

REPORT

ENGLAND AND ITS TWO UNIONS

THE ANATOMY OF A NATION
AND ITS DISCONTENTS



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INTRODUCTION: THE DOG THAT BARKED

In January 2012, IPPR published *The dog that finally barked: England as an emerging political community*.¹ In it we argued that an emerging English political identity may over time come to challenge the institutions and practices of the UK more profoundly than anything happening in the so-called Celtic fringe, even Scottish independence.

Here we return to Englishness and its political implications, analysing findings from a further survey – the Future of England survey 2012 (for details, see the appendix to this report). There are at least three reasons why this is appropriate.

First, several of the key arguments presented in *The dog that finally barked* focused on changing attitudes. We argued that:

- People in England increasingly stress the English aspects of their Anglo-British identity.
- They are increasingly dissatisfied with Scotland's apparently privileged position within the UK.
- They are increasingly supportive of the idea that England should receive proper recognition within the governing structures of the UK but have not reached a consensus as to how this should be done.
- English identity is becoming increasingly politicised – the more strongly our survey respondents stressed an English identity, the more they tended to favour some form of explicit recognition of England within the UK.

Our new survey provides an opportunity to determine whether these conclusions – many new, some controversial – are still supported by subsequent data.

Second, our new survey allows us to explore the impact on public attitudes of external developments since the first Future of England survey was conducted in September 2011. In the UK, summer 2012 saw Britishness well and truly to the fore during both the Queen's diamond jubilee celebrations and the London Olympic and Paralympic Games. Although given active support by the Olympic authorities, demonstrations of British sentiment were also spontaneous and – particularly, it appeared, within the English heartland of the UK – widely popular. Perhaps this efflorescence of Britishness has rekindled affection for Britain among the people of England, reversing the tendency to stress the English dimension of their identity and casting doubt on our previous conclusions. But if English identity is sufficiently robust as to withstand such widespread promotion of Britishness then this would add further credence to our original analysis.

Third, the follow-up research reported here allows us to explore in more detail two compelling and politically crucial themes. The first is Europe. Although not a central focus of the 2011 survey, that study provided some evidence that – compared to both the rest of the British Isles and Europe more generally – the English are particularly conscious of and hostile towards the EU. That finding in turn raises the question of how attitudes towards Europe relate to an increasingly strong English identity and to the growing dissatisfaction with the UK's territorial status quo highlighted by the 2011 survey. Put more simply, are attitudes towards England's two unions – the United Kingdom and the European Union – related to each other? The 2012 survey allows us to explore this in more detail.

¹ Richard Wyn Jones, Guy Lodge, Ailsa Henderson and Daniel Wincott (2012) *The dog that finally barked: England as an emerging political community*, London: IPPR. <http://www.ippr.org/publication/55/8542/the-dog-that-finally-barked-england-as-an-emerging-political-community>.

The second key issue is the relationship of ethnic minorities in England to English national identity. As noted in *The dog that finally barked*, in stark contrast to the position in Scotland and Wales (where ethnic minorities seem to find the 'local' national identity more amenable than Britishness), in England ethnic minorities tend to cleave towards Britishness. Given that Englishness seems in the ascendency among the population as a whole, this raises potentially troubling questions about social and political cohesion. But there were relatively few ethnic minority respondents in the 2011 survey, so any conclusions were highly tentative. Our 2012 survey was designed to allow us to explore ethnic minority attitudes in much greater depth.

The remainder of this report is divided into four chapters:

- **England as an emerging political community:** Here we reconsider the key findings of the 2011 Future of England survey in the wake of the events of 2012. Has a 'more British' sense of national identity been revitalised? Has the increasing tendency in England to view the territorial status quo as unsatisfactory continued or been reversed? And, crucially, what is the latest evidence concerning the increasing politicisation of English national identity? Does English national identity continue to be related to the view that England should be given greater recognition in the UK's constitutional arrangements?
- **England's two unions:** Here we explore the relationship between attitudes towards the two political unions of which England is a part. To what extent are attitudes towards the UK and the EU related?
- **Can Englishness be inclusive?** This chapter focuses on patterns of national identity within the ethnic minority population in England, as well as on their attitudes towards questions of territorial governance.
- **Conclusion: The partisan politics of Englishness:** This final chapter explores the differing attitudes of political party supporters towards England's two unions, illustrating the particular challenges that face party leaders in responding to English discontent.

1. ENGLAND AS AN EMERGING POLITICAL COMMUNITY

In *The dog that finally barked* (Wyn Jones et al 2012, see note 1), we advanced three central arguments:


- That people in England were increasingly stressing the English dimension of what was still, overwhelmingly, a joint Anglo-British identity.
- That people in England were increasingly dissatisfied with the way that England is governed within the United Kingdom, and increasingly inclined to support some explicit institutional recognition of England.
- That English national identity appeared increasingly politicised: the stronger someone's sense of English identity, the greater tended to be their dissatisfaction with the UK and how it dealt with England.

These findings underpinned the core claim of the report: that England was a (re)emerging political community. Here we revisit these findings from the 2011 Future of England survey (FoEs) in the wake of the events of 2012.

1.1 Patterns of national identity in England and the UK

Our survey includes two direct measures of national identity in England. The simplest, and crudest, is the 'forced choice' question (shown in figures 1.1 and 1.2). This is a two-stage question: respondents are first asked to choose which identities (from a range of options) they would apply to themselves, with respondents able to pick as many or as few as they wish; then they are required to select one option that 'best describes the way you think of yourself'.

Figure 1.1
'Forced choice' national identity (stage one), England, 1996–2012 (%)




Sources: British Social Attitudes 1996–2010; Future of England 2011–12

Question: Which, if any, of the words below best describe the way you think of yourself? (Please tick as many or as few as apply)

Note: Answers other than English or British not shown.

Figure 1.2
 'Forced choice' national
 identity (stage two),
 England, 1992–2012 (%)



Sources: British Election Studies 1992 and 1997; British Social Attitudes 1996, 1998–2010; Future of England 2011–12
 Question: And if you had to choose, which one BEST describes the way you think of yourself?
 Notes: Answers others than 'British' or 'English' not shown. It is perhaps worth noting that the 2006 data was collected around the time of the football world cup.


As in 2011, at the first stage most 2012 survey respondents identified themselves as both English and British. However, more identified themselves as English (60 per cent) than British (58 per cent). And although the difference between these two groups reduced from 6 per cent in 2011 to 2 per cent, the level of British identity recorded was the lowest in any survey reported here (going back to 1996).

At the second, 'forced choice' stage, more respondents chose to describe themselves as British (49 per cent) than English (41 per cent). This is the reverse of what we found in 2011, when 42 per cent chose British and 49 per cent English, suggesting a modest strengthening of British national identity from 2011 to 2012.

In the UK, where, as a multinational state, many people have overlapping or nested national identities, the 'Moreno question' is better suited to charting the strength of identity. It asks respondents to locate themselves on a spectrum of options extending from exclusively English to exclusively British (as seen in figure 1.3).

Compared to the 2011 FoEs, our 2012 data shows some weakening at the exclusively English end of the spectrum, and modest growth in the plural 'equally English and British' category. Yet these changes are limited, and it remains the case that twice as many prioritise English identity (35 per cent) as British (17 per cent). Only 10 per cent of respondents claim to be 'more British than English'. In this sense there was no discernible post-Olympics 'Britishness bounce'.

Figure 1.3
Trends in Moreno
national identity,
England, 1997–2012 (%)



Source: British Election Study 1997; British Social Attitudes 1999–2009; Future of England 2011–12
Question: Which, if any, of the following best describes the way you think of yourself?

Moreover, if we consider the longer timeframe offered by the British Social Attitudes (BSA) data, it is clear that while there is some fluctuation from one year to the next, English identity has strengthened since the late 1990s (see figures 1.1–1.3). Although most people retain an overlapping English and British identity, what has emerged – as we argue in our previous report – is ‘a different kind of Anglo-British identity in which the “Anglo” component is increasingly considered the primary source of identity for the English’ (Wyn Jones et al 2012: 20). What’s more, this trend has not gone unnoticed within England: when asked, 58 per cent agree that the English have ‘become more aware of English national identity in recent years’ (FoEs 2012).

Further evidence of the strength of English national sentiment is provided by the most inclusive survey of them all, the census. For the first time, the 2011 census explored patterns of national identity across the UK by means of a question similar to the first part of the ‘forced choice’ question discussed above.

In England, fully 70 per cent of the population identified themselves either as solely English (60 per cent) or English in combination with some other national identity (10 per cent). In another finding that is in line with the 2011 FoEs, the census found only limited regional variation across England – with one significant exception – in the strength of English national identification (see table 1.1). That exception was London. In the dual capital of England and the United Kingdom, while English national identity remains the most popular choice, Englishness was notably weaker than elsewhere and Britishness rather stronger.

Indeed, a majority did not feel any sense of English national identity at all (though even greater numbers in the capital felt no sense of *British* identity either).

Table 1.1
Regional differentiation
in national identification,
England, 2011 (%)

	Respondent selected...			Did not select...	
	English only	British only	British + other (British + English only)	English	British
North East	70	15	11 (11)	20	74
North West	66	17	11 (10)	24	73
Yorkshire and the Humber	66	17	11 (10)	24	72
East Midlands	66	17	10 (9)	25	73
West Midlands	63	19	10 (9)	28	71
East	65	16	10 (9)	25	74
London	37	31	7 (5)	56	62
South East	62	18	11 (10)	28	71
South West	65	16	11 (10)	24	73
England	60	19	10 (9)	30	71

Source: 2011 Census

What is particularly striking about the census data is the weakness of British national identity in England. Table 1.2 shows that only 29 per cent of census participants identified themselves as feeling any sense of British national identity. Indeed, when the relevant Scottish census data is published later in 2013, it is overwhelmingly likely that, of the constituent national units of the UK, only in Northern Ireland – that is, outside Great Britain – did even a plurality of census respondents feel any sense of British national identity. Although the census was taken before the Jubilee and the Olympics in 2012, the clarity of its findings on the strength of Britishness runs starkly contrary to the narrative of revivalism that we saw throughout last year.

