euro/Atlantic regional	Global
External military attack on the UK	Not an immediate threat. But obvious requirement to be ready for defence of national territory.		Armed Forces		NATO Alliance; EU	UN Security Council
International institutional reform	Ensure legitimacy and effectiveness of key institutions such as UN Security Council		Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)	Permanent 5 (UK, US, France, Russia, China) plus India and possibly Brazil	EU (possible EU seat on Security Council)	UN Secretary General; Security Council; specific UN agencies; G8
Terrorism	Understand challenge and the radicalisation process. Create policies to win hearts and minds; prevent attacks on UK soil (through intelligence work/policing/protection of UK borders; build domestic consensus around counter-terrorism strategy; combat the terrorism/organised crime interface	Local authorities (e.g. preventing political extremism pilots); Police Constabularies, including the Met; Police Community Tensions Teams; community and religious groups; individual citizens	Home Office; Cabinet Office; Intelligence Services; GCHQ; Serious and Organised Crime Agency; Border Police; Transport Police; organisations protecting critical national infrastructure; Armed Forces as aid to civil power	United States and other allied countries (intelligence service cooperation). Intelligence sharing relationships with countries in the Middle East	EU counter-terrorism strategy; Europol. EU diplomacy on Middle East conflict; EU policy on Turkish entry to the Union	Interpol; G8 Counter-Terrorism Cooperation
Weak, failed and failing states	Eliminate terrorist safe havens; build governance capacity in other failed and failing states through development and climate change adaptation assistance, conflict prevention measures, peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction	UK-based development and aid NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children	FCO; Armed Forces; Ministry of Defence (MoD); Department for International Development (DfID); Police		EU (Human Security Force?) NATO (as in Afghanistan)	UN Security Council; other regional bodies, such as African Union, acting under UN mandates; G8; IMF/World Bank; World Trade Organisation
Humanitarian intervention	Prevent genocide and human rights abuses; respond to emergency situations	UK-based development and aid NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children	Armed Forces; MoD; DfID		EU; NATO	UN Security Council
WMD proliferation	Prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons to state or non-state actors	Actors and institutions securing nuclear facilities and materials within the UK	FCO/MOD work on counter-proliferation; Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)	With United States and Russia, to encourage denuclearisation efforts	EU nuclear exports control regime; EU counter-proliferation efforts	IAEA; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear Suppliers Group; G8 Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme; Proliferation Security Initiative

Climate change	Prevention of further global warming through post-Kyoto global agreement; adaptation to already inevitable climate change, both for basic human survival and to ease conflict, migration and failed state pressures	Individual businesses and business groups; local authorities; energy consumers	Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), BERR, Environment Agency	United States, India, China	EU (Emissions Trading Scheme)	Kyoto Process; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Energy security	Ensure security of supply, minimum exposure to unstable regions and climate change mitigation	Energy companies; energy consumers	DEFRA, BERR, FCO	With supplier countries (Norway, Russia, Nigeria, Algeria, Caspian Sea region and others)	EU	OPEC, International Energy Agency
Global poverty	Reduce it and widen the circle of economic opportunity both for its own sake and to remove a key background factor to conflict and failed states	UK-based development, aid, and poverty reduction NGOs	DFID, FCO, HM Treasury		EU (trade and aid policy)	World Bank/IMF/WTO; increasingly important private foundations
Socio-economic resilience	Protect critical national and international infrastructure from terrorist attacks, climate events and accidents; ensure strong emergency planning and preparedness; ensure strong business resilience and recovery	Local authorities; regional government offices; private sector companies in key infrastructure sectors and throughout economy; community groups	Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat; Home Office; BERR; Confederation of British Industry /Institute of Directors.		EU coordination on critical national infrastructure issues	Global corporations; UN (on some issues, such as space infrastructure)
Disease/biosecurity	Prevent, contain and if necessary eliminate serious disease outbreak, whether occurring naturally, or as result of bioterrorism	Local authorities and local emergency services; transport authorities; local media	Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat; Health Protection Agency; Forces as aid to civil power; border police; national media	Forward activity in possible source countries, such as Vietnam and other countries in South East Asia	EU public health coordination	World Health Organisation
Transnational organised crime	To limit scale in overseas source countries; tighten UK border to make penetration of UK more difficult; achieve prosecutions where possible	Local communities; Police Constables, including the Met	Home Office; Cabinet Office; Intelligence Services; Serious and Organised Crime Agency; Border Police; Transport Police; FCO for assistance on source country policy (e.g. in West Africa)	Arrangements with individual countries on extradition and joint investigation teams	Europol; EU for use of wider economic policy instruments aimed at tackling international corruption	Interpol

Appendix B: Bibliography and list of contributors

Bibliography

The following sources are referenced in either our Interim Report, *Shared Destinies: Security in a Globalised World*, or in this, our final report.

- Abbott C, Rogers P and Sloboda J (2006) *Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century*, Oxford: Oxford Research Group
- Abbott P K (2004) 'Terrorist threat in the Tri-Border Area: myth or reality?', *Military Review*, September/October
- AdaCore (2009) The Tokeneer Project, project summary, available at: www.adacore.com/home/products/sparkpro/tokeneer/
- Alexander D (2009) 'Conflict, Fragile states and Security', Speech to the New Democratic Network, April 27, available at: www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Speeches-and-articles/2009/Conflict-fragile-states-and-security/
- Allison G (2004) *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* New York: Times Books
- Allsopp C and Fattouh B (2008) *Oil prices: fundamentals or speculation?*, Presentation to the Bank of England, June 13
- Amici Curiae Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Center for Constitutional Rights, International Commission of Jurists and International Federation for Human Rights (2008) *Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Center for Constitutional Rights, International Commission of Jurists and International Federation for Human Rights in support of Petitioner-Appellee Sameh Sami S. Khouzam*, April 22, available at: www.icj.org/IMG/amici.pdf
- Amnesty International (2008) Afghanistan: *Civilians suffer the brunt of rising suicide attacks*, June 5, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA11/006/2008/en/a09f845e-33ec-11dd-a097-6931d72158b2/asa110062008eng.html
- Amnesty International (2009) *Amnesty International Report 2009: The State of the World's Human Rights* London: Amnesty International
- Anderson I (2002) *Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report*, London: The Stationery Office
- Andvig J C (2007) *Corruption and Armed Conflicts: Some Stirring Around in the Governance Soup*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper No. 720, Oslo: NUPI
- Anwar M (1998) *Between Cultures: Continuity And Change In The Lives Of Young Asians* London: Routledge
- Ashdown P (2007) *Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century*, London: Orion
- Assaad R and Roudi-Fahimi F (2007) *Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Opportunity or Challenge?* Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau
- Associated Press (2008a) *Exxon Mobil turns biggest US quarterly profit*, July 31, available at: www.maritime-connector.com/NewsDetails/1340/lang/English/Maritime-Connector---Gateway-to-Maritime-Employment---Exxon-Mobil-turns-biggest-US-quarterly-profit.wshtml
- Associated Press (2008b) *U.N.: Opium cultivation drops in Afghanistan*, 28 August, available at: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26409842/
- Association of British Insurers (2005) *Financial risks of climate change*, London: Association of British Insurers, available at: www.abi.org.uk/Display/File/Child/552/Financial_Risks_of_Climate_Change.pdf

- Association of Chief Police Officers (2008) *Counter Terrorism Conference: Understanding the Picture*, Speech made to conference in Brighton, February 27-28 [transcript not publicly available]
- Bain S (2008) 'Police break £1m credit card fraud linked to terrorism', *The Herald*, April 21, available at:
www.theherald.co.uk/news/news/display.var.2211223.0.Scots_police_break_1m_credit_card_fraud_linked_to_terrorism.php
- Barber L (2008) 'Restive young a matter of national security', *Financial Times*, June 2, available at: www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e3d51336-2de1-11dd-b92a-000077b07658,dwp_uuid=e2e941f4-27bf-11dd-8f1e-000077b07658.html
- Barnaby F (2008 forthcoming) *The Nuclear Renaissance: Nuclear Weapon Proliferation and Terrorism*, London: Institute for Public Policy Research
- Barnett J (2001) *Security and Climate Change*, Working Paper 7, Canterbury: Tyndall Centre
- Barnett J and Adger N (2007) 'Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict' *Political Geography* 26, pp.639-655
- Barrett R (2008) 'Seven Years After 9/11: Al Qaida's Strengths and Vulnerabilities', London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence
- BBC (2001a) 'France terror code 'breakthrough'', October 5, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1580593.stm>
- BBC (2001b) 'Internet link in terror probe', October 10, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/1590908.stm>
- BBC (2004a) 'Bin Laden in his own words', April 15, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2827659.stm
- BBC (2004b) 'A web wise terror network', October 6, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/3716908.stm
- BBC (2006) 'Four in court on terror charges', September 12, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5337110.stm>
- BBC (2007a) 'Teenager's death shown to jurors' February 13, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/6358975.stm>
- BBC (2007b) 'Migrant 'underclass' to be probed', April 26, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6594577.stm>
- BBC (2007c) 'How many more are out there?', April 30, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/6607647.stm>
- BBC (2007d) 'Timeline: Alva terror trial', September 17, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6978227.stm>
- BBC (2007e) 'Future directions in computing', November 13, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7085019.stm>
- BBC (2008a) 'Blast suspect was 'radicalised'', May 23, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/devon/7415831.stm>
- BBC (2008b) 'Airline urges liquids review after trial', September 8, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7604808.stm>
- BBC (2008c) 'Computer terror teenager jailed', September 19, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/7625041.stm>
- BBC (2008d) 'Will next US president rethink Afghanistan?', October 21, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7674623.stm
- BBC (2009a) 'Al-Qaeda deputy denounces Obama', June 2, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8080311.stm
- BBC (2009b) 'Threat of dirty bombs 'increased'', March 24, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7960466.stm>
- Becker S R, Diop F, Thornton J N (1993) 'Infant and Child Mortality in Two Counties of Liberia: Results of a Survey in 1988 and trends since 1984', *International Journal of Epidemiology*, Vol. 22, SUP1, pp. S56-S63

