



# Development on the Move: Measuring and Optimising Migration's Economic and Social Impacts

## A Study of Migration's Impacts on Development in Jamaica and how Policy Might Respond

by Elizabeth Thomas-Hope, Claremont Kirton, Pauline Knight, Natasha Mortley and Mikhail-Ann Urquhart, with Claudel Noel, Hilary Robertson-Hickling and Easton Williams

June 2009

© ippr and GDN 2009

## Foreword

This report is the first major output from the project 'Development on the Move: Measuring and Optimising Migration's Economic and Social Impacts'. Development on the Move is a joint project of the Global Development Network (GDN), an international organisation headquartered in Delhi, India and dedicated to promoting development research; and the Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr), one of the UK's leading think tanks.

Development on the Move is a ground-breaking global research project gathering new qualitative and quantitative data about migration's development impacts. The project aims to comprehensively assess how migration affects development in a number of different countries around the world, and how policy can maximise migration's development benefits and minimise its costs.

We believe the project is unique in terms of scope, depth and focus. We are conducting comparable research in seven countries, each on a different continent, speaking to hundreds of thousands of people and gathering in-depth data from more than 10,000 households. We are looking at a wide range of migration's development impacts, thus taking a multi-issue approach, thinking about how migration *as a whole* affects development *as a whole*. And the project is uniquely policy focused, with policymaker inputs at various stages of the research and fresh, workable policy ideas one of the key project goals.

The range of outputs the project is producing is diverse, including workshops, a working paper series, a short film, a number of comparative reports, a publicly available household dataset, and a set of in-depth country studies. The outputs already available (such as the first four working papers), can be found on our websites. This report, a country study focusing on Jamaica, is the first major publication from the project.

The Jamaica research was our 'pilot' phase of the project, and as such differs in some ways from the forthcoming country studies. The household survey which forms the foundation of much of the new analysis was smaller in Jamaica than in the other countries (involving 486 households, versus 1200+) and was based on a slightly different questionnaire. The focus of the analysis in this case is also more descriptive than future studies will be, which will try to tackle the question of the 'counterfactual' – what would have happened in the absence of migration – more comprehensively. However, in most ways the research is very similar – it addresses the same research questions, using the same research inputs, and producing the same kind of output – a comprehensive country report – as all the forthcoming studies.

Jamaica was a particularly interesting case for our pilot analysis because of the region's long history of migration, as well as its continued prevalence today. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, for example, has estimated that Jamaica is one of the countries most affected by brain drain anywhere in the world. However, despite the long history of migration and the many insightful studies that have been conducted into different aspects of it, the extent to which migration – in all its forms – is occurring in Jamaica today, and what its various developmental impacts are, are still not clear. This suggests that our report addresses an important knowledge gap.

It is worth noting, too, that Jamaica's developmental circumstances make it a particularly interesting country in which to undertake our pilot analysis. The stakeholder workshop held in the capital Kingston to launch the research made clear, for example, the importance of addressing security issues in order to strengthen Jamaican development; Jamaica's murder rate at more than 1000 murders per year is of a level that could classify the country as experiencing a war or high-intensity conflict, making the issue a major policy priority. It is imperative, then, that our report takes into account Jamaica's unique developmental circumstances, touching on issues of crime and security, and how migration affects them. This is helped by the fact that all our in-depth country reports are authored by research teams primarily composed of researchers living and working in the country of study. This ensures that our research is shaped by and

references the local context, helping to make the analysis and resulting policy recommendations as relevant as possible.

The project management team are grateful to the paper authors for their important work on this project, as well as the team from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica who did an excellent job in carrying out the household survey upon which a substantial part of the analysis is based. The project would also not have been possible without the generous support provided by an international group of donors, comprising the Australian Agency for International Development, the Austrian Ministry of Finance, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the UK Department for International Development. However, the views in this paper do not necessarily represent those of any of the project funders.

Please contact ippr and GDN with any questions or comments you have on reading this report. Development on the Move is a collaborative endeavour between partners from all over the world hoping to learn from one another while adding to the global stock of knowledge. We would be delighted to further broaden that dialogue.

**Ramona Angelescu, Laura Chappell, George Mavrotas, Loic Sanchez, Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah**

Project Management Team

## Contents

About GDN	4
About ippr	4
About the authors	5
Acknowledgements	6
Executive summary	7
1. Introduction	10
2. Patterns of Jamaican migration	15
3. Consequences of Jamaican migration	32
4. Migration's development impacts	48
5. Policy	51
6. Concluding summary	59
References	60
Appendix 1: Institutions from which stakeholders were drawn	64
Appendix 2: Household survey summary	65

## About GDN

GDN, based in Delhi, strives to promote homegrown expertise in development research. It helps researchers from the developing and transition countries to generate new knowledge in the social sciences and build research excellence, share research output, data, and experiences across regions as well as to apply research to policy and inform policymakers.

GDN is the world's largest network of researchers and policy institutions dedicated to promoting policy-relevant research for the purposes of development. GDN has significant experience working on migration issues through designing and implementing global research projects that emphasise developing country perspectives on migration.

[www.gdnet.org](http://www.gdnet.org)

## About ippr

The Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr) is the UK's leading progressive think tank, producing cutting-edge research and innovative policy ideas for a just, democratic and sustainable world. Since 1988, we have been at the forefront of progressive debate and policymaking in the UK. Through our independent research and analysis we define new agendas for change and provide practical solutions to challenges across the full range of public policy issues.

With offices in both London and Newcastle, we ensure our outlook is as broad-based as possible, while our international and migration teams and climate change programme extend our partnerships and influence beyond the UK, giving us a truly world-class reputation for high quality research.

In recent years, ippr has examined migration and development issues for various organisations including the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

[www.ippr.org](http://www.ippr.org)

## About the authors

**Elizabeth Thomas-Hope** is the James Seivright Moss-Solomon (Snr.) Chair of Environmental Management at the University of the West Indies (UWI). She is a member of the Advisory Board of the EU-UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative, and the Advisory Committee of the United Nations Development Programme Report 2009.

**Claremont Kirton** is a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Economics at the University of the West Indies (UWI), Mona, Jamaica. He is a member of the *Caribbean Diaspora Economy Research Group (CDERG)* in the Department of Economics.

**Pauline Knight** is the Director of the Social Policy, Planning and Research Division of the Planning Institute of Jamaica. She is a member of the Cabinet Committee on Human Resources and is Vice-Chair of the Vital Statistics Commission.

**Natasha Kay Mortley** holds a PhD in Migration and Diaspora Studies from the University of the West Indies (UWI), Jamaica. She currently works as a Research Fellow at the UWI in the area of Gender, Leadership and Development for the Caribbean.

**Mikhail-Ann Urquhart** is an Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Economics at UWI, Mona, Jamaica. She has received several academic awards including the G. Arthur Brown Scholarship sponsored by the Bank of the Jamaica.

**Claudel Noel** (PhD) is currently managing the Campus Plastic Bottle Recycling Pilot Project, Centre for the Environment, UWI, Mona, Jamaica. He also lectures courses in Research Methods and Solid Waste Management Systems at UWI Mona.

**Hilary Robertson-Hickling** (PhD) is a Lecturer in Human Resource Management at UWI, Mona, Jamaica. Her research interests include migration and mental health, the migration of the health workforce, cultural therapy and resilience.

**Easton Williams** is the Manager of the Population Unit in the Social Policy, Planning and Research Division of the Planning Institute of Jamaica. He is Jamaica's focal point for the Global Forum on International Migration and Development and is a member of the Working Group on Policy Coherence, Data and Research on Migration and Development for the forthcoming meeting of the Forum in 2009.

## Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge, with gratitude, the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) for the conduct of the national survey on which much of the project was based. In particular, we thank the Deputy Director General, Annette McKenzie, the Director of Field Services, Merville Anderson, the Director of Surveys, Douglas Forbes, the Project Coordinator, Natalee Simpson, the Assistant Coordinator, Cary Renford, and the Programmer/ Data Processing Supervisor, Blossom McCurdy. We are also grateful to the 38 interviewers who carried out the survey and to those members of the STATIN staff responsible for data entry and editing. Lastly, thanks for inputs from ippr and GDN, including for training the interviewers in Jamaica.

The project management team thank the research team members and the survey team from STATIN for their vital contributions to the project. Thanks are also due to Naomi Jones and Naomi Pollard at ippr for their invaluable help in making the survey a success. Naomi Pollard, Maria Latorre (ippr) and Bob Lucas were vital in providing comments on previous drafts of this report, and Tim Finch and Lisa Harker from ippr, along with other ippr colleagues, gave important comments on this final draft, as did our external reviewer David Dodman of the International Institute of Environment and Development. We are also very grateful to Georgina Kyriacou for her publications assistance.

## Executive summary

This report takes a fresh look at the ways in which migration affects development in Jamaica. It maps out how much migration Jamaica is experiencing, and what that migration looks like, asking: who moves, why, where to, and for how long?

It also looks at the wide range of impacts that migration has on development. This includes but goes beyond those often discussed (such as the effects of remittances on household income) to look at health and education spending, family structure and gender roles, for example. As well as describing these impacts we consider to get how the best outcomes from them, by examining the role policy currently plays in shaping migration's developmental effects and how it could be improved. Our aim is to provide a comprehensive picture of the ways in which migration affects development in Jamaica, and to ensure that policymakers are best equipped to respond.

This report is the first in our series of in-depth country studies, each of which will ask the same research questions about migration's developmental impacts:

- How much migration is the country experiencing?
- What are the characteristics of this migration?
- How does it affect development?
- How could its developmental impacts be improved?

This report and the others in the series draw on the best of existing literature and data sources and are also based on new primary research, including in-depth stakeholder interviews and a nationally representative household survey. The survey in particular allows us access to new information and thus our data provides a new depth and breadth of knowledge on migration's development impacts.

Because the survey data is nationally representative it enables, for the first time in many countries, accurate estimates to be made of the numbers of people migrating (immigrants, emigrants and returnees). It also means that the estimates we make of migration's development impacts are accurate for the country's population as a whole. The data contains no biases towards particular regions or groups – which makes it an ideal resource for policy decisions.

### Key survey findings from Jamaica

1. Migration is a significant, integral part of Jamaican society, with large numbers of people moving, despite the fact that many of Jamaica's major destination countries have been reducing access to their labour markets for many Jamaican migrants. Nationally, 2 per cent of Jamaican households contain one or more immigrants, at least 15 per cent have one or more migrants currently abroad and 28 per cent have one or more members who have previously lived abroad. An unknown number of whole households have also departed, leaving no one behind.

2. Migrants leave Jamaica predominantly to earn more, send remittances home and accessing steady employment. So it is unsurprising that the main countries of destination for Jamaican migrants are the USA, Canada and the UK. However, this is not to say that people departing Jamaica were doing badly economically by Jamaican standards. Most were earning significantly more than the average non-migrant before departing. This is in line with other studies which have also shown that it is not usually the poorest of the poor who migrate.

3. Around 7 per cent of all Jamaicans have university degrees, whereas 20 per cent of absent male migrants have degrees, as do 9 per cent of absent females. So while the highly educated are



disproportionately likely to migrate, the majority of migrants do not have tertiary education. Jamaica may be experiencing brain drain, but the less well educated are moving too.

4. More and more migrants from Jamaica are female. While men predominated in outflows eight to 10 years ago, those who departed in the two years prior to our survey were predominantly women. The change is apparently at least in part due to changing labour demand in countries of destination.

5. Migrants who return do so mainly for social reasons. 73 per cent of returnees said that family was the main motivation in coming home. Completing an economic objective such as finishing a job or earning a certain amount of money is the next most popular reason. Substantial numbers also return because immigration systems required them to leave – this includes people whose work or student visa had expired, as well as deportees.

6. Remittances to Jamaica have been rising, and they make an important contribution to the economy. Approximately two thirds of the migrants currently away remit to the household they left. On average they send back approximately US\$640 annually, an important support to household budgets.

7. More than one third of all Jamaican households receive remittances from people who were not members of their households before departure, many of whom were not even related to the people to whom they were sending funds. This shows the extent to which remittances reach households right across Jamaican society. The amounts sent by 'non household members' were smaller, however.

8. It is clear that migration has had an important positive impact on the economic situation of the migrants themselves. 70 per cent saw a very significant increase in their standard of living once abroad and no one experienced a significant decrease. These results are even more marked for those who were in non-managerial and supervisory roles before departure. When combined with some evidence on the positive economic impacts of remittances it seems most migrants and their families benefit economically from migration and thus migration can be an important strategy for allowing people to meet their own life goals. This indicates why migration is so prevalent in Jamaica.

9. Migration's economic impacts at the community and national level are less clear. For example, our evidence suggests there are negative but modest impacts on labour force participation, as the receipt of remittances can mean households are less likely to take up employment. From the perspective of the Jamaican government, if not the households themselves, this may present a problem as it is looking to generate sustainable sources of national income, including through harnessing the talents of its people through employment in domestic businesses.

10. Our research suggests that migration may enhance individual education outcomes. A significant minority of migrants were able to advance their education while abroad and around half of those gained qualifications as a result. (Of course, it is not known how many of those migrants would have undertaken education in Jamaica had they not left.)

11. Migration can also affect education at a household level, because where remittances boost a household's budget, evidence suggests spending on all items increases, including on education and on health. Some interviewees also indicated that they disproportionately allocated remittances to health and education, which might suggest that remittances have a particularly beneficial effect in these areas. We have not been able to prove, however, whether this extra beneficial effect did occur, or whether the households that allocated remittances to these expenditures did not allocate income from other sources to these items.

12. There is some worry that migration damages the national infrastructure for providing health and education services by removing skilled personnel. Teacher and health-worker brain drain is a significant concern, perhaps more so than any other of migration's impacts, and it appears to be having an impact on

the quality of the Jamaican educational and health systems. However, immigrants to Jamaica are filling some of the vacancies left by departing nationals, so migration is part of the solution as well as the problem. And where skilled health and education workers return, the impact often appears positive; for example, they can relay valuable new experiences learnt abroad to help boost standards in Jamaican tertiary institutions.

13. Migration's effects on gender roles appear complex. Women are leaving for economic reasons just as often, and perhaps even more often, than men. However, this does not mean that women migrants have shaken off their traditional caring role, with the majority sending funds home for child support being women. There is also some evidence that when female migrants return to Jamaica, their experiences abroad may have helped them to progress professionally.

14. Migration affects culture, and we found the impacts to be generally perceived as positive. It enables Jamaica's culture to become internationally renowned, a source of pride for Jamaicans. And Jamaicans interact with other cultures through immigration and through returning migrants which strengthens some cultural values, such as multi-culturalism, which are perceived as important to today's Jamaican society.

15. Some groups may be disproportionately harmed by the experience of migration. Many people who were forcibly returned – deportees – lack social networks and support, and struggle to reintegrate into Jamaican society. And there is some evidence to suggest that children who are left behind by parents may suffer as a result. Specific policy interventions are required to assist both these groups.

## Policy responses

How can policy best respond to the apparent impacts of migration? The report identifies a number of ways forward:

### 1. Increase Jamaica's attractiveness to its citizens

This must involve promoting development at the national level so that people feel that their personal goals can be met in Jamaica, and they have no need to migrate, making migration feel more like a choice than a necessity. Specific policies to increase Jamaica's attractiveness include improving pay and working conditions in the health and education systems, and promoting the Jamaican way of life and culture to would-be migrants and the diaspora, tapping into the attachment Jamaicans have to their home country. These efforts to reach out to the diaspora must be carefully targeted though, to reach the right people with the right messages.

### 2. Shape migration movements to ensure that their impacts on development are as positive as possible

For example, tie bilateral short-term mobility programmes more effectively to Jamaica's development goals, so the various positive things that return migrants often bring with them – such as finance, new work ethics, and attitudes towards gender roles – can be maximised. Ensure that trafficking, which often severely undermines people's development, is minimised, and that immigration for labour meets Jamaica's needs.

### 3. Draw more effectively on the resources of people who are currently away

This again would involve ensuring that official efforts to engage with the diaspora are carefully designed, but in this case it would be important to ensure that they facilitate the transmission of some of the assets that migration can produce. This involves both tangible assets such as remittances or support for specific national development projects, as well as some more intangible assets such as ideas and knowledge.

### 4. React to some of the specific development impacts that migration appears to be having

For example, support the reintegration of returnees, with a particular focus on deportees, and develop specific programmes to support children and families, ensuring that where children are separated from their parents this causes as few problems for the child as possible.