Table 1.2
National identities across
the UK, 2011 (%)

	England	Wales	Northern Ireland
E/S/W/NI only	60	58	21
E/S/W/NI + other	70	66	29
British only	19	17	40
British + other	29	26	48
Irish only	1	0	25
Irish + other	0	0	28

Source: 2011 Census

Note: Equivalent data for Scotland was not available at time of publication.

Nonetheless, it would be misleading to suggest that the relationship between English and British national identities in England is (so far, at least) exactly analogous to the relationship between British national identity and Scottish and Welsh national identities in those nations.² Table 1.3 shows responses to a question in FoEs 2012 asking respondents which nation they would prefer to have inscribed on their passports (compared with equivalent 2011 data from Wales). That fully 40 per cent of people

² A striking feature of the Welsh data is that fully 11.2 per cent of the population of Wales subscribe to an English only national identity, with a further 1.5 per cent describing themselves as English and British only. (English in any form accounts for 13.8 per cent of the population.) Given that 21 per cent of the Welsh population was born in England – with much higher concentrations in certain areas – the growth and politicisation of English identity has potentially significant ramifications west of Offa's Dyke.

in England would, if given the opportunity, choose an English passport is striking, especially given the complete absence of any public debate around English citizenship. Nonetheless, even if England is emerging as a political community, Britishness remains a more important reference point for political identity for the people of England than for their neighbours in Scotland or Wales. This should, of course, come as little surprise given that debates about the notion of Scottish and Welsh citizenship are of long standing – be that explicitly through those nations’ respective nationalist parties, or implicitly through the actions of devolved government.

Table 1.3
Preferred passport by
GB nation, 2011/12 (%)

	England	Wales
British	51	38
English	40	8
European	3	2
Welsh	1	50
Irish	1	<1
Scottish	1	<1
Other	2	3

Source: Future of England 2012, Welsh Referendum Study 2011; no data available for Scotland
Question: If you were allowed to choose the nationality that appears on your passport, which of these descriptions would you choose?

Note: Equivalent data for Scotland was not available at time of publication.

Is the rise of English sentiment confined to particular social and demographic groups? Table 1.4 breaks down responses to the Moreno question by different groups and shows that across all age-groups, social classes and both genders Englishness is stronger than Britishness. The one important exception concerns members of England’s ethnic minorities (discussed further in chapter 3). This is not to say that English sentiment is experienced uniformly across England’s diverse population: Englishness is stronger among the older sections of the population than it is with 18–24-year-olds, and stronger among the less affluent social classes (C2s and DEs). Men prioritise their English identity more than women.

Table 1.4
Moreno national
identity by social
group, 2012 (%)

	English > British	Equally English and British	British > English	Difference between E>B and B>E	N
All	35	39	17	+18	3,600
White British	36	39	16	+20	3,401
Non-white British	12	26	44	-32	651
18–24	31	36	24	+7	437
25–39	30	39	19	+11	924
40–59	39	39	15	+24	1,221
60+	39	41	14	+25	1,018
Male	40	35	17	+23	1,756
Female	31	43	16	+15	1,844
AB	31	40	19	+12	1,005
C1	33	40	17	+16	1,076
C2	42	36	15	+27	753
DE	38	39	15	+23	753

Source: Future of England 2012


Note: ‘English > British’ combines the ‘English only’ and ‘More English than British’ categories; ‘British > English’ combines ‘British only’ and ‘More British than English’.

In summary, there appears to have been a modest strengthening of British national sentiment between 2011 and 2012. This may have been in response to the events of summer 2012, but we cannot definitively attribute cause and effect with our data, any more than we can predict whether such strengthening will persist. Nonetheless, both our 2011 and 2012 surveys demonstrate the strength of English identity, a point strongly reinforced by the 2011 census. Indeed, if the soon-to-be-published Scottish census data is consistent with expectations then the UK will be revealed as a state in which British national identity is not the main national identity in any of the three national territories of Great Britain.

1.2 Constitutional preferences

Our 2012 survey offers no indication that any modest strengthening of British identity in England is matched by increased support for current governance arrangements in the UK. If anything, the opposite is true. Our 2011 survey revealed substantial dissatisfaction in England with how Scotland, in particular, is treated within the UK. Scotland was felt to receive more than its fair share of public spending (and England less than its fair share). Our 2012 survey suggests such attitudes hardening: as shown in figure 1.4, over half of respondents (52 per cent) felt that Scotland received more than its fair share of public spending.

Figure 1.4
English attitudes towards
Scotland's share
of public spending,
2000–2012 (%)



Sources: BSA 1996–2011; FoEs 2011–12

Question: Would you say that compared with other parts of the UK, Scotland gets pretty much its fair share of government spending, more than its fair share, or less than its fair share?

Meanwhile, views on England's fair share have remained stable, with the biggest group still convinced that England gets less than its fair share (see table 1.5). The strength of feeling in England is further illustrated by the fact that the number who say that Scotland gets more than its fair share of public spending has more than doubled in the last decade (from 24 per cent in 2002).

Table 1.5
English attitudes towards
England's share of public
spending, 2011/12 (%)

	2011	2012
More than fair	7	8
Pretty much fair	26	27
Less than fair	40	40
Don't know	27	24
N	2,836	3,600

Source: Future of England survey 2011–12

Question: Would you say that compared with other parts of the UK, England gets pretty much its fair share of government spending, more than its fair share, or less than its fair share?

The English also overwhelmingly believe that public services delivered in Scotland should be funded by taxes levied in Scotland, and that Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on English laws. While changes to the wording of the question mean that data from our 2011 and 2012 surveys are not strictly comparable (but do enable direct comparison with the longer BSA time series), the 2012 findings are nonetheless striking. Over three-quarters of respondents supported the proposition that the Scottish parliament should pay for the services it delivers out of taxes levied in Scotland (see table 1.6), while more than 80 per cent agreed that Scottish MPs should not vote on English laws (table 1.7). Note also the intensity of feeling: 49 per cent and 55 per cent of English respondents 'strongly agreed' that, respectively, Scotland should pay its own way and that Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on English matters.

Table 1.6
'The Scottish parliament
should pay for services
out of taxes collected
in Scotland', England,
2001–12 (%)

	2001	2003	2007	2009	2011	2012
Strongly agree	20	22	28	36	44	49
Agree	53	52	47	46	36	29
Total agree	73	74	75	82	80	78
Neither agree nor disagree	12	12	14	10	*	11
Disagree	11	10	5	6	8	11
Strongly disagree	1	<1	1	<1	1	1
Total disagree	12	10	6	6	9	12

Source: BSA 2001–09; FoEs 2011–12

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please tick one option per row) 'Now that Scotland has its own parliament, it should pay for its services out of taxes collected in Scotland'

* The 2011 FoEs did not provide a 'neither/nor' option.

Table 1.7
'Scottish MPs should not
vote on English laws',
England, 2000–12 (%)

	2000	2001	2003	2007	2009	2011	2012
Strongly agree	18	19	22	25	31	53	55
Agree	45	38	38	36	35	26	26
Total agree	63	57	60	61	66	79	81
Neither / nor	19	18	18	17	17	*	8
Disagree	8	12	10	9	6	8	4
Strongly disagree	1	2	1	1	1	2	2
Total disagree	9	14	11	10	7	10	6

Source: BSA 2000–09; FoEs 2011–12

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please tick one option per row) 'Now that Scotland has its own parliament, Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote in the House of Commons on laws that only affect England'

* The 2011 FoEs did not provide a 'neither/nor' option.

These findings could prove particularly significant should Scotland vote to remain in the United Kingdom in 2014. All the major unionist political parties are committed to strengthening the powers of the Scottish parliament over and above those set out in

the Scotland Act 2012. In designing a model of 'devo-more' for Scotland, the unionist parties will surely need to reflect on the state of English public opinion presented here, if the model is to prove sufficiently versatile to work effectively.

That our English respondents believe that Scotland benefits disproportionately from the union is further underlined in their responses to a question that probed perceptions of the economic benefits of being part of the UK. When asked whether the English or Scottish economy benefits most from being part of the UK, just under a half of English respondents (49 per cent) point to the Scottish economy. In contrast, only 23 per cent of English respondents say that the English and Scottish economies benefit equally from membership of the union.

Also striking is the lack of trust in the UK government to act in England's interests (see table 1.8). As in the 2011 survey, around 60 per cent of respondents did not think that the UK government could be relied upon to do so, with 44 per cent trusting it 'not very much' and 18 per cent 'not at all'.

Table 1.8
'Do you trust the UK government to work in the best long-term interests of England?' 2011/12 (%)

	2011	2012
A great deal	4	3
A fair amount	31	27
Not very much	42	44
Not at all	17	18
Don't know	6	8
N	2,836	3,600

Source: Future of England survey 2011–12

Question: How much do you trust the UK government at Westminster to work in the best long-term interests of England?

Table 1.9 shows such sentiments are widespread across England. Although Londoners appear a little less dissatisfied than the English average, there is a striking regional uniformity in views. The overall message is clear: English dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo is both broad and deep.