- Bell S (2007) 'Jihadization of youth a 'rapid process'' *National Post*, January 26, available at: www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=25e76872-b309-47a7-841b-938bdd9ffd71
- Bennett D (2004) 'Terrorists and Unconventional Weapons: Is The Threat Real?', *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 12/1, p.31
- Berdal M and Serrano M (eds) (2002) *Transnational Organized Crime and International Security*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Berdal M and Ucko D (2009) 'NATO at 60' *Survival*, 51:2
- Bergen P and Cruickshank P (2008) 'The Unraveling', *The New Republic*, June 11
- Bird J (2007) *Energy Security in the UK* London: Institute for Public Policy Research, available at: www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=555
- Bitar M (2005) 'Water and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Competition or Cooperation?', Washington DC: Foundation for Middle East Peace
- Blair D (2009) *Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee* March 10, available at: www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090310_testimony.pdf
- Blake A and Sinclair T (2005) *The Economic Impact of Avian Flu*, Summary of Results, Nottingham: University of Nottingham
- Blanchflower D, Saleheen J and Shadforth C (2007) *The Impact of the Recent Migration from Eastern Europe on the UK Economy* London: Bank of England, available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2007/speech297.pdf
- Blas J and Khalaf R (2007) 'Opec to seek assurances on future demand' *Financial Times*, November 12
- Blitz J (2009) 'Testing waters ahead' *Financial Times*, May 20
- Bobbitt P (2008) *Terror and Consent*, New York: Knopf
- Borger J (2008) 'Failed Afghan drug policy harming us, says Iran', *The Guardian*, September 11, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/11/iran.afghanistan
- BP (2008) *BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008*, London: BP p.l.c.
- British Medical Association (BMA) (2004) *Biotechnology, weapons and humanity II*, London: British Medical Association
- British Standards Institute (2009) BS 25999 Business continuity, available at www.bsigroup.co.uk/Assessment-and-Certification-services/Management-systems/Standards-and-Schemes/BS-25999/
- Brown G (2007) 'National Security Statement', November 14, available at: www.number10.gov.uk/Page13757
- Brown G (2009) 'Speech on nuclear energy and proliferation', March 17, available at: www.number10.gov.uk/Page18631
- Browne D (2008) 'Laying the Foundations for Multilateral Disarmament', Speech by Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on February 5, available at: www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/20080205layingTheFoundationsForMultilateralDisarmament.htm
- Bunglawala S (2009) *British Muslims: Identity and Political Engagement*, February, London: Engage
- Burke J (2008) 'The Britons who become bombers', *The Observer Magazine*, January 20, pp.14-24
- Cabinet Office (2005a) *Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A short guide (revised)*, London: Cabinet Office
- Cabinet Office (2005b) *Investing in prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response*, Prime Minister's Strategy Unit Report to The Government, London: Cabinet Office

- Cabinet Office (2007a) *Overarching Government Strategy to Respond to Pandemic Influenza: Analysis of the Scientific Evidence Base*, London: Cabinet Office
- Cabinet Office (2007b) *Security in a Global Hub: Establishing the UK's new border arrangements*, London: Cabinet Office
- Cabinet Office (2008a) *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom*, London: Cabinet Office
- Cabinet Office (2008b) *National Risk Register*, London: Cabinet Office, available at: www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_risk_register.aspx
- Cabinet Office (2009a) *UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward*, London: Cabinet Office
- Cabinet Office and Department of Health (2007) *Pandemic Flu: A national framework for responding to an influenza pandemic*, London: Department of Health, available at: www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_080734
- Campbell K, Gullede J, McNeill J R, Podesta J, Ogden P, Fuerth L, Woolsey J, Lennon A, Smith J, Weitz R and Mix D (2007) *The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Climate Change* Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Case M (2006) *Climate Change Impacts on East Africa: A Review of the Scientific Literature* Gland: World Wide Fund For Nature
- Castells M (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (2007) *The P-5 and Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, Working Group Report, December, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Center on International Cooperation (2007) *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, London: Lynne Rienner
- Chalmers M (2007) 'Spending to Save? The Cost-Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention', *Defence and Peace Economics*, 18:1, pp.1 - 23
- Chalmers M (2008a) *Global Inequality and Security Policy: A British Perspective*, Whitehall Paper 70, London: The Royal United Services Institute
- Chalmers M (2008b) 'A Force for Influence?: Making British Defence Effective' *RUSI Journal*, December, Vol. 153, No. 6
- Chamie J (2007) *Population Trends: Humanity in Transition*, Coping With Crisis Working Paper Series, New York: International Peace Institute
- Channel 4 (2006) 'Attitudes to living in Britain – a survey of Muslim opinion', Poll by Growth For Knowledge NOP Social Research for Channel 4 Dispatches, March 14-April 9, available at: www.imaginate.uk.com/MCC01_SURVEY/Site%20Download.pdf
- Channel 4 (2007) 'Muslim opinions on 7/7 bombings', Poll by Growth For Knowledge NOP Social Research for Channel 4, April 2-19, available at: www.channel4.com/news/articles/society/religion/survey+government+hasnt+told+ruth+about+77/545847
- Channel 4 (2008) *It shouldn't happen to a Muslim*, Poll by ICM for Channel 4, May 21-28
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org (2007) 'Poll Finds Worldwide Agreement that Climate Change is a Threat', March 13, available at: www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar07/CCGA+_ClimateChange_article.pdf
- Chilcot J (2008) *Privy Council Review of Intercept as Evidence Report*, London: The Stationery Office
- CIA (2003) *The Darker Bioweapons Future*, Office of Transnational Issues, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, November 3, available at: www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/bw1103.pdf
- Cincotta R P and Leahy E (2006) *Population Age Structure and its Relation to Civil Conflict: A Graphic Metric*, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Environmental Change and Security Programme, Vol. 12, pp. 55-58, available at: www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/PopAgeStructures&CivilConflict12.pdf

- Cincotta R P, Engelman R and Anastasion D (2003) *The security demographic: Population and civil conflict after the cold war*, Washington, DC: Population Action International.
- Cirincione J and Leventer U (2007) 'The Middle East's nuclear surge', *International Herald Tribune*, August 13
- CNA Corporation (2007) *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*, Alexandria, Virginia: The CNA Corporation, available at: <http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/>
- Cohen M (2007) *Food Security: Vulnerability Despite Abundance*, Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, July, New York: International Peace Academy
- Cohen N (2009) 'It's little wonder liberal Muslims feel betrayed' *The Observer*, March 15
- Collier P, Elliott E, Hegre H, Hoeffler A, Reynal-Querol M and Sambanis N (2003) *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, Washington, DC: The World Bank/Oxford University Press
- Collier P, Hoeffler A and Söderbom M (2002) *On the duration of civil war*, Washington, DC: World Bank
- Commission on Human Security (2003) *Human Security Now*, New York: Commission on Human Security, available at: www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf
- Cornish P (2007) *The CBRN System: Assessing the threat of terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom*, February, London: Chatham House
- Daschle T (2008) *Biodefence in the 21st Century*, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, available at: www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=606
- Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2007) *Energy Markets Outlook* London: BERR
- Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2008a) *Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2008*, London: BERR
- Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2008b) *Digest of United Kingdom energy statistics 2008: long term trends*, London: BERR
- Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2008c) 'Natural gas and colliery methane production and consumption, 1970 to 2007 (DUKES 4.1.1)', data available at: http://stats.berr.gov.uk/energystats/dukes4_1_1.xls
- Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2008d) 'Crude oil and petroleum products: production, imports and exports, 1970 to 2007 (DUKES 3.1.1)', data available at: http://stats.berr.gov.uk/energystats/dukes3_1_1.xls
- Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2008e) *The Energy White Paper: Updated Energy and Carbon Emissions*, February, available at: www.berr.gov.uk/files/file39580.pdf
- Department of Communities and Local Government (2008) *Community, opportunity, prosperity* Communities and Local Government Annual Report 2008, London: The Stationery Office
- Department for Energy and Climate Change (2008) *Energy Markets Outlook December 2008* Norwich: The Stationery Office
- Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (2008) *Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills Departmental Report 2008* London: The Stationery Office
- Department for International Development (2005) *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States*, London: Department for International Development
- Department for International Development (2008) *Annual Report 2008* London: The Stationery Office
- Department of Health (2007) *Pandemic influenza: Surge capacity and prioritisation in health services*, Provisional UK Guidance, November, available at: www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_080744

- Department for Children, Schools and Families (2008) *Department for Children, Schools and Families Departmental Report 2008* London: The Stationery Office
- Department for Transport (2008) *Annual Report 2008* London: The Stationery Office
- Diamond J (2004) *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, New York: Viking
- DirectGov (2009) Preparing for Emergencies, available at:
www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/Dealingwithemergencies/Preparingforemergencies/index.htm
- Dorling D (2007) *A think-piece for the Commission on Integration and Cohesion*, London: The Commission on Integration and Cohesion
- Drew C and Sriskandarajah D (2006) *Brits Abroad: Mapping the Scale and Nature of British Emigration*, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, available at:
www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=509
- Dube O and Vargas J (2008) *Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia*, Harvard University, Centre for International Development Working Papers, No.14, available at: www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/grad/014.htm
- Eads C (2006) *Serious Organised Crime: A New Approach*, London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies
- Economic and Social Research Council (2007) 'The forces driving globalisation', ESRC website, available at:
www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/about/CI/CP/Our_Society_Today/globalisation/forces.aspx?ComponentId=15222&SourcePageId=16965
- Edwards C (2009) *Resilient Nation* London: Demos
- Elbadawi I and Hegre H (2008) 'Globalization, Economic Shocks, and Armed Conflict', *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 37–60
- Ellwood T (2008) *The Creation of a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force*, Unpublished.
- Ernst & Young (2006) *ITEM Club Special Report: Finding our potential* London: Ernst & Young, available at:
[www.ey.com/Global/download.nsf/UK/Economic_Outlook_for_Business_-_report_09_06_-_Finding_our_potential/\\$file/EY_ITEM_Finding_Potential_Report_Sept_2006.pdf](http://www.ey.com/Global/download.nsf/UK/Economic_Outlook_for_Business_-_report_09_06_-_Finding_our_potential/$file/EY_ITEM_Finding_Potential_Report_Sept_2006.pdf)
- Ernst & Young (2007) *Beyond Borders: Global Biotechnology Report 2007*, available at:
[www.ey.com/Global/assets.nsf/International/Industry_Biotechnology_Beyond_Borders_2007_Full/\\$file/BeyondBorders2007.pdf](http://www.ey.com/Global/assets.nsf/International/Industry_Biotechnology_Beyond_Borders_2007_Full/$file/BeyondBorders2007.pdf)
- Ero C and Ndinga-Muvumba A (2005) 'Small Arms, Light Weapons' in Adebajo A and Rashid I (eds) (2004) *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, London: Lynne Rienner
- Esposito J and Mogahed D (2008) *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think* New York: Gallup Press
- EurActiv (2008) 'BP: 'We should see volatility increase'', October 1, available at:
www.euractiv.com/en/energy/bp-see-volatility-increase/article-175922
- European Council (2002) *Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism*, Brussels: European Council
- European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) (2008) 'Table SZR-10: Quantities (kg) of cocaine seized 1995 to 2006', Statistical Bulletin 2008, available at:
www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index53119EN.html
- European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (2002) *Reports on Anti-Islamic reactions within the European Union after the acts of terror against the USA*, Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
- Evans A (2008) *Rising Food Prices: Drivers and Implications for Development*, London: Chatham House
- Evans A and Steven D (2009) 'Risks and resilience in the new global era', *Global Dashboard*, available at: http://globaldashboard.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/Renewal_resilience_article.pdf