## 1. Introduction

'Development on the Move: Measuring and optimising migration's economic and social impacts' is a large, innovative, policy-focused research project aiming to examine the impacts of migration on development. It is run jointly by the Global Development Network, based in Delhi, and the Institute for Public Policy Research, based in London.

'Migration and development' is an increasingly well researched area. A number of high level and important research projects have been or are being undertaken (for example, the World Bank's 2006 Global Economic Prospects as well as the United Nations' 2009 Human Development Report), and the issue is rising up the agenda of policymakers – as the Global Forum on Migration and Development process shows.

Development on the Move's contribution to this debate comes through tackling four aspects of current research and policymaking, all of which we believe still require attention.

- First, much of the current output is focused on specific issues (for example, remittances or diaspora), or involves general overviews of the topic. Very little of it aims for a true synthesis.
- Second, despite considerable potential overlaps, there has been very little exchange between the methodologies used in the studies of economic and social development, and of emigration and immigration.
- Third, there is significant scope for improving data.
- Finally, apart from relatively easy-win recommendations (for example, reducing the transfer costs of remittances) and attractive but unworkable proposals (for example, large-scale access to developed country labour markets for the low-skilled from the developing world) there have been few policy initiatives put forward.

Development on the Move aims to address some of these priorities by:

- Generating new, comparable data using a number of tools, including nationally representative household surveys
- Providing analysis of that data, examining a wide range of migration's economic and social impacts
- Devising innovative and workable policy responses.

To achieve this, the project has taken a distinct approach. It examines the impacts of all international migration. This includes both emigration and immigration, between all destinations (not just particular corridors or from South to North), and resulting from all sorts of motivations. See Box 1 for further details of our definition of migration.

As well as taking a wide perspective on migration, we also take a comprehensive view of development, which we view from an approach based on capabilities and sustainable livelihoods. This means that we examine the ways in which migration affects economic, health, educational, gender, 'other social' and governance indicators that are either directly or indirectly linked to capabilities (see Chappell and Sriskandarajah 2007 for further details on our conceptual approach).

Lastly, to try to generate knowledge of global relevance, the project is producing comparable information. The bulk of the *Development on the Move* research is being done at a country level, by researchers in Colombia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, Macedonia and Vietnam. However, in each case the teams are guided by the same research questions, are using the same methodologies (including the same household

survey template), and will produce the same kind of output: a 'country report' of which this one is the first.

### Definition of Migration

Development on the Move uses the following definitions:

- **Migrant:** Someone who has spent three months or more living continuously in a country other than that of their birth.

Within this, the project examines three different kinds of migrants:

- **Immigrant:** A person who was born in another country but has come to live in the country of our study.
- **Absent migrant:** A person who was born in the country of our study but who, within the last 10 years, left to go and live in another. Absent migrants are still living abroad. We only examine people who went to live abroad in the last 10 years in order to try to minimise 'recall errors' when respondents discuss them, so anyone who left more than 10 years ago is not included in this category.
- **Returned migrant:** A person who was born in the country of our study and who lives there now but who at some point has lived in another country for three months or more.

A three month definition of migration differs from the usual definition used in official data sources, which only includes people who moved for a year or more. We feel our definition is more useful as it allows us to capture short-term, irregular and seasonal movement, as well as more permanent emigration (and as Section 2 sets out, Jamaica experiences a lot of these shorter term moves, with important implications for development). The differences in definition must be borne in mind when comparing between data sources, as each examines a slightly different phenomenon.

## Methodology

This report on migration's impacts on development in Jamaica<sup>1</sup> is multi-disciplinary and draws its findings from a range of methodological tools, including examination of existing literature and data, stakeholder interviews, and a large, nationally representative, in-depth household survey. It is also designed to be policy-focused, involving policymakers and other key actors from the start.

Interactive launch workshops were held in each country at the beginning of the research, to which key stakeholders were invited. The launch workshops helped prioritise key issues for analysis in each country and ensure the research is well plugged into current developments. In addition, some countries have set up local steering committees comprising a sub-group of these key stakeholders to ensure they get this kind of feedback throughout the research process.

Together the launch workshop and literature and data review aim to ensure that each report is aware of, presents and assesses all the evidence in place thus far on the impacts of migration on development in the

---

<sup>1</sup> The Jamaica research was the pilot stage of the project, meaning that it was different in some ways to the research currently being conducted in the other six countries. In particular, the questionnaire was slightly different and the sample size was smaller (486 households compared with 1200+ in the other countries). This report also takes a more heavily descriptive approach than the following studies, which will focus to a greater extent on impact analysis.

country in question. In addition, this project builds on existing knowledge by generating two new sources of data.

### Stakeholder interviews

Twenty stakeholder interviews were undertaken in Jamaica with people with various different perspectives on migration and development – academics, representatives of government, international organisations and civil society. The stakeholder interviews comprise a vital source of information for the project, producing data of a variety of different kinds.

This includes factual information that might not be available in the public domain (for example, details of a policy that is in development), and expert opinion, which can be important in tackling questions (for example, of numbers of irregular migrants in a country) where there is a lack of data. The interviews were also designed to provide a narrative to explain some of the quantitative findings – the process behind a policy development, or the history of a particularly migratory movement; and also to generate a sense of priorities, ideas and possibly misconceptions that need to be addressed by researchers. The same set of issues was covered in each interview, though with some variation relating to the specific area of interest of the stakeholder. Appendix 1 provides further details on interviewees.

### Household survey

A major new household survey was designed for use in this project. The purpose of the survey is to generate reliable data on the prevalence of migration in Jamaica, and the impacts that has on development. We interviewed nearly 1000 households from across Jamaica asking them whether they had a migrant member. As a follow-up, a smaller set of households – 486 – were interviewed in more depth in order to examine the impacts of migration. At this stage, households with migrants were given a higher probability of being interviewed, so that about half the 486 households contained migrants and about half did not. This was in order to ensure we had enough households of each type so that we could use comparisons between the two kinds of households to assess migration's impacts. At both stages this was a nationally representative exercise, meaning that the results of this survey should reflect Jamaican trends as a whole.

The questionnaire gathered wide-ranging information both about individuals within the household (including demographic and socio-economic information, as well as data on their migration histories) and about the household as a whole. It also gathered data on the household's opinions on migration. Altogether it is a comprehensive, in-depth questionnaire, approximately 40 pages long.<sup>2</sup> Key parameters of the data collected (such as gender and age distribution of the sample and source countries of remittances) were checked against existing data for Jamaica (specifically data from the 2002 Census, the 2006 Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions, and population estimates made for 2007 by the Planning Institute of Jamaica). Our data was found to be consistent.

### Challenges

By drawing together the information from all these different sources on how migration is affecting development at present, it is possible to show how positive impacts might be enhanced and negative ones diminished. But this is not a simple task, and involves two distinct kinds of challenges.

---

<sup>2</sup> Further information about the survey is provided in Appendix 2 and a copy of the questionnaire is available on request from ippr or GDN.

First, isolating the impacts of migration is methodologically challenging, in at least four separate ways:

- 1) The first challenge is to attempt to disaggregate the effects of migration from other influences, including key structural and historical events such as colonialism and the non-migration aspects of globalisation. Doing so requires careful thought in analytical design.
- 2) The second challenge is to unravel causality. Is migration impacting on the economic and social variables we are interested in, or is it them that are impacting on migration? For example, if we find a relationship between household wealth and migration, it is difficult to know to what extent the household is wealthier because they have a migrant member, or if the household member was able to move because their household is wealthy.
- 3) Analysis is complicated by the fact that some of the characteristics that are distinguishing features of migrants – such as a drive to create a better life – cannot be observed in datasets. This makes understanding to what extent migration is the cause of outcomes difficult. It could be that a migrant is successful because of migration, or it could be that their drive and ambition caused them to migrate, but would have also made them successful wherever they were living.
- 4) Many impacts of migration reveal themselves over different time periods, with some taking a long time to appear. This means that researchers need to give careful thought as to when impacts might manifest themselves. It also means that ideally data referring to long time periods is required.

We have designed our research tools as far as possible to address these methodological problems. Our survey, for example, captures migrants who moved some time ago as well as those who moved recently. We also question non-migrant households, which act as a comparator group. The questionnaire itself uses backward-looking questions to capture data on past trends, and asks interviewees for their opinions regarding perceived causes. We believe that this combination of methodological tools allows us to begin to tackle these methodological challenges.<sup>3</sup>

The second major kind of challenge lies in evaluating impacts and making policy recommendations. This is difficult because of the ambitious approach of the project. It analyses a great range of impacts – those at the individual, household, community and national level, and across the spectrum of economic, educational, health, gender, other social and governance aspects of development. Inevitably some impacts are positive and some negative, and trying to evaluate these and 'weigh' them against one another so as to create policy recommendations is inherently challenging.

Our guide for doing this reflects our conceptual approach to development. We evaluate the effects of movement by assessing its impacts on particular variables that, either directly or indirectly, enhance or erode development, conceptualised from a capabilities and sustainable livelihoods perspective (see Chappell and Srisikandarajah 2007). This does not allow us to avoid making trade-offs, but it at least provides a framework within which we can assess them.

We also aim to set out the evidence in a clear enough way that a reader with another approach to development will also find it useful. They might ultimately evaluate the impacts differently, and perhaps come to different policy conclusions, but they should still be able to draw constructive information from our analysis.

---

<sup>3</sup> Although, as noted above, this report takes a more descriptive focus than some of the forthcoming reports will. Future studies will focus to a greater degree on isolating migration's impacts.

## **Structure of the paper**

- Section 2 provides a descriptive analysis of migration, setting out its history, current scale and characteristics.
- Section 3 sets out some of migration's consequences or corollaries – phenomena that exist as a result of migration into and out of Jamaica, including remittances and transnational communities.
- Section 4 analyses the impacts of migration and its consequences in terms of development outcomes. It asks what does migration and the phenomena it produces mean for development outcomes? What are its impacts across economic, educational, health, gender, governance and other social aspects of development?
- Section 5 provides an analysis of the current policy framework and sets out some recommendations for how it might evolve to increase migration's developmental benefits and reduce its costs.
- Section 6 provides a conclusion to the report.

## 2. Patterns of Jamaican migration

### The history of Jamaican migration

Migration has been a constant feature of life in Jamaica. It occurred in pre-colonial times, during the period of slavery, after Emancipation, throughout the 20th century and into the 21st, both in Jamaica and, more generally, throughout much of the Caribbean and circum-Caribbean region. Both short-term and indefinite stays in other territories have been common practice (Thomas-Hope 1998).

The volume of movement was particularly high during periods of specific economic activity and in most cases represented the transfer of labour. Immigrants provided labour for the sugar plantations established in Jamaica (17th to 19th centuries) by European mercantile interests, whether as slaves from West Africa or indentured workers from India and China (late 19th and early 20th centuries). With the abolition of slavery (1834) and of the indentureship system (1848), persons moved within and from the region whenever the opportunity existed. Jamaicans moved to Panama and elsewhere in Central America to work in the construction of the trans-Isthmian railway, the cutting of the Panama Canal and the operations of the United Fruit Company from the late 19th and into the early 20th centuries; to Cuba to provide labour for the expansion of sugar production in the early 20th century; and in the second half of the 20th century to the growth-nodes of tourism principally in the Bahamas, the United States and British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands.

The mobility of Jamaican (and other Caribbean) labour continued within the region while movements from the region were also occurring with increasing momentum by the mid-20th century. The need in the US and the UK for labour and manpower in the First and Second World Wars led to the recruitment of workers from Jamaica and other Caribbean colonies. Post Second World War reconstruction in Western Europe also required labour, much of which was obtained from Jamaica and Barbados. Large numbers of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers were recruited for hospital services, while others gained employment chiefly in industry and transport.

Restrictive immigration policies in the UK from 1962 coincided with legislation in the US which altered regulations of migrant entry in favour of selectivity according to required skills, rather than on the grounds of nationality or race. Canadian legislation in 1962 stipulated the entry of foreigners on the basis of education and occupation, while in the US an amendment in 1965 to the Immigration and Nationality Act had a similar effect. In addition to allowing entry of relatives and dependents, specified skills and occupations were also allowed on a quota basis.

These changes to immigration legislation made in the UK, the US and Canada had important implications for Caribbean emigration. First, the trend in the direction of migrant flow shifted from Western Europe to North America. The US became the chief destination, followed by Canada, of skilled migration from the Caribbean in the second half of the 1960s and continued during successive decades (Thomas-Hope 2002). Second, the selectivity of migrants on the basis of occupation led to a marked increase in the migration of skilled labour and professionals. The number of technical and professional workers from Jamaica entering the US with permanent visas rose from 176 in 1965 to 1,777 by 1968 (Planning Institute of Jamaica 1972), and it was estimated that during the 1970s some 14,000 skilled personnel per year were migrating from the Anglophone Caribbean as a whole (Maingot 1999).



Decade	Total	US	Canada	UK
1970s	<b>327,779</b>	256,984	56,964	13,831
1980s	<b>239,207</b>	201,177	33,973	4,057
1990s	<b>212,892</b>	170,291	39,443	3,158
2000-6	<b>135,493</b>	117,205	15,374	2,914
Total	<b>915,371</b>	<b>745,657</b>	<b>145,754</b>	<b>23,960</b>
% of total	<b>100</b>	<b>82.4</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>2.6</b>

*Source:* Thomas-Hope 2004 (updated to 2006). Compiled from data in: The Planning Institute of Jamaica, *Economic and Social Survey*, volumes for years 1970-2008. Kingston, Jamaica

As Table 1 shows, since the 1970s the numbers migrating officially have continued to fall. The number of people going to the US declined during this period, with the total for the 1990s some one-third lower than in the 1970s. Numbers for 2000 to 2006 indicate that this decrease in migration to the US has continued. Meanwhile, numbers to Canada also declined significantly in the 1980s in comparison with the 1970s. There was a slight increase in the 1990s but in the first six years of the 2000s the downward trend continued. Migration to the UK has remained relatively low since the 1970s, and fallen even further over time. These continuing trends are the result of the restrictions on immigration in key destination countries, which have intensified over time.

However, while official channels for migration have been closing to most Jamaican migrants, this does not mean that movement has slowed. In addition to the persons who are recorded as landed immigrants, and therefore documented as 'migrants' in the official data, many have found other ways of moving. Other routes include travel on visitors' visas or as holders of previously acquired work permits or residence status. These people are not included or captured again in the migration statistics. It is believed that most of these persons are short-term labour migrants and many move back and forth on an annual basis. This form of circulatory or short-term migration includes both independent movements arranged through personal networks and those through the Jamaican government for farm, factory or hotel work on short-term contracts. For example, in 2001, there were 8,382 Jamaicans who went to the US on short-term contracts arranged through the Jamaican government for farm and hotel work (data from the Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Labour, cited in Thomas-Hope 2004). This was more than half the number of Jamaican nationals (15,393) admitted to the US as 'immigrants' in the same year (2003 Yearbook of Statistics 2004).

Other movements involve the recruitment by private agents, and assisted migration of persons (chiefly young women) for jobs within and outside the Caribbean in ways that constitute trafficking (Thomas-Hope 2006). So while official migration may have slowed, alternative forms of migration have emerged that allow people to move.

### Changing gender patterns of movement

It appears that while men dominated in the initial stages of migration from the region, since the 1960s, higher female educational levels and changing labour markets overseas have led to greater female migration (Momsen 1992, Timur 2000, Mortley 2003). For example, Shepherd (1998) contends that after the completion of the Panama Canal, male migration dropped and female migration rose as the growth of

the tourist industry in the Caribbean, especially in the US Virgin Islands, created a demand for female workers (Pienkos 2006).

The increasing number of women migrating to the United States in particular reflected economic restructuring and the growth of female labour-intensive industries, notably in service, healthcare, microelectronics and the clothing industries (Sassen 1984, 1998). The official data shows more women than men migrating since the 1970s as shown by the official data (Table 2).

<b>Table 2: Official statistics on migration from Jamaica to the United States and Canada, by gender</b>								
<b>Males and females – averages for each decade, %</b>								
	1970s		1980s		1990s		2000-06	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
<b>United States</b>	48.2	51.8	48.4	51.6	47.1	52.9	45.4	54.6
<b>Canada</b>	32.6	67.4	43.0	56.9	46.6	53.4	47.6	52.4

*Source:* Thomas-Hope 2004 (updated to 2006). Compiled from data in: The Planning Institute of Jamaica, *Economic and Social Survey*, volumes for years 1970–2008. Kingston, Jamaica

### Current migration trends

The brief history above gives a sense of the evolving shape of Jamaican migration. Now we investigate what migration looks like in today's Jamaica.