Table 1.9
English resentment by region, 2012 (% agree)

	ENG	NE	NW	Y&H	EM	WM	East	LON	SE	SW
Scotland gets more than its fair share of spending	52	55	49	44	54	53	56	51	54	53
Scottish parliament should pay for services from own taxes	78	76	76	74	87	78	79	75	80	77
Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote on English laws	81	82	78	80	84	81	82	76	83	81
The UK government can't be trusted to work in English interest	62	62	65	63	61	67	59	56	59	58
N	3,600	170	481	373	338	350	400	532	588	367

Following the publication of *The dog that finally barked*, one question regularly posed to us was how salient were the questions of territorial governance that we highlighted within it? After all, survey participants may express dissatisfaction when specifically probed on an issue without necessarily regarding it to be a high priority. Our 2012 survey attempted to assess this by asking respondents to prioritise those constitutional issues that they regard as requiring

'urgent action or change at this time'.³ Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the UK's relationship with Europe was accorded highest priority (table 1.10). But, strikingly, the question of 'how England is governed now that Scotland has a parliament and Wales has an assembly' was in a clear second place, well ahead of a range of other constitutional issues – including voting reform, reform of local government and the House of Lords, and even the position of Scotland within the UK – to which the political system itself has accorded much higher priority in recent years.

Table 1.10
Priorities for 'urgent action or change', England, 2012 (%)


The UK's relationship with the EU	59
How England is governed now that Scotland has a parliament and Wales has an assembly	42
A more proportional system for electing MPs at Westminster	29
Strengthening local government	27
Reforming the House of Lords	26
Scotland's future relationship with the UK	25
The future of Northern Ireland	5
None of these	4
Don't know	11
<i>N</i>	3,600

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Question: Which three, if any, of the following areas do you think require urgent action or change at this time? (Please select up to three options)

A number of possible solutions could be taken to meet this need for 'urgent action' on how England is governed. One would be Scotland's independence. However, 49 per cent of our respondents opposed this and 30 per cent were in favour.⁴

Figure 1.5
'Scotland should become an independent country', England, 2012 (%)



Source: Future of England survey 2012; *N* = 3,600

Question: There will be a referendum in Scotland in 2014 on Scottish independence. Do you agree that Scotland should become an independent country?

³ We acknowledge that constitutional issues themselves are not considered a high priority by the public.

⁴ These are very close to the levels of support for union and independence revealed in Scottish opinion polls conducted around the time of the FoEs survey.

Equally, English independence might be seen as a potential response to the electorate's call for action. We broached this possibility for the first time in our 2012 survey and garnered an intriguing response. Despite no significant political party or actor advocating this option, those supporting the proposition that 'England should become an independent country' (34 per cent) were only narrowly outnumbered by those in opposition (38 per cent). And when asked how they would respond if Scotland were to vote to become independent, a plurality (39 per cent, compared with 33 per cent who disagreed) then said that England too should become independent.

Table 1.11
English attitudes to
English independence
2012 (%)

	'England should become an independent country'	'If Scotland votes to become independent then England should become an independent country'
Strongly agree	17	18
Tend to agree	17	21
All agree	34	39
Neither agree nor disagree	18	17
Tend to disagree	19	16
Strongly disagree	19	15
All disagree	38	31
Don't know	9	12
N	1,826	1,826

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Questions: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? England should become an independent country; If Scotland votes to become an independent country, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? England should become an independent country

Putting to one side the (currently unlikely) possibility of English independence, our 2012 survey included several questions designed to probe respondents' views on how England should be governed.⁵ Responses to these questions confirm:

- low and decreasing support for the status quo
- very low support for English regionalism
- strong support for a form of governance that treats England as a distinct political unit
- continuing lack of consensus about which English option is appropriate.

As shown in table 1.12, barely one-fifth of the electorate supports the territorial status quo. Support for English regionalism is lower still. By contrast, the two 'English options' taken together – English votes on English laws and an English parliament – are supported by a majority of respondents, with more tending to the former than the latter (36 per cent to 20 per cent).

Table 1.12
English preferences
for the governance of
England, 2011/12 (%)

	2011	2012
For England to be governed as it is now with laws made by all MPs in the UK parliament	24	21
For England to be governed with laws made by English MPs in the UK parliament*	34	36
For each region in England to have its own elected assembly	9	8
For England as a whole to have its own new English parliament with law-making powers	20	20
Don't know	14	16
N	2,836	1,774

Source: Future of England survey 2011–12

Question: With all the changes going on in the way different parts of the United Kingdom are run, which of the following do you think would be best for England?

* 'English votes on English laws'

5 This report does not consider the case of localism and empowering local government insofar as it might provide a partial solution to the 'English question'. This will be considered in more detail in future work.

Figure 1.6 illustrates responses to another question, probing the same issues but in a slightly different manner. It confirms low support for the territorial status quo, at 22 per cent. And in combination the two ‘English options’ again garner majority support with, again, English votes on English laws winning the backing of the largest group. It also confirms that, even when considered alongside other options, there is some support for English independence.

At this point it may be tempting to conclude that our previous caution in arguing that views in England have not coalesced around a particular ‘English option’ is misplaced or outdated. Should ‘English votes for English laws’ now be considered the favoured alternative to the status quo? The evidence presented in figure 1.7 suggests not. When respondents were asked to choose directly between English votes on English laws or an English parliament, they split their votes almost evenly – and both options were more popular than the status quo. Perhaps the clearest finding from these responses is that the status quo is not much of an option. Moreover, on a variety of question wordings, the status quo is consistently less favoured than alternatives which would give some form of institutional recognition to England as a whole.

Figure 1.6 (left)
English preferences for England's constitution, 2012 (%)





Figure 1.7 (right)
English preferences for law-making in England, 2012 (%)



Source: Future of England survey 2012; N = 1,774
Question: Thinking about how England should be governed, which one of the following statements comes closest to your view?
* 'English votes on English laws'

Source: Future of England survey 2012; N = 1,826
Question: Thinking about possible arrangements for making laws for England two options are often mentioned. If you had to choose which one would you prefer?
* 'English votes on English laws'

1.3 The politicisation of English identity

The final and perhaps most significant claim highlighted in our previous report, *The dog that finally barked*, was that English national identity has become politicised. Specifically, our 2011 data suggested that the stronger a person’s sense of English identity, the more likely they were to be dissatisfied with the place of England within the post-devolution United Kingdom. Our 2012 survey data strongly confirms this conclusion.

Table 1.13 shows how national identity (as measured by the Moreno question – see figure 1.3) interacts with discontentment with post-devolution governing arrangements. It is clear, even in the context of high levels of overall discontentment, that those who identify strongly as English are more dissatisfied with those governing arrangements than those who feel more British. And the relationship between identity and dissatisfaction was at least as marked in 2012 as in 2011: it is unassuaged by any post-2012 Jubilee/Olympics glow.

Table 1.13
English attitudes to questions of territorial governance by Moreno national identity, 2011/12 (% agree)

	All		English not British		More English than British		Equally English and British		More British than English		British not English	
	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012
Scotland gets more than its fair share of spending	45	51	52	64	57	62	39	50	43	46	38	41
Scottish parliament should pay for services from its own taxes (strongly agree)*	80 (45)	81 (49)	82 (67)	85 (76)	87 (51)	90 (58)	79 (37)	82 (45)	77 (35)	78 (43)	73 (38)	64 (33)
Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote on English laws (strongly agree)*	80 (53)	81 (55)	91 (71)	91 (77)	85 (65)	88 (62)	80 (47)	82 (52)	75 (41)	81 (52)	71 (44)	71 (37)
The UK government can't be trusted to work in English interest	60	62	71	72	56	62	61	60	54	55	61	62

Source: Future of England survey 2011–12

Note: N for all questions is 3,600 unless noted with * where N is 1,826.

Tables 1.14 and 1.15 (over) show how responses to two questions probing governance and constitutional preferences for England (previously reported in table 1.12 and figure 1.6) differ according to national identity. Once again it is clear that the ‘English options’ find most favour among those with the strongest sense of English national identity. Indeed, in both tables the status quo is the most popular option only among those claiming an exclusively British national identity. And, in table 1.15, the status quo is the *fourth* most popular constitutional option among those who feel exclusively English, trailing not only English votes on English laws and an English parliament but even English independence outside the EU.

In summary, although the 2012 FoEs data suggests that a modest strengthening of British identity may have taken place since 2011, people in England nonetheless retain a stronger sense of English identity than they possessed in the late 1990s. Strength of English identity is clearly associated both with dissatisfaction with the post-devolution settlement and with support for establishing distinct governing arrangements for England. Our analysis in *The dog that finally barked* – that the English have begun to form a *political* community seeking some form of self-government – is thus strongly supported by these findings from a subsequent survey.

Table 1.14
English preferences for the governance of England by Moreno national identity, 2011/12 (%)

	All		English not British		More English than British		Equally English and British		More British than English		British not English	
	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012
Status quo	24	21	13	14	19	16	31	23	21	29	35	30
'English votes on English laws'	34	36	39	38	44	45	34	34	21	36	20	18
English parliament	20	20	32	27	23	22	10	19	13	8	16	23
Regional assemblies	9	8	7	7	5	7	12	7	28	11	8	11
Don't know	14	16	9	14	10	10	13	17	17	16	20	18
<i>N</i>	2,836	1,774	470	269	604	384	946	654	282	176	236	135

Source: Future of England survey 2011–12

Question: With all the changes going on in the way different parts of the UK are run, which of the following do you think would be best for England? For England to be governed as it is now with laws made by all MPs in the UK parliament (status quo); with laws made by English MPs in the UK parliament; for each region of England to have its own assembly; for England as a whole to have its own new English parliament with law-making powers.