- Evans J (2007) *Intelligence, counter-terrorism, and trust* Manchester: Society of Editors
- Farr C (2009) 'Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: what next?', Third Annual Colin Cramphorn Memorial Lecture, March 25, available at: www.policyexchange.org.uk/assets/FINALFARR_.pdf
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2008) *Better World, Better Britain* Foreign & Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2007 – 31 March 2008, London: The Stationery Office
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2009) *Human Rights Annual Report 2008*, London: The Stationery Office
- Fenton N and Ohlsson N (2000) 'Quantitative analysis of faults and failures in a complex software system', *IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering*, Volume 26, Issue 8, August
- Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) (2008) 'Money Laundering FAQ', available at: www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,3343,en_32250379_32235720_33659613_1_1_1_1,00.html
- Fitzgerald M (2006) 'The British Context of Radicalisation: policing implications', Unpublished notes from presentation to PICTU Conference, May
- Foresight (2004) *Future Flooding Executive Summary*, London: Office of Science and Technology, project of the Foresight programme, available at: www.foresight.gov.uk/Previous_Projects/Flood_and_Coastal_Defence/index.html
- Foresight (2007) *Infectious Diseases: Preparing for the Future*, Executive Summary, London: Office of Science and Innovation
- Freedman L (2002) *Superterrorism: Policy Responses* London: Blackwell
- Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy (2008) *Failed States Index 2008*, July/August, available at: www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350
- German A and Mooney G (2001) *Air Vehicle Static Code Analysis - Lessons Learnt* in Redmill F and Anderson T (eds) *Aspects of Safety Management*, Springer-Verlag
- German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) (2008) *World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk*, London: Earthscan
- Ghobarah H A, Huth P and Russet B (2004) 'The post-war public health effects of civil conflict', *Social Science and Medicine*, Vol. 59, Issue 4, August, pp. 869-884
- Gilpin N, Henty M, Lemos S, Portes J and Bullen C (2006) *The Impact of Free Movement of Workers from Central and Eastern Europe on the UK Labour Market* Department for Work and Pensions Working Paper 29 London: Department for Work and Pensions, available at www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/wp29.pdf
- Githens-Mazer J (2009) *The Single Narrative, What's So Single About It?* Unpublished PowerPoint Presentation
- Gleditsch N, Nordås R and Salehyan I (2007) *Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link*, Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, May, New York: International Peace Academy
- Glenny M (2008a) *McMafia*, London: The Bodley Head
- Glenny M (2008b) 'A Dangerous Fiction', *The Guardian*, 22 July, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/22/drugstrade.internationalcrime
- Global Security (2005) 'Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi', available at: www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm
- Global Witness (2006) *The Truth About Diamonds*, November, available at: www.globalwitness.org/data/files/media_library/7/en/the_truth_about_diamonds.pdf
- Goldman Sachs (2007) *BRICs and Beyond*, November, available at: www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/BRIC-Full.pdf
- Gott C and Johnston K (2002) *The Migrant Population in the UK: Fiscal effects* RDS Occasional Paper 77 London: Home Office, available at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ77migrant.pdf

- Greater London Authority (2002) *London's Warming: the impacts of climate change on London*, Technical Report, available at: www.london.gov.uk/gla/publications/environment/londons_warming_tech_rpt_all.pdf
- Greater London Authority (2006) *Report of the 7 July Review Committee*, June, London: Greater London Authority
- Greenstock J (2009) *Society's Resilience in Withstanding Disaster*, A Note by the Director, Ditchley, available at: www.ditchley.co.uk/page/343/societys-resilience.htm
- Gumbel A (2001) 'Four cases of anthrax confirmed in the US', *The Independent*, October 17, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/four-cases-of-anthrax-confirmed-in-the-us-631676.html
- Guthrie C (2009) 'Torture uses the body against the soul. It is illegal and dumb', *The Times*, February 6, available at: www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article5671364.ece
- Guthrie C and Quinlan M (2007) *Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare*, London: Bloomsbury Publishing
- Hansard (2002) 'Written Answers', Column 33W, May 7
- Hansard (2007) 'House of Commons Hansard Debates for March 14', available at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070314/debtext/70314-0002.htm#07031475002517
- Hansard (2009) 'Oral Answers to Questions: Defence' Monday 30 March 2009, available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090330/debtext/90330-0001.htm
- Hanson S (2008) 'China, Africa and Oil', Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, available at: www.cfr.org/publication/9557/
- Harding T (2007) 'Terrorists 'use Google maps to hit UK troops'', *The Telegraph*, January 13, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1539401/Terrorists-%27use-Google-maps-to-hit-UK-troops%27.html
- Harris Interactive (2007) 'Poll Finds Strong Populist Mood in Europe and to a Lesser Extent in the USA', Financial Times/Harris Poll, July 25, available at: www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=791
- Hart Dyke A (2009) *Mosques Made In Britain*, London: Quilliam Foundation
- Hashemian F (2008) *Broken Laws, Broken Lives – Medical Evidence of Torture by US personnel and Its Impact* Washington, DC: Physicians for Human Rights
- Hartley K (2002) 'The Costs of War', *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 147, No. 5, October, pp.16-19
- Health Protection Agency (2008) *Annual Report and Accounts 2008* London: The Stationery Office
- Hecht J (2007) 'Web Browsers Are New Frontline in Internet War', *NewScientistTech*, May 5, available at: www.newscientisttech.com/article.ns?id=mg19426026.000&print=true
- Helm D (2007) 'The Russian dimension and Europe's external energy policy', September 3, available at: www.dieterhelm.co.uk/publications/Russian_dimension.pdf
- Hendrix C and Glaser S M (2007) 'Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Political Geography*, Vol. 26, No. 6, pp. 695–715
- Hill A (2002) 'Bin Laden's \$20m African 'blood diamond' deals', *The Observer*, October 20, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/oct/20/alqaida.terrorism
- HM Government (2006) *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005*, London: The Stationery Office
- HM Government (2007) *Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Energy*, London: The Stationery Office
- HM Inspector of Constabulary (2006) *Intercepting terrorism*, October, Confidential report shown to authors
- HM Treasury (2008) *Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2008*, available at: www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pespub_pesa08.htm

- Hoffman B (2006) 'The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists', Testimony before the United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, May 4, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation
- Holden M (2007) 'Bomb Suspects 'Radicalized in Week'' *Reuters*, January 24
- Home Office (2004) *One step ahead – a 21st century strategy to defeat organised crime* London: Home Office
- Home Office (2005) 'Worker Registration Scheme and Work Permit figures published' press release 22 February, available at www.workingintheuk.gov.uk/working_in_the_uk/en/homepage/news/press/worker_registration.html
- Home Office (2008a) *Home Office Departmental Report 2008* London: The Stationery Office
- Home Office (2008b) *Drugs: protecting families and communities*, available at: <http://drugs.homeoffice.gov.uk/publication-search/drug-strategy/drug-strategy-2008?view=Binary>
- Home Office (2009a) *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*, March, London: The Stationery Office
- Home Office (2009b) *Statistics on Terrorism Arrests and Outcomes Great Britain, 11 September 2001 to 31 March 2008*, Home Office Statistical Bulletin, May 13, available at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb0409.pdf
- Home Office (2009c) National Identity Service Cost Report, May 2009, available at www.ips.gov.uk/identity/downloads/docA_IPS_cost_report%202009_v11_BM.pdf
- Homer-Dixon T (1999) *Environment, Scarcity and Violence*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Homer-Dixon T and Friedmann S (2004) 'Out of the Energy Box', 83, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December, pp. 72-83
- Hoover J (2009) 'Major Cybersecurity bill introduced in senate', Information Week, April 2, available at: www.informationweek.com/news/government/technology/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=216402498
- Horsnell P (2008) 'Oil markets in 2008', Presentation to the British Institute for Energy Economics by Paul Horsnell, Head of Commodities Research, Barclays Capital, January 17, available at: www.biee.org/downloads/?dir=&download=Oil+Markets+in+2008+Dr+Paul+Horsnell+.pdf
- House of Commons (2004) *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction*, London: The Stationery Office
- House of Commons Business and Enterprise Committee (2008) *Energy prices, fuel poverty and Ofgem: Eleventh Report of Session 2007-08*, July 28, London: The Stationery Office
- House of Lords (2008) *Diseases Know No Frontiers: How effective are Intergovernmental Organisations in controlling their spread?*, Select Committee on Intergovernmental Organisations, HL Paper 143-I, London: The Stationery Office
- Howell D and Nakhle C (2008) *Out of the Energy Labyrinth* London: I.B.Tauris
- Hull A (2007) *Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate*, London: Metropolitan Police Authority
- Hull A (2008) *Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate – MPA update*, London: Metropolitan Police Authority
- Hull A (2009) 'Justice on the rack' *Public Policy Research*, Volume 16, Issue 1, March-May, pp. 38-44
- Human Rights Watch (2006) *Funding the 'Final War' – LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora*, New York: Human Rights Watch
- Human Security Report Project (2005) *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia

- Human Security Report Project (2007) *Human Security Brief 2007*, Vancouver: Simon Fraser University
- Hummels D (2007) 'Transportation Costs and International Trade Over Time', *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21 (3): 131-154
- Hussein F (2005) *Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda*, London: al-Quds al-Arabi
- ICM/Sunday Telegraph (2006) 'Muslims Poll – February 2006', Poll by ICM for the Sunday Telegraph available at: www.icmresearch.co.uk/pdfs/2006_february_sunday_telegraph_muslims_poll.pdf
- Innes M, Abbot L, Lowe T and Roberts C (2007) *Hearts and minds and eyes and ears: reducing radicalisation risks through reassurance-oriented policing*, Cardiff: Cardiff University
- Institute for Economics and Peace (2008) *Global Peace Index: 2008 Methodology, Results and Findings*, St Leonards, New South Wales: Institute for Economics and Peace
- Institute of Directors (2008) 'IoD Business Opinion Survey', conducted by extended telephone interview on a representative sample of 500 IoD members during February and March 2008
- Intelligence and Security Committee (2006) *Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*, London: Cabinet Office
- Intelligence and Security Committee (2009) *Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*, London: Cabinet Office
- Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) (2006) 'Guns Out of Control: The continuing threat of small arms', May, available at: www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58952
- Integrated Regional Information Networks (2008) 'DRC: Fear, uncertainty deter North Kivu IDPs from going home', Press Release, available at: www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=77463
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007a) 'Summary for Policymakers' in *Climate Change 2007: AR4 Synthesis Report*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007b) *Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis* Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007c) *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability* Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council (2008) *Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2007*, April, Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
- International Alert (2007) *A Climate of Conflict: The Links Between Climate Change, Peace and War*, London: International Alert
- International Civil Aviation Organization/United Nations Statistics Division (2008) 'Civil aviation, passengers carried, thousands (ICAO/SYB51)', data available at: <http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=CDB&f=srID%3a12880>
- International Energy Agency (IEA) (2008) *World Energy Outlook 2008*, Paris: IEA
- International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (2007) 'The growing divergence of population trends and concerns', *Options*, Winter 2007, pp.10-13, available at: www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/INF/OPT/Winter07/opt-07wint.pdf
- International Institute of Strategic Studies (2008) *Strategic Survey 2008*, London: Routledge