Because it is nationally representative, our household survey allows us to make accurate estimates of the extent to which people are migrating into and out of Jamaica. We found that despite more stringent official rules in major destination countries, migration remains a very common phenomenon in Jamaica. Nationally, 2 per cent of Jamaican households contain one or more immigrants, at least 15 per cent have one or more migrants currently abroad<sup>4</sup>, and 28 per cent have one or more members who have previously lived abroad but who have now returned to Jamaica (Lucas and Chappell 2009). In addition, an unknown number of whole households have also departed, leaving no one behind.

These estimates of migration are higher perhaps than many would expect. Part of this will be due to our definition of migration, which includes any episode of living in another country for three months or more, in contrast to the usual United Nations definition which uses 12 months. The three-month definition is highly relevant to Jamaica, however, as previous research has revealed that it is common for people to move for short periods of time, often for work, between Jamaica and various countries of destination.

Most households that contained a migrant contained only one. Of the households with absent migrants, 90 per cent had only one absent migrant, while in 8 per cent there were two absent migrants. In the case of households with return migrants, 95 per cent had only one return migrant, in 3 per cent there were two return migrants and in 1 per cent there were three or four return migrants. Few households contained both absent and returned migrants.

<sup>4</sup> We say at least 15 per cent because here we only capture migrants who left in the last 10 years. Anyone who left before is not included, and so this result is almost certainly an underestimate. We only included people who left in the last 10 years in order to try to minimise 'recall errors' when respondents discuss them.

Given this variety, we examine each type of households separately – households containing immigrants, absent migrants and returnees – setting out the characteristics of both the household and the migrants they contain.

### Immigration to Jamaica

Relatively little is known about immigration to Jamaica, and given its low prevalence it is not examined in depth in this report. As cited above, our survey found that only 2 per cent of Jamaican households contain immigrants.

However, people born in other countries do move to Jamaica, and most evidence suggests that this immigration, particularly since the 1970s, has chiefly been of professionals with work permits who have been accompanied by family members. Some indication of countries of origin is provided by the official data on immigration; see Table 3 below.

Years	Commonwealth citizens	Other citizens	Total immigration
1997–2001	11,984*	5,430*	17,414
2002–2006	11,882	11,104	22,986
<b>Total, 1997–2006</b>	<b>23,866</b>	<b>16,534</b>	<b>40,400</b>
<b>% of 1997–2006 immigration</b>	59%	41%	100%

*Note:* Data broken down into Commonwealth and other citizens as this is the basis for Jamaican immigration policy  
 \*1997 data on Commonwealth and other citizens estimated.  
*Source:* Adapted from Thomas-Hope 2004 (including by update to 2006). Compiled from data in: The Planning Institute of Jamaica, *Economic and Social Survey*, volumes for years 1970–2008. Kingston, Jamaica

Immigration has partly resulted from labour shortages in specific sectors such as health: nurses from Cuba and Nigeria, among other countries, have filled vacancies. In other cases skilled immigrants are brought in by foreign companies that have won contracts in sectors such as construction and manufacturing.

### Emigration

This section is strictly only relevant to migrants who left within the last 10 years (but it is likely that some characteristics are shared with those who left before 1997). This is because except where indicated we draw here on the results of our household survey, which defined emigrants or 'absent migrants' as people who were born in Jamaica but who, within the last 10 years, left to go and live in another country and who remain abroad.

#### *Where are Jamaica's absent migrants?*


More than half of absent migrants went first to the US (56 per cent) for at least three months, while 15 per cent went to the UK and 21 per cent to other countries. The vast majority (more than 90 per cent) have stayed in the same country for their whole time abroad.

#### *When did they leave?*

As Figure 1 demonstrates, the data shows that absent migrants have been leaving in a relatively steady stream over the past 10 years. More than a quarter (27 per cent) of the absent migrants had been away for less than two years prior to the interview, with females accounting for the larger proportion. It is likely

that some of these migrants are short-term migrants and returned within a few months of departure, but after the survey was conducted.

Figure 1: Absent migrants’ date of departure



**Why did they leave?**

The belief of the majority of respondents (71 per cent) was that earning more money abroad was the most important reason for the migration that had taken place from their household. In 46 per cent of cases, the opportunity for the migrant to save and remit money was reported to be a very important element in the migration decision. Only 31 per cent of respondents believed that study and overseas qualifications was a very important motivation for migration (see Table 4).

Despite the perception that job and income-led motivations were the critical factors in decisions to migrate, most (58per cent) of the absent migrants were reported to have been in paid jobs or working for themselves before they moved overseas. Nonetheless, this work may have been perceived as unreliable or too low paid, and hence work abroad still looked more attractive.

Reasons for departure*	Level of importance (%)			No response (%)
	Very	Quite	Not	
Hoped it would be easier to get a steady job in another country	58	9	30	3
Intended to study and get qualifications in another country	33	12	52	3
Hoped to learn to speak another language that would be useful	3	16	78	3
Thought would learn other useful skills by working in another country	31	28	38	3
Thought would be able to earn more money in another country than can earn here	71	10	16	3
Thought would be able to save money and send it back to this household	46	22	29	3
Did not feel safe living in this country	9	6	82	3
Felt discriminated against in this country	2	5	90	3
Thought would have more freedom overseas to do as wanted than have here	8	5	84	3
Went with other family members when they decided to live abroad	7	14	76	3
Left to get married	2	6	89	3
Went to live with family members who already lived there	31	14	52	3
*Migrants were asked the question: 'For each reason, please say whether it was very important, quite important or not important at all in your decision to leave the country'				

Not surprisingly, there appears to be a relationship between the likelihood of having work abroad and a migrant's reason for leaving in the first place. Of those migrants who were currently working abroad, 73 per cent were believed to have left in order to find steady employment (with this given as a 'very important' reason for their departure). Conversely, of migrants not currently working abroad, only 14 per cent were believed to have left in order to find steady work (Table 5).

Level of importance of finding a steady job	Had a paid job while abroad (%)		
	Yes	No	Don't know
Very	73	14	21
Quite	10	3	3
Not	17	81	46
No response		2	30
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


The migrants who were not working abroad were also not necessarily motivated to migrate in order to learn new skills. Of those migrants who were unemployed while abroad 71 per cent did not think that acquiring a skill was important as a reason for their migration. However, two thirds (66 per cent) of those who had paid jobs thought that learning a skill was an important reason for migrating. This shows a strong link in migrants’ minds between working abroad and the development of new skills.

*Profile of absent migrants*

*Age*

The age profile of the absent migrants is consistent with expectations. Economically active adults predominate, with the largest numbers aged 31–40 years and 41–50 years. There are also in excess of 15 per cent of the female migrants in the younger, 21–30 age group. There are some young children and elderly persons among the absent migrants, reflecting the importance of family networks that influence the destination and purpose of migration (Figure 2). It should be borne in mind that the ages recorded are the current age of the migrants; when they left Jamaica they will have been younger, in some cases, much younger. This is also in line with expectations, as we might expect people who move overseas do so near the start of their careers.

**Figure 2: Ages of absent migrants, by gender**



*Gender*

As discussed above, a notable characteristic of recent Jamaican migration is the rising number of women who are moving overseas. Evidence from our household survey gives a similar picture, as can be seen if Figure 1 is examined along gender lines.

However, this increase in the number of women leaving does not mean they make up the bulk of current Jamaican migrants. Our survey showed that just over half of the migrants currently away are women. This is because men predominated in earlier movements and some of those who moved then are still away.

What is causing large numbers of women to leave Jamaica in recent years? It seems likely that these trends reflect Jamaican society, with its complex combination of motives for women to depart, including high levels of female economic responsibility within the family, and the relative freedom given to them by the family structure to engage in employment abroad (Thomas-Hope 1992, 2008). The data bears this out. The three main reasons given for the migration of the absent migrants in the sample were to earn more money (72.5 per cent of absent migrants), obtain a stable job (59 per cent) and save money to send back home (46.5 per cent). Table 6 disaggregates these by gender and we see that earning more and being able to remit were similarly important motivations for both men and women to leave. However, women were somewhat more likely to have left in order to get a steady job. This indicates that the responsibilities of earning, saving and remitting were as true for women as for men, if not more so.

Looking by gender at the less frequently cited reasons for departure shows in some cases little gender difference. However, for a number of items there were differences. For example, men were quite substantially more likely to have left to develop new skills through work experience abroad. Women were more likely to be said to have left to gain greater freedoms and escape discrimination, suggesting that for some, migration may play an emancipatory role. Women were also more likely to have left for marriage.

**Table 6: Reasons for departure of absent migrants by gender**

Reasons for departure*	Male				Female			
	How important (%)				How important (%)			
	Very	Quite	Not	No response	Very	Quite	Not	No response
Hoped it would be easier to get a steady job in another country	53	10	32	5	65	6	27	2
Thought would learn other useful skills by working in another country	40	31	24	5	23	26	49	2
Thought would be able to earn more money in another country than can earn here	68	13	15	4	77	4	17	2
Thought would be able to save money and send it back to this household	48	20	27	5	45	20	33	2
Felt discriminated against in this country	0	3	93	4	4	8	86	2
Thought would have more freedom overseas to do as wanted than have here	6	2	88	4	10	9	79	2
Left to get married	2	3	90	5	3	8	87	2

\*Migrants were asked the question: 'For each reason, please say whether it was very important, quite important or not important at all in your decision to leave the country'

### Education

It was found that 22 per cent of men and 20 per cent of women had reached only the primary school level prior to migrating (Table 7). Nevertheless, the figures for secondary schooling (30 per cent of men and 29 per cent of women) were not insignificant and would reflect a profile similar to that of the population as a whole, as shown in Table 8. The proportion of the absent migrants who had a degree (20 per cent of men and 9 per cent of women) was considerably higher than for the population as a whole, where 7 per cent (men and women combined) had a degree.

Level being attained by those in school at the time of departure	Male (%)	Female (%)	Level attained among those <i>not</i> in school at time of departure*	Male (%)	Female (%)
None	18		None	47	33
Primary	22	20	CXC Basic/JSC 5 SSC/3rd JL	9	6
Secondary	30	29	CXC General, GCE 'O' 1-2	6	9
University		3	CXC General, GCE 'O' 3-4	4	14
Other tertiary	30		CXC General, GCE 'O' 5+	3	4
Other	n/a	3	GCE 'A' / CAPE 1-2	1	4
No response	n/a	45	GCE 'A' / CAPE 3+		5
			Degree	20	9
			Other	10	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

\*Note: CXC is a GCSE equivalent, and GCE 'A' is an A level equivalent

Level being attained by those in school at the time of departure	%	Level attained among those <i>not</i> in school at time of departure	%
None	6	None	54
Pre-primary	11	CXC Basic/JSC 5 SSC/3rd JL	9
Primary	31	CXC General, GCE 'O' 1-2	6
Secondary	27	CXC General, GCE 'O' 3-4	6
University	3	CXC General, GCE 'O' 5+	3
Other tertiary	7	GCE 'A' / CAPE 1-2	1
Special school	2	GCE 'A' / CAPE 3+	1
Other	4	Degree	7
No response	9	Other	13
<b>Total (count and %)</b>	<b>(476) 100</b>	<b>Total (count and %)</b>	<b>(1140) 100</b>


### Economic and other activities before departing

It was reported that 37.5 per cent of absent migrants were in paid employment just prior to their migrating – approximately 38 per cent of the men and 37 per cent of the women (this does not include



the self-employed) – see Figure 3. Only 4 per cent of men and 11 per cent of women were unemployed and seeking work prior to their migration. This compares with the overall population as indicated below (Table 9), in which 6 per cent of men and 6 per cent of women were unemployed and trying to find work. The fact that only a small percentage of the migrants had been unemployed prior to migrating suggests that migration does not directly act as a ‘safety valve’ for unemployment (though indirectly it may have some effect, as migrating nationals will leave vacancies which in turn may be filled by the unemployed).

**Figure 3: Economic activity status of absent migrants before departure, by gender**



**Table 9: Economic activity of the total sample population**


Economic activity status	Male	Female
	%	%
In education	31	28
Paid work	25	22
Working for self	17	12
Unemployed/trying to find work	6	6
Unpaid work	6	14
Retired/unable to work	6	9
Some other activity	4	4
Don't know	1	1
No response	4	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

*Income*

It is significant that of the total number of absent migrants more than 60 per cent of men and more than 40 per cent of women were reported to have been earning J\$60,000 (US\$857) and over per week prior to departure (Figure 4). We can compare this with the earnings of the general population (Figure 5): across the population as a whole more than 30 per cent of the women and more than 25 per cent of the men


earned J\$ 2,000–6,000 per week (US\$29– 86), meaning some were earning less than the Jamaican minimum wage of J\$3,200 per week (US\$46). 40 per cent of men and 35 per cent of women earned more than J\$6,000; and 10 per cent of men and 12 per cent of women earned \$60,000 or more (US\$857). This means migrants, on average, are among the highest earners in Jamaica prior to departure (or at least they were perceived to be such by the family members who reported their earnings). This again raises an interesting perspective on the role of economic motivations for migration and the complexity of the meaning of migration in terms of economic opportunity to different types of people.

**Figure 4: Weekly earnings of absent migrants before leaving, by gender (Jamaica dollars)**



Note: no one was reported in the 20-29,999 category

**Figure 5: Weekly earnings of the total population, by gender (Jamaica dollars)**



## Returned migrants

### *Where they went and why they left Jamaica*

The largest number of returned migrants had previously lived in the United States (more than 40 per cent), followed by the UK and then Canada.

As with absent migrants, returned migrants were also believed to have migrated for primarily economic reasons. The factors cited as most important were the ability to earn more money abroad and the opportunity to save money to remit to their households (54 per cent). The hope of obtaining a better job was indicated to have been very important in the migration decision of 41 per cent of the sample. To join family members already abroad was very important in the decision of one third (33 per cent). Nevertheless, 39 per cent said that obtaining a steady job was not a principal reason for having migrated (Table 11).

Reasons for departure*	How important (%)			No response (%)
	Very	Quite	Not	
I hoped it would be easier to get a steady job	41	19	39	1
I intended to study and get qualifications	12	9	78	1
I hoped to learn to speak another language that would be useful to me	6	8	85	1
I thought I would learn other useful skills	28	13	59	
I thought I would be able to earn more money in another country than I can earn here	54	13	33	
I thought I would be able to save money and send it back to this household	52	11	37	
I did not feel safe living in this country	3	6	91	
I thought I would have more freedom to do what I wanted than I have here	4	5	91	
I left when other family members decided to go and live abroad	8	5	86	1
I left to get married	1	1	97	1
I went to live with family members who already lived there	33	9	58	

\*Migrants were asked the question: 'For each reason, please say whether it was very important, quite important or not important at all in your decision to leave the country'

### *Reasons for returning to Jamaica*

Although economic factors may have been the main reasons for persons choosing to migrate, social reasons appear to be the main motivating force for returning home. The most important reason reported by both male and female migrants for return was to be with their family (Tables 12 and 14). For 27 per cent of the men and 25 per cent of the women another very important factor in returning home was that they had completed the job which they had gone abroad to do. 21 per cent of men and 20 per cent of women left because they were not legally allowed to remain. This may include people leaving on the

expiry of a visa, those who were actually deported, or even people whose legal permission to remain had expired some time before but whose evaluation of the risks of staying irregularly changed, prompting them to return.

Reasons for return*	How important (%)			No response (%)
	Very	Quite	Not	
To get married	2	1	95	2
To retire	8	5	85	2
The person I went to live with in the other country also came home	5	2	91	2
This is where my family members live	73	13	12	2
I went to earn a certain amount of money and I managed to, so I came back	20	14	62	4
To set up a new business or to start a new job	9	2	86	3
I went to do a particular contract/job and I always intended to come home after I had finished it	29	6	63	2
I went to study abroad, and the course finished	5	1	92	2
I wasn't legally allowed to stay in the other country	23	11	63	3
My relationship in the destination country ended	10	2	86	2
I lost my job	1		97	2
I was ill	6	2	90	2
Someone in my family needed me to be here	30	7	59	4
I missed the way of life in this country	25	14	59	2
My life wasn't as I hoped it would be in the other country	12	7	79	2
I was discriminated against in the other country	1	1	98	


\*Migrants were asked the question: 'For each reason, please say whether it was very important, quite important or not important at all in your decision to return'

### *Profile of returned migrants*

#### *Gender and age*

The return migrant population was made up of 48 per cent males and 52 per cent females. The age profile shows that there were approximately 25 per cent below the age of 20 (Figure 6). This indicates that some of this cohort would have gone abroad as children and subsequently returned. Contrary to conventional views, the majority of return migrants were under the age of 60 and were not, therefore, retired.