Table 1.15
English preferences for England's constitution by Moreno national identity, 2012 (%)

	All	English not British	More English than British	Equally English and British	More British than English	British not English
Status quo	22	10	17	25	37	29
'English votes on English laws'	33	39	38	32	33	25
English parliament	18	25	25	16	7	16
England independent inside the EU	7	5	6	6	8	8
England independent outside the EU	8	13	7	8	7	7
Don't know	12	9	7	13	8	15
<i>N</i>	1,774	300	387	670	167	112

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Question: Thinking about how England should be governed, which one of the following statements comes closest to your view? England should be governed as it is now with laws made by all MPs in the UK Parliament; England should be governed with laws made solely by English MPs in the UK Parliament; England should have its own new English Parliament with law-making powers; England should be an independent state inside the European Union; England should be an independent state outside the European Union.

The next chapter of this report explores how attitudes to European integration also form a key component of this English political community.

2. ENGLAND'S TWO UNIONS: EUROPE AND THE UK

This section is concerned with how English attitudes towards the European Union relate to attitudes towards England's other union, the UK.

2.1 Euroscepticism

The EU is very unpopular in England. When asked whether they considered the UK's membership of the EU to be a 'good thing' or not, 43 per cent of respondents held a negative view of membership, compared to 28 per cent with a positive view.

And when asked how they would vote in a referendum on continuing UK membership of the EU (and holding such a referendum is favoured by 67 per cent of respondents) the verdict was even more decisive. Fully half would vote for the UK to withdraw, only one-third to remain.

Figure 2.1 (left)
English attitudes to EU membership 2012 (%)





Figure 2.2 (right)
English intentions in an EU referendum, 2012 (%)



Source: Future of England survey 2012; N = 3,600

Source: Future of England survey 2012; N = 3,600

These figures throw prime minister David Cameron's manoeuvring around a possible future referendum on EU membership into stark relief. His is an extraordinary double gamble. First, unless he can bring home a significantly altered relationship with the EU, the English might well vote to leave. Second, recent polling in Scotland suggests the Scots think rather differently about Europe, and these differences could impact significantly on the independence debate.

For example, in February 2013, Ipsos-MORI found that 53 per cent of Scots would vote in a referendum to stay in the EU and 34 per cent to leave – almost a perfect inversion of the English views revealed in FoEs.⁶ Just as strikingly, a Panelbase survey for the *Sunday Times* in May 2013 found that 44 per cent of Scots would be 'very' or 'quite' likely to vote for Scottish independence 'if the UK was looking likely to vote to withdraw from the EU' and 44 per cent very or quite unlikely to vote for Scottish independence in the


⁶ See <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3131/Scots-want-EU-referendum-but-would-vote-to-stay-in.aspx>.

same situation.⁷ Most polls have shown that about half of Scots intend to vote ‘no’ in the independence referendum next year compared with only a third or so who intend to vote ‘yes’. But Euroscepticism elsewhere in the UK could potentially narrow that gap if Scottish people feel they could be dragged out of the EU against their will. Ipsos-MORI’s polling reaffirms the point. Asked ‘regardless of how you intend to vote in the Scottish independence referendum’ whether or not ‘an independent Scotland should be a member of the European Union’ 61 per cent favoured membership (including 59 per cent of those who intended to vote ‘no’ to independence) and only 33 per cent favoured Scotland not being an EU member. English Euroscepticism may be as much of a challenge to the UK’s own union as is Alex Salmond.

Perhaps the most dramatic indicator of the depth of Euroscepticism among much of England’s population (and of how specific these attitudes are to England) comes in responses to a FoEs question about the relative influence of different levels of government. Respondents were asked which of three levels of government – local government, the UK government or the EU – they think ‘has most influence over the way England is run’. Almost one in three (see figure 2.3) nominated the EU – and of that group, fully 81 per cent indicated that they would support UK withdrawal in an EU referendum.

Such perceptions of (harmful) European influence in England contrast significantly with those in all other places where similar questions have been asked. In 2009, the current research team undertook comparative research in 15 European regions and minority nations (not including England). It found that the three regions other than England with the highest proportions identifying the EU level as having the most influence were Brittany, Upper Austria and Galicia. In each case, only 9 per cent of respondents believed that the EU had most influence in their respective regions – in England, this figure was 31 per cent (Wyn Jones et al 2012: 16). England appears truly to be an outlier in its attitudes to Europe.

Figure 2.3
English perceptions of government influence, 2012 (%)



Source: Future of England survey 2012; N = 3,599

Question: Which of the following do you think currently has the most influence over the way England is run?

7 See www.panelbase.com/news/TheSundayTimesScottishPollTables190513.pdf

As we have already discussed, Englishness as a national identity has both strengthened over the last decade and become increasingly politicised. Yet conventional wisdom would set this tide against that of Euroscepticism, which has historically been strongly associated with the symbolism and rhetoric of Britishness. Traditionally it is the Union flag rather than the cross of St George that is waved by members of Ukip, the UK Independence party, which has grown dramatically in prominence as the standard-bearer of Euroscepticism in the UK.

Yet our data shows a strong, consistent and unambiguous link between Euroscepticism and English, rather than British, national identity. For example, when asked whether or not UK membership of the EU is a good or bad thing, negative views are much more prevalent towards the more English end of the identity spectrum (per the Moreno view of national identity – see figure 1.3). Conversely – and again counter to received wisdom – attitudes to European integration are notably more positive among those with a more British identity (see table 2.1). It is British identifiers who are the Europhile group in England.

Table 2.1
Perceptions of UK's membership of the EU by Moreno national identity, England, 2012 (%)

	All	English not British	More English than British	Equally English and British	More British than English	British not English
Good thing	28	14	24	29	39	45
Bad thing	43	64	53	40	31	28
Neither	21	17	18	24	26	20
Don't know	8	5	5	8	4	7
N	3,600	545	734	1,405	371	234

Source: Future of England survey 2012

The association between English identity and Euroscepticism (and conversely between British identity and more positive attitudes to the EU) can be further illustrated by the relationship between national identity and voting intentions in an EU referendum (table 2.2). Support for leaving the EU is much higher at the English end of the identity spectrum; a plurality of those with a mainly or exclusively British identity support continuing membership.

Table 2.2
Voting intention in an EU referendum by Moreno National Identity, England, 2012 (%)

	All	English not British	More English than British	Equally English and British	More British than English	British not English
Remain	33	17	28	33	45	49
Leave	50	72	58	48	37	35
Wouldn't vote	5	3	3	6	5	3
Don't know	12	8	10	13	13	13
N	3,600	545	734	1,405	371	234

Source: Future of England survey 2012

In a similar vein, table 2.3 demonstrates that exclusively English identifiers are far more likely than others to perceive Europe as having greatest influence over how England is run. Once again, it is the English rather than the British who are most likely to perceive (and object to) high levels of European influence.

Table 2.3
Perceptions of government influence by Moreno national identity, England, 2012 (%)

	All	English not British	More English than British	Equally English and British	More British than English	British not English
Local authority	3	3	3	2	3	4
UK government	55	37	55	59	68	60
European Union	31	50	35	29	22	25
Other	2	2	2	1	2	4
Don't Know	8	7	5	9	6	7
N	3,599	543	734	1,405	371	234

Source: Future of England survey 2012

2.2 Devo-anxiety

Having established Euroscepticism in England as something associated with English – and not British – identity, we now turn to explore the relationship of Euroscepticism to what we might term ‘devo-anxiety’ among the English. Tables 2.4–2.6 report the relationship between responses on key questions tapping into both phenomena.

As the tables show, in each case, those who adopt the Eurosceptic position (regarding EU membership as a bad thing; indicating they would vote for UK withdrawal from the EU; and regarding the EU as having most influence over the way England is run) are also notably more dissatisfied with the constitutional status quo in the UK.

Even in the context of questions that reveal substantial discontent across the population as a whole – those concerning Scottish MPs voting on English laws and the absence of a clear relationship between tax and spending in Scotland – Eurosceptics are clearly those most likely to harbour such discontent. And they do so extraordinarily emphatically: at levels approaching unanimity of response which are very rarely seen in social surveys.

Table 2.4
Devo-anxiety by attitudes to EU membership, England, 2012 (% agree)

	All	Attitude to EU membership		
		Good thing	Bad thing	Neither
Scotland gets more than its fair share of spending	52	48	62	46
Scottish parliament should pay for services from its own taxes (strongly agree)*	81 (49)	75 (34)	91 (66)	80 (46)
Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote on English laws (strongly agree)*	81 (55)	76 (44)	91 (70)	82 (51)
The UK government can't be trusted to work in English interest	62	57	71	59

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Note: Base N for all questions is 3,600 unless noted with * where N is 1,826.

Table 2.5
Devo-anxiety by EU referendum voting intention, England, 2012 (% agree)

	All	Voting intention in an EU referendum		
		Remain	Leave	Wouldn't vote
Scotland gets more than its fair share of spending	52	47	62	34
Scottish parliament should pay for services from its own taxes (strongly agree)*	81 (49)	76 (37)	92 (64)	75 (37)
Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote on English laws (strongly agree)*	(55)	67 (30)	77 (47)	54 (23)
The UK government can't be trusted to work in English interest	62	55	69	61

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Note: Base N for all questions is 3,600 unless noted with * where N is 1,826.

Table 2.6
Devo-anxiety by
perception of
government influence,
England, 2012 (% agree)

	All	Government perceived as most influential			
		Local authority	UK government	EU	Other
Scotland gets more than its fair share of spending	52	61	48	66	42
Scottish parliament should pay for services from its own taxes (strongly agree)*	81 (49)	77 (40)	80 (42)	94 (69)	52 (38)
Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote on English laws (strongly agree)*	81 (55)	80 (51)	80 (49)	93 (74)	80 (42)
The UK government can't be trusted to work in English interest	62	54	55	76	75

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Note: Base N for all questions is 3,600 unless noted with * where N is 1,826.