- International Institute of Strategic Studies (2009) *The Military Balance 2009* London: International Institute of Strategic Studies
- International Labour Organization (2005) *A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour*, Geneva: International Labour Organization
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007) *World Economic Outlook October 2007: Globalization and Inequality*, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund
- International Rescue Committee (2007) *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis*, available at: www.theirc.org/resources/2007/2006-7_congomortalitysurvey.pdf
- Internet World Stats (2008) 'Internet Growth Statistics', reproduced on All About Market Research website, available at: www.allaboutmarketresearch.com/internet.htm
- Interpol (2008) 'Money Laundering', available at: www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/default.asp
- ippr (2008a) *Shared Destinies: Security in a Globalised World*, The Interim Report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, London: ippr
- ippr (2008b) 'An ippr event on Energy Security in the Long Term: Discussion Notes', June 25, available at: www.ippr.org/uploadedFiles/events/energy_security_2.pdf
- Iraq Body Count (2007) 'Large bombings claim ever more lives', October 4, available at: www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/biggest-bombs/
- Iraq Body Count (2008a) 'Civilian deaths from violence in 2007: Analysis of the year's toll from the Iraq Body Count project', January 1, available at: www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2007/
- Iraq Body Count (2008b) 'Enforced security: solution or stopgap?', February 28, available at: www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/enforced-security/
- Joehnk T (2007) 'The Great Wall of India', *The Economist: The World in 2007*, March
- Johnson K (2008) *Food Price Inflation: Explanation and Policy Implications*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations
- Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group (JESS) (2006) *JESS long-term security of energy supply*, December, available at: www.berr.gov.uk/files/file35989.pdf
- Kagan R (2008) *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, New York: Alfred A Knopf
- Kaldor M (2006) *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*, 2nd Edition, Cambridge: Polity Press
- Kanbur R (2007) *Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link*, Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, June, New York: International Peace Academy
- Kearns I and Gude K (2008) *The New Front Line: Security in a changing world*, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, available at: www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=588
- Khanna P (2008) *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order*, London: Penguin Books Ltd
- Klare M (2001) *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*, New York: Henry Holt and Company
- Kleist N (2004) *Nomads, sailors and refugees - a century of Somali migration*, Working Paper No. 23, Sussex: University of Sussex
- Kolmannskog V (2008) *Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conflict and Forced Migration*, Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council
- Korb L and Boorstin R (2005) *Integrated Power: A National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*, Washington: Center for American Progress
- Krebs B (2009) 'Obama Administration Outlines Cyber Security Strategy', *The Washington Post*, January 22, available at: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/01/obama_administration_outlines.html

- Krueger A (2006) 'Globalization and International Locational Competition', Lecture delivered at the Kiel Institute, May 11, available at: www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/051106.htm
- Kurzweil R and Joy B (2005) 'Recipe for Destruction', *The New York Times*, October 17, available at: www.nytimes.com/2005/10/17/opinion/17kurzweiljoy.html
- La Guardia A (2008) 'Winning or losing? A special report on al-Qaeda', *The Economist*, July 19-25
- Laville S (2006) 'Terror trial hears tapes of plot to blow up club', May 26, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/may/26/topstories3.terrorism
- Leake J (2008) 'Coming soon: superfast internet', April 6, available at: www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/science/article3689881.ece
- Leggett J (2005) *Half Gone: Oil, Gas Hot Air and the Global Energy Crisis* London: Portobello
- Lekander P, Comper S and Gandolfi A (2008) *Half of coal generation shut by 2015* UBS Investment Research Report
- Leppard D, Calvert J, Jaber H, Taher A, Gadher D, Macaskill M, Singh D and Ham P (2007) 'Biting back at terror suspects', *The Sunday Times*, July 8, available at: www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2042409.ece
- Lewis J (2005) *Computer Espionage, Titan Rain and China* Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies
- Lewis M and I Curien (2008) *It takes CO2 to contango* Paris: Deutsche Bank
- Li J (2007) 'China Releases First National Report on Climate Change', *World Watch Institute*, January 11
- Liberal Democrat Party (2008) *Security and Liberty in a Globalised World*, Policy Paper 86, available at: www.libdems.org.uk/assets/0000/7885/Policy_Paper_86_-_Security_and_Liberty_in_a_Globalised_World.pdf
- Lloyd R (ed) (2006) *Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century* William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics Papers Number 2, available at: www.nwc.navy.mil/Academics/courses/nsdm/documents/RugerPaper2Web.pdf
- London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2006) *One Year On From 7/7*, July, London: London Chamber of Commerce and Industry
- London Resilience (2007) *London Regional Resilience: Flu Pandemic Response Plan: Special Arrangements for Dealing With Pandemic Influenza in London*, available at: www.londonprepared.gov.uk/downloads/flu_pandemic_response_plan_v3.pdf
- MacFarquhar N (2004) 'After Attack, Company's Staff Plans to Leave Saudi Arabia', *New York Times*, May 2
- MacLean R (2006b) 'Madrid suspects tied to e-mail ruse' *International Herald Tribune*, April 28
- Macpherson W (1999) *The Inquiry Into Matters Arising from the Death of Stephen Lawrence*, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/02/99/stephen_lawrence/report/default.htm
- MacRae F (2006) 'British scientists grow human liver in a laboratory', *Mail Online*, October 31, available at: www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-413551/British-scientists-grow-human-liver-laboratory.html
- Maplecroft (2008) 'Climate Change Vulnerability Index' from the *Climate change risk report 2008/9* [data not publicly available]
- Marsh T J and Hannaford J (2007) *The summer 2007 floods in England and Wales – a hydrological appraisal* Wallingford: Centre for Ecology and Hydrology
- Masood E (2006) *British Muslims: Media Guide* London: British Council
- Matthew R A (2008) *Resource Scarcity: Responding to the Security Challenge*, April, New York: International Peace Institute
- Mayor of London (2006) *Muslims in London*, October, London: Greater London Authority

- McCarthy M (2006) 'Climate Change Will Cause Refugee Crisis', *The Independent*, October 20
- McKibbin W (2006) *Global macroeconomic consequences of pandemic influenza*, Sydney: The Lowy Institute for International Policy
- McSweeney T, Turnbull P and Hough M (2008) *Tackling Drug Markets and Distribution Networks in the UK: A review of the recent literature*, July, London: Institute for Criminal Policy Research
- Médecins Sans Frontières (2006) *Access to healthcare in post-war Sierra Leone: Summary of a 2005 Survey in Four Districts*, Amsterdam/Jette: Médecins Sans Frontières, available at:
www.msf.org.au/uploads/media/sierra_leone_05_sum_01.pdf
- Mellor C (2009) 'Reding demands Cyber Cop for Europe' *The Register*, April 27, available at: www.theregister.co.uk/2009/04/27/eu_cyber_cop/
- Messer E and Cohen M (2006) *Conflict, Food Insecurity and Globalisation*, FCND Discussion Paper 206, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington: IFPRI
- Messer E, Cohen M, and Marchione T (2001) *Conflict: A Cause and Effect of Hunger, Environmental Change and Security Project Report No.7*, available at:
www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF23E.pdf
- Ministry of Defence (1998) *Strategic Defence Review July*, available at:
www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf
- Ministry of Defence (2002) *Strategic Defence Review: The New Chapter* London: The Stationery Office
- Ministry of Defence (2003) *Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper* December, available at: www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/051AF365-0A97-4550-99C0-4D87D7C95DED/0/cm60411_whitepaper2003.pdf
- Ministry of Defence (2004) *Delivering security in a changing world: future capabilities*, London: The Stationery Office
- Ministry of Defence (2006) *The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent*, December, available at: www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf
- Ministry of Defence (2007) *Global Strategic Trends 2007-2036*, Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
- Ministry of Defence (2008a) Spring Performance Report: MOD Public Service Agreement 2007 – 2008, available at: www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/22C9EFF8-4A89-46DC-AF69-7D543E1C05EE/0/modpsa_200708_spring.pdf
- Ministry of Defence (2008b) *MOD Annual Report And Accounts 2007/08* Volume II: Departmental Resource Accounts and Annexes, London: The Stationery Office
- Moore K, Mason P and Lewis J (2008) *Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British Muslims in the National Print News Media 2000-2008*, July 2008, Cardiff: Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies
- Metropolitan Police Authority (2002) 'Trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation in the United Kingdom', July 22, available at: www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/2002/020722/11.htm
- Metropolitan Police Authority (2007) *Counter-terrorism: the London debate*, London: Metropolitan Police Authority
- Metropolitan Police Authority (2008) *Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate – MPA update*, London: Metropolitan Police Authority
- Metropolitan Police Service (2007) *Counter Terrorism Bulletin 2007*, London: Metropolitan Police Service
- MI5 (2009) www.mi5.gov.uk/output/news-threat-level-updates.html
- Miliband D (2009) *Our Shared Future: Building Coalitions and Winning Consent*, 21 May 2009, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, available at:
www.fc.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=18130489

- Muenz R (2007) *Aging and Demographic Change in European Societies: Main Trends and Alternative Policy Options*, March, Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0703, available at: www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/03/26/000020953_20070326101644/Rendered/PDF/391740ECA0DemographicsOSP0070301PUBLIC1.pdf
- Mukherjee K (2008) *British Islamism and the South Asian Connection*, University of Bradford Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief Number 44, available at: <http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief+44.pdf>
- Naqshbandi M (2006) *Islam and Muslims in Britain: A Guide for Non-Muslims* London: City of London Police
- National Association of Muslim Police and Demos (2008) *Diversity in Modern Policing*, November, available at: www.demos.co.uk/files/File/diversity_in_modern_policing.pdf
- National Science Board (2006) *Science and Engineering Indicators 2006*, Arlington, Virginia: National Science Foundation, available at: www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/pdf/volume1.pdf
- NATO (2008) Bucharest Summit Declaration, available at: www.summitbucharest.ro/en/doc_201.html
- NATO (2009) *Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence*, Brussels: NATO available at: www.nato.int/docu/pr/2009/p09-009.pdf
- Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2007) *National Security: strategy and work programme 2007-2008*, The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, available at: www.minbzk.nl/bzk2006uk/subjects/public-safety/publications/106955/national-security
- Neville-Jones P (2007) *An Unquiet World*, submission by the Conservative National and International Security Policy Group to the Shadow Cabinet, available at: www.conservatives.com/pdf/securityreportfinal.pdf
- Neville-Jones P (2009a) 'Resource Rivalry and the Global Economy: A Conservative Approach to Securing our Energy Supplies', ippr Security Lecture, February 25 2009, available at: www.ippr.org/uploadedFiles/events/Jones_ippr_050209.pdf
- Neville-Jones P (2009b) 'Responding to large scale attacks in cities', Speech to Airwave Forum 2009, March 25, available at: www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/03/Pauline_Neville-Jones_Responding_to_large_scale_attacks_in_cities.aspx
- Newborne P (2009) *Flood Management and Equity: The missing piece in the policy puzzle*, March, London: Overseas Development Institute
- Niksch L (2008) *North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Development and Diplomacy*, CRS Report for Congress, January 21, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33590.pdf
- Noël P (2008) *Beyond dependence: How to deal with Russian gas* European Council on Foreign Relations Paper ECFR/09, London: ECFR
- Noland M and Pack H (2008) *Arab Economies at a Tipping Point*, January, available at: <http://iiea.iie.com/publications/papers/noland-pack02081.pdf>
- Nordås R and Gleditsch N (2007) 'Climate Change and Conflict', *Political Geography*, Vol. 26, No. 6, pp. 627-638
- Norton J (2008) 'The Crisis in Our Critical National Infrastructure', *Public Policy Research*, Vol 14, Issue 4, pp.244-247
- Norton J (2009) 'A Stitch In Time', *Contingency Today*, February 24, available at: www.contingencytoday.com/online_article/A-stich-in-time..../1771
- Norwegian Refugee Council (2008) *Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conflict and Forced Migration*, Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council
- Nuland V (2008) 'U.S. Ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland's Speech in Paris', February 22. available at: <http://nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=21A35613-E9D6-431D-9FD5-36FDD1389EBO>

