DARFUR

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

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1. Introduction

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At the sixtieth-anniversary summit of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in September 2005, the world's leaders endorsed an international 'responsibility to protect'. This defines an obligation to act to protect civilians in the face of war crimes or genocide, where the government locally is perpetrating these abuses itself or is unable or unwilling to stop them (United Nations General Assembly 2005). But the continuing crisis in the Darfur region of western Sudan – and the woefully inadequate international response to it – calls into question the seriousness of this commitment and the integrity of the leaders who made it.

The phrase the 'responsibility to protect' (RtP) was coined in 2001 in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001). The Commission was set up to respond to the challenge laid down by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the 54th Session of the General Assembly in 1999:

> '… if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?' (ICISS 2001: vii)

While the Commission acknowledged the significance of national sovereignty to the global political order, it sought to redefine the concept, placing a new emphasis on the idea of 'sovereignty as responsibility'. The Commission asserted that:

> 'sovereign states have the primary responsibility for the protection of their people from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder, rape, starvation – but when they are unable or unwilling to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the wider community of states' (ICISS 2001: viii).

The Commission suggested that the responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities. First, a 'responsibility to prevent' – to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and man-made crises putting populations at risk. Second, 'the responsibility to react' – to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures such as sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. Third, 'the responsibility to rebuild' – to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the

causes of the humanitarian crisis that the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

While the findings of the ICISS report were overshadowed by the events of 11 September 2001, the report has found a steadily growing international audience over the last five years. The idea of the responsibility to protect featured strongly in the work of the independent commission on UN reform that reported to the UN Secretary-General in December 2004, *A More Secure World – Our Shared Responsibility* and in Kofi Annan's own document on these issues, *In Larger Freedom*, published in March 2005 (UN 2004 and 2005). But the biggest breakthrough for the idea of the responsibility to protect came at the September 2005 meeting of the UN General Assembly, where the world's leaders endorsed a responsibility to protect in the Outcome Document (United Nations General Assembly 2005).

Alongside the work of the ICISS Commission and the debate that it has generated within the UN and in key western capitals, there has also been much discussion and action on these issues within Africa. Interestingly, Africans and non-Africans who have addressed these questions have reached broadly similar conclusions. For example, the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) has involved a formal shift from a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of states to one of non-indifference in circumstances of war crimes or genocide. This thinking within the AU mirrors the ideas of conditional sovereignty and the responsibility to protect developed by the ICISS.

But the ICISS report remains the best single document for setting out the principles and operational parameters for a responsibility to protect. Of the three responsibilities identified by ICISS, the most contentious is the responsibility to react, particularly where this involves the use of military force.

One of the really critical questions is over how bad a situation has to be to warrant military action. But there are also important questions about the conditions that need to be met for such action to be a legitimate and effective response. The Commission suggests that all of the relevant decision-making criteria for reaching such a decision can be summarised under the following six headings: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects (ICISS 2001).

The situation in Darfur is precisely the kind of case for which the responsibility to protect was developed and it meets some of the key criteria for intervention identified by the ICISS. But the international community is still failing to discharge its responsibilities to the people of Darfur. The essays in this collection suggest why this is the case, and they make proposals for what can and should be done now. They primarily represent the views of practitioners with a very pragmatic view of the successes and failures of the various regional and international efforts to reduce the suffer-

ing of Sudanese civilians affected by the crisis in Darfur.

The crisis in Darfur

The conflict in Darfur has deep roots. For decades there have been tensions over land and grazing rights between the mostly nomadic Arabs, and farmers from the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa communities. But the start of the most recent crisis has been linked to a meeting in July 2001 between a group of Zaghawa and Fur, where they pledged to work together to defend their villages against government attacks (De Waal and Flint 2005). Another critical moment occurred in April 2003 when two rebel groups in the region, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), mounted an attack on a military garrison at al-Fashir, provoking a brutal and disproportionate response from the Sudanese government and its allies. The al-Fashir raid can be seen as a turning point both militarily and psychologically. It was from this point onwards that the conflict escalated dramatically, with a huge increase in Sudanese government attacks on rebel groups in Darfur.