Attitudes towards England's two unions, therefore, are clearly linked: Euroscepticism and devo-anxiety are two sides of the same coin of English discontent.

Euroscepticism is also clearly associated with a demand for greater recognition for England in the UK's own constitutional arrangements. Eurosceptics are strong advocates of a clearer institutional demarcation of their country within the UK. This is demonstrated in tables 2.7–2.9, which display the relationship between constitutional preferences regarding England and attitudes towards Europe. In each case it is only the least Eurosceptic respondents who offer plurality support for the current constitutional position. By stark contrast, for more Eurosceptic respondents the status quo is the *fourth* most popular option, trailing behind English votes on English laws, an English parliament and an independent England outside the EU.

Table 2.7
Constitutional
preferences by attitudes
to EU membership,
England, 2012 (% agree)

	All	Attitude to EU membership		
		Good thing	Bad thing	Neither
England should be governed as it is now with laws made by all MPs in the UK parliament	22	40	14	18
England should be governed with laws made solely by English MPs in the UK parliament*	33	29	38	34
England should have its own new English parliament with law-making powers	18	15	22	17
England should be an independent state inside the EU	7	9	3	11
England should be an independent state outside the EU	8	0	17	4
Don't know	12	7	6	15
N	1,774	499	769	386

Source: Future of England survey 2012

* 'English votes on English laws'

Table 2.8
Constitutional preferences by EU referendum voting intention, England, 2012 (% agree)

	All	Voting intention in an EU referendum		
		Remain	Leave	Wouldn't vote
England should be governed as it is now with laws made by all MPs in the UK parliament	22	38	14	11
England should be governed with laws made solely by English MPs in the UK parliament*	33	30	38	25
England should have its own new English parliament with law-making powers	18	15	23	14
England should be an independent state inside the EU	7	11	4	8
England should be an independent state outside the EU	8	0	16	6
Don't know	12	6	6	35
<i>N</i>	1,774	577	900	78

Source: Future of England survey 2012
* 'English votes on English laws'

Table 2.9
Constitutional preferences by perception of government influence, England, 2012 (% agree)

	All	Government perceived as most influential			
		Local authority	UK government	European Union	Other
England should be governed as it is now with laws made by all MPs in the UK parliament	22	30	29	13	23
England should be governed with laws made solely by English MPs in the UK parliament*	33	27	33	37	33
England should have its own new English parliament with law-making powers	18	21	17	22	4
England should be an independent state inside the EU	7	10	7	5	8
England should be an independent state outside the EU	8	6	4	16	10
Don't know	12	5	10	7	22
<i>N</i>	1,774	56	982	555	44

Source: Future of England survey 2012
* 'English votes on English laws'

In short, although political commentary – especially around the rise to prominence of Ukip – tends to portray *Britishness* as being in tension with European integration, our findings show clearly that it is those with the strongest and most exclusively British sense of national identity who are most *supportive* of the EU. Euroscepticism is concentrated most heavily among those with a more English sense of national identity. It is English, rather than British, hackles that rise in response to Europe, just as it is those who identify more strongly as English who feel most aggrieved by the perceived iniquities of devolution and wish to give England some explicit recognition within the UK.

2.3 Interpreting this picture of Englishness

How should we interpret these findings? It would be easy to resort to ‘little Englander’ stereotypes, to construct a narrative that charges the population of England with a hostility to ‘the other’ – ‘Europeans’, Scots, foreigners in general – that borders on xenophobia. But to dismiss, patronise or demonise the attitudes traced in this report would be counterproductive. It is important to try to *understand* how English identity has come to be politicised and associated with such powerful sentiments of Euroscepticism, devo-anxiety and demand for some form of English self-government. At least three potential explanations – none of them necessarily mutually exclusive – suggest themselves.

The first concerns **material interests**. One possible explanation for the attitudes identified here is simply that many people in England increasingly perceive both of their unions as detrimental to their material interests. If this is so then we would expect Euroscepticism and devo-anxiety to be related to the extent to which people believe that Scotland benefits more than England from the Union, and that the EU benefits more than England from UK membership. In short, the politicisation of English identity may largely be about (shifting) perceptions of material self-interest: ‘it’s the economy, stupid!’

A second interpretation would focus on **traditional understandings of the nature of the UK state** in England. While Scottish scholars saw the pre-devolution UK as a ‘union state’, in which significant vestiges of pre-union distinctiveness could persist, mainstream English opinion viewed such differences as inconsequential or archaic (or knew nothing of them). Marriage arrangements at Gretna Green were almost the only instance where this kind of national difference entered the popular consciousness. The prevailing view in England was of Britain/the UK as one and indivisible, with undiluted sovereignty held by the Crown-in-Parliament. Similar intellectual contortions proposed that parliamentary sovereignty might also survive European integration. Yet the developing realities of devolution and European integration have rendered such understandings increasingly untenable. The politicisation of English identity may, against this background, be a response to the way in which multi-level government within and beyond the UK state offends deeply rooted English assumptions about the nature of legitimate authority.

Thirdly, we may be observing a **legitimacy crisis** among the political institutions that govern England. The power and prestige of Westminster and Whitehall has been challenged by the collapse of Britain’s status as a global power, by European integration, by devolution, and by recent episodes of sleaze and scandal. Moreover, these institutions are seemingly unable to address the bulk of its citizenry by their chosen, collective name: ‘England’. Perhaps a substantial proportion of the English feel both poorly served by and disenfranchised from their apparently tarnished and diminished traditional political institutions, and in the absence of clear alternatives have withdrawn their ‘diffuse support’ for them.

Our intention is to explore these (and other) possible explanations in subsequent reports. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the interest and importance of understanding *how and why* English identity has become politicised, we contend that this politicisation must now be considered a centrally important political and social fact in its own right.

3. CAN ENGLISHNESS BE INCLUSIVE?

This chapter explores the implications of the emergence of England as a distinct political community in the context of an English society that is multicultural. In *The dog that finally barked* we noted a ‘significant ethnicity gap’ in the national identities claimed by white and by black and minority ethnic (BME) respondents – BME respondents identified themselves as less English and more British than white respondents – but these findings had to be regarded as provisional given the small number (fewer than 100) of BME respondents in our 2011 survey.


To explore this and other issues in greater depth and with greater statistical power we added a booster sample of 500 BME respondents to the 151 BME respondents in the core FoEs 2012 sample, for a total BME sample of 651. Of that, the largest group – just over half (336) – was of South Asian ethnicity, mainly Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. The only other ethnicity of significant size in the sample was ‘black’ (163). Perhaps surprisingly, given the diversity of the BME category, we did not see major variations among different BME ethnicities in any of the key questions we examine here. In what follows, therefore, we report responses from a single BME group, comparing them directly with white English respondents.

3.1 Identity

Given an open choice from a list of identities, BME respondents were slightly more likely than white respondents to choose a British identity. However, BME respondents were much less likely to claim English identity: this was chosen by only a quarter of them, but over three-fifths (62 per cent) of white respondents.

When forced to choose a single identity, our white respondents marginally favoured British over English identity; by contrast, a majority of BME respondents chose a British identity, while fewer than a quarter selected English. This contrasts with patterns observed in Scotland and Wales, where BME survey respondents have often preferred the ‘local’ national identity over the British one.


Figure 3.1
‘Forced choice’ national identity by ethnicity, England, 2012 (%)



Source: Future of England survey 2012

We get similar results using the Moreno national identity scale, which allows for gradations of English and British identity. Although the 'equally English and British' category is the plurality choice for white respondents, the remainder of the sample lean heavily towards the English end of the scale. The opposite is true for BME respondents: barely more than one in 10 choose an exclusively or mainly English identity (12 per cent combined), and 'British not English' is actually the plurality choice (27 per cent).

Figure 3.2
Moreno national identities by ethnicity, England, 2012 (%)



Source: Future of England survey 2012

Similar findings emerge in response to questions on aspects of national pride. Most BME respondents claim to be proud to be both British and English, and proud of the Union and St George's flags. However, they show lower levels of pride generally than white respondents, and particularly in relation to the specifically English variations. BME respondents are also notably less likely than white respondents to support St George's Day as a public holiday, and they are very substantially less likely to indicate that they would favour an English designation on their passport.

Table 3.1
British and English national pride by ethnicity, England, 2012 (%)

	Proud to be...		Proud of...		Preferred nationality on passport		Agree with...
	British	English	Union Jack	St George's flag	British	English	St George's Day as national holiday
White	83	80	78	63	50	41	67
BME	77	62	64	40	72	14	47


Source: Future of England survey 2012

Note: Base N for all questions is 3,401 for the white category and 652 for the BME category.

Questions: How proud are you of being British/English? When you see this flag, how do you feel? Union Jack/St George's; St George's Day should be a public holiday? If you were allowed to choose the nationality that appears on your passport, which of these descriptions would you choose?

This lower level of pride in and support for national symbols generally, and the lower level of endorsement for English as opposed to British national symbols, clarifies the difference between our white and BME samples. However, this does not mean that BME respondents do not have a strong sense of attachment to England as a place: they do, and at a level not much different to that of white respondents. But in terms of *identity*, England's BME population tends to align itself to the broader, and perhaps rather looser, notion of Britishness rather than to Englishness more narrowly.

Figure 3.3
Attachment to place by ethnicity, England, 2012 (% 'very' or 'fairly' closely attached to...)