Figure 6: Age of returned migrants



*Education*

The level of educational achievement of the return migrants was similar to that of the population as a whole. Most had primary and secondary level schooling, with only 8.5 per cent having received university or other tertiary level education.

Level being attained by those in school at the time of departure	Male (%)	Female (%)	Level attained among those <i>not</i> in school at time of departure	Male (%)	Female (%)
None	10	5	None	52	44
Pre-primary	7	12	CXC Basic/JSC 5 SSC/3rd JL	8	13
Primary	26	40	CXC General, GCE 'O' 1-2	8	8
Secondary	37	25	CXC General, GCE 'O' 3-4	4	8
University	4	3	CXC General, GCE 'O' 5+	2	1
Other tertiary	5	5	GCE 'A' / CAPE 1-2	1	1
Special school	3	3	GCE 'A' / CAPE 3+	1	1
Other	3	2	Degree	4	10
No response	5	5	Other	20	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

*Gender*

There are no obvious differences between men and women in their reasons for return. This is an interesting contrast with the gendered differences for departure. The most important reasons that male

and female migrants gave for returning home are listed in Table 14. To be with their family was most important for both genders.

**Table 14: Reasons for returned migrants return to Jamaica, by gender**


Reason for return*	How important – Male (%)				How important – Female (%)			
	Very	Quite	Not	No response	Very	Quite	Not	No response
This is where my family members live	71	12	15	2	75	14	9	2
I went to try to earn a certain amount of money and I managed to, so I came back	20	14	63	3	21	13	62	4
I went to do a particular contract/job and I always intended to come home after I had finished it	30	6	62	2	29	6	63	2
I wasn’t legally allowed to stay in the other country	21	9	67	3	25	12	59	4
Someone in my family needed me to be here	29	6	61	4	31	8	57	4
I missed the way of life in this country	25	14	59	2	24	15	59	2

\*Migrants were asked the question: ‘For each reason, please say whether it was very important, quite important or not important at all in your decision to leave the country’

*Economic and other activities*

Approximately 17 per cent of return migrants were earning in the highest wage bracket of J\$60,000 (US\$870) or more per week at the time of the survey, making returned migrants more likely to be earning high wages than the average Jamaican (see Figure 5 for a comparison). However, it is to be noted that around one-third were still earning low amounts – between J\$2,000 (US\$29) and \$10,000 (US\$145) (Figure 7).

**Figure 7: Earnings of migrants after return to Jamaica, by gender**



Half (50 per cent) of the returned migrants indicated that just prior to leaving Jamaica, they were either in education or working for regular pay – which is consistent with the experience of absent migrants.

Almost two thirds (63 per cent) of the returned migrants indicated that they had no jobs in the destination country arranged prior to migration, while slightly more than one third (37 per cent) of returned migrants stated that they did not have paid employment at all while they were abroad. This was surprising given that finding employment or earning more money are identified as strong reasons for migration. However, it is likely that this result is linked to the trend highlighted above where having a job abroad and citing economic reasons for departure were closely correlated. Where people move for work, they often seem to find it.

Most of the migrants who were employed at some point while they were away obtained that employment informally – 56 per cent found jobs through friends and family. This was slightly more likely to happen after departure from Jamaica (as happened for 55 per cent of this group) than before. The government of Jamaica was the next most useful conduit for migrants to find work, with 21 per cent of all migrants who found work doing so via government-arranged schemes. This is a substantial number of migrants, demonstrating some success on the part of government in helping its citizens to migrate. Private employment agencies in Jamaica were also used in the job-finding process. 13 per cent of these migrants obtained work in this manner. Other routes into work, such as assistance by governments in the country of destination, or intra-company transfers, were much less common.

Of all the activities migrants were doing before return to Jamaica, the most common were once again economic – paid employment and self-employment. Very few individuals stated that they were in education. Only 8 per cent of the respondents indicated that they were retired or unable to work just before they returned home. 88 per cent of the migrants who were employed abroad were working in jobs that were non-managerial or non-supervisory. This suggests that migration did not lead to dramatic improvements in Jamaicans' working status abroad and for many their situation may have actually worsened.

### *Groups of interest to policymakers*

Among returned migrants two particular groups attract particular interest from policymakers, perhaps because they appear to represent two ends of the migration and development spectrum. On the one hand there are those termed 'returning residents', classified as people who return voluntarily after more than three years abroad. This group are thought of as positive contributors, providing substantial remittances to their families and households in Jamaica as well as transfers of skills, technology and knowledge.

To some extent in Jamaica there is an expectation that migrants will return. Caribbean migrants, even after decades abroad, identify strongly with their homelands, retaining what has been termed an 'ideology of return' (Philpott 1973, Gmelch 1992). This is closely associated with the relationship that many migrants retain with their home country while they are away, with Caribbean migration characterised by transnational linkages and systems of mutual support between migrants and non-migrants (Thomas-Hope 1999).

The other prominent group of returned migrants that preoccupy Jamaican policymakers are deportees. These are Jamaican nationals abroad who are involuntarily returned to their country of birth following charges for offences committed (most criminal and some civil) in a country overseas (Headley 2005, Martin-Johnson 2008). According to the official statistics, the number of deportees now far exceeds that of the 'returning residents', a cause for some concern given the public view that this influx is contributing to an increased incidence and variety of crimes committed in Jamaica.

The Jamaican government collects data on these two 'official' forms of return migration. This is provided in Table 15.

<b>Table 15: Official data on return migration to Jamaica (1997–2006)</b>			
<b>Years</b>	<b>Returning residents</b>	<b>Deportees</b>	<b>Total official return migration</b>
1997–2001	8,133	10,190	18,323
2002–2006	6,018	17,796	23,814
<b>Total, 1997–2006</b>	<b>17,141</b>	<b>27,986</b>	<b>42,137</b>
<b>% of 1997–2006 official return migration</b>	41%	59%	100%
<p><i>Note:</i> 1998–2000 returning migrants: incomplete data  <i>Source:</i> adapted from Thomas-Hope 2004 (including by update to 2006). Compiled from data in: The Planning Institute of Jamaica, <i>Economic and Social Survey</i>, volumes for years 1970–2008. Kingston, Jamaica</p>			



### 3. Consequences of Jamaican migration

This section examines the consequences or corollaries of Jamaican migration. As set out in the Introduction, we are interested in migration's impacts on development outcomes. However, not all those impacts come about directly as a result of movement. While emigration might lead directly to teacher brain drain and thus have negative impacts on national education systems (a possibility examined in Section 4), some of migration's impacts occur through other channels such as remittances, or the creation of 'diasporas' or 'transnational communities'. Migration creates these phenomena, which then affect development outcomes – for example, remittances might boost household incomes' roles. It is important therefore to set out some of migration's consequences in terms of the phenomena it creates. We need to do this before we can assess the impacts migration has on development, which we turn to in Section 4.


#### Remittances

Remittances are perhaps the most obvious channel through which migration impacts on households. They are also known to have effects at the community and national level – for example by bolstering foreign exchange receipts. We begin here by describing the patterns of remittances received by Jamaican households, which is a vital first step in understanding their impacts.

#### National trends

The sum of the remittances received across the country is undoubtedly considerable and has increased over the past two decades, stimulated by the financial liberalisation policies of the early 1990s (Figure 8).

**Figure 8: Remittances to Jamaica, 1994–2007**



*Note:* data for 2007 is for January – November

*Source:* Bank of Jamaica (total of remittances received through money transfer organisations, commercial banks, building societies and post offices)

When worker remittances are calculated as a percentage of Jamaica's gross domestic product, the country is among the top three CARICOM<sup>5</sup> countries, second to Guyana (Kirton 2005). They are also significant in terms of earnings in comparison with other income sources. By 2003, when remittances were US\$1.5 billion for the year, this had exceeded earnings from sugar and bauxite as the leading sources of foreign currency (IDB 2004).

### Remittances from migrants to the households they left

#### *Where are remittances sent from?*

There is a direct relationship between the countries where absent migrants live and the sources and levels of remittances received. The survey data indicate that just over half (51 per cent) of remittances came from absent migrants living in the US where the majority of Jamaican migrants are resident. Almost one fifth (18 per cent) of remittances were from UK while 6.5 per cent came from Canada. Cayman Islands accounted for about 5 per cent of remittances; there has recently been a high level of migration from Jamaica to Grand Cayman. The remainder came from other countries within the Caribbean region: Antigua, St Kitts/Nevis, Bahamas, Bermuda, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago and Turks and Caicos.

#### *How many migrants remit and how much do they send?*

It was reported that approximately two thirds of the absent migrants were remitting funds to the households of which they were members before migrating. Of those who were sending remittances, about 70 per cent sent funds to be used for the entire household, with 30 per cent sent for use by a particular member. Of those who reported having received remittances from absent migrants, almost all (97 per cent) reported that they were not required to repay funds to the remitter or donor.

During the year prior to the survey, about half (52 per cent) of the absent migrants who remitted funds contributed amounts totalling J\$20,000 (US\$285) or less (Table 17). Some 14 per cent contributed \$100,000 (US\$1,428) or more. The highest amount reported to have been received from absent migrants in the 12-month period was J\$250,000 (US\$3,572). The average amount remitted over the previous 12-month period was J\$44,801 (US\$640), with the median at J\$20,000 (US\$285). The total modal amount for these funds was J\$20,000 (US\$285). It should be noted that these were amounts received and since most of the funds were transferred through money transfer companies, certain costs were incurred for these services. If these costs could be reduced, the amounts received would rise at no additional cost to the remitter.

<b>Funds received (J\$)</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Less than 20,000	52.5
20,001–40,000	23
60,001–80,000	2.7
80,001–100,000	7.7
More than 100,000	14.2

<sup>5</sup> Caribbean Community

In addition, over one third (36 per cent) of the respondents indicated that they received remittances in the form of goods (in-kind transfers) from absent migrants. The average value of the total amount of goods (or in-kind transfers) sent for the year by absent migrants was assessed at \$18,873 (US\$274). Only 2.9 per cent of persons receiving remittances were required to repay the absent migrant for these in-kind remittances.

These receipts – both monetary and in-kind – were of major significance to the recipients themselves because of the typically low income levels of recipient households and the immediate use to which even such small sums of money were put in meeting expenses for basic needs (SLC 2006).

#### *How often are remittances sent?*

It was reported that approximately 55 per cent of the absent migrants who remitted funds did so only for special occasions. Of the other group of 'regular remitters', just under half sent funds at least monthly. Not unexpectedly, results show that absent migrants who sent money regularly were more likely to have sent larger amounts in total over the year than those sending occasionally. Some 89 per cent of the absent migrants who sent less than \$20,000 (US\$285) did so on special occasions only. Over 70 per cent of those that remitted over \$100,000 (US\$1,429) over the year had sent funds on a regular basis (Table 18).

Total funds received in past 12 months (J\$)	Frequency of remittances	
	Regular (%)	Special occasions (%)
Less than 20,000	10.8	89.2
20,001–40,000	70.4	29.6
60,001–80,000	40	60
80,001–100,000	100	0
More than 100,000	73.1	26.9

#### *How are remittances transferred?*

Western Union Remittance Services was the most widely used money transfer organisation (MTO) with about three quarters (73 per cent) of survey participants indicating that they received remittances from absent migrants through this company. Building societies were used by 13.6 per cent of recipients; some 3 per cent used the postal services; 5.7 per cent remitted funds via a traveller who could include a family member, relative or friends (Table 19).

<b>Table 19: Methods used by absent migrants for remitting money</b>		
	<b>Absent migrants from recipient's household</b>	<b>Other migrant donors not from recipient's household</b>
<b>Name of MTO</b>	<b>% of sample receiving money through MTOs</b>	
Western Union	72.8	68.1
Building society	13.6	13.6
Other banks	1.3	6.5
Postal service	3.1	1.9
Traveller	5.7	7.9
Other	3.5	1.9

### *Remittances receipts other than from absent household members*

In addition to remittances received from absent household members, some were received from other migrants. 37 per cent of Jamaica households indicated that they benefited from migration through receipt of remittances in cash and/or kind from persons other than absent migrants from their own households.

The nature of these remittances was, in many ways, very similar to those sent by absent migrants from the household. Half of the recipients of these remittances were sent the money from migrants living in the US. The next largest share was received from the UK (28 per cent), followed by Canada (9 per cent) and Cayman (6 per cent). The gender of the remitter was almost evenly distributed, with females accounting for 52 per cent. Also, most (69 per cent) of the respondents reported that their remittances from persons other than absent members of their own households were transferred via money transfer organisations, as shown in Table 19. The most popular MTO was Western Union, with over two thirds (68 per cent) of the respondents using this firm. The local post office was the least used method of transfer of funds reported, used by only 2 per cent of the respondents.

In other ways, however, these remittances appear different in nature to those sent by that household's absent migrants. Most of the recipients reported that they did not receive remittances from 'non-member remitters' on a regular basis – just over one third (38 per cent) reported receiving them regularly. This group of remitters were also less likely to send remittances to support the whole household – just over half (52 per cent) of the funds that were remitted from migrants other than household members were for specific household members. These trends seem to suggest that in many cases, remittances from non-household members may be more like gifts than income transfers.

### *Domestic remittances*

In addition to remittances received from persons living abroad, there were some domestic remittance flows, with 20 per cent of the respondents reporting receiving funds from within Jamaica. These amounts were, on average, J\$16,815 (US\$240) annually and ranged between J\$98 and J\$144,000 (US\$1.40–US\$2,057).

### *Reverse money transfers*

The survey data show that money transfers are normally received by households from migrants abroad rather than vice versa. Outward transfers were reported by only 3 per cent of the households surveyed. The amounts of the outward transfers over the year ranged from J\$3,000 to J\$14,200 (US\$43 to \$203).

### *Remittances to institutions*

As well as remitting to individuals and households, migrants have also been shown to remit to institutions such as schools, hospitals and religious organisations. Our survey asked returned migrants about their remittances to institutions and found that some 7 per cent of all returned migrants also had financial relationships with Jamaican organisations while they lived abroad (this data was only gathered for returned migrants). The majority of this group sent remittances to religious institutions, as shown in Table 20.

Type of organisation	Percentage
School	4
Community organisation	2
Religious organisation	68
Other	2
No response	24
Total	100

This shows that some, though a small number, of migrants have a relationship with community-level organisations, and that migration plays a small role in generating remittances for these institutions. We look into the development impacts of this further in Section 4.

## **Transnational communities**

While financial transfers made by migrants to their households and to others are the most prominent 'consequence' of migration, other consequences are also critical. One broader consequence are the personal relationships that migrants retain with people across borders, which can create 'transnational' identities for the migrant themselves and transnational communities of which the migrants are a part, along with people in Jamaica, to some extent overcoming the boundaries put in place by borders. These relationships that migrants have with people in Jamaica can be the conduit for all sorts of transfers. They may be the reason for sending remittances, but they may also result in non-financial transfers, such as new ideas or knowledge. One way of examining whether such communities exist is to look at the frequency and nature of contact between migrants and the households they left.


### **Absent migrants' contact while away**

The vast majority (98 per cent) of the households in the sample maintained contact with absent members abroad<sup>6</sup>. The frequency of contact was chiefly on a weekly basis (31 per cent) and some (28 per cent) even more frequently (Figure 9). This shows the strength of relationships between Jamaican migrants and the households they left, and the likely influence of these relationships on the way these households live

<sup>6</sup> We are only examining migrants who left in the last 10 years, and it seems likely that those who left longer ago may not retain such high levels of contact. Nonetheless, for almost 100 per cent of migrants who departed within the last 10 years to still be in contact with the households they left is a high figure, and suggests that many of those who left longer ago might also retain ties.

and their ideas. We look further into the developmental impacts of these transnational relationships in Section 4.

**Figure 9: Frequency of absent migrants' contact with household in Jamaica**



### Financial resources brought back by returned migrants

As well as transmitting remittances, ideas and knowledge while they were away, migrants have the potential to impact on development outcomes by bringing resources back with them when they return.