Since 2003, more than 200,000 people have been killed in the area and more than two million displaced (UN 2006a). And nearly four million people now depend on humanitarian aid for food, shelter and health care. While some of the rebel groups have also committed serious human rights abuses, and have shown very little interest in resolving this conflict diplomatically, primary responsibility for this human tragedy rests with the Sudanese government and the government-backed militia, known as the Janjaweed.

For three years now, the Janjaweed have engaged in ethnic cleansing and forced displacement by bombing, burning and looting villages. Women and girls have been particularly vulnerable to violence and abuse, with large numbers of them becoming victims of sexual attacks when going out of their villages to get water or firewood or when taking goods to local markets. The livelihoods of millions more Darfurians have been destroyed. Fighting has also impacted on Sudan's neighbours. For example, some 200,000 people have sought safety in Chad, although many of these remain vulnerable to attacks from Sudanese forces across the border.

Africa's response
Much of the response to the situation in Darfur has come from within Africa itself, particularly through the work of the African Union (AU). There have been two aspects to this – the AU's role in mediation, ceasefire talks and peace negotiations and the deployment of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

Initial mediation efforts in Darfur were led by neighbouring Chad, but

the AU took the lead in negotiations in the Chadian capital N'djamena in early 2004 – with the support of the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. These negotiations produced a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in April that year. This was supplemented in late May by an agreement to establish a Ceasefire Commission, and by the deployment of AU observers to Darfur.

At first, the AU authorised the deployment of a small force of 60 military observers and 310 protection troops to monitor and observe the compliance of the parties to the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. But a worsening security situation convinced the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), at meetings on 20 October 2004 and subsequently 28 April 2005, to expand the AMIS mandate and force. The force was expanded to include 2,341 military personnel and 815 civilian police, and then 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police, respectively. Under its enhanced mandate, AMIS was tasked with overseeing compliance with the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement and subsequent accords, helping to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance, and a restricted role in protecting civilians under imminent threat.

As Kofi Annan noted in his September 2006 report to the Security Council on Darfur, AMIS's efforts have brought some limited relief from the worst excesses of this vicious war (UN 2006b). But it has managed to do little more than that. With fewer than 7,000 troops, poorly equipped and lacking a credible mandate, AMIS has failed to provide effective civilian protection to the people of Darfur.

The AU has also been deeply involved in trying to facilitate peace talks between the various parties, through a series of negotiations between the Sudan Government and rebel groups. The seventh round of these AU-led talks culminated in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria, in early 2006. This was signed on 5 May by the Government of Sudan, but only by one of the rebel groups, Minni Minnawi's faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA/MM). The negotiation process was undermined by obstructive approaches by both the government and the rebels. In addition, as suggested by Alex de Waal in this collection, international support for the talks was sometimes unhelpful, particularly the setting of an arbitrary deadline to conclude the DPA.

While it was hoped that the DPA would lead to the cessation of hostilities and the creation of a lasting peace, it has not done so. Indeed, things have deteriorated sharply. Elements of the rebel groups that refused to sign the DPA have formed a new National Redemption Front (NRF) and have subsequently escalated attacks. In August 2006 and again more recently, the Sudanese government has also launched major military offensives in an apparent attempt to secure a decisive military victory in Darfur. The SLA/MM has sometimes acted as a paramilitary wing of the Sudanese army,

but more recently it has been involved in clashes with Sudanese government forces (International Crisis Group 2006). This worsening security situation has inevitably contributed to a still worse humanitarian situation (ibid). This has further compounded the problems facing AMIS, and increased the international demands for it to be replaced by a UN or a UN/AU hybrid force (an issue addressed in the next section).

The wider international response

The international response to Darfur has been seriously ineffective. Divisions among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council have prevented a concerted response by the UN. Significant Muslim bodies such as the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the Arab League have not supported serious international responses to protect civilians in Darfur. Nor have AU member states consistently maintained a united political front to require compliance by Khartoum.