- Obama B (2009) Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, June 4 2009, Cairo University, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/
- Office for National Statistics (2008) *First release: UK trade July 2008*, September 10, Newport: Office for National Statistics, available at: www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/trd0908.pdf
- Office for National Statistics (2009) 'National accounts: GDP by category of income', available at: www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/tsdataset.asp?vlnk=574&More=Y
- Ofgem (2005) *Ofgem's gas probe findings*, January 28, available at: www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/FactSheets/Documents1/8495-gas_probe_factsheetpdf.pdf
- Ofwat (2009) *Setting price limits for 2010-15: Framework and approach – a consultation paper* Birmingham: Ofwat
- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2006) *OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2006 Highlights*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2008a) *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Environments: From Fragility to Resilience*, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper, Paris: OECD
- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2008b) *Climate Change: Meeting the Challenge to 2050*, Policy Brief, February, available at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/21/39762914.pdf
- Ostby G (2004) *Do Horizontal Inequalities Matter for Civil Conflict?* Oslo: International Peace Research Institute
- Ostby G (2008) 'Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp.143-162
- Osterholm M (2007) 'Unprepared for a Pandemic', *Foreign Affairs*, 86, March/April, pp. 47-57
- Ostrovsky A and Daneshkhui S (2006) 'Finance ministers fail to find unity on energy security' *Financial Times*, June 12
- Overseas Development Institute (2008) *Rising Food Prices a Global Crisis*, London: ODI
- Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2006) *Military Uses of Space*, POSTnote No. 273, December, available at: www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/postpn273.pdf
- Pendleton A (2009) *Fairness in global climate change finance* London: ippr
- Perelet R, Pegov S and Yulkin M (2007) *Climate Change. Russia Country Paper*, UNDP Human Development Report Office, Occasional Paper, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/papers/perelet_renat_pegov_yulkin.pdf
- Pfeifer S (2008) 'Submarine Suffers Further Delays' *Financial Times*, September 13
- Pfleeger S and Hatton L (1997) 'Do formal methods really work?' *IEEE Computer*, January
- Pitt M (2008) *Learning lessons from the 2007 floods* London: Cabinet Office, available at: www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/thepittreview/final_report.aspx
- Pluta A M and Zimmerman P D (2006) 'Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent', *Survival*, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp.55-69
- Podesta J and Ogden P (2007) *Global Warning: The Security Challenges of Climate Change*, Washington, DC: Center for American Progress
- Portes J and French S (2005) *The Impact of Free Movement of Workers from Central and Eastern Europe on the UK Labour Market: Early evidence* Department for Work and Pensions Working Paper 18, London: Department for Work and Pensions, available at www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/WP18.pdf
- President of the Republic of France (2008) *Défense et Sécurité nationale: Le livre blanc*, June, available at: www.ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_blanc_Press_kit_english_version.pdf

- RAND Corporation (1997) *RAND Terrorism Chronology Database*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation
- RAND Corporation (2007) *RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation
- Reynolds S and Muggeridge H (2008) *Remote Controls: how UK border controls are endangering the lives of refugees*, London: Refugee Council
- Richardson L (2006) *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* New York: Random House
- Rogers P (2009) 'A state of blindness' *openDemocracy*, March 26, available at: www.opendemocracy.net/article/a-state-of-blindness
- Rossi V and Walker J (2005) *Assessing the economic impact and costs of flu pandemics originating in Asia*, Oxford: Oxford Economic Forecasting Group
- Rotberg R J (ed) (2004) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press
- Roth K (2008) 'Exploring the dynamics between peace and justice, security and human rights', ippr Security Lecture podcast, available at: www.ippr.org/events/archive.asp?id=3297&fID=239
- Rothkopf D (2009) 'A Thousand Envoys Bloom' *The National Interest*, May/June
- Roudi-Fahimi F, Creel L and De Souza R (2002) *Finding the Balance: Population and Water Scarcity in the Middle East and North Africa*, MENA Policy Brief, Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau
- Rubin B and Sherman J (2008) *Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication*, New York: Center on International Cooperation, available at: www.cic.nyu.edu/afghanistan/docs/counternarcoticsfinal.pdf
- Runnymede Trust (1997) *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, London: Runnymede Trust
- Rutter J (2006) *Refugee children in the UK*, Buckingham: Buckingham University Press
- Ryan A (2007) 'Supply-demand balance – Winter 2007/08', Presentation to the British Institute for Energy Economics by Andrew Ryan, Network Operations, National Grid, June 19, available at: www.biee.org/downloads/?dir=&download=Supply-Demand+Balance+19+June+07.pdf
- Sapir D G and Gomez V T (2006) *Angola: The Human Impact of War: A data review of field surveys in Angola between 1999 and 2005*, Brussels: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
- Scheinin M (2009) 'My concerns remain about cross-border intelligence operations', *The Guardian*, March 16, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/16/uk-security-martin-scheinin
- Schmitt E (2008) 'Experts See Gains Against Asian Terror Networks', *The New York Times*, June 9, available at: www.nytimes.com/2008/06/09/world/asia/09terror.html
- Schroeder M and Lamb G (2006) 'The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa: A Global Enterprise', *African Analyst*, Third Quarter, pp. 69-78
- Schultz M (1995) 'Turkey, Syria, and Iraq: A Hydropolitical Security Complex' in Ohlsson L (ed) *Hydropolitics: Conflicts Over Water as a Development Constraint* London: Zed Books
- Security and Defence Agenda (2008) *Risk analysis and preparedness for the next influenza pandemic*, available at: www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Portals/7/Documents/Report_Pandemic_Preparedness.pdf
- Serious Organised Crime Agency (2008) *The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Serious Organised Crime 2008/9*, available at: www.soca.gov.uk/assessPublications/downloads/UKTA2008-9NPM.pdf
- Shaikh A (2007) *Local Level Research with Muslim communities in towns in the South East of England*, Paper prepared for the European Forum for Urban Safety, Cities and Terrorism Conference, Brussels, September 10-11
- Shapiro R (2008) *Futurecast 2020: A Global Vision of Tomorrow*, London: Profile Books

- Shelley L (2002) 'The Nexus of Organized International Criminals and Terrorism', *International Annals of Criminology*, Volume 40, No.1-2, pp. 85-92
- Shelley L, Picarelli J, Irby A, Hart D, Craig-Hart P, Williams P, Simon S, Abdullaev N, Stansislawski B and Covill L (2005) *Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism*, June, available at: www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211207.pdf
- Simmons M (2005) *Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy*, Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley
- Small Arms Survey (2005) *Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Smith J (2008a) *World Oil: Market or mayhem?* Working paper 08-015, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, MIT
- Smith J (2008b) 'Prevent strategy: background and next steps' - speech to the BCU Commanders Conference, April 18, available at: <http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/bcu-conference-speech>
- Smith R (2005) *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, London: Allen Lane
- Spalek B, El Awa S and McDonald L (2009) *Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purposes of Counter-Terrorism: An Examination*, Project Report, January, Birmingham: University of Birmingham
- Sriskandarajah D, Cooley L and Reed H (2005) *Paying Their Way: The fiscal contribution of immigrants in the UK* London: Institute for Public Policy Research, available at www.ippr.org/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2FPaying+Their+Way%2Epdf
- Standard Chartered (2007) 'The Increasing Influence of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets', press release, October 15, available at: www.standardchartered.com/global/news/2007/grp_20071015.pdf
- Stewart F (2003) *Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development*, CRISE Working Paper, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity
- Surdin A (2008) 'San Francisco Case Shows Vulnerability of Data Networks', *The Washington Post*, August 11
- Taylor C, Waldman T and Gick S (2008) *British Defence Policy Since 1997*, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 08/57, London: House of Commons Library available at: www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-057.pdf
- Taylor I (2008) 'Is tackling climate change compatible with maintaining energy security?', October 29, available at: <http://conservativehome.blogs.com/platform/2008/10/ian-taylor-mp-i.html>
- Tehrani S (2008) 'Battling the tyranny of drugs in Iran', *The Guardian*, September 12, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/12/iran.drugstrade
- Terror Free Tomorrow (2008) *Pakistani Support for Al Qaeda, Bin Laden Plunges; Moderate Parties Surge; 70 Percent Want President Musharraf to Resign: Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan before the February 18th Elections*, Washington: Terror Free Tomorrow
- The 1990 Trust (2006) *Survey: Muslim views: Foreign policy and its effects*, London: The 1990 Trust
- The Audit Commission and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (2008) *Preventing violent extremism learning and development exercise*, November 10, London: The Audit Commission/Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
- The Economist (2007) 'Clipping the dragon's wings', 19 December, available at: www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10329268
- The Economist (2008a) 'Sovereign-wealth funds: Asset-backed insecurity', *The Economist*, January 17, available at:

- www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10533428
- The Economist (2008b) 'Disharmony in the spheres', January 17, available at: www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10533205
- The Economist (2008c) 'The New Colonialists', March 13, available at: www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10853534
- The Economist (2008d) *A Ravenous Dragon: China's Quest for Resources*, Economist Special Report, March 13, available at: www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10795714
- The Economist (2008e) *Beyond Doha*, Economist Special Report, October 9, available at: www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12373720
- The Independent (2009) 'A Right Menace: Nick Griffin', 23 May, available at www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/a-right-menace-nick-griffin-1689784.html
- The Smoking Gun (2007) 'Google As Terror Tool?', June 4, available at: www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/years/2007/0604071google1.html
- The Times (2006) *Populus poll of British Muslim attitudes*, London: The Times
- Thomas P, Ryan J and Cook C (2009) 'Holder Says Waterboarding is Torture', ABC News online, January 15, available at: <http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/DOJ/Story?id=6648730&page=1>
- Thompson T (2002) 'Heroin 'emperor' brings terror to UK streets', *The Guardian*, November 17, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/nov/17/drugsandalcohol.ukcrime1
- Thoms O and Ron J (2007) 'Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict?', *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 3, August, pp. 674-705
- Travis A (2008) 'MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain', *The Guardian*, August 21
- UCDP/PRIO (Uppsala Conflict Data Program/International Peace Research Institute) (2007) *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook*, Version 4-2007, available at: www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDP_PRIO_Codebook_v4-2007.pdf
- UK Border Agency (2008) *UK Border Agency celebrates six months of success*, London: UKBA
- UK Climate Impacts Programme (2008) *The Climate of the UK and recent trends*, available at: www.ukcip.org.uk/images/stories/08_pdfs/Trends.pdf
- UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) (2005) *Measuring Progress: Preparing for climate change through the UK Climate Impacts Programme*, June, available at: www.ukcip.org.uk/images/stories/Pub_pdfs/MeasuringProgress.pdf
- UK Parliament (2000) *Terrorism Act 2000*, London: The Stationery Office
- UK Parliament (2006) *Terrorism Act 2006*, London: The Stationery Office
- UKSpace (2008) *Space Secures Prosperity* London: Newsdesk Communications Ltd
- Union of International Associations (2008) 'Statistics compiled by the UIA', available at: www.uia.be/en/stats
- United Nations (1984) *United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Degrading and Inhumane Treatment or Punishment*, A/RES/39/46, 10 December, New York: United Nations, available at www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm
- United Nations (2000a) *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/55/2, September 18
- United Nations (2000b) *United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto*, General Assembly Resolution 55/25, 15 November, New York: United Nations
- United Nations (2004) *A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility*, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York: United Nations
- United Nations (2005) *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