Source: Future of England survey 2012
Question: How closely attached do you feel to these different parts of the world?

One possible reason for these differences is that England's BME population continues to associate Englishness with a hostility towards immigration. Table 3.2 shows that those who identify as exclusively English are considerably more likely to believe that 'government gives too much help to immigrants' – 71 per cent of this group agree strongly with the statement, compared to 54 per cent and 48 per cent of those who are 'more English than British' and 'equally English than British' respondents, respectively.

Table 3.2
Attitudes towards immigration by Moreno national identity, England, 2012 (%)

	English not British	More English than British	Equally English and British	More British than English	British not English
Agree strongly	71	54	48	35	33
Tend to agree	19	28	29	27	28
Tend to disagree	4	10	13	20	20
Disagree strongly	0	2	3	10	12
Don't know	6	6	7	9	8
N	545	734	1,405	371	234

Source: Future of England survey 2012
Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please tick one option per row)...
Government gives too much help to immigrants

3.2 Devo-anxiety and Euroscepticism


To what extent are these differences also reflected in political attitudes? Chapter 2 suggested that an English political community has emerged that is discontented with various aspects of the status quo: with European integration, with Scottish devolution, and with the capacity of the British political system to respond to English concerns. If our BME sample is less 'English' than our white sample, does it also follow that they are more content with their lot? The answer is a qualified yes.

Figure 3.4 shows responses sorted by ethnicity to the block of questions used earlier to illustrate 'devo-anxiety' in England (see section 2.2). BME respondents are clearly less concerned than their white counterparts about the perceived advantages that Scotland

enjoys as a result of devolution, and the relative disadvantages supposedly facing England. They are substantially less likely to agree with the proposition that Scotland gets more than its fair share of public spending, and more likely to believe that the UK government can be relied upon to act in the English interest.

Nevertheless, the biggest group among BME respondents endorses both propositions. And while the majorities among BME voters agreeing that Scottish MPs should not vote on English laws and that the Scottish parliament should finance its spending through its own taxes are smaller and less vociferous than with white voters (note the big difference in the proportions that ‘agree strongly’), these are nonetheless clear and decisive majorities. These figures do not reveal BME endorsement of the status quo, but rather less – though still significant – dissatisfaction with that status quo.

Figure 3.4
Devo-anxiety by
ethnicity, England, 2012
(% agree)



Source: Future of England survey 2012

Note: Base N for all questions is 3,401 for the white category and 652 for the BME category unless noted with * where N is 1,685 for the white category (no change for the BME category).

Much of the difference between the two samples in responses to these questions is accounted for by the consistently higher proportion of BME respondents choosing the ‘don't know’ option (by some 14–16 percentage points for each question). This suggests a BME population that is generally less engaged with and concerned about the question of England's place within the UK.⁸ But to the extent they are concerned, their views are similar to those of the white majority, though less strongly felt.

⁸ However, there are no significant differences in levels of general political interest between white and BME respondents: two-thirds of both white and BME respondents claimed to be ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ interested in politics.

However, findings differ with regards to England's other union, the EU (see table 3.3). More BME respondents think the UK's membership of the EU is a 'good thing' rather than a 'bad thing'; among white respondents the opposite is true. In the event of any referendum, BME respondents show a slim preference for continued EU membership, whereas among white respondents there is clear support for withdrawal. Perceptions of the relative influence of the EU are also notably different, with white respondents more than twice as likely as BME respondents to identify the EU as having the greatest influence over the way England is run. (It is also worth pointing out, however, in the context of a generally more positive attitude towards the European Union, that BME respondents are again more likely than their white counterparts to choose the 'don't know' option.)

These findings do not demonstrate enthusiastic BME endorsement of the EU – on the contrary, there is substantial discontentment in evidence. But these are the kinds of doubts about Europe we find in Scotland or Wales, rather than the especially high (white) English levels of suspicion and hostility.

Table 3.3
Attitudes towards the
EU by ethnicity, England,
2012 (%)

	White	BME
Attitude to EU membership		
Good thing	28	34
Bad thing	45	27
Neither	20	22
Don't know	7	17
Voting intention in an EU referendum		
Remain	32	37
Leave	51	34
Wouldn't vote	4	10
Don't know	12	19
Government perceived as most influential		
Local authorities	3	6
UK government	55	61
European Union	32	14
Other	2	2
Don't know	7	16

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Note: Base N for all questions is 3,401 for the white category and 652 for the BME category.


The overall pattern we find is of a BME group which is discontented with current devolution arrangements and limited in its enthusiasm for the EU, but which is significantly less discontented with both than are white respondents.

Given that BME respondents do not express the same level of concern about England's 'others' in Scotland and the EU, one might expect them to show less concern over the capacity of current governing arrangements to secure English interests. This is indeed the case.

Our survey examined constitutional attitudes in a number of ways. One was to ask about the relative importance of different constitutional issues. The UK's relationship with the EU was the most popular choice for BME respondents, as for whites, but notably fewer BME respondents chose this as a priority (see figure 3.5).

Governing arrangements for England were a strong second among white respondents, but selected as a priority issue by only half as many BME respondents, and were only the fifth most commonly selected issue (also behind strengthening local government, proportional representation and House of Lords reform).

Figure 3.5
Priorities for 'urgent action or change', England, 2012 (%)




Source: Future of England survey 2012

Question: Which three, if any, of the following areas do you think require urgent action or change at this time? (Please select up to three options)

White and BME respondents also differed interestingly on potential options for governing England (figures 3.6 and 3.7). Responding to the options on offer in the first question, the plurality BME response was 'don't know', again suggesting lower levels of knowledge of, or interest in, questions of political structure among this group. Only just over a third of BME respondents supported either of the two main 'English options' (English votes on English laws at Westminster or an English parliament), compared to a clear majority of white respondents, with BME respondents particularly reluctant to endorse an English parliament. BME respondents were also a little more likely to support the status quo. That said, even among BME voters there is more support for English votes on English laws than for the status quo.

Figure 3.6
 Preferences for the
 governance of England
 by ethnicity, England,
 2012 (%)




Source: Future of England survey 2012

Question: With all the changes going on in the way different parts of the United Kingdom are run, which of the following do you think would be best for England?

When the constitutional options for England are presented differently, we find a narrow plurality of BME respondents favouring the status quo over English votes on English laws. By contrast, a clear plurality of white respondents favoured the latter option. And BME respondents are again much more likely than whites to choose the 'don't know' option.

Figure 3.7
 Constitutional
 preferences by ethnicity,
 England, 2012 (%)



Source: Future of England survey 2012

Question: Thinking about how England should be governed, which one of the following statements comes closest to your view?

3.3 Englishness and Britishness among the UK's BME population

In *The dog that finally barked* we cautioned that England's emergence as a political community raised potentially far-reaching and challenging questions about inclusion of a BME population that appeared not to share the stronger sense of English identity that we identified among the population at large. But this cautionary note was sounded in the context of a very small number of ethnic minority respondents in our 2011 survey; by including an ethnic minority booster in 2012 we have been able to explore this issue in much greater depth.

The result has confirmed our findings regarding national identity. BME respondents identify as British rather than English to a far greater extent than their white counterparts. In terms of constitutional attitudes, however, differences between BME and white respondents are more limited. BME respondents are less dissatisfied with current arrangements than whites, but the differences lie generally in degrees of discontentment rather than between contentment and discontentment. Similarly with attitudes towards the EU: BME respondents in England are less discontented than their white compatriots, but they are hardly a wellspring of Europhilia.

In other words, England's BME population broadly shares many of the same concerns as the majority white English population, if less vehemently. It could well be that a shared sense of discontentment is what binds England's multicultural society together.

4. CONCLUSION: THE PARTISAN POLITICS OF ENGLISHNESS

This paper has both confirmed and extended the arguments made in *The dog that finally barked*. England is emerging as a distinct political community – a community characterised by an increasingly politicised sense of English national identity and by significant discontent with England’s place within the post-devolution UK. Our 2012 survey has demonstrated that this discontentment persists and has shown that it is closely linked with hostility towards England’s other union, the EU. Among the English, devo-anxiety and Euroscepticism are two sides of the same coin.

In this concluding section, we shall explore the extent to which the emerging English political community has a party-political dimension. How is support for the different political parties associated with the concerns and priorities that we have identified? The substantial sample size of our 2012 survey helps us here: we have large samples of Conservative (931) and Labour (1197) supporters.⁹ The samples of Ukip (312) and Liberal Democrat (262) supporters provide a less statistically robust basis for analysis – nonetheless, some of the differences we identify in this chapter are so substantial that it is unlikely they reflect nothing more than sampling error.

Given the substantial discontentment in England with the territorial status quo, it is unsurprising that these sentiments are observable among supporters of all political parties. But there are also important differences between supporters of the different parties. In general, we find Liberal Democrats at one end of the spectrum and Ukip supporters at the other. The former are the most British in terms of national identity and (ironically, given their party’s long history of campaigning for constitutional reform) the most content with the constitutional status quo both within the UK and vis-à-vis the EU.

Equally ironically, given their party’s Union Jack-bedecked symbolism and British rhetoric, Ukip supporters are by far the most English in terms of national identity and are by far the most strongly discontented with both of England’s unions, favouring major constitutional change both domestically and in the UK’s relationship with the EU. Conservative supporters share much common ground with Ukip and count, likewise, as constitutional radicals. Labour supporters are on average the most evenly spread in terms of identity and constitutional views (or, to put it less charitably, are the most divided).

We can illustrate these differences through responses to the questions examined earlier on national identity and attitudes both to the internal constitutional arrangements of the UK and towards the EU.