Early attempts to galvanise international action on Darfur fell on deaf ears. As Mukesh Kapila notes in his chapter, senior UN officials and the foreign ministries of key governments failed to treat the situation in Darfur with the urgency or seriousness that it deserved, and put forward various arguments to excuse their failure to act more effectively.

However, as mounting evidence of atrocities in Darfur came to light in 2004, it became impossible for the international community to ignore the situation there. A report by the Secretary-General's High-Level Mission to Darfur in early May 2004 was candid about the scale of the humanitarian crisis and the culpability of the main players. A degree of international pressure at this time led to a slight improvement in the humanitarian situation: the N'djamena Agreement opened up some humanitarian space and Khartoum agreed to allow in a number of aid agencies.

The first UN Security Council resolution specifically on Darfur, resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004, endorsed the presence of AMIS. Successive resolutions have placed various demands and have threatened penalties on the parties to the conflict. They have called on all parties to allow humanitarian access, to cooperate with AU mediation initiatives, to uphold commitments to the ceasefire and other political agreements, and they have approved the transition of AMIS to a UN mission.

In April 2006, the Security Council also voted for targeted sanctions on four Sudanese individuals – a former Sudanese military commander, a Janjaweed militia leader and two rebel commanders. These sanctions included travel bans and the freezing of foreign bank accounts and other assets. Since May 2006, UN resolutions have also required non-signatories to sign up to the DPA. Threats by the Security Council have included financial, military and other sanctions, as well as referral of suspects of major war crimes to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Since the September 2005 meeting of the UN General Assembly, the international debate about Darfur has been framed ever more explicitly within the context of the responsibility to protect (RtP). In a speech given in London in January 2006, Kofi Annan declared that the UN Summit's commitment to RtP would only be meaningful if the Security Council is prepared to act 'swiftly and decisively, to halt the killing, rape and ethnic cleansing to which people in Darfur are still being subjected' (Annan 2006).

Discussions in the Security Council during 2006 have also focused increasingly on the idea of a transition from the struggling AMIS to a much bigger and more capable UN mission. This idea was endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council in May 2006. In August 2006, it was also finally approved by the UN. The UN Security Council agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force of more than 17,000 troops and as many as 3,300 civilian police officers to Darfur to try to end the spiralling violence.

However, no one in New York or in key international capitals has been prepared to deploy UN forces without Khartoum's consent, and the Government of Sudan shows no interest in giving it. The Sudanese government claims that such a deployment would be a violation of its sovereignty and would be tantamount to declaring war on it.

But this claim is inaccurate and disingenuous. There are already UN troops of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in the south of Sudan. They are there with Khartoum's support to underpin the 9 January 2005 North-South peace agreement. UN Resolution 1706 proposed to expand the mandate of UNMIS to cover Darfur as well. The UN force was mandated to take over the role of AMIS by no later than 31 December 2006.

The real reason for Khartoum's opposition is that it fears that a UN force would be more effective in curbing its military actions in Darfur. It is also concerned that a UN presence on the ground, backed by the Security Council, might lead to key figures in the Sudanese government being indicted for war crimes before the International Criminal Court.

The upshot of intense diplomatic negotiations in September 2006 was an agreement to extend the AMIS mandate for a further three months, but with no clarity about when or if a UN force might go into Darfur. Despite UN and AU resolutions calling for it, there is currently a serious deadlock on this and a tense stand-off between the international community and the Sudanese government. And there is some evidence that the international community is backing away from the idea of a UN force, in the face of determined opposition from Khartoum.

On 16 November 2006, Kofi Annan and the AU convened a high-level consultation on the situation in Darfur in Addis Ababa. This brought together the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the five permanent members of the Security Council and a number of African countries, including Sudan. There is some confusion about what was agreed at the meeting. The

UN argued that a breakthrough had occurred: that Sudan had agreed to a strengthened AU force (as an interim measure), to a re-energised peace process and to the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Darfur, in the context of an AU/UN hybrid mission. The Sudanese government has rejected this interpretation, particularly the last point.