Upon their return to Jamaica, 77 per cent of the migrants reported that they brought savings back with them and 24 per cent of them continued to hold savings in a bank account in the country they had been living in. Some returned migrants are entitled to access the pension schemes of the countries they have been living and working in. Pensioners from the UK are one such group, with many receiving their monthly pensions in Jamaica. Our stakeholder interviews revealed that £62 million in pensions for return migrants from the UK was being transferred annually to Jamaica<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> Macroeconomic data would classify these pensions as remittances, but in our study we examine transfers from individuals and institutions such as pensions authorities separately.

## 4. Migration's development impacts

Having described the patterns of migration into and out of Jamaica and its consequences, we now take a look at how these phenomena appear to impact on development.

### Economic impacts

For many households, economic success is intimately bound up with migration. It has been argued that it is the main motivator behind movements (Terry 2005), a suggestion our data confirms for Jamaica. Moreover, much of the recent literature (for example, Ozden and Schiff 2006) has shown that migration is delivering what households want – it is associated with significant economic gains, at least for individuals and households. This project then examines whether these positive economic impacts are occurring in Jamaica. It looks at effects at a number of levels – effects on the migrant themselves and their households (and other households they have a relationship with), but also the broader effects at the level of the community or the national economy.

#### Living standards of the migrant

In the majority of cases (70 per cent) respondents felt that the material living standards of the absent migrants had increased substantially after they migrated; one fifth (20 per cent) assessed that their standards of living had at least remained the same or increased only slightly (see Table 22). In almost no cases was it thought to have fallen.

Standard of living compared with Jamaica	Percentage
Much better	70
Slightly better	14
Same	6
Somewhat worse	1
Don't know	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

The perception of the increase in living standards appears to have been affected by the employment status of the migrant prior to leaving Jamaica. Where migrants had held a non-managerial and non-supervisory position in Jamaica, respondents were more likely to suggest that their living standards had increased significantly. Indeed, for this group, every single migrant was perceived as experiencing an increased standard of living. These results are the for those who were in non-managerial and non-supervisory roles before departure. There were no reported cases of standards of living remaining the same or falling.

Material standards of living are an important 'umbrella' measure of the overarching economic impacts that migration is having. For such a great proportion of migrants to appear to have seen their living standards improve because of their experiences abroad is an important endorsement of the effects that migration has on the individual migrant<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> It should be noted that these are not the migrants' own perceptions of the change in their standards of living, but those reported by their households in Jamaica. However, other data suggests that these responses are probably a fairly accurate reflection of the real changes in living standards experienced by migrants. Such data includes Figure 9 which shows a high frequency of contact between absent migrants and their households, suggesting households are relatively well informed

### Living standards of households receiving remittances

As set out in Section 3, evidence from the household survey indicates that remittances sent home by migrants are principally small amounts. However, in the short run at least evidence suggests that these small amounts nonetheless provide economic benefits for the recipient individuals and households in adding to household budgets and maintaining and even possibly raising living standards<sup>9</sup>.

Regarding the usage of remittances, just under two thirds (63 per cent) of the respondents indicated that they used the money received via remittances in a similar manner to which they would use their regular wages and other income. Where the household members felt that usage differed, the most commonly reported uses of remitted funds were for child support and purchases of household goods<sup>10</sup>.

Use of remittances	Percentage
Child support	22.6
Education	6.6
Medical expenses	15.4
Funeral	3.6
Household business	5.2
Purchase household goods	35.4
Other	10.8

From the household's perspective there is no reason to believe that this use of remittances is anything other than optimal. However, policymakers may see the prioritisation of household goods as problematic if they are trying to move towards a more investment-oriented economy.

### Economic growth

Migration has the potential to contribute to economic growth in a number of ways. In particular, if migration results in net inflows of capital through remittances, this money has the potential to promote growth. If the funds are invested this should have a direct growth impact. However, even if they are not they can still indirectly boost the economy's growth potential. If saved, this increases the stock of funds in the financial system to be drawn on for investment, and if consumed, this can still have a positive effect on growth through the multiplier effect.

---

about their migrants' lives abroad, as well as data from returned migrants, who were asked the same question about their relative standard of living abroad. A large majority (72 per cent) of returned migrants also reported that migration improved their material standard of living, and only a very small number (4 per cent) reported a decline,

<sup>9</sup> The net effect on household budgets is not clear, as this paper does not calculate what the migrants' economic contribution to households might be if they had not left Jamaica. Future Development on the Move country reports will examine this in greater depth.

<sup>10</sup> It should be noted, however, that self-reported use of funds are only indicative. It may be that households subconsciously reallocate their budgets so that, for example, when remittances are spent on household goods, less wage income is allocated there – so a household's propensity to spend on different items may not change.



So which if any of these scenarios is playing out in Jamaica? The small amounts remitted and the small number of households allocating remittances specifically towards investment and savings (see Table 23) suggests that most of the funds go into consumption. However, consumption expenditure in Jamaica has a high import content. In 2006, imports of goods and services represented 75 per cent of total consumption expenditure, while in 2007 this figure increased to 76.7 per cent.<sup>11</sup> As a result, the multiplier effects of remittances may not be as strong as desired.

## Labour markets

### *Labour force participation*

Through its function as welfare support, remittances are also commonly perceived to have some undesirable effects on Jamaica's labour force participation. This was certainly an issue raised in our interviews with stakeholders, and previous work has corroborated their assumptions. Working with Jamaican household surveys for the 1995–2002 periods, Kim (2006) found negative links between increased remittances and labour supply decisions of Jamaican households. However, Bussolo and Medvedev (2007) argued that this link may not be a strong one and may depend on issues such as the gender and specific circumstances of the individual recipients.

Analysis of our household survey data also raised questions about the strength of this effect. Lucas and Chappell (2009), using Development on the Move data, found remittances were associated with lower labour force participation, but the effect was only small and not very statistically significant. It should also be noted that even though the reduction in labour supply by some remittance recipients (on account of the reduced necessity to work) may have some negative consequences, the decision as to whether or not to work is made by individuals in line with their own desires. If they choose not to work as they have other sources of income, we should assume that is the best course of action, at least from their own perspective, if not from that of government.

### *Brain drain*

Contrary to conventional views, some of which are expressed in the literature, the sample suggests that the majority of migrants have low levels of educational attainment. Data indicated above show that only 16 per cent of the absent migrants had attained university and other tertiary-level education. One of the reasons for the difference between perceptions and our findings is that perceptions tend to be based on the official statistics. These exclude the large numbers of persons moving who do not obtain landed immigrant status. Moreover, it appears data that indicate the high percentage of tertiary-level educated persons living abroad has been misinterpreted (Knight *et al* 2008). Among the national population of those who are educated at the tertiary level, there is a high rate of emigration. The rate of emigration of the secondary-level educated is also high. Of the total stock of Jamaicans with tertiary-level education, 82.5 per cent were in the OECD states; and of the total stock of Jamaicans with secondary education, 30 per cent were in the OECD States (Docquier and Marfouk 2004). However, this group only makes up a small part of overall flows. Lots of educated people leave – but this does not mean that everyone leaving is educated.

Unfortunately, this still means that Jamaica is losing many of the people who might make important contributions to the country's development, and implies that a substantial national investment in education is lost (Knight *et al* 2008). An unknown proportion of these persons would have obtained their qualifications while living abroad, but even taking this factor into consideration, it signals serious negative implications in terms of Jamaica building its human resource capacity for the labour force and national development generally.

---

<sup>11</sup> Calculated by authors using the World Bank 2008 country unit data

It should be noted, however, that many of those who leave do eventually return, as shown in Section 2, so their skills are not lost forever. Furthermore, Jamaica gains when persons return who obtained further qualifications abroad with little or no outflow of either public or private funds from Jamaica. Lastly, the possibility that 'brain gain' is taking place must be considered. If highly skilled people migrate and migration is something people aspire to do, then this may increase incentives to obtain skills in the first place. As a result, the net effect of brain drain might not be fewer skilled people in the country, but more. Some of the latest evidence (for example, Chand and Clemens 2008) shows this 'brain gain' taking place. If this occurring in Jamaica (a question this report does not examine) it does not change the fact that Jamaica has lost a substantial national investment in education, but it would mean that brain drain's overall effect on skill levels in Jamaica is positive, rather than negative.

### *Unemployment*

As noted previously, many of those leaving were employed or self employed before departure. In fact, currently absent migrants were more likely to fall into these categories than the average Jamaican (see Figure 3 and Table 9).

On the one hand this is bad news for unemployment – it means that Jamaica is not exporting its unemployed. On the other hand, there may be indirect impacts on unemployment. As so many emigrants were previously in work, they are probably creating job vacancies on their departure. To the extent that unemployed Jamaicans have the skills required to do these jobs, they may be able to move into the labour market to replace those leaving.

## **Educational impacts**

Many projects on the impacts of migration tend to focus on economic impacts. Here we go beyond that, to look at some of the social impacts, beginning with education.

### **Impact on educational achievement of the migrant**

Our data shows 32 per cent of respondents stating that absent migrants undertook some studies while living abroad, with around half of these (16 per cent overall) gaining qualifications. 86 per cent of those migrants had obtained further educational qualifications with 50 per cent reportedly obtaining a diploma, 10 per cent a certificate and 4 per cent a university degree (Table 24).

<b>Highest qualification that absent migrant had received while living abroad</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
University degree	4
Certificate	10
Diploma	50
Other	22
Don't know	12
No response	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Returned migrants were less likely to have obtained educational qualifications while abroad. 12 per cent studied while away, of whom just over half obtained qualifications. However, the achievements they

attained were of a higher level – 27 per cent of those who attained a qualification were awarded a degree (Table 25).

Highest level of qualifications of return migrants obtained abroad	Percentage
University degree	27
Certificate	33
Diploma	2
Other	18
No response	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

It should be noted that in almost no case did migrants report that they had taken qualifications as a formality, because their Jamaican qualifications were not being recognised abroad. While non-recognition of migrants' qualifications in destination countries is often perceived to be a problem for migrant communities in this case at least the overwhelming reason for studying was to gain new skills.

Migration appears, therefore, to have played a part in advancing the education of a small but significant number of absent and returned migrants. It is possible, however, that those same people might have obtained similar qualifications had they remained in Jamaica – we have not been able to examine this 'counter-factual' situation in this report.

#### Impact on household educational achievement

Our previous examination of remittance expenditure demonstrated that remittances are not allocated towards education in any heavily disproportionate way. Indeed, as shown in Table 22 above, of the households who indicated that they spent remittances differently to other sources of income, only 7 per cent highlighted education (though a further 23 per cent spent funds received from migrants on child support, which may include education-related costs). This compared with 35 per cent on the purchase of household goods (see Table 23 above).

However, it is worth noting that where the household was receiving remittances specifically from an absent member of their own household a greater focus was put on education and also child support. This may be because the absent migrant is a parent who has migrated with the specific intention of remitting money back for a child's education. Of remittances received specifically from absent migrants and which were allocated differently to funds from other sources, 14 per cent of their households spent remittances on education and 31 per cent on child support (Table 26).

Uses of remittances	Percentage
Child support	31
Education	14
Medical expenses	12
Investment in household business	4
Purchase of household goods	17
Other	9
No response	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

While most households did not allocate remittances towards education in any disproportionate way, remittances can still have a positive impact on spending on education. Where remittances simply add to household budgets (and most households indicate that they treat remittances in the same way as any other source of income), this will increase a household's spending across all areas, including education.

## Quality and reach of the educational system

### *Migrants' contributions to schools*

Stakeholders interviewed for this study pointed out that migrants did not only support the educational system by sending remittances to households but also in some cases provided resources directly to schools. Such contributions are usually made to specific schools with which the migrant has connections, usually as a past student. It has been suggested that if linkages with the Jamaican diaspora and returning residents were strengthened this could be a significant source of support for the education system.

One way in which migrants make financial contributions to education in Jamaica is through the Returning Residents Associations. These associations have implemented an 'Adopt a Child Programme', through which returned migrants and those still away can sponsor children in secondary schools in Jamaica by paying for school uniforms, books and other school materials. The reach of this programme is not clear, but some indication can be gleaned from our household survey, which asks returned migrants if while they were away they had supported institutions such as schools. 13 per cent indicated that they had sent money to institutions, but of this group, only 4 per cent supported a school. This translates into only 1 per cent of the sample of returned migrants as a whole. By comparison, 68 per cent of those sending money to institutions contributed to religious organisations, with which the links were stronger (this is equivalent to 9 per cent of all returned migrants). While the survey did not collect data on whether the returned migrants were supporting schools now, it seems likely that the level of support is somewhat similar, or at least not radically increased. This evidence suggests that efforts to use the diaspora and returned residents as a significant support to educational institutions face some barriers to success.

### *Teacher brain drain*

The respondents of the household survey were asked for their views on the impacts of migration. Respondents reflected the generally held view in Jamaica that education was negatively impacted by teacher migration. 67 per cent agreed that public education was suffering because of the high levels of teacher migration, which made it one of the topics upon which there was most agreement. Furthermore, among that 67 per cent, some 74 per cent believed that the situation was made 'much worse', indicating that they felt that the impact was severely negative. Again, this was one of the strongest reactions, with only one other statement eliciting a stronger response. Table 27 gives people's responses to the opinion statements and Table 28 indicates how important they feel each issue is for Jamaica.

Statements presented to respondents relating to the current situation in Jamaica	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Don't know (%)	No response (%)
Children are often neglected when their parents go to live in other countries	60	29	10	1
Important public services – like schools and hospitals – are offering poorer services because teachers, nurses and doctors are leaving the country	67	24	8	1
When people here see others migrating, many of them want to leave themselves	75	16	8	1
Because people see skilled people migrating, they are keener on studying because they think getting educated will help them to migrate	63	25	10	2
Receiving money from migrants makes people lazier – they don't want to work	56	36	7	1
Jamaicans living abroad provide support to the community (e.g. give money to a school or religious facilities)	52	28	18	2
When people who have lived abroad come back, they get involved in politics and social issues	21	48	30	1
Migration is creating global criminal networks, which makes crime worse here in Jamaica	56	28	15	1
People are moving to this country and doing important jobs that otherwise wouldn't get done	43	42	13	2
Government services are being affected because the government has to spend money caring for immigrants	39	36	2	3

What are the impacts of this trend on development in Jamaica?	It makes life here:					
	Much worse (%)	A bit worse (%)	Neither worse nor better (%)	A bit better (%)	Much better (%)	No response (%)
Children are often neglected when their parents go to live in other countries	62	25	4	5	3	1
Important public services – like schools and hospitals – are offering poorer services because teachers, nurses and doctors are leaving the country	74	20	3	1	1	1
When people here see others migrating, many of them want to leave themselves	47	20	16	11	4	2
Because people see skilled people migrating they are keener on studying, because they think getting educated will help them to migrate	40	14	8	19	15	4
Receiving money from migrants makes people lazier – they don't want to work	65	17	13	2	1	2

Jamaicans living abroad provide support to the community (e.g. give money to the school, or for religious facilities)	9	3	14	35	35	4
When people who have lived abroad come back, they get involved in politics and social issues	22	7	29	17	19	6
Migration is creating global criminal networks, which makes crime worse here in Jamaica	84	11	1	1		3
People are moving to this country and doing important jobs that otherwise wouldn't get done	21	11	9	26	25	8
Government services are being affected because the government has to spend money caring for immigrants	55	25	9	2	2	7

The view that teacher brain drain has a negative impact on the quality of education provided is corroborated by some important evidence. A study by Sives *et al* (2005) found that the quality of teaching in Jamaican schools has been negatively affected by teacher migration. Impacts can be indirect too; for example, the increased rate of teacher migration resulting from active, even aggressive, recruitment campaigns has had negative psychological impacts on those who remain within the sector (Thomas-Hope 2005).

On the other hand, the stakeholders interviewed in the present study were of the view that the development of tertiary education in Jamaica has been almost entirely dependent on contributions from returning highly educated migrants. It was expressed that most lecturers, tutors and top university administrators had received some of their higher education abroad. Again, however, we have no evidence as to what the contribution of these people would have been had they never left Jamaica. It is possible that they would have been involved in higher education anyway, though stakeholders were of the view that without their experiences abroad, the contributions of these educationalists would not have been as strong.

## Health impacts

### Health of members of migrant households

We begin by looking at impacts of migration on the health of households receiving remittances. As indicated above, where respondents indicated that remittances had not been allocated in the same way as any other source of income, 15 per cent stated that they allocated them towards medical expenses. This shows that increasing spending on healthcare is a mid-order priority for households, *vis-à-vis* other potential uses (see Table 23). As previously noted, however, where remittances simply add to household budgets (and most households indicate that they treat remittances in the same way as any other source of income), this will increase spending on all budget items, including healthcare.