4.1 Identity

The first point to note is that party support in England is clearly associated with national identity (see table 4.1). It is only Liberal Democrat voters in England who are more likely to prioritise their British identity (and even among this group it is only very marginally the case). By contrast, Labour voters place more emphasis on their Englishness than on their Britishness: while a plurality say they are equally English and British, far more of their supporters can be found at the more exclusively English end of the scale (31 per cent) than at the more exclusively British end (19 per cent). However, the strength of English sentiment is most striking among Ukip and Conservative supporters. Fully 55 per cent of Ukip supporters, alongside 43 per cent of Conservatives, favoured the two ‘more English’ options. While the majority of supporters of all parties choose some form of overlapping Anglo-British identity, for Tories and Ukip supporters the English end of the spectrum is clearly favoured.

⁹ For of this report, respondents are defined as ‘supporters’ based on their general election voting intention.

Table 4.1
Moreno national identity
by party support,
England, 2012 (%)

	All	Liberal Democrat	Labour	Conservative	Ukip
English not British	15	7	13	17	27
More English than British	20	18	18	26	28
Equally English and British	39	40	40	40	32
More British than English	10	16	13	8	6
British not English	7	10	6	6	3
Other	6	7	7	3	4
Don't know	3	3	3	1	1
<i>N</i>	3,600	262	1,197	931	312

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Questions on national pride and national symbols reveal a similar picture (see table 4.2). Clear majorities of respondents from all four parties were proud of being both British and English. The Union flag prompts more enthusiasm among supporters of all parties than St George's flag (the difference among Liberal Democrat supporters in their perceptions of the two flags is particularly pronounced), while Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters were notably less fired by flags in general. There was a significant difference between party supporters in their attitudes towards making St George's Day a national holiday, with Ukip supporters the most enthusiastic and Liberal Democrats the least, although there was majority support for such a move among all respondents.

Intriguingly, a substantial majority of Ukip supporters would choose English rather than British as their passport nationality. This is in stark contrast to the position among Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters (although even here, around a third would choose English as their passport nationality.) Conservative supporters were much more evenly divided with a narrow plurality favouring the British designation. Once again, the overall picture is that while supporters of all parties consider themselves both British and English, Englishness weighs more heavily among Conservatives and, in particular, Ukip supporters.

Table 4.2
British and English
national pride by party
support, England,
2012 (%)

	Proud to be...		Proud of...		Preferred nationality on passport		Agree with...
	British	English	Union Jack	St George's flag	British	English	St George's Day as national holiday
Ukip	75	85	82	75	35	59	81
Conservative	89	92	90	74	49	47	77
Labour	83	80	72	57	55	35	73
Lib-Dem	88	78	82	55	55	32	65
All	82	81	78	62	51	40	73

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Note: Base N for all questions is 3600

4.2 Devo-anxiety and Euroscepticism

Turning to our measures of devo-anxiety, we again find some striking differences between party supporters (see table 4.3). Discontent is widely shared, but is felt particularly strongly among Conservative and, especially, Ukip supporters. The strength of feeling here is very striking: 67 per cent of Conservative supporters and 84 per cent of Ukip supporters agree *strongly* with the proposition that Scottish MPs should be denied a vote on laws that affect England only. Only in relation to levels of trust in government working in the English interest does the prevailing pattern of discontent vary: here, Conservatives (but less so

Liberal Democrats) are notably more trusting in the UK government, suggesting that this question is, at least for supporters of the senior partner in the Coalition government, acting as a proxy for partisan support.

Table 4.3
Devo-anxiety by party support, England, 2012 (% agree)

	All	Lib-Dem	Labour	Con.	Ukip
Scotland gets more than its fair share of spending	52	42	53	66	74
Scottish parliament should pay for services from its own taxes (strongly agree)*	81 (49)	80 (38)	79 (42)	89 (63)	93 (72)
Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote on English laws (strongly agree)*	81 (55)	86 (47)	78 (48)	89 (68)	91 (78)
The UK government can't be trusted to work in English interest	62	47	75	38	87

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Note: Base N for all questions is 3,600 unless noted with * where N is 1,826.

While attitudes towards the UK's internal territorial constitution reflect varying levels of discontentment, those towards the EU reveal sharper contrasts between party supporters (see table 4.4). Liberal Democrats tend to view EU membership positively, while Labour supporters are evenly split. By contrast, Conservatives are overwhelmingly Eurosceptic, regarding UK membership as a 'bad thing' by a margin of five-to-two. They are even more likely to vote for UK withdrawal in a referendum.

However, and as might be expected, Tory attitudes look moderate when compared to those of Ukip supporters. Indeed, the proportion of Ukip voters who would vote 'no' to EU membership in a referendum – 91 per cent – is close to unanimity. Equally striking is the finding that fully 69 per cent of Ukip voters believe that the EU has the greatest influence over the way that England is run; among Liberal Democrats, by contrast, the equivalent figure is only 18 per cent. In sum, partisan perceptions of and views about 'Europe' differ starkly.

Table 4.4
Attitudes towards the EU by party support, England, 2012 (%)

	All	Liberal Democrat	Labour	Conservative	Ukip
Attitude to EU membership					
Good thing	28	52	38	21	4
Bad thing	43	20	34	53	86
Neither	21	23	20	22	9
Don't know	8	5	8	3	1
Voting intention in an EU referendum					
Remain	33	60	44	25	5
Leave	50	29	40	62	91
Wouldn't vote / Don't know	17	11	16	13	4
Government perceived as most influential					
Local authorities	3	3	3	4	1
UK government	55	71	63	56	23
European Union	31	18	26	34	69
Other	2	4	2	1	3
Don't know	8	4	6	4	4

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Note: Base N for all questions is 3,600.

4.3 Perspectives on England within the UK

Concerning options for the future governance of England, tables 4.5 and 4.6 report responses to our two constitutional preference questions according to voter intention. Strikingly, the status quo gains plurality support only once: in the case of Labour voters' responses to the second menu of constitutional options. Indeed, it is only among Labour supporters that the status quo fares relatively well at all (although even here support for the various English options collectively far outweighs support for current arrangements).

By contrast, Conservative and Ukip voters are the least enthusiastic about the status quo, the latter in particular. With the one aforementioned Labour exception, 'English votes on English laws' is the plurality option across party supporters whatever the menu of options offered – and again by some margin among prospective Conservative and Ukip supporters. Among Conservatives, support for an English parliament – the more ambitious option – rivals that for the status quo, while among Ukip supporters an English parliament is very much more popular than the status quo. Such is the disdain among Ukip supporters for the current order that even support for English independence (outside the EU, of course) is more popular than the status quo. But in terms of how the Coalition government might respond positively to calls to address the English question, the clear plurality support among Liberal Democrat supporters for 'English votes on English laws' is probably at least as significant.

Table 4.5
Preferences for governance of England by party support, England, 2012 (%)

	All	Liberal Democrat	Labour	Conserv.	Ukip
Status quo	21	27	27	19	14
'English votes for English laws'	36	38	28	46	42
English parliament	20	19	18	21	32
Regional assemblies	8	9	10	5	6
Don't know	16	7	16	10	6
<i>N</i>	1,774	139	597	455	146

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Table 4.6
Constitutional preferences by party support, England, 2012 (%)

	All	Liberal Democrat	Labour	Conserv.	Ukip
Status quo	22	27	29	21	9
'English votes for English Laws'	33	37	27	42	45
English parliament	18	13	15	19	28
England independent inside the EU	7	6	8	6	2
England independent outside the EU	8	8	9	6	16
Don't know	12	9	12	6	0
<i>N</i>	1,774	139	597	455	146

Source: Future of England survey 2012

However, if support for delineating England more clearly within the structure of the UK is common ground among party supporters, there are also important differences. One is the priority accorded to the issue (see table 4.7). For all except Liberal Democrats, who still hanker after electoral reform, the UK's relationship with the EU was the most pressing constitutional issue – emphatically so for Conservatives and Ukip. Beyond that, however, on the right of the political spectrum we find that how England is governed was a strong second choice. This contrasts notably with Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters, for whom England was one of a cluster of issues of roughly equal importance, alongside House of Lords reform and strengthening local government.

Table 4.7
Priorities for 'urgent action or change' by party support, England, 2012 (%)

	All	Liberal Democrat	Labour	Conserv.	Ukip
The UK's relationship with the EU	59	50	51	73	84
How England is governed now that Scotland has a parliament and Wales has an assembly	42	37	34	55	58
A more proportional system for electing MPs at Westminster	29	60	30	20	30
Strengthening local government	27	30	36	22	16
Reforming the House of Lords	26	35	35	20	21
Scotland's future relationship with the UK	25	15	23	33	29
The future of Northern Ireland	5	6	5	6	2
None of these	4	3	5	3	1
Don't know	11	7	10	7	4

Source: Future of England survey 2012

Question: Which three, if any, of the following areas do you think require urgent action or change at this time? (Please select up to three options)

Our findings show that Ukip support reflects English discontentment with the political status quo – and not simply with 'Europe'. The breadth of this discontent, as outlined here, has recently enabled Ukip to overtake the Liberal Democrats in poll ratings and to secure a 'projected national share' of 24.8 per cent of the vote in the May 2013 local elections – elections that also gave the party a meaningful local government presence for the first time in much of England.¹⁰

Yet in the only local elections held outside England in May 2013 – in Ynys Môn, in north-west Wales – Ukip actually saw its vote decline significantly. Similarly, in European parliament and UK general elections since 1999 (when Ukip first emerged as a reasonably significant player) Ukip's performance in Wales and (especially) Scotland has consistently lagged well behind that in England; in the June 2013 Aberdeen Donside Scottish parliament by-election Ukip lost its deposit despite a highly publicised campaign spearheaded by Nigel Farage. It is those who feel most English and most discontented with the territorial status quo who are flocking to the Ukip banner in increasing numbers. Ukip might better be described as England's nationalist party than the UK's independence party.