To demonstrate its continuing contempt for the international community, Khartoum also stepped up attacks in Darfur in November 2006. As a result, the humanitarian situation has worsened further, with a number of relief organisations deciding to pull out of Darfur (United Nations 2006c). According to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, the number of people in Darfur needing aid to survive surged by hundreds of thousands to four million in just the six months prior to this report being published (United Nations 2006d).

What should be done now about Darfur?

There are no easy options left in Darfur, but there are two overarching priorities for international action: ensuring the deployment of an effective international force, and action to revive political negotiations.

An international force for Darfur

Much stronger and more concerted international pressure should be applied on the Sudanese government to make it accept an effective international force in Darfur. This should be a UN force, with adequate funding and a UN command structure. The November 16 meeting in Addis, convened by Kofi Annan and the AU, suggested that an AU/UN hybrid force be deployed in Darfur. This should not be ruled out, and there is a strong case for African troops and personnel constituting a large proportion of the deployment. However, the priority must be the efficacy of the force in protecting civilians. This is most likely to be secured through a UN mission, led by a UN commander and with sufficient resources and a clear mandate.

Earlier in 2006 Kofi Annan outlined what a UN Mission in Darfur might look like, highlighting key tasks to improve security and physical protection in Darfur, such as:

- Assisting in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the redeployment and disengagement provisions of the DPA, including actively providing security and patrolling the demilitarised and buffer zones and through the deployment of police in areas where internally displaced persons (IDPs) are concentrated, along key routes of migration, and other vital points.
- Taking all action necessary to protect vulnerable civilians under imminent threat, and deterring potential opponents of the peace process (so-called spoilers) through robust action.

- Assisting in the establishment of the DPA's disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme and actively participating in disarmament. (United Nations 2006a)

These tasks are more essential than ever and the UN is best placed to carry them out successfully.

While Khartoum continues to resist the deployment of a UN force, there are precedents for encouraging recalcitrant governments to concede. In 1999, international pressure of this kind compelled an equally reluctant Indonesia to accept international peacekeepers into the then-occupied territory of East Timor. Serious pressure has also worked before with Khartoum. For example, tough UN and US sanctions in the 1990s 'forced Khartoum to cut its ties with Al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations', and 'US pressure and the imperative of its own survival [...] later led it to end two decades of civil war with southern Sudan' (Grono and Prendergast 2006). Comparable international pressure today still represents the best hope for persuading the Sudanese government to end its offensive in Darfur, accept a UN force, take steps to demilitarise and disarm the Janjaweed and enter negotiations with the rebels.

Maximising international pressure on Sudan requires help from China, Russia and the Arab states. These countries can potentially play a major role in applying pressure on the Sudanese government to comply with international demands: China and Russia are allies of Khartoum on the Security Council, while key members of the Arab League maintain close ties with Sudan. So far, however, all have opposed more decisive international action on Darfur (Mepham and Wild 2006).

The Chinese have very significant economic interests in Sudan and they have been reluctant to press Khartoum about Darfur. But the Beijing authorities have been affected to some extent by sustained international criticism of their policy on Darfur, leading them to support a peacekeeping operation in southern Sudan in the context of the North-South peace agreement. Moreover, faced with international criticism, the Chinese did not prevent the UN Security Council from granting the International Criminal Court jurisdiction over gross human rights abuses committed in Darfur. The Chinese are aware that their stance on Darfur is damaging their image in Africa and the developing world more generally. This creates some opportunities for other parts of the international system to put pressure on China to put pressure on Sudan. Russia has also resisted a more concerted response by the Security Council, and Moscow should similarly be pressed to back effective action to protect civilians in Darfur.

The international community should urge the Arab League to address the situation more resolutely, too. Sudan currently serves as the president of the Arab League, and it has traditionally had close relations with Egypt and

other parts of the Arab world. But the Arab League has yet to criticise the massive human rights abuses taking place in Darfur.