- Weapons, New York, May 2-27, available at:
www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html
- United Nations (2006) *Trends in World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision*, New York: United Nations Population Division, available at:
www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration2005.htm
- United Nations (2007) *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision*, New York: United Nations Population Division, data available at:
www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/wpp2006.htm and
<http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d=PopDiv>
- United Nations (2008a) *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*, New York: United Nations Population Division, data available at:
<http://esa.un.org/unup/>
- United Nations (2008b) *World Population Policies 2007*, New York: United Nations Population Division, available at:
www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2007/Publication_index.htm
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2008) *Development and Globalization: Facts and Figures 2008*, New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, available at:
www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdscsir20071_en.pdf
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2007) *World Investment Report 2007*, Foreign Direct Investment online database, available at:
http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx?CS_referer=&CS_ChosenLang=en
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2000) *Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?* New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2007a) *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007* New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2007b) *The World Youth Report - Young People's Transitions to Adulthood: Progress and Challenges* New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
- United Nations Development Programme (2005) *Securing Development: UNDP's Support for Addressing Small Arms Issues*, New York: United Nations Development Programme
- United Nations Development Programme (2006) *Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis*, Human Development Report 2006, New York: United Nations Development Programme
- United Nations Development Programme (2007) *Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world*, Human Development Report 2007/2008, New York: United Nations Development Programme
- United Nations Information Service (2003) 'People Smuggling, Trafficking Generate Nearly \$10 billion Annually as Core Businesses of International Criminal Networks, Third Committee Told', Press Release, October 14, available at:
www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/gashc3742.html
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006) *Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns*, April, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, available at:
www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/HT-globalpatterns-en.pdf
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007) *World Drug Report 2007*, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, available at:
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2007.html
- United Nations Secretary General (2008) *Report of the Secretary General on Small Arms*, S/2008/258, New York: United Nations
- United Nations Statistics Division (2008) 'Population, latest available census and estimates (2006-2007)' in *Population and Vital Statistics Report: Series A*, available

- at: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/vitstats/serATab2.pdf>
- United States General Accounting Office (2002) *Critical Issues Remain in Deterring Conflict Diamond Trade*, GAO-02-678, June, available at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d02678.pdf
- Uniting Britain Trust (2004) *Islamophobia: challenges, issues and action*, Report by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Stoke on Trent: Trentham Books
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2008) 'UCDP Definitions', available at: www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/definitions_all.htm#n
- Urdal H (2006) 'A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 50, Issue 3, pp. 607-629
- Vallings C and Moreno-Torres M (2005) *Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile?*, PRDE Working Paper No. 7, available at: www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragile-states/drivers-fragility.pdf
- Warrick J (2008) 'US cites big gains against Al Qaeda', *Washington Post*, May 30
- Webb S (2008) 'Oil refining surplus may bring UK, U.S. plant closure' *Reuters*, April 11, available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKL1059134720080411?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0>
- Weitz R and Mix D (2007) *The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security*
- Wenche H and Ellingsen T (1998) 'Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 299-317
- Wiggins S and Levy S (2008) *Rising Food Prices: A Global Crisis*, April, London: Overseas Development Institute
- Wike R and Holzwart K (2009) *Few in Pakistan Support Extremists - But Few Favor Military Confrontation*, Pew Global Attitudes Project, available at: <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1148/pakistan-little-support-for-terrorists-most-favor-education-for-girls>
- Wiktorowicz Q (2005) *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West* London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
- Wilton Park (2006) *Counter Terrorism Conference: Engaging with Muslim youth in Europe and North America*, West Sussex, October 30-November 1
- Witney N (2008) *Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy* London: European Council on Foreign Relations
- Wolf A T and Priscoli J D (2006) *Resolving International Water Resource Conflicts*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
- Woodman P (2008) *Business Continuity Management 2008*, London: Chartered Management Institute
- World Bank (1995) *Workers in an Integrating World: World Development Report 1995*, June, available at: www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1999/04/28/000009265_3961219103803/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf
- World Bank (2007a) *World Development Indicators 2007* Washington, DC: The World Bank
- World Bank (2007b) 'Consultative Group Meeting on Democratic Republic of Congo', World Bank Press Release, available at: <http://go.worldbank.org/4YAM4UQ790>
- World Bank (2008a) *Global Monitoring Report 2008: MDGs and the Environment*, Washington, DC: The World Bank
- World Bank (2008b) *The World Bank in Russia, Russian Economic Report*, June, available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRUSSIANFEDERATION/Resources/rer16_eng.pdf
- World Health Organization (2007) *A Safer Future*, World Health Organization Public Health Report, available at: www.who.int/whr/2007/en/index.html

- World Trade Organisation (2008) 'Statistics database', data available at:
<http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx>
- Wray R (2008) 'Revealed: how sovereign wealth funds were left nursing multibillion losses', *The Guardian*, March 22, available at:
www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/mar/22/banking.investmentfunds
- WWF and Oxfam (2008) *Russia and Neighbouring Countries: Environmental, Economic and Social Impacts of Climate Change*, Moscow: WWF Russia and Oxfam GB
- Zawahiri A (2002) *Knights under the Prophet's banner* London: Al-Sharq Al-Awsat
- Zoellick R (2008) 'Opening Press Briefing at the WB-IMF Spring Meetings 2008', April 10, available at:
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21725341~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>

List of individuals consulted or offering views to the Commission and Commission Secretariat

In addition to the sources listed in the bibliography, the following individuals have contributed to the research of the Commission over the past two years, either by authoring policy briefs, taking part in round-table discussions, speaking at events, offering views in private meetings, or making written submissions. We are grateful to every one of them. We would stress that the views expressed in this report are the views of members of the Commission panel only, and not those of any of the individuals listed below.

- **James Acton**, Lecturer, Centre for Science and Security Studies, Department of War Studies, King's College London
- **Katharine Adeney**, Senior Lecturer, University of Sheffield
- **Clare Algar**, Executive Director, Reprieve
- **Chris Allan**, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- **John Almonds**, Director of Security Operations, Infinity
- **Bob Ainsworth MP**, Minister of State for the Armed Forces
- **John Andrews**, Ministry of Defence
- **Superintendent Dal Babu**, former Chair of the National Association of Muslim Police, MPS
- **Andy Baker**, Deputy Director of Intelligence, SOCA
- **Frank Barnaby**, Emeritus Consultant, Oxford Research Group
- **Catherine Barnes**, Consultant on Conflict Issues, Conciliation Resources
- **Ambassador Bob Barry**, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- **John Baylis**, Pro-Vice Chancellor, Swansea University
- **General Sir Hugh Beach**, Board of Directors, VERTIC
- **Christopher Beese**, Chief Administrative Officer, Armorgroup
- **Sally Benton**, Corporate Information Officer, MPA
- **Paul Bernstein**, Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation
- **Sir Ian Blair**, former Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
- **Robert Bonner**, former first Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency
- **Claude Boucher**, Deputy High Commissioner to the UK and Former Canadian Ambassador to Haiti
- **Rachel Briggs**, Senior Research Fellow, National Security and Resilience Department, Royal United Services Institute
- **Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP**, Prime Minister
- **Shenaz Bunglawala**, Project Officer, Engage
- **James Cameron**, NGOs and Humanitarian Department, Control Risks Group
- **Andy Carl**, Director, Conciliation Resources
- **Lord Alex Carlile**, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, House of Lords
- **Matt Cavanagh**, Prime Minister's Policy Directorate, 10 Downing Street
- **Shami Chakrabarti**, Director, Liberty

- **Malcolm Chalmers**, Professor of International Politics, University of Bradford
- **Robert Chatterton-Dickson**, Deputy Director – CT Policy, CT Department, FCO
- **Inspector Fiaz Choudhary**, Chair of MPS Association of Muslim Police, MPS
- **Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP**, Leader of the Liberal Democrats
- **DCI Andy Coles**, Head of Training, ACPO TAM
- **Paul Collier**, Professor of Economics, Oxford University Economics Department and Director, Centre for the Study of African Economies
- **Claudio Cordone**, Senior Director for Research and Regional Programmes, Amnesty International
- **Gordon Corera**, Security Correspondent, BBC
- **Paul Cornish**, Head, International Security Programme and Carrington Chair in International Security, Chatham House
- **Chris Coverdale**, Founder, Action Against War
- **Jonathan Cooper**, Doughty Street Chambers
- **Jeremy Corbyn MP**
- **Moty Cristal**, former negotiations adviser to the Israeli Prime Minister and CEO, Nest Consulting
- **Stuart Croft**, Professor of International Security, Warwick University
- **General Sir Richard Dannatt**, Chief of the General Staff
- **Michael Dale**, EDS
- **Tom Daschle**, US Senator
- **Neil Davison**, Senior Policy Adviser, Royal Society
- **Thomas De Saint-Maurice**, IDRC
- **Ken De Souza**, Policy Analyst, CHASE, DfID
- **DAC Cressida Dick**, Deputy ACPO, MPS
- **Norman Dombey**, Emeritus Professor, University of Sussex
- **Lyse Doucet**, News Correspondent and Presenter, BBC World News
- **Richard Dowden**, Director, the Royal African Society
- **Jim Drummond**, Director of the South-Asia Division, UK Department for International Development
- **Chris Earnshaw**, Deputy President, Institution of Engineering & Technology
- **Charlie Edwards**, Senior Researcher, Demos
- **Ambassador Rolf Ekéus**, Chairman of the Governing Board, SIPRI and former High Commissioner on National Minorities, OSCE
- **Richard English**, Professor of Politics, Queen’s University Belfast
- **Alex Evans**, Fellow, the Center on International Cooperation (New York University)
- **Gareth Evans**, President, International Crisis Group
- **Charles Farr**, Director General, OSCT
- **Toby Fenwick**, Birkbeck College
- **Stephen Fidler**, Defence and Security Editor, Financial Times
- **Catherine Fieschi**, Director, Counterpoint, British Council
- **Regina Finn**, CEO, OFWAT