### Reach and quality of healthcare system

While impacts of migration at the household level appear positive, the evidence suggests migration may have a negative impact on the provision of healthcare services. The high rates of migration of medical personnel, especially nurses, have placed considerable strain on the capacity of the health system to maintain quality services. That this is felt to be an issue was shown by responses to the opinion questions in the household survey, where most (67 per cent) were of the view that public health had worsened as a result of migration of health workers. Of this group, 74 per cent believed that the situation had been

made 'much worse' – again showing the strength of this opinion (see Tables 27 and 28). Stakeholders also held this view, with a majority being of the opinion that the provision of healthcare had declined because of migration of health workers.

Looking at the evidence from previous studies backs up this perception. A previous study found the main negative impact was staff shortages (measured in terms of nurse/patient ratios) (Mortley 2008) which were exacerbated, though not created, by migration. These had the effect of over-burdening the workloads and responsibilities of existing staff, which in turn led to high levels of staff absenteeism, reduced staff morale and, inevitably, a deteriorating quality of healthcare.

This health worker brain drain contributed to a situation in which there were just over 2,000 registered nurses in the Jamaican public healthcare system in 2008, when there should have been 4,500 (in the view of the Jamaica Nurses Association). To take one example: at the Bustamante Children's Hospital the 2008 nurse-patient ratio was 1 to 50, while the recommended acceptable ratio is 1 to 4 (see International Council for Nurses 2008). At the Kingston Public Hospital, the main referral hospital in Jamaica, one of the wards was reported to be at its maximum capacity of 63 beds. This ward was staffed with just two registered nurses, one ward assistant and one enrolled nurse (stakeholder interview).

Immigration has also played some part in addressing these shortages, however. Jamaica has seen the immigration of foreign nurses, chiefly from Cuba and Nigeria. Stakeholders did point out, though, that there were public concerns about language barriers potentially leading to mis-communication, mis-diagnosis and other errors being made.

The extent to which quality health and education are provided for also depends in part on the proportion of the public budget that government decides to invest in these areas. In health, although the government of Jamaica has recently taken the decision to make free basic healthcare available to all, there has also been a cut in the budget allocated to training health professionals. In 2008 the budget was reduced to J\$301 million from J\$322 million in 2007 (Jamaica Gleaner, March 2008). So while the emigration of teachers and health professionals appears to have placed additional strain on these sectors, it is not the sole cause of staff shortages. The question of whether more people have been attracted into the health sector than might otherwise have been the case if healthcare professionals did not find it so easy to migrate must also be considered. We do not present any evidence here, however, as to whether or not this is the case.

## **Gender impacts**

### **Gender roles in the household**

Section 2 showed high and rising levels of female migration. However, the implications of this for gender roles cannot be simply extrapolated. The role of migration in the consolidation versus the erosion and transformation of traditional gendered roles is multi-faceted and complex. Gender roles within Jamaica are not simple, and vary, for example, according to class. Layered on top of this complexity are the differentiated ways in which migration has in some cases been used by men and women as a strategy for meeting gender-based responsibilities while in other cases it has been used as a strategy for avoiding or changing inequitable gendered power relations within the family and wider society (Thomas-Hope 2002, 2008).

One set of findings from our survey illustrates the complexity of these issues. We found that many women are leaving, and their economic motivations for departure appear slightly stronger on the whole than men's. This can be interpreted as migration advancing their economic empowerment, and a number of stakeholders argued that migration has created greater opportunities and autonomy for women in Jamaica, offering them opportunities to increase their resources (both financial and personal). Remittances too were seen as advantageous to those women who receive them. According to one

stakeholder: 'remittances from migration empower women. They become less dependent on chauvinistic Jamaican men.'

However, while this may be true for middle-class Jamaican women, a more nuanced analysis suggests that migration probably did not have the same implications for lower-class families which have a significant number of men absent from the homes and where the female has always had greater economic responsibility for her children. Moreover, living abroad does not appear to have reduced women's caring responsibilities. Among the 31 per cent of absent migrants who were reported to be sending remittances home that were disproportionately allocated to child care around 63 per cent were women. This supports the view that women were, through their migration, still playing a traditional role in taking responsibility for the provision and care of children.

Stakeholders suggested, however, that returning female migrants tended to have different attitudes to the traditional class-based Jamaican gender roles. Such awareness, they suggested, came from educational opportunities abroad and also the experience of working and living in developed societies and interacting with people of different cultures. When women have returned to Jamaica they have brought these new experiences and expectations with them. This has influenced changes in the dynamics of the Jamaican family, especially among the middle classes.

### Societal gender roles

Migration also appears to have had an effect on gender roles in the public sphere, again partially through the educational opportunities migrants gained while abroad, increasing mobility and promotional opportunities within the work place when female migrants return. A study conducted by Brown (2007) in Jamaica found that return among middle-class and professional Jamaican women was accompanied by a changing dynamic within the workplace and that a number of females had moved into managerial positions at the executive level on their return.

### Other social impacts

#### Culture and norms

Most of the evidence we gathered on the cultural impacts of migration was positive. Most stakeholders, for example, felt that the Jamaican diaspora was well known for exporting its culture to other countries, building knowledge about Jamaica and even a 'brand image' for the country. Some stakeholders also felt immigration had had an impact – though small – by contributing to changes in racial and ethnic composition of society which has had the positive effect of increasing the racial and cultural diversity of the society. This has also led to the infusion of new values and coping strategies learnt by experiences from other multi-cultural societies, thereby boosting diversity and also knowledge of how to manage and value it.

Within corporate Jamaica, some stakeholders were of the view that immigrants and returning migrants often brought new values that served to challenge traditional values and thus caused some changes, for example to the work culture. This view is supported in the literature where migrants have been found to return home, taking back work habits, experience and attitudes as a result of the wider international professional exposure (Thomas-Hope 2002, 2006). These have a potential to benefit Caribbean societies. Unfortunately, levels of receptiveness were not always high, resulting in many returning professionals feeling under-valued and frustrated. As a result, many consider re-migrating.

In terms of political culture, nearly half the sample in the household survey (48 per cent) disagreed with the statement 'returning migrants are involved in politics or social issues in Jamaica'. A minority (21 per cent) agreed with it. Likewise, among the stakeholders more than half (53 per cent) disagreed with the statement and 22 per cent agreed. Stakeholders interpreted the perceived or observed lack of political



involvement on the part of many returning migrants as the result of their disappointment with Jamaican governance and politics.

### Social networks

Encounters with new persons of different socio-economic, cultural and ethnic backgrounds contribute to the changing character and expansion of social networks. The stakeholders in the present study agreed that when Jamaicans migrate they find numerous opportunities to enlarge their social networks through work, business transactions and other personal contacts. This expands their 'social capital' which has been found to be a major resource for migrants themselves (Thomas-Hope 2004, 2005). Expanding networks do not just benefit migrants, however. For example, research elsewhere, such as in Mexico, has found that the increasing extent of networks associated with migration progressively brought benefits to poorer members of the community (McKenzie 2006). Thomas-Hope argues that with respect to Jamaica, however, it is difficult to see any evidence of the social capital of migrant families and communities being effectively transferred to promote national development in this way (Thomas-Hope 2004).

While most migrants experience an expansion of their social networks through migration, one group differs dramatically. This is deported nationals, which arrive in significant numbers each year (see Table 5 above). As these persons are removed involuntarily from their networks abroad, they are ill prepared for returning to Jamaica (Griffin 2008, Headley 2005, Martin-Johnson 2008). Many have no contacts and limited social capital on returning and the formal support services in Jamaica are, likewise, ill-prepared to cope with those who are unable to establish themselves economically and socially. There is a need to do more to support this group, given their absence of social capital and coping strategies, both for their own good and to ensure that they are able to integrate into and become a productive part of Jamaican society.

### Family structure

Migration also appears to affect family structures, and our household survey provides a unique opportunity to examine what some of those changes look like. Among absent migrants in the present study, 57 per cent were either married or had a long-term partner (Table 29).

Marital status	Percentage
Married/long-term partner	57
No spouse or long-term partner	27
Don't know	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

In the case of more than half of this group (59 per cent), their spouses were living abroad with them (Table 30).

Location of domicile	Percentage
In this household	21
In another household in this country	19
With the migrant abroad	59
Don't know	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

It was also reported that 69 per cent of absent migrants had children (Table 31).

	<b>Percentage</b>
Have children	69
Don't have children	30
Don't know	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

About 35 per cent of that group had their children living abroad with them, with the rest living in Jamaica.

<b>Location of domicile</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
In this household	32
In another household in this country	31
Abroad	35
Elsewhere	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

The implications of these patterns are potentially serious, especially in light of the indication that 59 per cent of these migrants had their spouses living with them. This might mean that a number of children had both parents abroad (or that the children were not the offspring of the spouse).

Further, among those absent migrants who had children living in Jamaica, almost as many children (31 per cent) were living in a household other than the original household of the absent migrant (32 per cent) (Table 32). This could be explained by the fact that children would usually be left with female kin of the migrant who would not necessarily be in the same household as the migrant prior to his or her departure. Both the transfer of children from one household to another and the complexities of having one and maybe two parents living abroad, could lead to psychological stress for the child. It is these sorts of fears that appear to motivate concern about this trend by both respondents in the household survey and by stakeholders. A majority of household members polled (61 per cent) agreed that migration of parents had a largely negative impact on the family, and among stakeholders 74 per cent felt the same way.

Looking deeper into the effects of the separation of parents and children reveals some variability in views and nuances, however. Most stakeholders believed that migration of parents did negatively affect their children. It was suggested that it led to neglect, resulting in interruptions in the socialisation process, bad behaviour among children, poor performance at school and children turning to neighbourhood gangs in the search for a sense of belonging and family. Thus family structure was seen to be disrupted due to migration, resulting in broken homes and greater social ills for the wider society.

While this was the view of most, stakeholders differed in their analysis of the effects of mothers' and fathers' departures. Some argued that when mothers migrated the impact on children was greater, whereas others believed that absent fathers had a greater negative impact on the family. One person stated, 'I think that when men [versus women] move there is greater disruption of the family. I am speaking about older men who have families: when they migrate there is greater disruption and sometimes they even establish new families abroad.'

In contrast, another stakeholder argued that the Jamaican traditional family has systems in place to care for children when a parent had migrated. He said that generally grandparents successfully took on the responsibility of children when parents migrated and that the stereotype that children were neglected is merely an excuse used to explain many of the problems in society. Moreover, according to this perspective, while family structures might change to some extent on account of migration, this did not necessarily imply that there was significant disruption since close links were generally maintained over time due to ease of communication: the internet and telephone ensure that people remained in touch and cheaper airfares enable frequent travel, so that family links can be maintained. The data from our survey presented in Section 3 shows that contact between households and absent family members is indeed very frequent in most cases.

However, while contact might be frequent between absent migrants and their households, the literature tends to concur with the view that the effects of separation are nonetheless negative. Crawford-Brown (1993), in a comparative study of delinquent and non-delinquent male adolescents in Jamaica, found a preponderance of absent mothers (86 per cent) in the delinquent group versus 13 per cent in the non-delinquent group. Pienkos (2006) has found that the absence of males from Caribbean families due to migration threatens their stability. However, further research would be required before the complexities of this relationship could be fully understood.

### Personal security and crime

On the one hand migration appears to be strengthening security in Jamaica through the peace-building activities of the diaspora. Cunningham's 2006 study of the Jamaican diaspora argued that Jamaicans in the diaspora already contribute by providing financial assistance and skills training, and he notes that more could be done towards other aspects of peace building, such as advancing the protection of human rights and promoting political participation. Cunningham concludes, however, that it would require considerable effort in order to implement an effective programme.

On the negative side, international criminal networks are entwined with the migration process. This has been recognised and is starting to be addressed, with the President of the Association of Commissioners of Police emphasising that international cooperation in this regard is in development. Among the initiatives that have already begun are border enforcement training provided by Canada; the development of a regional database system, in collaboration with the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations; and the establishment of computer-assisted labs to assist in investigating cyber crime (Jamaica Gleaner, December 2007).

However, stakeholders felt that migration was only one factor contributing to increasing global criminal networks. One said: 'I think the problem is due to other factors like technology and the internet and media. That may be more a contributing factor to crime in Jamaica.' Poverty levels were also thought significant. Where migration was deemed a factor, it was believed to contribute not so much to increasing criminal activities per se, but more to facilitating a greater variety and sophistication of criminal techniques.

The other key aspect of the relationship between crime and migration relates to deportees. The public view is that the large number of deportees returned to Jamaica annually has contributed to the increased incidence and variety of crimes committed within the country. While the full impact of deportation is difficult to measure, the public perception that deportees are a menace to society can result in deportees being shunned and even excluded from mainstream society. This exacerbates the situation by encouraging deported persons to resort to underground activities for survival (Headley 2005, Martin-Johnson 2008).

## 5. Policy

This section examines current policies of three kinds:

- Migration-related policies of the Government of Jamaica
- Other domestic policies that have an effect on migration and its development impacts
- Policies of other countries that have an impact on migration and development in Jamaica.

### Migration-related policies

The Government of Jamaica currently has a framework for migration involving five main pieces of legislation (dating from 1946), along with certain policies and programmes that have been implemented over the years. In general the emphasis has been on border control, facilitating short-term labour emigration and encouraging return migration.

#### Immigration and border control

The two principal laws governing international migration in Jamaica focus on controlling immigration. These are the *Aliens Act* (28 February 1946) and the *Immigration Restriction (Commonwealth Citizens) Act* (27 December 1954). These laws were developed in pre-independence Jamaica and reflect the realities and prejudices of the period. While the Acts have provided a general framework for border management controls and security, they fail to adequately address the changing dynamics and current operational challenges of international migration. Moreover, the distinction between Commonwealth Citizens and Aliens as a basis for separate legislative enactments is questionable given the new realities of international relations and migratory movements.

The *Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth Citizens (Employment) Act, 1964*, or Work Permit Act, is designed to fulfil local labour market needs by recruiting from the international market. The majority of workers recruited each year by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security belongs to the category of Professionals, Senior Officials and Technicians. As noted previously, this has assisted somewhat in alleviating the impact of the brain drain on the labour market. In recent years there have been noticeable increases in the number of work permits granted in most occupational categories. This may be due to the impact of globalisation and the requirement for certified workers by most foreign enterprises operating in Jamaica. However there is the view that '...the work permit system essentially allows foreigners to come to Jamaica and displace Jamaican workers...' and the present administration has acknowledged the need for tighter administration of the Act to prevent breaches from occurring (Planning Institute of Jamaica 2008).

The *Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Free Movement of Persons Act, 1997* under the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) has been enacted in all CSME member states. The provisions are being implemented in different stages. Under current agreements, persons with university degrees and other designated categories of workers are permitted to move and work in any territory in the CSME states. The freedom to live and work throughout the CSME is granted by the Certificate of Recognition of CARICOM Skills Qualification/CARICOM Skills Certificate. The Skills Certificate replaces the work permits. The full implementation of all the provisions for the free movement of all persons is expected to be realised later this year.

In spite of some initial concerns by some member states, the implementation of the provisions seems to be proceeding without any major distortions. However, the heads of governments need to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to monitor the implementation of the free movement provisions in order to serve the labour market and developments needs of member states.

The *Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Suppression and Punishment) Act* became law in 2007. The Act is intended to institute provisions for preventing, suppressing and punishing persons involved in human

trafficking. The Act was initiated on the basis of reported cases of people (especially women and girls) being trafficked. The majority of detected cases were women and girls from rural areas who were being trafficked primarily for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labour as domestics. However, the numbers being trafficked across international borders could not be easily determined.

The US Department of State in its annual report on Human Trafficking (2006) reclassified Jamaica downwards, effectively placing the country in a position for possible sanctions if appropriate actions were not implemented to correct the situation. Following certain steps taken by Jamaica its classification was reversed in 2007 (Jamaica Gleaner, 14 June 2007).

While the implementation of the Act has so far addressed internal trafficking it has not yet provided a basis for dealing with cross-border trafficking of persons. For the Act to be effective in this area, it seems that greater scrutiny of cases requesting work permits will have to be practised.