Further confirmation of this point is found in table 4.8, which reports responses at three different points in time to the question 'Which party best stands up for the interests of England?'

Table 4.8
'Which political party best stands up for the interests of England?' (%)

	June 2011	Nov 2012	April 2013
Ukip	9	18	21
Labour	21	19	19
Conservatives	20	16	17
No party	23	22	16
Liberal Democrats	4	3	6
BNP	4	3	2
Greens	2	2	2
English Democrats	2	2	1
Don't know	15	15	15

Source: YouGov poll for IPPR/FoEs, April 2013

10 For more, see Curtice J (2013) 'Never to be forgotten? The 2013 English local elections', *Juncture*, 20(1): 62–70. <http://www.ippr.org/juncture/171/10970/never-to-be-forgotten-the-2013-english-local-elections>

Two points stand out. The first is how poorly the established parties perform: not once does their combined total represent more than 45 per cent of respondents. Indeed, in both June 2011 and November 2012, the proposition that ‘I do not think that any party stands up for the interests of England’ was the most popular choice.

By April 2013 that had changed, bringing us to the second point: the rise of Ukip as the champion of English interests. Viewed in the light of this finding, the party’s strong performance in the local elections just a few weeks later is unsurprising. ‘England’s nationalist party’ is on a roll. Since June 2011, it has more than doubled its support as the party that best stands up for English interests, and in April 2013 was the top choice among respondents in England. Ukip’s rise in this context will be of particular concern to the Conservatives. Those who reported in FoEs 2012 having voted Conservative at the 2010 UK election are split on which party they believe best stands up for England: while 38 per cent say the Conservatives, almost as many (34 per cent) say Ukip – and this figure has almost doubled from 18 per cent in 2011, hinting at the potential for Conservative electoral support to drift over to Ukip.

Ukip – a party traditionally associated with espousing a 1950s-style British traditionalism – has been reluctant to play the English card, for fear it might muddy their position on Europe and weaken the union. But with its support so heavily concentrated in England and finding itself attractive to voters who are increasingly interested in a decidedly English strain of populism, it seems likely that it will seek to champion the cause of English nationalism more explicitly. Should it do so, it could further strengthen its appeal in England with potentially far-reaching political implications.

4.4 The political implications of Englishness

We argued in *The dog that finally barked* that politics in Westminster’s ‘bubble’ had paid insufficient attention to the strengthening of Englishness. That argument appears stronger still in 2013. Apart from isolated interventions – such as Ed Miliband’s 2012 speech on England¹¹ (which sits rather uneasily with the ‘One Nation’ imagery he has otherwise evoked) – there are few signs that mainstream politics has woken up to the emergence of an English political community defined by a distinct English identity, its devo-anxiety and Euroscepticism, and its support for English political institutions.

There are various reasons for this. Much of the political class remain in denial, failing to acknowledge the trends identified in this report, or refusing to admit their salience. Others prioritise Scotland, fearing that engagement with the ‘English question’ may in some way strengthen the hand of Alex Salmond ahead of the Scottish independence referendum. It would seem a little odd, though, if advocates of union refused to talk about its largest constituent part at a point when in Scotland the very terms of union are being challenged. Where is the *English* perspective – which is not the same as the Westminster perspective – on what the UK union is and should be?

Another factor is a sense of trepidation about what contemporary Englishness stands for. For some, Englishness seems to be regarded as a dark and chauvinistic force, best kept under wraps. The evident association of English discontentment with the right-wing populism of Ukip may well reinforce that concern. In particular, progressives may be reluctant to engage with the emerging English agenda for fear of legitimising what they see as the grievances of ‘little Englanders’.

11 Miliband E (2012) ‘Defending the Union in England’, speech, Royal Festival Hall, London, 7 June 2012. <http://www.labour.org.uk/ed-miliband-speech-defending-the-union-in-england>

This, we believe, would be a serious error. The issue is not going to go away. This is not merely because of the public attitudes identified in this report – although they constitute sufficient cause in their own right – but also because the continuing processes of renegotiation of the terms of union in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales will ensure that England, by default, becomes ever more clearly delineated as a distinct political arena. Any decision to ignore English discontentment for fear of guilt by association with right-wing populism is only likely to further feed such discontentment – and perhaps encourage it to develop more toxic undertones, if the perception grows that the political class is simply ignoring issues of real concern to people.

The challenge is for the major parties to take England seriously, and this appears easier for the Conservatives than Labour. Conservative supporters in England identify more strongly as English than Labour supporters, and are more anxious about devolution, more Eurosceptical, and stronger advocates of English political institutions. There is an obvious strategy of tacking more overtly towards these positions, not least to ward off the inroads Ukip is making in this section of the electorate. The Tories' Byzantine manoeuvres on the question of an EU referendum around the 2013 Queen's speech are an obvious, if clumsy, example of this strategy in action.

There is a bigger challenge for Labour. Some may review the data here and conclude that Englishness is natural territory for the right and should not be a ground on which Labour competes – especially if a 'more English' Labour might undermine the party's standing in Scotland and Wales. Yet the importance of Labour's strength outside England is easily overstated. Labour has never won a stable and enduring parliamentary majority without winning a majority of seats in England – Labour needs to win in England to win UK elections.

So there is no alternative but for Labour to contest the changing England described in this report. It needs to find a distinct, progressive platform from which to secure and develop its strength in England – or risk leaving 'Englishness' to become ever-more-closely associated with the political right. It needs to recognise that its supporters also – if currently less emphatically than Conservative and Ukip supporters – have a strong sense of English identity, embrace English national symbols, and share concerns about devolution and Europe.

Labour has the patriotic traditions on which to build this platform. From the Levellers to Orwell and Tawney, there are serious intellectual roots to the English radicalism on which significant strands of the Labour tradition draw. There is no reason to believe that recognising England as a political community and giving it a voice must be inevitably linked to the more inward-looking and defensive agendas pursued on the political right.

And there are now serious options for institutionalising England's political community within the UK political system. The recently published report of the McKay Commission is particularly helpful here.¹² This is not only – or even mainly – because of the specific proposals put forward by the Commission (principally a limited, non-binding form of 'English votes on English laws'). Even more significant, perhaps, is the way the report seeks to reframe the so-called 'West Lothian question'. For McKay, the point is not simply to assuage English resentment about Scotland's perceived advantages, but rather to *encourage the political class to speak positively both to and about England*.

12 McKay Commission (2013) *Report of the Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons*, London. <http://tmc.independent.gov.uk/report-of-the-commission-on-the-consequences-of-devolution-for-the-house-of-commons/>

Doing so, of course, represents a serious challenge for the political parties that contest elections in England and for a political system that has thus far failed to provide a distinctive platform for England's concerns and growing discontents. But the English discontentment with the status quo that is revealed in this report is so substantial that political leaders cannot afford to avoid the issue any longer.

APPENDIX

THE FUTURE OF ENGLAND SURVEY 2012

The survey was conducted between 23–28 November 2012. Survey fieldwork was conducted by YouGov, whose assistance throughout the project we gratefully acknowledge. The main sample had 3,600 respondents. Of these, 151 were classified as BME respondents. Our BME booster sample, as described in chapter 3 above, enabled us to have a BME sample of 651 respondents. All data used in the analysis was weighted for representativeness of the registered adult electorate, using YouGov's standard weighting factors which adjust for a range of demographic and attitudinal factors, including age, gender, region, social class, newspaper readership and past vote.

Much of the content of the 2012 Future of England survey questionnaire parallels the 2011 Future of England survey. The main innovation has been a battery of questions exploring the European dimension. To accommodate these, a number of Wales- and Northern Ireland-focused questions included in 2011 were dropped; however, questions about attitudes to, and comparisons with, Scotland were retained. We took this decision in part because Scotland is a central focus of media and public attention as we approach the independence referendum in September 2014. But the 2011 survey also suggested that English voters' concerns about devolution were directed primarily at Scotland.

While these factors justify a fuller focus on Scotland, we note that there has also been significant media commentary about Wales' preferential treatment compared to England on issues like free prescriptions or higher education, and that there was some evidence of concern about the perceived favourable treatment of Wales in our 2011 survey. Simply because our 2012 survey focuses overwhelmingly on Scotland, it should not be assumed that resentment is directed *only* at Scotland. As is shown in our analysis, people in England tend to think in English terms and to perceive *England* (not England, Wales and Northern Ireland, or England and Wales) as the aggrieved party.

We have also used the flexibility and cost-effectiveness of internet-based surveys to experiment with some new question wordings. Those seeking to understand changing constitutional attitudes in England not only have to deal with a relative paucity of survey evidence but also a problematic tendency to stick rigidly to past question wordings, even when these include options no longer relevant to the contemporary debate or fail to include currently live options. Our approach has been both to use past questions (even where they are now problematic) to facilitate tracing change over time and to introduce newer – and in some places we hope better – question wordings.

As with the 2011 Future of England survey, the 2012 survey was largely funded by the Universities of Cardiff and Edinburgh, to whom we are grateful

As in *The dog that finally barked*, in this report we sometimes present FoEs findings alongside those from other sources, notably the British Social Attitudes survey (BSA), even when modes of data collection differ. This may offend purists still waging what, in our view, are outdated 'mode wars'. But we believe this is particularly appropriate when discussing a topic where the evidence is scant and all relevant sources should be mobilised. We trust to readers' good sense to observe where methodological caution is necessary.