- **Marian Fitzgerald**, Visiting Professor of Criminology, University of Kent
- **Jeremy Fleming**, Head of Strategy, OSCT
- **Richard Fletcher**, Senior Policy Advisor, EADS
- **Tim Fox**, United States Navy
- **Babak Ganji**, Consultant
- **Frank Gardner**, Security Correspondent, BBC
- **Amélie Gauthier**, Researcher, Peace, Security and Human Rights, FRIDE
- **Conor Gearty**, Professor of Human Rights Law and Director of the Centre for the Study of Human Rights, LSE
- **Jonathan Githens-Mazer**, Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics & Co-Director, Exeter Centre for Ethno-Political Studies
- **Misha Glenny**, freelance journalist and author
- **Paul Grasby**, Head of Social and Behavioural Science Unit, OSCT
- **Owen Greene**, Chair of the Management Board, Centre for International Co-Operation Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
- **Frank Gregory**, Professor of European Security, the University of Southampton
- **Katherine Gregory**, Project Leader, Per Capita
- **Ken Gude**, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
- **Mia Hakl-Law**, Researcher to Edward Fitzgerald QC, Doughty Street Chambers
- **Lord Toby Harris**, Home Secretary's Appointee, MPA
- **James Hart**, Infinity Advisory Board Member and former Commissioner of the City of London Police
- **Carolyn Hayman**, Chief Executive, Peace Direct
- **Dieter Helm**, Professor, Oxford University
- **David Hendon**, Head of Business Relations, BERR
- **Claire Hickson**, Head of Advocacy and Communications, Saferworld
- **Gary Hindle**, Head of Security and Counter-Terrorism, RUSI
- **Lin Homer**, Chief Executive, UK Border Agency
- **Edward Howker**, Journalist, The Independent
- **Darryl Howlett**, Senior Lecturer in the Division of Politics and International Relations, University of Southampton
- **William Hughes**, Director General, SOCA
- **Ed Husain**, Co-Director, Quilliam Foundation
- **Dilwar Hussain**, Head of Policy Research Centre, The Islamic Foundation
- **Rt Hon John Hutton MP**, Secretary of State for Defence
- **Paul Ingram**, Executive Director, BASIC
- **Peter Ingram**, Ofcom
- **Nigel Inkster**, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, International Institute for Strategic Studies
- **Andrew Jackson**, Director of Border and Visa Policy, UKBA
- **General Sir Mike Jackson**, former Chief of the General Staff

- **Mick Jenkins**, Infinity Operations Director and former counter-terrorist intelligence officer
- **Eric Joyce MP**, Parliamentary Private Secretary, BERR
- **Mary Kaldor**, Co-Director, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE
- **Kerry M. Kartchner**, Senior Advisor for Strategic Planning, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, US State Department
- **Jean-Roger Kaseki**, human rights campaigner
- **Sunder Katwala**, Chair, Fabian Society
- **Zachary Katznelson**, Legal Director, Reprieve
- **Bob Keen**, Head of Government Relations, BAE Systems
- **Tim Kellow**, John Bright Peace & Security Programme Officer, UNA-UK
- **Glenn Kelly**, Counter Proliferation and Security Cooperation, Ministry of Defence
- **Joanna Kidd**, Research Fellow, International Centre for Security Analysis, King's College London
- **Parag Khanna**, Senior Research Fellow, New America Foundation
- **Susan Kincade**, Senior Partner, Global Concepts and Communications, LLC
- **Francesca Klug**, Director, Human Rights Futures Project, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE
- **Daniel Korski**, Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations
- **Patrick Lamb**, Deputy Chief Executive, International Financial Services London
- **Robert Lambert**, Research Fellow, Department of Politics, University of Exeter
- **James Leonard**, Scientists Working Group on CBW of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
- **Helen Lewis**, Conflict Advisor, DfID
- **Julian Lindley French**, Professor of Military Operational Science, Defence Academy of the Netherlands
- **Nick Low**, Head, Nuclear Issues Section, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- **Baroness Sarah Ludford MEP**, Liberal Democrat Member of the European Parliament and Liberal Democrat European justice spokeswoman
- **Martin Lynch**, CEO, Infinity
- **Sara MacNeice**, Campaign Manager on terrorism, security and human rights, Amnesty International
- **Zaiba Malik**, Journalist
- **Adam Mallalieu**, Director of Corporate Security, National Grid
- **Lord Mark Malloch-Brown**, Minister for Africa, Asia and the UN, FCO
- **Bruce Mann**, Head of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office
- **DCI Tony McCarthy**, Detective Chief Inspector within Special Branch, Office of the National Co-ordinator Ports Policing
- **Trevor McCrisken**, Associate Professor in American Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick
- **Kevin McDonald**, Marie Curie International Fellow, University of London, Goldsmiths College
- **Detective Superintendent Peter McGowan**, Deputy National Coordinator of Ports Policing / Protect, ACPO

- **Celia McKeon**, Director of Policy, Communications and Comparative Learning, Conciliation Resources
- **Professor Colin McInnes**, UNESCO Chair of HIV/AIDS, Education and Security and Director, Centre for Health and International Relations, Aberystwyth University
- **Oliver McTernan**, Co-founder and Director, Forward Thinking
- **Eric Metcalfe**, Director of Human Rights Policy, JUSTICE
- **Geoff Miller**, Head of Risk Management, United Utilities
- **Mohammad Mahroof**, MCU – SO15, MPS
- **Andrew Moran**, Professor of International Relations, London Metropolitan University
- **Gemma Mortensen**, UK Director, Crisis Action
- **James Mortimer**, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- **Anna Murison**, Head of Global Jihad Forecasting, Exclusive Analysis
- **Karma Nabulsi**, Lecturer in International Politics, Oxford University and former PLO representative
- **Carol Naughton**, WMD Awareness Programme
- **Maajid Nawaz**, Co-Director, Quilliam Foundation
- **Dan Nelson**, President of Global Concepts & Communications, LLC, and Senior Fellow, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation
- **David Newton**, Conflict Adviser, DfID
- **Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones**, Shadow Security Minister and National Security Adviser to the Leader of the Opposition
- **Richard Norton-Taylor**, Security Editor, The Guardian
- **William Nye**, Director, National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Office
- **Denis O'Connor**, HMI, HMIC
- **Tara O'Toole**, CEO and Director, Center for Biosecurity, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
- **Nathan Oley**, Strategic Policy Adviser, APA
- **Sima Osdoby**, Secretary of the Board, BASIC
- **Lord David Owen**, former Member of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
- **Cleo Paskal**, Associate Fellow, Energy, Environment and Development Programme, Chatham House
- **Kenneth Payne**, Lecturer in Defence Studies, KCL
- **Tony Payne**, Professor, Department of Politics, Sheffield University
- **Owen Pengelly**, Head of the Central Sponsor for Information Assurance, Cabinet Office
- **Andreas Persbo**, Arms Control and Disarmament Researcher (Nuclear), VERTIC
- **Robert Picciotto**, Visiting Professor, King's College London
- **Tom Porteous**, London Director of Human Rights Watch
- **Lyndon Powell**, Director of Human Continuity Operations, Infinity
- **Peter Power**, Managing Director, Visor Consultants (UK) Limited
- **Professor Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha**, Institute of International Relations, University of Brasilia

- **Sheikh Aliur Rahman**, Director, Consultancy, Double Barrel Design & Consultancy Ltd
- **Sumit Rahman**, Policy Advisor on Official Statistics, Economic and Domestic Affairs Secretariat, Cabinet Office
- **Siddharth Ramana**, Researcher, BASIC
- **Chris Rampling**, Deputy Head, Counter-Proliferation Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- **Ben Rhode**, Research Analyst and Programme Coordinator, International Institute for Strategic Studies
- **General Sir David Richards**, Commander-in-Chief Land Forces
- **Willy Rickett**, Director General, Energy, BERR
- **Stephen Rimmer**, Home Office
- **DCS Andy Rintoul**, Detective Chief Superintendent, HMIC
- **Nick Ritchie**, Post Doctoral Research Fellow in the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, University of Bradford
- **Guy Roberts**, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO
- **Mark Rodmell**, Head of Aviation Facilitation, Department for Transport
- **Professor Paul Rogers**, Professor of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
- **Kenneth Roth**, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch
- **Michael Rutter**, Director of Energy Resilience, BERR
- **Philippe Sands**, Professor of Law, UCL
- **Malcolm Savidge**, BASIC board member
- **Mark Sedwill**, International Director, UK Border Agency
- **Hagai Segal**, Lecturer, New York University in London
- **Mark Segal**, Senior Conflict advisor, DfID
- **Narcis Serra**, former Minister of Defence and Vice-president of the Spanish Government
- **Claudia Seymour**, Child Protection Adviser, UN Expert Group on the Democratic Republic of Congo
- **Salman Shaikh**, Special Representative to Europe, Muslim West Facts Project
- **Asima Sheikh**, Independent Researcher and Consultant, Community Cohesion & Conflict Resolution, NRA/LIA
- **Mary Shockledge**, Head of the Conflict Prevention Team (ISD), FCO
- **Mike Short**, Vice President of Research and Development, O2
- **Liz Siberry**, Director, CPNI
- **John Simpson**, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton
- **Detective Inspector Andy Slater**, Staff Officer to ACSO, MPS
- **Dan Smith**, Secretary General, International Alert
- **Rt Hon Jacqui Smith MP**, Home Secretary
- **Jennifer Smith**, Policy Analyst, CAFOD
- **Mark Smith**, Programme Director, Wilton Park

- **Stephen Smith**, Home Office
- **Ann Snow**, Policy Advisor, Amnesty International UK
- **Basia Spalek**, Senior Lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Birmingham
- **Clive Stafford-Smith**, Director, Reprieve
- **Jonathan Stern**, Director of Gas Research, Oxford Institute of Energy Studies
- **Elizabeth Stubbins-Bates**, David Davies of Llandinam Research Fellow in International Relations, LSE
- **Roger Styles**, Deputy Director, Central Sponsor for Information Assurance, Cabinet Office
- **John Taylor**, Director General of Information, MoD
- **Terry Thompson**, Booz&Co
- **Lemonia Tsaroucha**, Lecturer on World Legal Orders, UCL
- **Lord Andrew Turnbull**, former Head of the Civil Service
- **Doug Turner**, BT Group Engineering Services, BT
- **Phil Vernon**, Director of Programs, Africa and Peacebuilding, International Alert
- **Ollie Welch**, Ministry of Defence
- **Admiral Lord Alan West**, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Security and Counter-terrorism
- **Keith Weston**, Deputy Director of the Resilience Centre, Cranfield University
- **Robert Whalley**, Consulting Senior Fellow, IISS
- **Nicholas Wheeler**, Professor of International Politics, Aberystwyth University
- **Detective Superintendent Peter Wickstead**, SO15, MPS
- **Detective Inspector Steve Wilkinson**, Head of Human Trafficking Unit, MPS
- **David Williams**, Director, Cohesion Directorate, DCLG
- **Angela Wilson**, Cabinet Office
- **Revd Canon Flora Winfield**, Churches Together in Britain and Ireland and World Conference on Religions for Peace
- **Stewart Wood**, Prime Minister's Policy Directorate, No. 10
- **Angela Woodward**, Executive Director, VERTIC
- **James R. Wright**, Canadian High Commissioner to the UK

Appendix C: Policy recommendations from the Commission's Interim Report *Shared Destinies: Security in a Globalised World*

In the Commission's Interim Report, we set out initial proposals on conflict prevention and intervention, recommendations related to regional security organisations, and detailed proposals on two fundamentally important areas which require multilateral cooperation, namely nuclear non-proliferation and global biosecurity.