Most obviously, there is a critical role for fellow African states in pressuring Sudan to accept a UN force. While the Constitutive Act of the African Union (article 4h) recognises a right of intervention when war crimes are being committed, most African states are still reluctant to put real pressure on Khartoum. But African states have the most to lose if the Darfur crisis deteriorates still further – and the most to gain if the AU can demonstrate a greater willingness to condemn gross human rights abuses and to hold the offending governments to account.

For the wider international community there are three additional policy options available for exerting leverage over Khartoum. First, there is scope for using economic pressures more assertively. As the International Crisis Group has argued, it is important to 'change the calculus of self-interest for the Sudanese regime, and one of the most effective ways of doing this is to target its sources of illicit income and unravel the Sudanese government's shadowy web of commercial interests' (Grono and Prendergast 2006). Such interests include secret companies run by senior figures in the ruling National Congress Party, security companies run by Sudan's National Security Agency and so-called 'charitable companies' that are affiliated with Islamic charities but controlled by Islamists within the regime. Grono and Prendergast (2006) recommend rightly the need to focus on what they describe as the 'parallel economic network run by Sudan's regime'.

Second, international legal instruments should be used more effectively, especially through the International Criminal Court (ICC). The UN Security Council referred Darfur to the ICC in March 2005. And the threat of ICC prosecution in Darfur is potentially one of the more effective tools at the disposal of the international community for changing the calculations of warring parties there. To date, however, there has been very little progress with the Darfur investigation. The Sudanese government has refused to cooperate with the ICC and is doing its best to undermine the investigation. This in itself suggests that senior figures in the government are genuinely worried about the possibility of being indicted for war crimes, and the threat can and should be used to put pressure on Khartoum.

Third, consideration should be given to international military options in Darfur. The critics are right to say that it would be hugely dangerous, difficult, costly and wrong to declare war on the regime in Khartoum. But there are military options that may help to bring real pressure to bear on the Khartoum authorities while avoiding a wider military confrontation. One option is the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Darfur (which has been agreed in successive UN resolutions, including the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1591 in 2005). Although there is a Chapter VII

resolution and Khartoum has made an additional commitment to the DPA to cease hostile military flights, there has been no effective system of surveillance or airport monitoring put in place, and aerial attacks have continued, 'presently involving Antonovs and helicopter gunships that carry out strikes in North Darfur and eastern Jebel Marra' (International Crisis Group 2006: 11). Given that the situation could further deteriorate, there is a strong case for the UN or key international governments putting in place contingency plans for other military options, including the idea of a rapid reaction force that could be deployed to eastern Chad (International Crisis Group 2006).

A peace agreement for Darfur

While an effective international security presence is essential in the short term to better protect civilians, it is also necessary to redouble international efforts to promote a political resolution of the Darfur conflict. There can be no secure future for the people of Darfur without this. While the DPA lacks popular support among most Darfurians, the AU and the international community cannot afford to give up on the idea of a negotiated solution.

On 5 May 2006, the Sudanese government signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria, with a faction of the SLA headed by Minni Minawi. But two other rebel movements, JEM and the SLA faction led by Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nur, refused to sign. The reasons given by the rebels for refusing to sign included concerns about a proposed victim compensation fund, and doubts about the arrangements on power-sharing, rebel representation in government and the disarmament of the Janjaweed militia. There were also concerns that 'essential actors such as traditional leaders, the displaced and women were largely excluded from the talks' (International Crisis Group 2006: 13).

Alex de Waal, part of the AU mediation team during the Abuja talks, argues in this collection that the main parties to the talks were not that far away from a deal. He suggests, for example, that Abdel Wahid al Nur, the leader of largest rebel group that refused to sign, found the security arrangements 'acceptable' and the wealth-sharing provisions '90 per cent acceptable'. While highly critical of the mediation process, and of the excessive pressure placed on the parties to reach a deal by an agreed date, he believes that with a little more flexibility on all sides an accommodation could have been found and an agreement reached.

Six months on from the talks, following a dramatic worsening of the security situation, it will be harder to find a political agreement. Positions have hardened and mutual distrust and enmity have increased. But there is no credible alternative to reviving political talks.