### **Short-term labour mobility programmes**

Jamaica is one of the countries supplying temporary/seasonal workers to the US and Canada and has been doing so for over three decades. The workers are generally low skilled and are employed mainly in agriculture, factories and in recent years service-related work. These programmes are the USA Farm Work Programme, the USA Hospitality Programme, the Canadian Farm and Factory Work Programme and the Canadian Skilled Worker Programme.

The programmes were established on the basis of certain contractual agreements between the Government of Jamaica and the relevant parties in the US and Canada. They meet the objective of providing some employment for low-skilled Jamaican workers. Benefits to the country also involve a saving plan whereby 23 per cent of workers' earnings are deposited with the government in foreign exchange. Workers access their saving in Jamaican currency after a period.

Over time the programmes have evolved with the skills and occupational profile of workers, and the jobs in the programmes have all become more diversified. These changes reflect demographic and labour market shifts experienced in the recipient countries with little or no consideration being given to the labour market conditions of the sending state.

Alongside these formal seasonal short-term employment programmes are various informal work arrangements. These involve mainly students and professionals who migrate during their vacations and take a variety of jobs. Indications are that developed countries may develop more short-term employments programmes involving highly skilled and professional workers as a policy option for the future.

### **Bonding**

Bonding is a policy instrument used by the Government of Jamaica to secure, for given periods, the services of persons following government-assisted courses of study. The length of the bonding period is dependent on the level of financial assistance provided. The national policy is executed by the Department of the Public Service, Ministry of Finance. Different ministries, agencies and departments of government, however, have the authority to modify the generic policy to serve their particular institutional requirements. These modifications are not expected to differ fundamentally from the conditions and agreements specified in the generic policy.

Bonding as a policy instrument for securing the labour of persons studying locally has been fairly successful. However, it has not been very successful for students who studied overseas. A significant proportion of these students have remained in the countries in which they studied, many having used

repayment of the bond as a strategy to avoid returning to Jamaica. Therefore, a high proportion of the Jamaican population with tertiary-level education is lost to the country.

For bonding to be a more effective instrument, greater collaboration and consultation with the overseas institutions and international funding agencies for ensuring adherence to the bonding conditions would have to be pursued. Stricter measures on violation of the conditions of the bond would also have to be implemented, with Jamaica also ensuring suitable employment upon return of those under bonding.

### Programmes for return migration

Two programmes were introduced in the early 1990s to encourage and facilitate the return of Jamaican migrants even for a limited period. The Return of Talent Programme, funded by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), was implemented up to 1998 to offer several types of incentives (allowances, insurance, salary subsidies and so on) to highly qualified professionals to fill vacant positions in the public sector. Persons were expected to remain a minimum of two years in the post permitting a transfer of knowledge and skills to take place. Around 60 persons were recruited under the programme.

The Returning Residents Programme which began in 1993 and is still in operation seeks to facilitate the return of Jamaican nationals by *inter alia* provision of a range of information, for example, on jobs and investment opportunities. Services such as the maintenance of a skills bank and links with prospective employers in Jamaica were also provided. The programme is operated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade through its offices overseas. Between 2003 and 2007 official statistics show returning residents averaging 1,250 per annum (Planning Institute of Jamaica 2007), though it is not clear to what extent these people were influenced by the returning residents programme.

### Programmes for the diaspora

Major initiatives have recently been undertaken to mobilise the diaspora, strengthen its linkages with home, and enhance its contribution to national development. A Jamaican Diaspora Foundation was launched in 2004, and a Jamaican Diaspora Board in 2005. Bi-annual conferences are also being convened. This is spearheaded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, with Missions in the main destination countries having been assigned community relations officers to assist the diaspora in various ways, including the settlement or resettlement of migrants, promoting rights and helping the sick and those imprisoned abroad.

Stakeholders were sceptical as to the extent to which migration policies were really shaping migration trends. Many felt that at present, people's decisions around migrating and their actions while they were away were determined much more by other factors, such as their personal circumstances, national development trends in Jamaica and in potential countries of destination, and other kinds of policy besides migration policy. We turn now, then, to consider other relevant policies.

### Other relevant domestic policies

Migration policies are not the only relevant domestic policies in shaping migration's development impacts. Stakeholders emphasised the importance of structures and policies that affect Jamaica's reputation and profile, and its ability to meet its citizens' needs. In particular, policies that shape working conditions were felt to be important, in order to stem brain drain of professionals such as nurses.

In addition to these policies it is also important to recognise the importance of policies that tackle the phenomena that migration creates or aggravates – both positive and negative. On the positive side, policies around remittances are vital, as well as financial sector policies that might help to promote the more productive use of remittances. On the negative side, policies that touch on the social problems that

migration appears to aggravate are important, in particular those affecting troubled families, deportees, and international criminal networks.

Lastly, data policies are also vital. The knowledge base available to the authorities is crucial for being able to formulate appropriate responses to the migration phenomenon. However, the current state of fragmented and inadequate data was seen as preventing the government and others gaining a sound appreciation of the problems at both the micro or macro levels. Our own survey work should hopefully help to fill this data gap to some extent, but there is room for policy to do more.

### Host country migration policies

As suggested in Section 2 the immigration laws and policies of Jamaica's main destination countries, namely the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, have a significant impact on the volume and trends of the country's migratory outflows, and more recently also on its inflows through the deportation of persons. Strict controls by all three countries in this regard have resulted in the deportation of approximately 3,000 persons to Jamaica annually. Approximately half of this group has been deported for criminal activities and the vast majority of these crimes are drug-related (Planning Institute of Jamaica 2007).

Immigration laws and policies for permanent residence in the US aim to satisfy four basic requirements:

- to unite families by admitting immigrants who already have family members living in the US
- to admit workers in occupations with strong demand for labour
- to provide refuge for people who face the risk of persecution in their home country
- to provide admission to people from a diverse set of countries.

(Immigration Policy in the United States, February 2006)

Programmes for short-term and seasonal work in the US have also been diversifying in recent years, this being one of the strategies for coping with the emerging shortages in the US labour market. Another strategy is the wholesale recruitment of professionals, particularly teachers and nurses, through employment services offered in the home country.

Canadian immigration laws and policies for both permanent and short-term migration are structured around three main categories. These are economic needs, family reunification and refugees. The largest volume of immigrants is admitted under the economic category. Preference (based on a points system) is given to persons with higher levels of education, job experience and competences in English and French. The second biggest category is family reunification, followed by refugees (Smick 2006). The strong preference for high-talent manpower to meet labour market needs has led to a decline in the volume of migration from Jamaica to Canada since the 1990s. It has also altered the nature of official migration streams.

The Canadian short-term worker programmes are also undergoing some changes. Recruitment, while continuing in the farm and factory schemes, has been diversifying to include construction and trades. In light of the Canadian push for economic expansion and its relatively small working-age population, the prospect for expanded recruitment of labour from Jamaica on short-term programmes is highly probable.

Immigration laws and policies in the UK are currently undergoing reform and modification, particularly for the entry of non-European Union (EU) workers. Jamaicans are now required to apply for visas to enter the UK. The UK has also introduced a points-based system which gives preference to migrants with certain economic characteristics and skills profiles. Stricter rules on work permits and 'group' migration were also introduced. Migrants who are travelling for the purpose of family reunification are also required to obtain clearance prior to entering the country.



Jamaica has been receiving a net inflow of migrants from the UK for almost two decades. This is a result of a decline in Jamaican migration to the UK, while deportees and returning residents have been growing in numbers. Furthermore, the recent upsurge in the recruitment of nurses and teachers from Jamaica may be slowing down somewhat due to stricter regulations in the UK and the agreements reached with respect to the Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers (2003) and the Commonwealth Teacher Recruitment Protocol (2004).

Nonetheless, the demographic conditions for facilitating the possible increase in the volume of Jamaican migration to the UK are present. The current movement of population from other EU states to the UK is not likely to continue for very long. Border security and threat of terrorism may serve to restrict population flows from Asia. The Caribbean is still one of the safest pools of surplus labour available for international recruitment. Joint policies and programmes, however, are critically necessary to manage recruitment and movement, both to the UK and to other major destination countries.

### **Policy recommendations**

In our view, the policy framework described above is not sufficient to maximise the development benefits presented by migration to and from Jamaica and minimise the costs. Changes in the framework are therefore necessary. We believe that policy changes must, however, respect the basic principle that individual freedom should not be restricted by attempts to manage migration.

A set of policies and approaches to policy are recommended below under five headings:

- Improving Jamaica's attractiveness
- Making emigration work for Jamaica
- Making immigration work for Jamaica
- Engaging the diaspora
- Optimising migration's impacts.

While further work is required to develop the policy identified into implementable policy, we believe that pursuing these lines of thinking would go some way to addressing the issues and impacts highlighted in the previous sections.

#### **Improving Jamaica's attractiveness**

The first area of policy that requires attention is around improving Jamaica's attractiveness, both to people who might be thinking of leaving and to those who might consider returning or immigrating to Jamaica. This approach acknowledges the fact that migration is driven by the desire for personal advancement and seeks to make Jamaica better able to fulfil these desires. This is an appropriate way of responding to migration not only because it should be effective but also because it works with, rather than against, individual freedoms and choice – providing potential migrants with more desirable choices about where to live. It should also have spill-over effects as improving Jamaica's attractiveness to potential migrants will help to improve life for all Jamaican citizens, even those who have no intention of leaving. In other words, a policy approach to make Jamaica attractive to citizens who have left or are thinking of leaving can be part of an over-arching development agenda that benefits everybody.

Improving Jamaica's attractiveness would involve, firstly, promoting development. Given that most people leave in order to pursue economic opportunities, promoting development, which entails expanding economic opportunities within Jamaica, should help to increase Jamaica's attractiveness. This report has not examined Jamaica's existing national development strategies in detail and so we do not provide an explicit assessment of the extent to which they will promote development, but it is clear that this research adds fresh impetus for the need for policies that can effectively promote sustainable development in Jamaica.



More specific policy measures that may help boost Jamaica's attractiveness include improving terms and conditions of work in key sectors, as well as opportunities for career advancement. The need for improved service conditions and career prospects were particularly noted in relation to nurses. However, modifying local labour market conditions is not just the responsibility of government, but also of employers, who need to respond to an internationally competitive labour market. In the case of teachers and nurses, however, the main employer is, of course, the government.

The problem with this approach is that the competition is inherently inequitable where it takes place between developed and developing countries. To have a greater chance of success, therefore, would also involve promoting the Jamaican 'brand', especially to persons overseas, enhancing the image of the country and marketing it as a desirable place of residence. Jamaica must combine the two strategies – not just competing with other countries on pay levels and working conditions, where it has a natural disadvantage, but combining this with emotive factors such as the preference for 'home', the 'ideology of return', and other areas in which it has some perceived competitive advantage (such as better climate and more attractive cultural provisions).

### **Making emigration work for Jamaica**

Most importantly, in light of the expected growth in demand by developed countries for labour from the region, CARICOM needs to form a united alliance for negotiating policy positions and outcomes with developed countries that will serve the development needs of both parties. Negotiating together will strengthen the hand of all CARICOM members.

As well as altering negotiating strategies there is also a need to try to change patterns of emigration, to move towards increased circular migration so that emigrants are not permanently lost to the country. This could be based on co-development agreements with recipient countries as to the type of skills needed and the length of stay. This implies a number of things.

Firstly, the maintenance of current recipient-driven short-term mobility programmes and agreements is not advisable. The programmes need to be reconfigured and integrated into the broader context of a co-development paradigm and policy framework. This would include measures to recompense Jamaica for its education and training investments.

Secondly, co-development policies could also include professional 'exchange' programmes, such as teacher exchanges, whereby teachers from Jamaica and the US, Canada and the UK could undertake work placements in one another's countries. This would allow for professionals to migrate in a circular fashion through a structured programme. This programme could be designed to help the participants share their knowledge while they were away, maximise their own learning from their experiences, and help them to share new skills and perspectives gained from migration when they return to Jamaica.

Thirdly, for bonding to be a more effective instrument, greater collaboration and consultation with the overseas institutions and international funding agencies for ensuring adherence to the bonding conditions would have to be pursued. Stricter measures on violation of the conditions of the bond would also have to be implemented. The country should also ensure suitable employment upon return of those under bonding.

This takes us to the fourth measure. For a proactive co-development policy to be effective it should involve local human development provisions, career guidance and job placement services, all linked to the global labour market. Job placement to utilise the skills and experience of migrants upon return would also be essential. This could involve modifying the Return of Talent and Returning Migrants Programmes to establish a more comprehensive package of advice and support.

An overall package of this type would represent an effective strategy for structuring a good portion of the migratory outflow, while increasing the chances of Jamaica benefiting from the return of an enhanced labour pool.

### **Making immigration work for Jamaica**

It is desirable to have a comprehensive review of the two immigration laws in light of current realities and best practices, and to develop an integrated and comprehensive law on immigration. The new immigration law could make a distinction between Jamaicans/CARICOM nationals and other nationals or foreigners, with the distinction between Commonwealth citizens and other foreign nationals being eliminated. The new legislation should also address issues of trafficking of persons, smuggling of migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and other pertinent migration categories and issues. Specific issues that this new approach would have to address include those around immigration for work, and trafficking.

Firstly, the administration of the Work Permit Act appears to have been fairly effective in supporting the needs of the local labour market. Importation of skills has been driven largely by private arrangements, with the exception of the health sector, where medical personnel have been recruited by the government. However, problems noted in the study include language barriers, as well as the need to ensure that local job seekers are not overlooked for positions they can fill. This suggests that stricter implementation of the Act is necessary, with greater attention given to ensuring that work permits are granted only in situations where local expertise does not exist. The government has signalled its intention to do this and we support its implementation. Additionally, in keeping with the proactive approach in managing emigration, a similar stance should be adopted in entering into agreements to meet local skill shortages. This should include agreements between developing countries as well as others.

Secondly, while progress has been made in relation to tackling human trafficking, this requires further attention. The Trafficking in Persons Act should be reviewed and any requisite modifications introduced to make it a more effective tool for handling cross-border cases.

### **Engaging the diaspora**

The diaspora has been recognised as a vital feature of Jamaican society. Our research has shown the variety of ways in which the diaspora interact with people remaining in Jamaica, and some of the impacts – many positive – that this appears to have. These impacts are, however, dependent on engaging with the diaspora through official and unofficial channels. While family interaction is already strong, as shown by our research, it seems more could be done formally. The government has made recent initiatives to strengthen the ties of Jamaican groups with home and assist them in various ways. However, these initiatives could be strengthened into efficient and effective communication channels, in order to optimise mutual developmental benefits.

While further thought is required to ensure that potential initiatives are effective and efficient, more could be done, for example, to facilitate the cheaper transfer of remittances. Another proposal worth exploring is whether there should be some mechanism to tax Jamaicans working abroad in order to generate government revenue – though it should be noted that such a proposal would be highly contentious. Government could also try to gain diaspora support for development initiatives, for example through funding projects for urban renewal, infrastructure upgrading, and in education and training. Such efforts would need to bear in mind, however, the evidence presented in Sections 3 and 4 of the report which showed low levels of diaspora involvement at present in these sorts of activities. This suggests that policy would need to create a real step change in the extent to which the diaspora support to these kind of initiatives, if they are to provide significant contributions to development. Thinking too about the role policy can play in assisting in the development of the diaspora suggests that more efforts could be made to better protect their human rights.

### Optimising migration's impacts

To ensure migration makes the maximum positive contribution to development in Jamaica a number of measures need to be put in place to ensure that migration and the phenomena it creates have impacts that are as positive as possible.

Firstly, this means that persons returning – particularly returning retirees and deportees – must be socially re-integrated. Currently there are only skimpy provisions designed towards this end. Returning residents' organisations are private associations that assist, as does the Government's Returning Residents Programme. Programmes to assist deportees are similarly focused in the private and voluntary sectors. These may be enhanced with more emphasis on identifying how to facilitate deeper involvement and participation in the local social and political milieu. For deportees in particular, additional services may be required to address personal needs, whether physical, social or psychological.

Secondly, those left behind – particularly children – must be assisted, given the evidence that departure of parents can be problematic. There is clear need for a policy that enables the authorities to be aware of the circumstances in which children are left as a result of migration. This will be difficult to obtain but initiatives to maintain contacts with the diaspora offer the best chance of getting this information, and these should be pursued. Services to families and households left behind by migrants would need to be put in place to meet their various needs, and this should include sensitisation of the socio-psychological impact of migration on dependents, especially children. This should be done before migrants leave the country so that necessary preparations may be made to offset the negative effects as much as possible. It could also be combined with any provision of general parenting education.