These recommendations are reproduced below.

Conflict prevention

In the full Recommendations we call upon the Government to develop further and more deeply embed the notion of a Responsibility to Prevent Violent Conflict in UK foreign, defence and overseas development policy. This is because violent conflict is a human tragedy, destabilises whole countries and regions, and can contribute to the generation of ungoverned spaces which may become a source of direct threat to the United Kingdom.

In support of this goal, we call for:

- **The generation of shared strategic assessments** of possible conflict situations both across Whitehall and in coordination with international partners
- **The creation of an independent Conflict Modelling Panel** to assess possible conflicts and the likely human, strategic and financial consequences of not acting to prevent them.
- **The integrated use of a full spectrum of upgraded conflict prevention instruments**, covering aid, trade, diplomacy and military instruments capable of bringing pressure to bear for peace in regions that may be on the verge of conflict. We have restructured whole armed services to be able to project military power. Now we need a similar exercise to project a capacity for rebuilding peace.
- **The addition of a conflict reduction goal to the existing Millennium Development Goals.**
- **A further investment in and refocusing of Britain's in-country diplomatic expertise** to facilitate interventions in conflict prevention that are better informed and better targeted at local conditions.
- **An increase in resources channelled to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) promoting conflict prevention and in-country political dialogue** and increased efforts to coordinate more effectively the activities of UK-based bodies engaged in such activities, incorporating them into prevention, planning and post-conflict intervention.
- **The funding of independent research into successful conflict prevention activities and financial support for a public inventory of case studies of successful preventive action.** This is vital both for lessons to be learned but also as a practical tool to address the deficit of political will in relation to early preventive action.

Intervention in conflict environments

Since we cannot realistically expect all violent conflict to be prevented and since there are likely to be other interventions required at some point in the future, we must also organise ourselves far more effectively for the challenges ahead.

We therefore call for:

- **The development of coherent political objectives within which military strategy and tactics must reside in future operations.** This did not happen in Iraq: coalition forces were asked to defeat the Iraqi army and take Baghdad rather than to develop a strategy for the stabilisation of Iraq post-Saddam. Despite some improvements, we are also struggling with the lack of a strategic concept in **Afghanistan**.
- **A more fundamental review of military doctrine and operational planning,** as they relate to interventions in conflict and failed state situations.
- **Clear unity of command to be established, under a well-resourced civilian leadership, across UK military, diplomatic, aid and reconstruction activities in conflict zones.** This will be required in future and is also needed now in Afghanistan.
- **Stronger and more focused political engagement and leadership, through the creation of a ‘security diplomacy’ leadership post within the Cabinet, to coordinate the entire UK effort in a major conflict zone and to gather international support for the action required. Again, this is needed now in relation to Afghanistan.** The creation of such a role in Cabinet would embed the notion of unity of command under civilian leadership at the heart of government and would allow one individual to coordinate a joined-up response from across the entire Whitehall machine.
- **On Afghanistan in particular, we believe the UK government should work with the new US administration to promote a regional context supportive of peacebuilding in the country, bringing in Iran, Russia, Pakistan, China and a range of civil society organisations.** This will not be easy, but should be attempted.

Strengthening and adapting regional security organisations

In addition, we also believe there is a need for:

- **The adaptation and strengthening of Europe-based regional security organisations such as the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), with the last of these incorporating the full engagement of the United States,** as a central plank of British strategy on more effective multilateral security cooperation.
- **A massive increase in the EU’s and NATO’s logistical and financial help to the African Union,** the regional security body that is likely to be tested the most in the next five to ten years, but which is currently the least well equipped to respond.

Issue-specific and treaty-based multilateralism

Nuclear non-proliferation

Given the growing dangers associated with nuclear weapons, we believe it is not safe for the world to rely on nuclear deterrence for long-term security. We therefore support the view that the long-term goal of our policy must be the creation of a world free of nuclear weapons and believe action on non-proliferation is urgent ahead of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010. We know the road to achieving this goal will be long and the path towards it not always clear, but we call upon the Government to pursue it actively and to:

- **Use all the instruments at its disposal to encourage further rapid reductions in the strategic arsenals of both Russia and the United States.**

- **Pursue a strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions on monitoring and compliance, to provide greater assurances to all parties on the effectiveness of the Treaty.**
- **Increase further its financial contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and encourage other states to do the same.**
- **Provide further practical help to those states wishing but not fully able to implement Security Council Resolution 1540 on improving the security of nuclear stockpiles.**
- **Provide a financial contribution to the IAEA/Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) nuclear fuel bank fund, which is aimed at establishing an internationally accessible nuclear fuel bank.**
- **Use all of its influence inside NATO to ensure that the review of NATO's strategic concept, being carried out in 2009 and 2010, produces a result sensitive to and supportive of the requirements of a successful outcome to the NPT Review Conference in 2010.**

Moreover, the Government should:

- **Seek to use its membership of the P-5 to stimulate a deeper and more active strategic dialogue on non-proliferation within this group of states.**
- **Invite the foreign and defence ministers of the P-5 to a non-proliferation strategic dialogue meeting prior to the 2010 NPT Review Conference in pursuit of a joint P-5 position at the conference.**
- **Fund and contribute to a second, less formal track of diplomatic activity involving former senior officials and policy experts from the P-5 plus India, Pakistan and Israel, if possible.** This would not be easy to put together, but should be attempted and should be aimed at identifying and thinking through the political and strategic issues required for a phased progression to zero nuclear weapons among this group, the representatives of which would cover the eight key nuclear weapons states (both signatories and non-signatories of the NPT).

In addition:

- To ensure that non-proliferation issues remain at the forefront of national political debate and to ensure domestic awareness of the need for these measures, **the Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary should make annual joint statements to the House of Commons on current proliferation concerns and trends, and on the Government's full range of activities and resources being deployed to respond to them.**

Global biosecurity

We draw particular attention to the challenges of bioterrorism and disease throughout our Interim Report. As emerging problems, these expose significant weaknesses in the international institutional landscape and an urgent response is required. Since there is widespread consensus that the arrangements for detecting and responding to the deliberate release of a deadly pathogen are largely identical to those required for detecting and responding to naturally occurring disease, our recommendations here are aimed at improving global readiness to deal with both.

We call for the Government to:

- **Work with international partners to create a panel of scientific experts, equivalent to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for purposes of reviewing and bringing to policymakers' attention developments in the biological sciences that may have implications for security and public safety.**
- **Increase its support to the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) and to encourage other countries to do so the same.**
- **Use its own bilateral aid programmes to upgrade developing countries' skills and capacities in the field of disease surveillance and response.**

- **Promote the idea of a Global Compact for Infectious Diseases.** This would be a new treaty designed to deliver a number of internationally coordinated biosecurity advances including:
 - The creation of a network of research centres aimed at the carrying out of fundamental research on infectious diseases
 - Improved data and knowledge sharing from research and bio-surveillance activities around the world
 - The harmonisation of national standards, regulatory practices, and best laboratory practices
 - A major expansion in the production of important drugs and vaccines.
- **Couple its promotion of the Compact with moves to expand the International Health Partnership (IHP) as an urgent priority,** to ensure that the Compact does not lead to a locking-in of vaccine access and health governance advantages already enjoyed by the wealthiest countries.
- **Support the creation of an event-reporting system for animal diseases** equivalent to that set up in relation to human health in the International Health Regulations 2005. In a world where so many diseases cross the species barrier, the absence of such an event-reporting system is a major weakness in the international architecture for ensuring biosecurity.

Glossary of abbreviations

APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BCP	Business Continuity Plan
BERR	Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
C4ISTAR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information/Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting Acquisition and Reconnaissance
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNI	Critical National Infrastructure
CNPA	Civil Nuclear Police Authority
CONTEST	UK Strategy for Countering International Terrorism
CPNI	Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CSR	Comprehensive Spending Review
CTBT	Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
CTSA	Counter Terrorism Security Advisor
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
DCSF	Department for Children, Schools and Families
DECC	Department of Energy and Climate Change
DfID	Department for International Development
DIUS	Department for Innovation, Universities & Skills
EBO	Effects Based Operations
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ENISA	European Network and Information Security Agency
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUROPOL	European Police Office
EUROjust	European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit

FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
G20	Group of Twenty
GCA	Global Cybersecurity Agenda
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLA	Greater London Authority
GPS	Global Positioning System
HPA	Health Protection Agency
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
LNG	Liquefied natural gas
LCCI	London Chamber of Commerce and Industry
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MI5	Security Service
MI6	Secret Intelligence Service
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NaCTSO	National Counter Terrorism Security Office
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEC	Network Enabled Capability
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSB	National Science Board
NSF	National Security Forum
NSID	Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
Ofgem	Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets

OLAF	European Anti-Fraud Office
ONS	Office for National Statistics
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
POST	Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology
PET	Preventing Extremism Together Taskforce
PSA	Public Service Agreement
RAF	Royal Air Force
SDR	Strategic Defence Review
SitCen	European Union Joint Situation Centre
SMEs	Small and medium enterprises
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SRS	Strategic Review of Security
TA	Territorial Army
TACT	Terrorism Act 2000
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WHO	World Health Organisation
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction



ARTS & CULTURE

CRIME

DEMOCRACY & CULTURE

DIGITAL

ECONOMY

EDUCATION

ENVIRONMENT

EQUALITIES

EUROPE

FAMILIES

HEALTH

HOUSING

INTERNATIONAL

MEDIA

MIGRATION

PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT

PUBLIC SERVICES

REGIONS

SECURITY

SOCIAL POLICY

TRANSPORT

WELFARE

This is the final report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, an all-party Commission preparing an independent national security strategy for the United Kingdom. Based on research and Commission deliberations over a two-year period, the report sets out a wide range of proposals designed to make our country and its citizens, businesses, and communities more secure.

Our recommendations include:

- A new approach to the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Proposals to improve the UK's energy security
- Measures to address radicalisation and the threat of terrorism here in the UK
- The call for a transformation in our approach to defence policy, and measures to strengthen both NATO and the European pillar of the transatlantic alliance
- Measures to strengthen and improve the institutions handling security at the centre of government
- Proposals for improved global governance
- A call to strengthen and deepen the legitimacy of the security strategy we pursue.

Our report, as with our interim report, *Shared Destinies: Security in a Globalised World*, is a call to action. We face serious and worsening international security challenges but provided we are willing to learn lessons, to change the way we think, to find the necessary political will and to adapt our policy solutions and instruments to new circumstances, there is much that can be done. In the post 9/11, post financial crisis world of complex threats and limited national resources, this report charts a safer course for the country in turbulent times.

Institute for Public Policy Research

30–32 Southampton Street

London WC2E 7RA

United Kingdom

tel: +44 (0)20 7470 6100

fax: +44 (0)20 7470 6111

email: info@ippr.org

www.ippr.org

Registered Charity No. 800065

Printed on chlorine-free
paper made from at least
75% post-consumer waste