There are three steps that should be taken, consistent with this goal. First, it needs to be acknowledged upfront that the DPA has failed to command suf-

ficient support in Darfur and that the Agreement should be amended to reflect this. That does not mean wholesale renegotiation of the DPA. But there does need to be a willingness to look more flexibly at the terms of the agreement, to persuade the non-signatories to come on board. Simply pressuring them to sign, without making any further concessions, will not work.

Second, the AU, with international support, should re-establish formal contact with the non-signatory groups. The decision to expel the non-signatories from the Ceasefire Commission after their failure to sign the DPA was a mistake and should be reversed. While the non-signatories remain highly fractured and have weak negotiating capacity, engaging them is essential to revive the prospects of a politically negotiated solution.

Third, the AU, with international support, should try to reconvene all the parties to the Abuja talks, providing a new forum in which the signatories and non-signatories and other previously excluded stakeholders can address issues around the DPA and resolve differences. This was proposed in the conclusions of the 16 November meeting in Addis. It should be taken forward as a priority.

Structure of the report

In the second chapter, Suliman Baldo addresses the African response to Darfur since 2003. Baldo notes that the Darfur crisis has been a huge test for the African Union and, in particular, for its new peace and security architecture. He notes that AMIS has been hamstrung throughout by an inadequate mandate and insufficient forces and capabilities. But despite these limitations, Baldo notes that AMIS did manage in 2004 and early 2005 to contribute to the reduction in violence and to provide a degree of protection to civilians in the areas where it was deployed. Baldo suggests, however, that by late 2005 and throughout 2006, AMIS has been overwhelmed by the ceasefire violations of all parties and by the worsening security situation, particularly following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006.

Next, Mukesh Kapila focuses on the international response to Darfur, particularly during 2003 and 2004, at a time when he was the United Nations resident and humanitarian coordinator in Sudan. Kapila argues that the inadequacy of the international response to Darfur was not because of a lack of awareness of what was going on, or of a failure in early warning. He suggests that, on the contrary, within the UN system and in key national capitals, there was a full appreciation of the severity of the crisis unfolding in Darfur, matched only by a collective inability or unwillingness to act on this information,

Kapila notes that within the UN system, the crisis was dealt with within a humanitarian rather than a political context, with a focus on improving

the delivery of humanitarian assistance rather than addressing the factors that created a need for it. The most important claim in Kapila's piece is that 'earlier intervention could have averted or moderated the magnitude of the genocide'. Failing to act at an earlier stage, he suggests, worsened the conflict and made subsequent international options more costly and complex.

Jim Terrie's contribution considers the military and other options currently available to the international community for addressing the crisis in Darfur and providing more effective protection for civilians. Terrie observes a lack of international support for the kind of forceful action that he believes is necessary to protect civilians in Darfur. He suggests that there are some real weaknesses with the AU's peacekeeping capacity but also with the paradigm of peacekeeping currently dominant in the UN.

Terrie addresses military options for Darfur, but contends that to be credible these would need more troops than is generally suggested. There would also need to be a willingness to engage the Sudanese government in serious combat, for which existing UN member states appear to have no appetite. A UN force, along the lines of the one proposed in UN Security Council Resolution 1706, would be better than nothing, he argues, but would still fall short of a serious responsibility to protect.

Alex de Waal then looks at the negotiations process that led to the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006 (a process in which he was intimately involved as a mediator). He highlights some of the real difficulties experienced by the mediators and negotiators, not least the pressure exerted by key governments to clinch a deal within a specific timeframe. He sees this pressure as unhelpful and counterproductive. But de Waal also suggests that the distance between the signatories and non-signatories over the substance of a deal was not large. His piece calls for an early revival of political negotiations as the only way to secure peace and security in Darfur in the long term. This he sees as essential to the more effective protection of civilians.

Finally, editors David Mepham and Alexander Ramsbotham provide some brief conclusions, identifying six lessons about civilian protection to be applied to future Darfur-like situations.

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Note: web references correct at November 2006

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