To design these efforts, best practices in relation to such family services in other countries should be identified and evaluated in terms of their appropriateness for adoption in Jamaica. It is important to explore how such measures would be funded, and whether, if households gain financially from migration through remittances, it is desirable and possible to use some of these funds for this purpose. Some measures to mitigate negative impacts on children are not expensive, however – migrants should be encouraged and assisted to take full advantage of the family reunification policies of the destination countries.

Thirdly, the impact of the economic transfers of migrants can be maximised by a number of measures. The government could explore setting up programmes to educate people in the best use of remittances. It is also recommended that financial institutions offer attractive savings with special rates to encourage people to save their remittances, to help with the channelling of remittances into investment.

## 6. Concluding summary

This report has made clear the importance of migration to Jamaican society.

As with every study, this report has not been able to provide definitive answers as to the range of migration's impacts on development, but new evidence has been presented and linked to the policy context; we hope that it will provide useful information for policymakers and others interested in optimising migration's development impacts.

Optimising impacts is nonetheless an inherently difficult task because different people are affected differently by migration. The evidence presented in the report suggests that in Jamaica, migration's impacts on the migrants themselves are generally positive. Effects on their households generally appear positive too, though with an important caveat for effects on children, which appear negative in a number of cases where migration separates the child from its parents.

Effects on Jamaican communities and society at large are less clear, but the evidence suggests that effects are more differentiated and varied than is often thought. Migration appears to have an effect on labour force participation, gender roles, working practices, cultural values and many other aspects of Jamaican life. All of these are complex, and some seem to be positive and some negative.

In addition, though, while the balance of impacts on people remaining in Jamaica is vital, this must not be the only consideration in making policy relating to migration and development. Migration provides freedoms to Jamaican people to pursue their personal goals and this remains an important priority. Inherent in this freedom is the fact that, at the level of the individual, migration is not pursued as an option when it ceases to be perceived as beneficial. The greatest challenge to policy, therefore, is to ensure that Jamaicans' freedom to move elsewhere – which appears on the whole to deliver effectively what migrating Jamaicans want from it – also enhances life for those remaining behind to as great an extent as possible.

## References

- Bank of Jamaica (2007) *Bank of Jamaica Quarterly Monetary Policy Report*, October - December 2007, Volume 8 No. 3
- Bolles L (1981) 'Going abroad: Working class Jamaican women and migration,' in Bryce-Laporte and Mortimer (eds.) *Female immigrants to the United States: Caribbean, Latin America and African experiences* Washington D C.: Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Institution
- Brown M (2007) *I did not come to count the cows, I came to drink the milk: The influence of an intent to return on the migration experience of foreign educated, middle class Jamaicans* Doctoral dissertation, New York: Columbia University
- Bussolo M and Medvedev D (2007) *Do Remittances Have a Flip Side? A General Equilibrium Analysis of Remittances, Labor Supply Responses and Policy Options for Jamaica* Development Prospects Group, Washington, D C.: The World Bank
- Chand S and Clemens M (2008) *Skilled Emigration and Skill Creation: A quasi-experiment*, Working paper 152, Washington DC: Centre for Global Development
- Chappell L and Sriskandarajah D (2007) *Mapping the Development Impacts of Migration. Development on the Move: Working Paper 1* London: Institute for Public Policy Research, available at [www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=621](http://www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=621)
- Cohen R (1997) *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* London: University College London Press
- Connell J and Brown R (2005) *Remittances in the Pacific: An Overview* Asian Development Bank
- Crawford-Brown C (1993) *Study of the Factors Associated with the Development of Conduct Disorder in Jamaican Male Adolescents*. MPhil Thesis, Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Economic and Social Studies, University of the West Indies
- Cunningham R (2006) 'Impacting peace building and development in Jamaica: Addressing challenges and opportunities encountered by the Jamaican Diaspora', in *Diaspora Conference Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of the Diaspora*. Toronto Canada, 19–20 October
- Docquier F and Marfouk A (2004) *Measuring the International Mobility of Skilled Workers*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 3381, Washington D.C.: The World Bank
- Figueroa M (2008) 'Migration and Remittances: Typologies and Motivations', in Thomas-Hope E (ed.) *Freedom and Constraint in Caribbean Migration and Diaspora* Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers
- Gmelch G (1992) *Double Passage: The Lives of Caribbean Migrants Abroad and Back Home* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
- Griffin C E (2008) 'From Immigration to De-Integration to Re-Integration in the Caribbean: Exploding the Deportee Phenomenon', in Thomas-Hope E (ed.) *op. cit.*
- Headley B *et al* (2005) *Deported, Vol 1: Entry and Exit Findings Jamaicans Returned Home from the US Between 1997 and 2003* Kingston: Stephenson Litho Press

- International Council for Nurses (2008) 'Nurse: patient ratios', web page at [www.icn.ch/matters\\_rnpratio.htm](http://www.icn.ch/matters_rnpratio.htm)
- Kim N (2006) *Impact of Remittances on Labor Supply: The Case of Jamaica*. Background Paper for Jamaica Poverty Assessment: Breaking the Cycle of Unemployment, Vulnerability, and Crime, Washington D C.: The World Bank
- Kirton C (2005) 'Remittances: The experiences of the English-speaking Caribbean' in Terry DF and Wilson SR (eds.) *Beyond Small Change. Making Migrant Remittances Count* Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank
- Knight P, Williams E and Kerr S (2008) 'An Assessment of the Emigration of Highly Skilled Workers from Jamaica' in Thomas-Hope E (ed.) *op cit.*
- Lucas R and Chappell L (2009) *Measuring Migration's Development Impacts: Preliminary evidence from Jamaica*, Development on the Move: Working Paper 2. London: Institute for Public Policy Research, available at [www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=648](http://www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=648)
- Maingot A (1999) 'Emigration dynamics in the Caribbean: The cases of Haiti and the Dominican Republic' in Appleyard R (ed.) *Emigration Dynamics in developing countries*. Vol. 3, London: Ashgate
- Martin-Johnson S (2008) 'Involuntary and coerced migration of "deportees" coming "homeward": NGOs as actors in reintegration policy in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic' in Thomas-Hope E (ed.), *op cit.*
- McKenzie D (2006) 'Beyond remittances: The effect of migration on Mexican Households', in Ozden C and Schiff M (eds.) *International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain* Washington D.C.: The World Bank
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Report on Returning Residents Programme, undated.
- Momsen J (1992) 'Gender selectivity in Caribbean migration' in Chant (ed.) *Gender and Migration in Developing Countries* New York: Belhaven Press
- Mortley N (2003) *Gender Relations within the Household and the Migration Decisions of St. Lucian Women*, MPhil thesis, St. Augustine Campus, The University of the West Indies, Trinidad and Tobago
- Mortley N (2008) 'Nurse migration and the impact on the health system in the Caribbean: St. Lucia and Jamaica' in Thomas-Hope E (ed.) *op cit.*
- Ozden C and Schiff M (eds.) (2006) *International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain* Washington D.C.: The World Bank
- Philpott SB (1973) *West Indian Migration: The Montserrat Case* New York: Humanities Press
- Pienkos A (2006) *Caribbean Labour Migration: Minimizing Losses and Optimizing Benefits* Port of Spain: International Labour Office, International Labour Organization
- Planning Institute of Jamaica (1972) *Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica (ESSJ)*

- Planning Institute of Jamaica (1996) cited by Mars P and Young A (eds.) (2004) *Caribbean labour politics: Legacies of Cheddi Jagan and Michael Manley* Wayne State University Press
- Planning Institute of Jamaica (2007) *Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica (ESSJ)*
- Sassen S (1984) 'Notes on the Incorporation of women into wage labour through immigration and offshore production' *International Migration Review*, Vol. 18, 4:1144-1167
- Sassen S (1998) *Globalization and its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of people and Money* New York: New Press
- Shepherd V (1998) *Women in Caribbean History the British-colonised Territories* Kingston: Ian Randle
- Sives A, Morgan J, Appleton S and Bremmer R (2006) 'Teacher Migration from Jamaica: Assessing the short-term impact', *Caribbean Journal of Education*, Vol 27. No.1, 85-166
- Smick E (2006) 'Canada's Immigration Policy', cited in [www.cfr.org/publication](http://www.cfr.org/publication)
- Terry DF (2005) 'Remittances as a Development Tool', in Terry DF and Wilson SR (eds.) *Beyond Small Change. Making Migrant Remittances Count* Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank
- Thomas-Hope E (1986) 'Transients and settlers: varieties of Caribbean migrants and the socio-economic implications of their return', *International Migration*, Vol. 24, 3: 559-572
- Thomas-Hope E (1999) 'Emigration dynamics in the Anglophone Caribbean', in Appleyard R (ed.) *Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries: Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean* London: Ashgate
- Thomas-Hope E (2002) 'Transnational livelihoods and identities in return migration to the Caribbean: the case of skilled returnees to Jamaica', in Sorensen N and Olwig KF (eds.) *Work and Migration: Lives and Livelihoods in a Globalizing World* London: Routledge
- Thomas-Hope E (2004) 'Migration situation analysis, policy and programme needs for Jamaica', Kingston: The Planning Institute of Jamaica and UNFPA
- Thomas-Hope E (2005) 'Current trends and issues in Caribbean migration', in *Regional and International Migration in the Caribbean and Its Impacts on Sustainable Development: Compendium on Recent Research on Migration in the Caribbean by the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean* Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago: ILO
- Thomas-Hope E (2006) 'Maximizing migration: Caribbean return movements and the organization of transnational space', in Plaza and Henry (eds.) *Returning to the Source: The Final Stage of the Caribbean Migration Circuit* Kingston: University of the West Indies Press
- Thomas-Hope E (2008) 'Shifting location, negotiating place: women and migration in the Caribbean single market and economy', in Hall and Chuck-A-Sang (eds.) *Caricom Single Market and Economy: Genesis and Prognosis*. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers
- Timur S (2000) 'Changing trends and major issues in international migration: An overview of UNESCO programmes', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 52 Issue 165: 255-268.

United States Department of Homeland Security (2004) *2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics*.  
Available at: <http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/archive.shtm>

World Bank (2005) *Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration*  
Washington DC

#### **Further web links**

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International\\_Organization\\_for\\_Migration](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Organization_for_Migration), cited 24/04/2008

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/11047/canadas\\_immigration\\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11047/canadas_immigration_policy.html), cited 04/03/2008- Canada's Immigration Policy

<http://www.Jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20070614/newss4.html>. 'Jamaica gets improved Human Trafficking report' June 14, 2007

<http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20071208/carib/carib1.html> 'Region to get help with criminal deportees'

<http://www.legislationline.org/?tid=137&jid=54&less=false> 'Family Reunion cited 04/03/2008

[http://www.icn.ch/matters\\_rnptratio.htm](http://www.icn.ch/matters_rnptratio.htm)

<http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20080324/lead/lead1.html> 'US Woos Jamaican teachers – Recruitment drive triggers fears of new exodus'



## Appendix 1: Institutions from which stakeholders were drawn

Institution	Number of stakeholders
Academia	4
Bank of Jamaica	2
British High Commission	2
Civil Society	3
Government Senate	1
Heart Trust Jamaica	1
Ministry of Labour	1
Ministry of Health	1
Passport Immigration and Citizenship Agency	1
Planning Institute of Jamaica	1
Returning Residents Association	1
School of Advance Nursing Mona	1
World Bank	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>

## Appendix 2: Household survey summary

This appendix describes the methodology used by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) to conduct the Development on the Move survey on behalf of the University of the West Indies (UWI). This survey was conducted during the period October to December 2007.

The survey instruments used were designed by Laura Chappell, Robert E.B. Lucas and Roger Thomas for GDN and ippr and were modified to fit the Jamaican situation.

### Survey methodology

#### Sample design

The sample design for the survey was a stratified multi-stage probability sample comprising approximately 1,200 dwellings initially drawn from 80 Enumeration Districts (EDs) at the national level of which 43 were classified as urban and 37 rural across the 14 parishes of Jamaica. Due to a number of challenges experienced during the fieldwork phase of the project, three additional EDs and a total of 61 additional dwellings across different parishes were selected.

#### Sampling strategy

In an attempt 'to enhance the statistical power of comparison between migrant-producing and non-migrant producing households' interviewers were required to interview a minimum of 250 migrant households and 250 non-migrant households throughout the island. It was assumed that the 250 non-migrant households could be easily obtained but that the remaining 250 migrant households may have presented a challenge since the information on the incidence of migration is limited in the Jamaican households. To overcome this it was estimated that the 250 migrant households could be obtained from the remaining 950 households, which should result in a successful interview from every four households.

#### Response rate

From the data obtained, a total of 1,116 households were visited during the survey, 975 accepted an interview and 141 refused. Based on the sampling strategy and the challenges faced during the fieldwork a total of 486 questionnaires were completed across the 14 parishes. Table A provides details of the aforementioned information by parish.

<b>Parish</b>	<b>Total no. of dwellings selected</b>	<b>No. of questionnaires completed</b>	<b>No. of screening questionnaires completed</b>
Kingston	60	26	60
St. Andrew	185	73	159
St. Thomas	71	24	50
Portland	65	23	63
St. Mary	60	24	59
St. Ann	60	24	58
Trelawny	70	28	64
St. James	90	36	66
Hanover	60	24	48
Westmoreland	95	38	77
St. Elizabeth	95	34	87
Manchester	90	36	90
Clarendon	90	36	90
St. Catherine	170	60	145
Total	1261	486	1,116

## **Data collection**

### **Questionnaire**

A face-to-face interview with the use of a structured questionnaire was completed for each eligible household visited. Two questionnaires were used to collect information from the respondents. The first is a screener which classifies the household into a migrant and a non-migrant household. For this study a migrant household can be broken down as follows:

- Households that have one or more immigrants and/or;
- Households that have one or more returned migrants and/or;
- Households that have one or more absent migrants.

The second is the main questionnaire which consisted of six different sections:

Section 1a – All respondents

Section 1b – Only those households with an absent migrant

Section 1c – All respondents

Section 2 – All respondents

Section 3 – Only those households with an absent migrant

Section 4 – Only those households with a returned migrant

The completion of each section was dependent on the type of household that was identified. The person who responded to the questionnaire was recorded as the household response person (person 1) and was the main respondent. Where the household had one or more absent migrants, the person who knew most about each absent migrant's life abroad was identified, and answered that section. Where a household contained one or more returned migrants, each such person answered section 4 about their own

experiences (unless they were unavailable, in which case the person who knew most about their life abroad was identified and responded on their behalf).

### Training and fieldwork

The training of field staff for the survey took place in two locations:

- Savanna la Mar, October 30-31
- Kingston, November 1-2.

The training was conducted by Laura Chappell, Naomi Newman and Naomi Pollard of ippr with assistance from STATIN. A total of 38 interviewers were trained, eight males and 30 females.

Field supervision was conducted by the project team from STATIN's Head Office:

- Merville Anderson – Director, Field Services
- Martin Brown – Senior Statistician
- Douglas Forbes – Director, Surveys Division
- Cary Renford – Statistical Officer
- Natalee Simpson – Statistician

The fieldwork activity for the Migration Pilot Project started during the week of 5 November 2007 and officially came to an end the week of 3 December 2007.

Data quality checks were done during the week beginning 12 November 2007. These quality checks continued when the questionnaires were received in office and again while they were being coded.

### Constraints

A number of factors including a delay in the start of the fieldwork activities due to late delivery of the questionnaires, bad weather conditions during the month of November and violence in one Kingston and Montego Bay community resulted in the continuation of the fieldwork activities for an additional week. In an attempt to enable the interviewers to meet their quota of migrant households a number of the EDs were over sampled, that is, if they had failed to meet their quota after visiting the first initial households assigned to them. This also caused a further delay in the timeline for the project. Unfortunately, time did not allow for all of the challenges to be adequately dealt with in order to achieve the targeted 500 successfully completed questionnaires/interview by the time the data collection phase ended.

### Data processing

The data was entered by seven data entry operators using the Census and Survey Processing System (CSPPro), a software package used for data entry, editing and tabulation of survey data. This programme included several checks such as range, skips and codes for missing data. The data was then imported into the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

The final phase of the project, which includes the editing/coding and data entry, began on 27 November 2007 and continued until 20 December 2007 with checks and initial edits. Subsequent to the checks and presentation of the preliminary findings, the verification process took place over the period 29 February to 13 March 2008. During this time the data on each questionnaire were reviewed to minimise the possibility of data entry errors and to make any necessary edits.